Fig. 3.1A. A security figuration shaped by the rhetorical figure of a securitizing move.

Fig. 3.1B. One type of security configuration: the classic security dilemma.

Fig. 3.1C. Transfiguration of a security configuration, in this case from a security dilemma to a different type of configuration, possibly more dynamic.

Fig. 3.2A. Animal rights securitization of hunting: Hunters pose an existential threat to individual animals. Extraordinary means: intervene physically between hunter and prey.

Fig. 3.2B. Environmentalist securitization of hunting: Hunting poses an existential threat to species. Extraordinary means: ban hunting or import or boycott products.

Fig. 3.3. Countersecuritization of hunting: Ban/boycott poses existential threat to Inuit livelihood, culture, identity.

Fig. 3.4. Desecuritization of Inuit hunting. Extraordinary means: Inuit exception.

Fig. 3.5. Resecuritization of Inuit exception: Inscription in nature conditioning Inuit exception poses existential threat to Inuit self-determination, development, identity.

Fig. 3.6A. Securitization of climate change: Fossil extraction / CO2 emissions pose existential threat to climate, ecosystem, livelihood. Extraordinary means: ban extraction and cap emissions.

Fig. 3.6B. Securitization of climate change as threat to Inuit identity. Fossil extraction / CO2 emissions pose existential threat to Inuit identity. Extraordinary means: ban extraction and cap emissions.

Fig. 3.7. Securitization of climate action: Ban/cap on fossil extraction / CO2 emissions pose existential threat to Inuit development, self-determination, identity.

Fig. 3.8. Desecuritization of Greenlandic fossil extraction / CO2 emissions. Extraordinary means: territorial exception.

Fig. 3.9. Shortcutting the securitization of Greenlandic fossil extraction to fall in line with Greenland’s green image. Extraordinary means: lifting territorial exception and banning extraction.

Fig. 4.1. The history of United States’ securitizations of Greenland.

Fig. 4.2. The Cold War macrosecuritization between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries had cascading effects on other scales and sectors. For instance, the establishment of the Thule Air Base broke with full Danish sovereignty over Greenland and had further effects on the local societal security and the individual economic security, where the Inughuit identity and the hunters’ households were threatened by the forced relocation. In the figure, the y-axis indicates the different scales and the x-axis the different sectors, while the text inside the circles describes the referent object, which changes as the securitization cascades vertically and horizontally, as the arrows show.

Fig. 4.3. Following the end of the Cold War, the macrodesecuritization of East-West relations cascaded onto the Arctic, where desecuritization within the military sector allowed more room for interstate cooperation regarding environmental protection and promotion of Indigenous peoples’ rights. Though geographically located within the Arctic, Thule Air Base remained largely detached from this new U.S. regional security perspective because it was an essential element in the defense against ‘rogue states’ as securitized by the Rumsfeld Commission report.

Fig. 4.4. After having been discursively separated, the U.S. security discourses regarding Thule, Greenland, and the Arctic were yet again aligned in 2019, when they were all framed within an overarching perspective of great power competition with China and Russia.

Fig. 7.1. Denmark’s main ‘others’ in the 2018 parliamentary debate were Russia (RUS), which was largely described in antagonistic terms, USA, which was characterized as a close ally, and China (CH) which oscillated between the categories ‘antagonistic’ and ‘agonistic.’ Denmark (DK), Greenland (GL), and the Faroe Islands (FO) were often collectively represented as a unit under the titles ‘the Realm’ or ‘the Kingdom of Denmark.’

Fig. 7.2. Greenlandic and Faroese members of the Danish parliament challenged the discursive construction of ‘the Kingdom’ and ‘the Realm’ as the main ‘we,’ hence causing porosity in the attempt to represent the three as a unit and instead emphasizing the respective agency of Denmark (DK), the Faroe Islands (FO), and Greenland (GL).

Fig. 7.3. In 2019, the parliamentarians’ portrayal of Russia (RUS) and China (CH) remained the same, while the characterization of the USA oscillated between being characterized as an ally, a competitor, or an enemy. As a consequence of the enhanced American interest, Denmark (DK), Greenland (GL), and the Faroe Islands (FO) were more often articulated as three separate countries, nations, or even states, hence highlighting their respective agency and strive for more mutual equality.