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Climate Games: Experiments on How People Prevent Disaster
Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, and Reuben Kline
Can humanity work together to mitigate the effects of climate change? Climate Games argues we can. This book brings together a decade and a half of experimentation, conducted by researchers around the world, which shows that people can and will work together to prevent disasters like climate change. These experiments, called economic games, put money on the line to create laboratory disasters. Participants must work together by spending a bit of money now to prevent themselves from losing even more money in the future. Will people sacrifice their own money to prevent disaster? Can people make wise decisions? And can people decide wisely on behalf of others? The answer is a resounding yes.
Yet real climate change is a complex social dilemma involving the world's nearly eight billion inhabitants. In the real world, the worst effects of climate change are likely to be felt by developing countries, while most of the decisions will be made by rich, industrialized countries. And while the world as a whole would be better off if all nations reduced their greenhouse gas emissions, any given nation could decide it would be even better off if it continued emitting and let other nations take care of the problem. These disaster experiments test how real people respond to climate change's unique constellation of challenges and deliver a positive message: People will prevent disaster.
Fig. 18. The proportion who used geoengineering at each probability that geoengineering succeeded, in each condition. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
Fig. 19. The proportion who used geoengineering at each probability that geoengineering succeeded. Results are broken down by whether players believed their group would succeed without geoengineering. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
Fig. 23. The average proportion that players contributed from their endowments in each condition. To meet the threshold, players had to contribute 53% of their endowments on average. The dashed line represents this threshold.
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