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Electoral Reform and the Fate of New Democracies: Lessons from the Indonesian Case
Sarah Shair-Rosenfield
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When and why do democratic political actors change the electoral rules, particularly regarding who is included in a country's political representation? The incidences of these major electoral reforms have been on the rise since 1980.
Electoral Reform and the Fate of New Democracies argues that elite inexperience may constrain self-interest and lead elites to undertake incremental approaches to reform, aiding the process of democratic consolidation. Using a multimethods approach, the book examines three consecutive periods of reform in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim majority country and third largest democracy, between 1999 and 2014. Each case study provides an in-depth process tracing of the negotiations leading to new reforms, including key actors in the legislature, domestic civil society, international experts, and government bureaucrats. A series of counterfactual analyses assess the impact the reforms had on actual election outcomes, versus the possible alternative outcomes of different reform options discussed during negotiations. With a comparative analysis of nine cases of iterated reform processes in other new democracies, the book confirms the lessons from the Indonesian case and highlights key lessons for scholars and electoral engineers.
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Abbreviations
Acknowledgments
Part I: Setting Up the Puzzle
One. Why Reform in New Democracies?
Two. Constrained Strategies: The Effects of Inexperience and Time
Part II: Lessons from the Indonesian Experience
Three. Indonesian Democratization and the Party System
Four. Early Stage Reforms in a Period of High Inexperience, 1999–2004
Five. Reforms under Declining Inexperience and Modest Temporal Constraints, 2004–9
Six. Reforms under Severe Temporal Constraints, 2009 and Beyond
Part III: Exploring Iterated Reforms in Comparative Context
Seven. Changing Rules and Incentives in New Democracies
Eight. Extensions and Implications: Lessons for Scholars, Reformers, and Advisers
Appendixes
Appendix A. Referenced Interviews
Appendix B. Reform Codes by Case and Observation
Appendix C. Additional Iterated Electoral Reform Cases