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The Games of July: Explaining the Great War
Frank C. Zagare"Frank C. Zagare combines a deep command of historical scholarship and the sophisticated skills of an applied game theorist to develop and test a theory of why deterrence failed, catastrophically, in July 1914. . . . Zagare concludes with sage advice on how to avoid even more cataclysmic breakdowns in a nuclear world."
---Steven J. Brams, New York University
"Zagare's deft study of the origins of the First World War using his perfect deterrence theory uncovers new insights into that signal event and shows the value of formal theory applied to historical events. A must-read for those interested in security studies."
---James D. Morrow, University of Michigan
"Through an exemplary combination of formal theory, careful qualitative analysis, and lucid prose, The Games of July delivers important and interesting answers to key questions concerning the international political causes of World War I. Its well-formed narratives and its sustained engagement with leading works in IR and diplomatic history . . . make it a rewarding read for security scholars in general and a useful teaching tool for international security courses."
---Timothy W. Crawford, Boston College
Taking advantage of recent advances in game theory and the latest historiography, Frank C. Zagare offers a new, provocative interpretation of the events that led to the outbreak of World War I. He analyzes key events from Bismarck's surprising decision in 1879 to enter into a strategic alliance with Austria-Hungary to the escalation that culminated in a full-scale global war. Zagare concludes that, while the war was most certainly unintended, it was in no sense accidental or inevitable.
The Games of July serves not only as an analytical narrative but also as a work of theoretical assessment. Standard realist and liberal explanations of the Great War are evaluated along with a collection of game-theoretic models known as perfect deterrence theory.
Frank C. Zagare is UB Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Buffalo.
Cover illustration: Satirical Italian postcard from World War I. Used with permission from The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Libraries.
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Cover
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Title
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Copyright
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Dedication
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Contents
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Preface
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PART ONE. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
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CHAPTER ONE. Purpose and Method
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1.1. Bringing Theory to Bear on Data
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1.2. Bringing Data to Bear on Theory
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1.3. A Possible Objection and a Rejoinder
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1.4. Blueprint
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1.5. Scylla and Charybdis
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1.6. Coda
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CHAPTER TWO. Theories and Explanations
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2.1. The Realist Paradigm and Classical Deterrence Theory
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2.2. Coda
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CHAPTER THREE. Perfect Deterrence Theory: An Overview
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3.1. Axioms and General Theoretical Characteristics
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3.2. Explaining the Absence of War
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3.3. Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Expectations, and Policy Implications
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3.4. Coda
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PART TWO. EXPLAINING THE GREAT WAR
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CHAPTER FOUR. Bismarck's System
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4.1. The Tripartite Crisis Game
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4.2. Outcomes and Preferences
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4.3. Analysis
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4.4. Explaining the Austro-German Alliance of 1879
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4.5. Coda
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CHAPTER FIVE. Vienna, Berlin, and the Blank Check
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5.1. Background
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5.2. The Tripartite Crisis Game Redux
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5.3. Analysis
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5.4. Coda
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CHAPTER SIX. La Guerre Européenne
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6.1. Asymmetric Escalation Game
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6.2. Preferences
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6.3. Some Caveats
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6.4. Analysis
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6.5. Discussion
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6.6. Coda
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CHAPTER SEVEN. Britain's Strategic Dilemma
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7.1. Modeling the Deterrence versus Restraint Dilemma
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7.2. Preference Assumptions
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7.3. Information and Utility Assumptions
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7.4. Analysis
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7.5. Explaining Britain's Foreign Policy in 1914
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7.6. Coda
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PART THREE. ENDGAME
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CHAPTER EIGHT. Questions, Answers, Implications
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8.1. Explanation
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8.2. Theoretical Assessment
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8.3. Implications and Final Thoughts
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References
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Index
- 978-0-472-05116-8 (paper)
- 978-0-472-02370-7 (ebook)
- 978-0-472-07116-6 (hardcover)