INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION

New York City in 1970

THE VIEW FROM 1970

THE MAJOR PART OF *Beyond the Melting Pot* DATES FROM 1960–61. It was in those years, at the end of Mayor Wagner's second term, that we wrote the chapters on the five major ethnic groups. (Glazer wrote the sections on the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Italians, and Jews. Moynihan wrote the section on the Irish.) Glazer had formulated the major themes sometime earlier: they were that ethnicity in New York remains important; that it would continue to be important for politics and culture; that, from the perspective of New York City, Negroes and Puerto Ricans could be seen as the latest of the series of major ethnic groups that had—oddly enough, two by two, beginning with Germans and Irish, going on to Jews and Italians—come as immigrants to make up the population of the city; that helping to make each group different, in its own development and its relation to the rest of the city, were its basic cultural

characteristics, and particularly important among these was family structure.

The conclusion of the book was fashioned and attached in late 1962, and was based, in large measure, on Moynihan's experience in the campaign of Robert Morgenthau for governor of New York State in that year, an experience that seemed to be consistent with and to confirm the basic assumptions of the book. The book was finally published in 1963. An appropriately obscure final paragraph reads: "Religion and race define the next stage in the evolution of the American peoples. But the American nationality is still forming: its processes are mysterious, and its final form, if there is ever to be a final form, is as yet unknown."

It is a combination of obtuseness and perception that more or less sums up how the book reads today. Obviously, in the aftermath of New York's primaries and election campaign of 1969, it hardly seems as though religion defines the present, or the future, major fissures in New York life. Race has exploded to swallow up all other distinctions, or so it would appear at the moment. Yet, ten years ago one of the major splits in New York City was between Catholics and Jews. The rise of the reform Democratic clubs was a means whereby the liberal upper-middle-class Jewish population of the city tried to control the Democratic party, dominated until then by Irish, and latterly some Italian, Catholic politicians. True, the issues on which they divided often seemed less important than the images of the leaders they felt comfortable with. And even in those distant years there was already some narrowing evident between the liberal values of Jews and the conservative values of Irish and Italian Catholics on such a matter, for example, as school integration. But there *were* issues, such as support to parochial schools, and these issues were live enough to help account for the defeat of a new constitution for New York State in 1968.

By now, it hardly seems that the religious split matters. Catholics have become more liberal—in particular, on such matters as the role of traditional authority, censorship, sex, and morals, on which they used to diverge sharply from Jews—and Jews have become far more aware

of the virtue of conservative working-class and middle-class values, which they always practiced but refused to celebrate. Even the American Jewish Congress, the most liberal of the major Jewish organizations, seems to spend as much of its energy these days on threats from black militancy as in older concerns such as keeping inviolate the line between church and state. In any case, the administration of President Kennedy seems to have reduced the salience of that latter issue.

And yet, as we shall point out in a later section, "The Catholics and the Jews," the conflict does persist. The religious element in it has been reduced, the ethnic term expanded. But let us not ignore even muted conflicts—they reappear. As a result of the changes among Jews, Mario Procaccino, running against John Lindsay, did better than could ever have been expected a few years ago among the Jewish working and lower-middle classes, just as the Civilian Police Review Board did poorly with the same group in the referendum of 1966. It isn't as if Procaccino were a new type of Italo-American political figure, either. He is one of a long line of similar types, and seems a direct descendant of an earlier comptroller, Lawrence Gerosa, who is described on page 214 as exemplifying the ideological outlook of small homeowners, so typical among New York's Italian Americans, which includes "opposition to high taxes . . . welfare programs . . . 'frills' in schools. . . ." Eight years later, with the welfare population past one million and a higher crime rate, this outlook has a much wider appeal. College-educated and professional Jews may still resist the appeal of conservative issues and candidates.[1] Better-educated and poorer-educated Jews do split drastically on this issue. But lower-middle-class and working-class Jews find conservative candidates more and more attractive.

Thus, religion as a major line of division in the city is for the moment in eclipse. Ethnicity and race dominate the city, more than ever seemed possible in 1963. That was, after all, before the first summer riots. The civil rights revolution had not yet broken out of the South. Nor had it yet raised economic issues, and even less, the issue of potential separatism, that were to prove so much more

explosive than issues of political equality, which were, after all, part of the American creed all along. It seemed hardly possible then that the violence one had always associated with Southern race relations could be transferred bodily to New York—its racial violence seemed far in the past (it had not had a mass attack on blacks in either World War I or World War II, as had other Northern cities). One looked at the demands of the civil rights movement in 1963—equality in the vote, equality in the courts, equality in representation in public life, equality in public accommodations—saw that they existed more or less in New York City, and concluded that the political course of the Northern Negro would be quite different from that of the Southern Negro. He would become part of the game of accommodation politics—he already was—in which posts and benefits were distributed to groups on the basis of struggle, of course, but also on the basis of votes, money, and political talent, and one concluded that in this game the Negroes would not do so badly.

A number of considerations led to this outlook, which seemed reasonable enough at the time.

First, other New York groups had started at the bottom economically and politically and had risen. What was to keep the Negro from doing the same, particularly since the crude evidence available suggested there had already been substantial shifts in occupation—from domestics and laborers to clerical workers and semiskilled workers, for example? On the basis of the experience of other ethnic groups, it was hard to see that this economic rise would need any additional direct commitment by local government. It would come through growth in the national economy, change in the structure of job markets, higher levels of education (which were already evident), and movement into specific but rewarding parts of the economy and labor market: certainly the civil service, possibly the great private bureaucracies of New York businesses, hardly through entrepreneurial activity, though there were opportunities there, too.

Second, there seemed to be no major obstacle to this development in the form of a massive, institutionalized racism. There was prejudice, of course, but other

groups had met that. And countering the greater scale of prejudice Negroes met, there were now well-funded city and state agencies devoted to fighting prejudice and discrimination in jobs, education, housing (though that we admitted to be an enormous problem), and indeed in the actions of both public and private bodies.

Third, *Beyond the Melting Pot* did suggest that a significant check to the economic rise of the Negroes might be found in the values of American Negroes themselves; these played some large but not fully explicated role in economic development. But the suggestion was tentative—no major warning sign was flashed—because the economic and sociological fundamentals seemed so secure.

What was wrong with this optimistic outlook? First, it was based on poor data. The analysis of the distribution of population by income is a late development, and even so we are in bad shape between censuses. When the work on *Beyond the Melting Pot* began, the figures for the decade 1940–1950 were available, and showed remarkable upward change for Negroes, owing to the war. The stagnation of opportunities for Negroes after the Korean War could perhaps be discovered in the statistics available in the early 1960's, but we didn't discover them. There was a serious undercount of Negro males in New York (as in the whole country) which probably led to an overstatement of the economic position of the Negro. The undercount was first pointed out in 1955 in an article by Ansley J. Coale, but it was not until after our book was published, amazingly enough, that this became general knowledge among social scientists, aside from some specialists in demography.[2] Since the analyses of income data were then so scanty, one depended on occupational data, and these, interestingly enough, did show more upward change for Negroes than the income data. After the book was published, Herman P. Miller and others demonstrated that Negro income had moved not at all in relation to white income since the mid-1950's; Michael Harrington helped rediscover poverty; the civil rights movement for the first time took up economic aims (only in 1963, it will be recalled); and the basis for a relatively optimistic view of the Negro's economic future in our book collapsed.[3]

It is not that the black economic position deteriorated either in real or in relative terms. Just the opposite took place. During the second half of the 1960's Negroes made probably the most rapid economic and occupational gains in their history. These were made relative to and often at the expense of whites. However, for a variety of reasons, possibly including the message of deprivation that accompanied the poverty movement, and certainly owing to greater attention being paid to their condition, the *perception* of well-being seems not to have accompanied the reality. To the contrary, the often false optimism of the past was seemingly supplanted by a pervasive sense of deprivation and impending doom among the more vocal and militant elements of the New York City population. This, too, was a reality, and had the effect of reality.

In addition, New York City seems to have fallen behind the rest of the country's cities in the *rate* at which it overcame poverty among blacks. The percentage of nonwhite New York City families in poverty dropped only 2 points, from 26 to 24 per cent, according to census surveys, between 1959 and 1967, while it dropped 11 points, from 37 to 26 per cent, among Negro families in all central cities.[4] The evidence suggests that the sluggishness in overcoming poverty was largely owing to the rise in the number of black female-headed households.

Puerto Ricans are economically and occupationally worse off than Negroes, but one does find a substantial move in the second generation that seems to correspond to what we expected for new groups in the city. Thus, Nathan Kantrowitz, comparing second-generation Puerto Ricans in 1950 and 1960 (small groups in both years, but their numbers are rapidly growing) showed they improved their position, both in terms of numbers graduating from high school and college, more rapidly than other white males in the city. And while the story on occupational mobility is mixed, even there one sees some grounds for optimism in a substantial shift into white-collar work.[5]

We have not seen such an analysis for Negroes (that is, one based on economic and occupational movement of Negroes born in the city), but the basic question remains: If one had it, would it really matter? [6] And

one must conclude sadly, it would not. There is one basic reason for this. Perhaps it made sociological sense in 1963 to treat Negroes as an ethnic group in New York, parallel to other ethnic groups, to evaluate their place in the city in contrast to that of immigrant groups, and record how rapidly this position was changing, but it did not make *political* sense. It is even a question, of course, how much sociological sense it made. It made some, we still think. After all, Negroes themselves saw their place in the city in these terms, viewed themselves as fighting to improve their position not in an undifferentiated white society but an ethnically diverse one, and in such a society some groups, for some purposes, were allies. That Negroes were, or were becoming, one group in a society made up of self-conscious groups was the basic assumption of the book—in that sense, it was closer to social reality than some analysts of American society who saw assimilation and integration as already more advanced for most groups in the society than was actually the case.

Where the book failed was in determining what *kind* of group Negroes would form. As an ethnic group, they would be one of many. As a *racial* group, as "blacks," as the new nomenclature has it, they would form a unique group in American society. In a sense, of course, they always have been; they are old settlers whose presence shaped our Constitution, they were the only group held as slaves, they dominate a good part of American culture and literature—no one could forget that or deny that. But New York City, *Beyond the Melting Pot* argued, while it was America, was also different from America. It accentuated and heightened one distinctive goal of American society: its openness to new groups and its even-handed distribution of opportunity. Here, the larger American experience of the Negro, based on slavery and repression in the South, would be overcome, as the Negroes joined the rest of society, in conflict and accommodation, as an ethnic group.

It didn't happen. Groups may preexist in sociological reality, but they shape themselves by choice; they define their own categories (and this, curiously enough, was also a major theme of the book). In 1963, it looked as if the categories could still be defined as ethnic—groups

defined by common culture as well as common descent. In 1969, we seem to be moving to a new set of categories, black and white, and that is ominous. On the horizon stand the fantastic categories of the "Third World," in which all the colors, Black, Brown, Yellow, and Red (these are the favored terms for Negro, Mexican-American and Puerto Rican, Chinese and Japanese, and American Indian—a biologically and humanly monstrous naming, it seems to us—among some militants of southern California) are equated as "the oppressed" in opposition to the oppressing whites.

Human groups do not exist in nature, or rather, the part of difference that exists because of nature is unimportant. They are chosen, and whether one chooses to see oneself as Third World, Black, Negro, is not determined by either biology or sociology. It is a free act, even if constrained by social influences. Thus, as Negroes become "black"—and, perhaps beyond that, part of an alliance of the "internally colonized"—one cannot say this was inevitable, that the shaping forces of American society determined it. The experiences of Negroes in New York since the great migration fifty years ago has had a great deal in it, good and bad. If one compared it with the first fifty years of the Irish, the Italians, and the Jews, we are convinced there would be enough in that comparison to justify an ethnic rather than a racial or "internally colonized" self-image.

But the arts of politics, as exercised in the nation and the city, were insufficient to prevent a massive move toward what must be, for the nation and the city, a more damaging identity. The failure is a complex one.

The received wisdom—perhaps the best expression of it is to be found in the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, the Kerner Commission, on which Mayor Lindsay served as vice-chairman and played a major role—was that the failure was primarily in the level of response by government to the needs of Negroes and other deprived groups. It would be a foolish man who would say that more could not have, should not have, been done. And yet what impresses us is the creativity, relatively speaking, of the American political response all through the decade. A large range of civil rights legislation

was passed, and some of it was remarkably effective. Toward the end of the decade, the legislation on equality in employment was being enforced with increasing ingenuity, now by a Republican administration that owed little to Negroes. Affirmative action nationally had replaced, by the end of the decade, the requirement at the beginning, in only a few localities, for nondiscrimination. Voting rights legislation had led to the creation for the first time in 70 years of a substantial body of Negro voters in the South, exercising increasing influence in various areas. Discrimination in public accommodation had just about disappeared. The tax cut (and the war) replaced unemployment with labor shortages, and inflation, created in large measure by labor shortages, replaced unemployment as the dominant economic issue at the end of the decade. To deal with inadequate working skills, a variety of manpower training programs of increasing complexity was mounted, all through the decade, and if many were less than successful, no one could say the various levels of government ever stopped trying. Enormous new funds were put into education, largely to support new educational efforts for the poor (and the black) and to increase opportunities in higher education, where discrimination had passed into history and had turned into a positive effort to bring higher education to as many Negroes as possible.

We had seen the sequence of antidelinquency programs, poverty programs, a model cities program, and the rise of the doctrine of government-supported advocacy of radical change and of participation of client groups: the poor, the tenants, the welfare clients, the patients, in the agencies and institutions that affect their lives.[7] In the field of housing, a fantastic new variety of instruments was made available; they were poorly funded, but almost everything was being tried, to some degree. Indeed, in this decade, the United States, instead of being the consumer of European reforms and European mechanisms of social change, became an exporter: the theories of advocacy and participation began to affect English social policy, and poverty was rediscovered in Europe in response to its rediscovery in the United States.

Obviously more could have been done, but we do not feel, on balance, that the primary failure was in the political response of government to recognized need. But by the end of the decade, following the lead of the Kerner Commission, government response was routinely described as a failure and ascribed to an underlying and pervasive "white racism."

We would point to two other areas of failure, at least as important. One was the failure of intellectuals and the mass media to report and analyze what was happening. During this decade intellectuals continued their surprising conquest of the mass media which began after the Second World War, and which by the end of the decade had made such terms as "highbrow," "middlebrow," and "low brow" archaic. The "highbrows," "middlebrows," and "low brows" now merged, under the stewardship of the intelligentsia. And the intelligentsia, as it so often has, lusted after the sensational and the exotic. The hard work of politics and social change bored it. An increasingly dangerous romance with social brinksmanship and violence developed. The main task of intellectuals, keeping the channels of thought and of communication honest, was increasingly abandoned. Thus, until the rise of black militancy a few years ago, it was typical for the intelligentsia to argue that whatever the shape of race relations, whatever the condition of Negroes, it was fully and exclusively to be ascribed to whites. Whites prevented Negroes from rising economically and politically, and whites by their actions consigned Negroes to slums, poor jobs or unemployment, poor schools, and inferior education. This was an exaggerated and distorted view of the situation even five and ten years ago. Whites of course held far more power than blacks; but blacks could (and did) by their own measures shape a good part of their environment, their conditions of life, and their power.

After the rise of Black Power, liberal sentiment, following the new black ideologies, jumped entirely to the other side. Now blacks could exclusively, and without concern for the attitudes, power, and position held by white groups, fully shape their environment, their conditions of life, and their power. This was as extreme a position in ascribing *all* power to the deprived as the previous

position was in denying *any* power to the deprived. Both were wrong. The errors of the first position did nothing to encourage blacks to organize, to create social institutions, to dominate their environment with distinctive social and cultural interests and capacities, for just as previous groups of the deprived had shaped their environment, so could blacks. The second position, on the other hand, ignored that other groups did have interests, did have power, and would and could react against militant and arrogant demands, which owed to the black culture of the streets a good deal of their peculiar bite and arrogance. Whatever the effect of this new black style in creating self-satisfaction among those who used it, it did little to reach the other side and create conditions for accommodation. "The dozens" (the ghetto game of verbal abuse, in which each participant tries to see how much his antagonist can take) was not the ideal form for the conduct of public business; it has become, as far as militant blacks are concerned, almost the only form, with the encouragement of a good number of the white intelligentsia.

Instead of introducing clarity and sanity, the intelligentsia devoted itself to encouraging the varied fantasies and the fascination with violence of black militants. Consider two examples: Malcolm X was one of the most impressive black leaders of the sixties. His autobiography has perhaps the strongest claim to be considered a classic of any book by a black writer of the sixties. He broke with the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims) for a number of reasons, but one basis of separation was his growing rejection of black exclusivism, and his conviction blacks could work with like-minded whites. He was assassinated, and at the time most informed observers, black and white, saw little reason to question the widespread assumption that his black killers were associated with the dominant faction of the Black Muslims. Yet by the end of the decade it was nigh universally accepted in the black community, and was also widely believed by young middle- and upper-middle-class whites, that his tragic death was at the hands of whites, and probably at the behest of the United States government.

Another example is immediately at hand. During 1968 and 1969, a number of Black Panthers were

killed in shoot-outs with the police in Oakland, Los Angeles, and Chicago, as were a number of police. Conflicting stories resulted concerning who started shooting and for what reason. In December, 1969, after one of the most serious of these shoot-outs in Chicago resulted in the death of two Black Panther leaders, one could read in the most responsible newspapers in the country that "twenty-eight Black Panthers" had been killed by the police. This figure, which one assumes came from Black Panther sources, was immediately accepted, and spread throughout the world. The *New York Times,* in its *News of the Week* section, an authoritative summary of the news, reported flatly, in a headline on December 7, "The Black Panther toll is now 28." A few weeks later, the *New York Times* apparently thought better of its acceptance of this figure, and asked the Black Panther lawyer, Charles Garry, to specify the 28. It turned out he could come up with 19 dead Panthers, except that four were killed by a rival black group; one by a white merchant; one was killed, the New Haven police charged, by other Black Panthers; one was unknown to the police who had supposedly killed him; another in the list, it was asserted, was shot by a "police agent," not further identified. The 28 was down, maximally, to 11. And even in these cases there were guns on both sides, and the question of who started shooting is disputed. The number of dead policemen is not of any interest to the intelligentsia.

The point is that the political failures of the 1960's also include a failure by intellectuals and by the mass media they increasingly influenced to give a true and honest account of the situation. Lies started, and they were not stopped, because those whose task was to monitor words and ideas had less and less interest in doing so. It was no wonder that, even while progress was substantial, fears of genocide rose.

There was another political failure of the sixties, and this was the failure of Negroes (and Puerto Ricans) to develop and seize the political opportunities that were open to them. It was less clear in 1960–61 than in 1969 how massively Negroes (and Puerto Ricans) abstained from politics, in some of the key ways that counted, for example, voting. They abstained *more* in the 1960's than in the mid-

1940's in New York City, and the reasons are unclear. Arthur Klebanoff has studied this for the city, particularly for Brooklyn. Between 1950 and 1965, the proportion of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in Brooklyn rose from 9 per cent to 29 per cent of the population. This should have meant a massive change in political representation, and presumably in rewards. It didn't.

The remnants of the older political machinery, once broad-based, continued to control Brooklyn politics as late as 1966. Jews and Italians ran the stores, owned the apartments, and filled the political clubhouses. This was to be expected. The surprise was the absence of any competing Negro or Puerto Rican organizations. Jews and Italians continued in office long after the districts they represented became predominantly Negro and Puerto Rican. . . . The existing political organizations did not recruit in Negro and Puerto Rican areas because they had no need to. Nonvoters have never been of great interest to politicians in control of a small constituency. And no politician managed to convince Brooklyn's white party machinery that Negroes and Puerto Ricans would ever be anything but nonvoters.[8]

Klebanoff's analysis demonstrated that while Negroes and Puerto Ricans formed approximately 30 per cent of Brooklyn's total population and 25 per cent of its eligible voting population, they were no more than 15 per cent of Brooklyn's registered voters. It is understandable, then, that the Ocean Hill–Brownsville Local Governing Board should have declared, "Men are capable of putting an end to what they find intolerable without recourse to politics." Unfortunately, when they do, only uncertainty, insecurity, and disorder can result.

Beyond the Melting Pot explored some of the reasons why Negroes and Puerto Ricans might not organize as rapidly and effectively as other groups. For the Negroes, it suggested that the mere fact that they did not form a self-consciously foreign group, cut off by barriers of language from English-speaking institutions, meant that the bases for organization were restricted.* For Puerto Ricans,

* One passage in *Beyond the Melting Pot* has given me considerable pain, and the point I make here gives me a chance to correct it. I wrote, in the chapter on the Negroes, that the chances for "massive self-help"

it suggested that the attitudes developed toward the paternalistic government of Puerto Rico were easily transferred to the government of New York City. Thus, in both groups, the push to organization and self-help was somewhat muted. But in the very nature of the ethnic analysis, this could not be expected to last—the groups would become

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efforts among Negroes, along the lines of some ethnic and religious groups, were not promising, and one reason I suggested was that "it is not possible for Negroes to view themselves as other ethnic groups viewed themselves because—and this is the key to much in the Negro world—the Negro is only an American, and nothing else. He has no values and culture to guard and protect. He insists that the white world deal with his problems, because . . . he is so much the product of America. . . ." (p. 53, first edition).

What I meant, as the context suggests, was *not* that there were no Negro values and culture—something totally at odds with everything in the section and the book—but that, as the text just quoted states, Negro values and culture were so completely *American* in origin that Negroes, as against other groups of foreign origin, had no strong incentives to create schools to preserve a foreign language, hospitals and old-age homes to give comfort to those raised in a foreign culture, or even to develop retail stores to serve a distinctively foreign market.

I based myself on authoritative scholars, among them E. Franklin Frazier, who argued that the Negro had been remade in America, and almost nothing African had survived in American Negro culture. There has been strong challenge to this view in recent years. The rise of Afro-American and Black Studies will undoubtedly turn up a larger measure of African survivals, both specific and general.

Even, however, as I have elaborated it here, this passage I believe was quite wrong. Conceivably the fact that Negroes saw themselves as American had inhibited to some degree the development of a fully elaborated set of strong organizations along the lines of other groups. But after all, as so much in the book argues, a conscious awareness of foreign origin based on the reality of a foreign culture is only one element in the establishment of a strong set of social organizations, and by no means absolutely essential. The creation of the Mormons out of completely American origins—a group that now shows the American ethnic pattern of a group, largely formed through descent, with distinctive values and social organization—demonstrates that foreign language and culture is no requirement for very strong social organization. Out of American origins, one can create a distinctive subculture which generates the need for its own organizations to "guard and protect" it. This has certainly happened as a result of 300 years of Black American history, and could serve as sufficient basis for strong organization, regardless of the contribution of African origins. Even aside from groups formed in America, we have examples of immigrant groups who have become conscious of themselves as distinct entities in America, and on the basis of experience in America.

In this edition, I have edited the original passage, as I quoted it here, to come closer to my original meaning, so that it now at least expresses the error I originally made, rather than one I did not intend. N.G.

more self-conscious, better organized. What could not be foreseen, of course, was what form this organization would take.

In the Negro communities, we have seen a wholly admirable and impressive rise of self-assertion and pride. The distinctive aspects of the Negro experience in America and Africa are being explored, reported, recorded, analyzed, and increasingly taught, both in private and in public schools. Aspects of Negro experience that were previously considered by Negroes themselves as unimportant, or matter-of-fact, or even shameful are becoming part of the curriculum for this new movement of self-assertion. All this deserves encouragement and support. When it is combined, as it so often is, with an effort to teach an unreal past and an unreal present, one can still understand it—every group has its own similar tendencies. But when it is combined with an effort to separate Negroes from the mechanisms by which varied groups, in this most mixed of nations, participate in a common society and a common state, then we can only be saddened and frightened.

The political costs of separatist rhetoric, and the surprising mobility offered by the ethnic political model, were to be seen at the outset of the 1970's when the issue arose among liberal Democrats of nominating a Negro for Lieutenant Governor in the primary campaigns that were to precede the 1970 general elections. The press reported elaborate calculations as to how this could be done with minimal damage to the party's prospects, especially "upstate." Seemingly ignored in these strategy sessions was the fact that in 1962 the Democrats had nominated a Negro, Edward R. Dudley, for the incomparably more important post of Attorney General and no one had batted an eye. Dudley was nominated by precisely the process, described in our final chapter, "Beyond the Melting Pot," by which Robert M. Morgenthau had been chosen. A Jew, a Catholic, a Negro, *et al.* His had been almost the classic ethnic political background. A childhood in rural Virginia, Howard University, St. John's Law School, the New Era Democratic Club (a Harlem Tammany group), the legal staff of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, followed by a steady rise through appointive posi-

tions (Ambassador to Liberia, the Domestic Relations Court), and at length the nomination for Attorney General of New York, a position we noted was held by an Irish patriot as early as 1812. It is important to note that, while Dudley was nominated for Attorney General, a Negro (Ralph Bunche) was also considered in the polling for Governor (p. 306). It was becoming *routine* for Negroes to have "a place on the slate." Only after a decade of intense preoccupation with injustices done black people, with "white racism," "genocide," and the rhetoric of social revolution did it become a chancy thing to nominate a black for the least significant of statewide posts.

We, black and white, continue to grapple with our primal dilemma, the place of blacks in American society, and the range of options that we now see before us is wider than was apparent when we wrote *Beyond the Melting Pot.* At that time, from the perspective of the city, there were seemingly only two options. One was color blindness, with its corollary assumptions that Negroes could be fully assimilated in American society, fully acculturated, that no distinctions of importance would remain in reality, and distinctions based on racist prejudice would finally fall away. We saw this as unrealistic, not so much because racism was so deeply ingrained in American society (though of course it was far more deeply ingrained than the prejudice any other group had met, even the ferocious prejudice that confronted the Chinese and Japanese), but because the model of America was faulty. White groups, we argued, had not yet "assimilated," perhaps they never would. The ethnic pattern was American, more American than the assimilationist. Would not the ethnic pattern prove the model for the incorporation of Negroes into the life of the city, as it had proved for impoverished Irishmen, for Jews and Italians, all of whom, when they had arrived, had been considered by some of the best representatives of the American thought of the time as inferior races?

There was of course a third alternative, which we dismissed completely—separatism, formal minority status—in the pattern that arose briefly between the wars to accommodate the minority groups of Eastern Europe—perhaps a separate nation. This had been proposed, most

prominently by the American Communist party in the thirties, who propounded a theory of autonomy to the point, if wished, of separatism for the black majority areas of the South. More recently the Nation of Islam had proposed a separate nation, in a much vaguer form. We did not see this as even a distant possibility. The Communist party was almost totally divorced from American reality. The Black Muslims, to our mind, were more noteworthy for their effort to create a middle-class style for lower-class blacks than for their vague political goals. But this alternative has been raised far more seriously since.[9]

When we wrote *Beyond the Melting Pot,* the alternatives seemed to lie between assimilation and ethnic group status; they now seem to lie somewhere between ethnic group status and separatism. Earlier assimilation seemed to us the unreal alternative, today it is separatism that holds that status. But unreal unfortunately does not mean impossible. Will makes almost all alternatives possible, even those that are disastrous and that seem sure to guarantee a substantial measure of misery and unhappiness.

We now have as alternatives two models of group relations, which we will name the Northern and the Southern. Both reject a total assimilation in which group reality disappears. In the Southern model, society is divided into two segments, white and black. The line between them is rigidly drawn. Other groups must choose to which segment they belong, even if, as many Southern Jews felt, they do not really want to quite belong to either. Violence is the keynote of relations between the groups. And "separate but equal" is an ideology if not a reality.

The Northern model is quite different. There are many groups. They differ in wealth, power, occupation, values, but in effect an open society prevails for individuals and for groups. Over time a substantial and rough equalization of wealth and power can be hoped for even if not attained, and each group participates sufficiently in the goods and values and social life of a common society so that all can accept the common society as good and fair. There is competition between groups, as between individuals, but it is muted, and groups compete not through violence but through effectiveness in organization and achieve-

ment. Groups and individuals participate in a common society. Individual choice, not law or rigid custom, determines the degree to which any person participates, if at all, in the life of an ethnic group, and assimilation and acculturation proceed at a rate determined in large measure by individuals. This is at any rate the ideal—prejudice and discrimination often force people into closer association with groups than they wish. The Northern model in group relations is perhaps best realized in New York City.

We have begun to see the Northern model creep into the South. The politics of the city of Atlanta is now one in which various groups compete, bargain, and come to agreements in a style familiar to us from Northern urban politics. But the Southern style is now being brought into the North. Physically, by immigrants, black and white. Ideologically, by sections of the intelligentsia, black and white. Violence is beginning to play a frightening role in politics.[10] The demand for a rigid line between the races is now raised again, more strongly from the black side, this time. We believe the ethnic pattern offers the best chance for a humane and positive adaptation to group diversity, offering the individual the choice to live as he wishes, rather than forcing him into the pattern of a single "Americanized" society or into the compartments of a rigidly separated society. The question is, can we still convince the varied groups of the society that this is still the best solution?

All the work of incorporating Negroes, as a group and as individuals, into a common society—economically, culturally, socially, politically—must be pushed as hard as possible. Negroes who want to be part of a common society—and these are still, from all evidence, the large majority, if a quiet one—must be given every aid and encouragement, and must be associated in every common enterprise. It is hard to believe that the genius for compromise and accommodation which has kept this a single city, despite the fact that it was made of minorities, will now fail. But the possibility, in 1970, is a haunting one.

THE RACE ISSUE IN CITY POLITICS

THE FACT IS, WE ARE ALREADY FAR ADVANCED ON THE ROAD to division, and perhaps the best indication is that the

mayoralty election of 1969 was the *first* in New York City's history that was decided principally by the intensity of racial conflict in the city.

The matter, of course, is not one of race alone, particularly not in New York City. Against the stark contrast of black and white that dominates the South, in New York we have, in partial and grudging alliance with blacks, a substantial part of the Puerto Rican group. They are not racially Negro (only a small proportion—in recent censuses, less than 10 per cent—are Negro as well as Puerto Rican), but the two groups share many common elements of social position: both are relatively recent migrants to the city, come from poor areas, and are equipped generally with relatively poor education and poor occupational skills, both suffer from having to take the worst jobs and the worst housing, both feel aggrieved in their relations with the major city services—police, schools, housing, health, fire, sanitation—and both have formed part, on many occasions, of a single political alliance.

The divisions between them however are as important as the similarities. There are conflicts between them over precedence and power in specific functional areas of government and in specific physical areas of the city. Thus, in the new community agencies that handle the programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Model Cities Program, the chief city agencies dominated by blacks and Puerto Ricans, the conflict is often severe. In the Hunts Point area of the East Bronx, it has been particularly fierce. There are cultural and political differences between the two groups. The Puerto Ricans are perhaps more willing to see themselves as one in a sequence of ethnic groups in the city who will eventually through traditional processes of government get their due. Radical elements among blacks, who deny the validity or legitimacy of such a model and such expectations, tend to be stronger, though many young Puerto Ricans are trying to catch up. Puerto Ricans do not express as much resentment and anger, are not as convinced that measures proposed by black activists should be given such high priority (for example, the push to community control of schools and other city functions). Thus, one Puerto Rican daily (of two in the city) endorsed the con-

servative Democrat Procaccino and the conservative Republican Marchi in the primary, as against Mayor Lindsay or the liberal and radical opponents of Procaccino. And in the final mayoralty vote, the vote for Mayor Lindsay among Puerto Ricans fell far short of the overwhelming support among Negroes.

We also find, in rather firmer alliance with blacks, a good number of whites: "Manhattan," as it is called—and that means whites of high social and economic position, largely Jewish and white Anglo-Saxon in background, with a mixture of better-off Catholics somewhat liberated from their ethnic groups. They were willing to support Mayor Lindsay and liberal Democratic candidates in a primary where the main issue was whether too much was being done for blacks. They took this position presumably because they are better off, better educated, and also because they are somewhat freer of the pressures of ethnic groups that are helping to solidify, elsewhere in the city, a strong resistance to what are seen as pro-black policies.

The opponents of this coalition can once again be described in ethnic and class terms, as well as by race. Whether we say "blue-collar" or "lower middle-class" or "homeowner" in New York City, or whether we say "Italian" or "Irish" is not unimportant, and yet we know we are talking about roughly the same people. So the mass media discourse about the "white ethnic groups" or the "white working- and lower-middle class"—the people are the same, and the issues are the same: their feelings that they have been ignored, have received little from government in recent years, and have borne the brunt of the costs involved in the economic and political rise of the Negroes.

And in the middle in New York is a "swing group," the largest in the city, Jews, and perhaps the single most important development in the current crisis is the shift of middle- and working-class Jews, in large numbers, from one side to another, a move hastened by the referendum on the police Civilian Review Board in 1966, the school strike over decentralization in 1968, and rising black—and occasionally anti-Semitic—militancy. The facts of ethnicity and race, which were for a long time somewhat underground if vital and recognized factors in New York City's life, surfaced

everywhere by 1969. Each primary and election was analyzed in ethnic terms, and, where once class and occupational terms obscured the ethnic factors beneath, now ethnic factors were used as the immediate shorthand, covering the economic and social realities they paralleled. Thus, a reporter interviewing Representative Hugh Carey for the magazine *New York* gave the following account of his Brooklyn district (paraphrasing the congressman):

> The make-up of the 15th Congressional District is Park Slope—Irish and Italian; Prospect Heights—Black and Spanish-speaking; Borough Park—Hasidic and Sephardic Jews; Sunset Park—Swedish and Norwegian ("8th largest concentration east of Minneapolis," according to Carey); Bay Ridge—Italian, Irish, German, and "maybe the only White Anglo-Saxon Protestants in the district"; and part of Bensonhurst—a racially mixed district.[11]

Herman Badillo, explaining why he would support Mayor Lindsay instead of Mario Procaccino, was quoted in the *New York Times* (July 30, 1969): "When he talks about crime and treating juvenile offenders as adult criminals, he's talking about black and Puerto Rican kids. Everyone knows he's not talking about Jewish and Italian kids. . . ." (Interestingly enough, when you talked about criminals and juvenile delinquents in this city until twenty-five years ago, you *did* mean Jewish and Italian kids.)

The calculations of political leaders, the analyses of journalists, the reporting of the daily papers, all emphasize, perhaps they even overemphasize, the significance of attitudes toward the Negroes, toward policies that are assumed to be designed to help Negroes, and how these attitudes vary depending on whether white voters are Italian or Jewish or Polish, blue-collar or white-collar or professional, high school-educated or college-educated.

But if there is nothing new in the statement of the case, there is something new in that for the first time in New York City's history, as far as we know it, racial conflict, which can also be viewed as ethnic conflict, became determinative for the city's politics.

Ethnic considerations have always been primary in New York City politics, where the three top spots of each party are regularly divided among a Jew, an

Italian, and an Irishman (sometimes a white Protestant noses out one of the others, most recently the Irishman, who now represents the smallest of the three major white ethnic groups); where the Borough Presidency of Manhattan has been reserved to Negroes for some years; where the old Board of Education was regularly divided among three Jews, three Catholics, and three Protestants. What is new?

What is new is that these arrangements, which were adjustments to the reality of race and ethnic difference, have now taken the center of the stage. They did not play an important role as recently as the first Lindsay election in 1965. As between Lindsay and Beame, the issue was still the traditional one of "reform" versus the "machine," and this was true of earlier elections, too. Connected with the fundamental break between reformers and regular politicians were such issues as efficiency, corruption, relations with criminals. These were, it appears in retrospect, the major issues of past New York City elections. Behind them the steady change in position and status of ethnic groups went on, and was marked by nominations by regular parties of members of various groups to new and higher positions, by elections of members of ethnic groups to new positions, by the creation of factions within old parties, and by the establishment of third parties dominated by new ethnic groups. But, once again, these factions and third parties—the Reform Democrats, the American Labor Party, the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party—while they clearly represented disproportionately certain ethnic groups, were not defined primarily in ethnic terms, they were defined by the classic issues of urban government: reform, machines, corruption, efficiency, taxes.

In the past election, however, there was one overwhelming issue: Had Mayor Lindsay done too much for Negroes, and in lesser degree, Puerto Ricans? Could this charge be pinned on him, not directly, but by the fairly unsubtle messages that political candidates in a democratic society will use: Had he favored Manhattan over Brooklyn and the Bronx, what had he done about crime in the streets, what was his role in the teachers' strike and the struggle over expanded black and Puerto Rican enrollment at City

College, and even more directly, had his tenure in office increased racial and ethnic hostility?

In the end, Lindsay won, though with a minority of the popular vote. But it is clear that the big issue of the campaign remains as the main issue of city politics: Do city policies favor poorer blacks as against working-class and lower-middle-class whites, and its corollary, how does one deal with the danger of further polarization between these groups? In New York, as we have pointed out, this issue is inevitably modulated by the complex ethnic mix of the city, and it is this too which gives New York its chief advantages in dealing with it. These advantages should not be ignored. New York was one of the few major Northern cities that avoided an anti-Negro race riot during the period of rapid Negro migration to the Northern cities that opened with World War I. It did not experience anything like a Chicago riot of 1919 or a Detroit riot of 1943. Indeed, its two major race riots, that of 1935 and 1943 in Harlem, reflecting the fact that New York City *was* different, foreshadowed the "commodity" riots of the 1960's: they were not directed by whites against Negroes but by Negroes against the white storekeepers in black areas, expressions of hostility against whites.[12] And even though New York had its share of devastating riots in the 1960's, the great divide in race relations in New York is marked not by a riot but by the teachers' strikes of 1968, in which the violence was almost entirely verbal rather than physical. Physical violence of course there is. But it is still for the most part the random and individual violence of criminals and near criminals. Even if black criminals now add (as many do) racial excuses to the armory of self-justifications that all criminals use, and even if many are encouraged to criminal violence by the inflated and overheated rhetoric of racial anger, what we find for the most part is still the violence of individuals. And as has often been pointed out, other Negroes are overwhelmingly the victims, and whites, despite their reasonable fear, do not suffer as much.

But at any rate one does not sense that whites are arming in New York, or that groups of whites are muttering about beating up or killing Negroes. New

York is still a different city—not Chicago, not Detroit, not Los Angeles. And, undoubtedly, part of what makes New York a different city are traditions arising from its ethnic variety. New York has had more experience than most American cities in living with a large variety of ethnic groups and in seeing their position and power wax and wane. Perhaps most significantly, this ethnic variety is marked by the presence, as still the largest ethnic group, of the traditionally pacific and nonviolent Jews. Despite the example of Israel, New York City Jews are still strangers to arms—or hunting or target practice or the other recreational and cultural pursuits that encourage acquaintance with arms. They have never been workers in heavy industry, which encourages brawn and provides an environment in which violence is more easily accepted. They are in light industry, in commerce, and in the professions, and come out of cultural environments in which violence is limited to language. Even when they are criminals, they tend to make illegal use of brains, not brawn.

Further, no group in New York City is accustomed to domination, though each may have a partial dominance in some area, and no group, therefore, finds challenge unexpected or outrageous. The Irish have withdrawn before the pressure of Italians and Jews; the white Protestants have been a minority for more than a century, and in recent generations a small minority; Italians, despite their huge number as the second largest white group, have always been concentrated in fairly humble occupations; Jews, despite their recent prominence, remember anti-Semitism and the need for prudence and caution. There is a basic reservoir of good feeling in the city that permits accommodation, change, the rise of new groups to new positions of political power and economic well-being. Obviously, saying this, we present a hypothesis but a hypothesis that we must believe in generally, throughout the country, if the nation is to survive without racial warfare. In New York, at any rate, we have more grounds for believing it than elsewhere.

But if this reservoir is to be built on, if New York is to continue to survive as a city with some degree of harmony and accommodation, then there must be wider

understanding of the state of race and ethnic relations in the city.

A RESURGENCE OF ETHNICITY?

THE OVER-ALL ETHNIC PATTERN OF THE CITY HAS NOT CHANGED since 1960, though the proportions have. There are still six major, fairly well-defined groups. The most visible is the Negro, which is rapidly increasing its proportion of the city's population, and has risen from 14 per cent in 1960 to an estimated 20 per cent today. The second most visible and sharply defined group is the Puerto Rican, whose proportion within the city population has increased since 1960 from 8 to 11 per cent. Substantial numbers of Latin Americans—Cubans and others—have come into the city since 1960 and tend to be lumped in public identification with Puerto Ricans, though they resist this. The largest single ethnic group in the city is the Jewish. Our data on their numbers are very poor. We guess they are declining from the quarter of the city's population they have long formed, to more like a fifth, but they are still probably more numerous than the Negroes. The next largest white group is the Italian. The Italian-born and their children alone formed 11 per cent of the city's population in 1960, leaving out the entire third generation and beyond. Perhaps they form one-seventh of the city's population. The Irish are a steadily declining part of the city's population, owing to heavy movements to the suburbs (also true, but in lesser degree, of Jews and Italians). They form probably some 7 per cent of the city.[13]

White Anglo-Saxon Protestants form the sixth most important social segment of the city in ethnic terms. If Irish identity becomes questionable in the later generations, WASP identity is even less of a tangible and specific identity. It is a created identity, and largely forged in New York City in order to identify those who are not otherwise ethnically identified and who, while a small minority in the city, represent what is felt to be the "majority" for the rest of the country.

Even in New York they bear the prestige of representing the "majority," whatever that may be, and, more significantly, they dominate the large banks, the large insurance companies, the large corporations that make their

headquarters in the city. Young people flock to the city to work in its communications industries, advertising agencies, in the corporate office buildings, and discover they have become WASPs. This odd term includes descendants of early Dutch settlers (there are still a few), of early English and Scottish settlers (there are still some of these, too), immigrants and descendants of immigrants to the city from Great Britain, and migrants to the city from parts of the country which have had substantial proportions of settlers of British, English-speaking background. Merged into this mix may be persons of German background who no longer feel ethnically identified as German-Americans. The Germans, who formed along with the Irish the dominant ethnic group of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the city, have not maintained, as a group, a prominence in the city proportionate to their numbers. (And yet in the 1960's the Steuben Day parade became a major event, at which the attendance of city officeholders was obligatory.)

Beyond the six major defined segments that are crucial to politics, to self-awareness, and also to the social description of the city, there are numerous others, but they tend to have a more local significance. In any given area, one must be aware of Poles, Russians, Greeks, Armenians, Chinese, Cubans, Norwegians, Swedes, Hungarians, Czechs, and so on, and so on, but even the largest of these groups forms no more than a few per cent of the city's population.

The Chinese community has grown, owing to the revision of the immigration laws in 1965, which eliminated the last references to race and national origin. The Cuban community is the largest new addition to the city's ethnic array. The over-all pattern, however, remains the familiar one of the early 1960's, with the trends then noted continuing: the growth of the Negro and Puerto Rican populations; the decline of the older ethnic groups, Irish and German; the continued significance of the two major groups of the "new immigration" of 1880 to 1924, the Jews and the Italians. This is the statistical pattern. Politically, economically, and culturally, however, two groups have outdistanced all others in the sixties: Jews and White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The life of the city in the late six-

ties reflected nothing so much as an alliance between these groups, or parts of them, and the growing Negro group, against the remaining white, largely Catholic, groups. We shall say more later concerning why this has come about and what it means for the city.

Have ethnic identity and the significance of ethnic identity declined in the city since the early 1960's? The long-expected and predicted decline of ethnicity, the fuller acculturation and the assimilation of the white ethnic groups, seems once again delayed—as it was by World War I, World War II, and the cold war—and by now one suspects, if something expected keeps on failing to happen, that there may be more reasons than accident that explain why ethnicity and ethnic identity continue to persist. In *Beyond the Melting Pot,* we suggested that ethnic groups, owing to their distinctive historical experiences, their cultures and skills, the times of their arrival and the economic situation they met, developed distinctive economic, political, and cultural patterns. As the old culture fell away—and it did rapidly enough—a new one, shaped by the distinctive experiences of life in America, was formed and a new identity was created. Italian-Americans might share precious little with Italians in Italy, but in America they were a distinctive group that maintained itself, was identifiable, and gave something to those who were identified with it, just as it also gave burdens that those in the group had to bear.

Beyond the accidents of history, one suspects, is the reality that human groups endure, that they provide some satisfaction to their members, and that the adoption of a totally new ethnic identity, by dropping whatever one is to become simply American, is inhibited by strong elements in the social structure of the United States. It is inhibited by a subtle system of identifying, which ranges from brutal discrimination and prejudice to merely naming. It is inhibited by the unavailability of a simple "American" identity. One is a New Englander, or a Southerner, or a Midwesterner, and all these things mean something too concrete for the ethnic to adopt completely, while excluding his ethnic identity.

In any case, whatever the underlying fault lines in American society that seem to maintain or permit

the maintenance of ethnic identity beyond the point of cultural assimilation, the fact is ethnic identity continued in the sixties.

We have precious few studies of ethnic identity, despite the increasing prominence of its role in the mass media in recent years, and we speak consequently quite hypothetically. Yet we would like to suggest three hypotheses on the changing position of ethnic identity in recent years.

First: ethnic identities have taken over some of the task in self-definition and in definition by others that occupational identities, particularly working-class occupational identities, have generally played. The status of the worker has been downgraded; as a result, apparently, the status of being an ethnic, a member of an ethnic group, has been upgraded.

There is no question that many occupational identities have lost a good deal of their merit and virtue, not to say glamour, in the eyes of those who hold them, and in the eyes of those in positions of significance in communications and the mass media who do so much to dispense ideas of merit, virtue, and glamour. The unions, the organizations of the working class, have certainly lost much of their glamour. What young bright man coming out of college would think that the most attractive, personally satisfying, and useful job he could hold would be to work for a union, as the authors did in 1944? Indeed, the intelligentsia has been quietly departing from unions and moving into government and the universities for ten years and more. But more significant has been the downgrading of working-class occupations. In the depression, in World War II, even after the war, the worker held an honored and important position. Radicals fought over his allegiance, the Democratic party was happy in his support, one could even see workers portrayed in the movies by men such as Humphrey Bogart, John Garfield, Clark Gable, and these heroes portrayed occupations, whether as truck drivers or oilfield workers or even produce marketmen, that had some reputation and value.

Similarly, to be a homeowner after the war, and many workers became homeowners, was meritorious. It

indicated rise in status, setting down roots, becoming a part of the community. Today, if one were to test associations to the word "worker" and "homeowner" among television newscasters and young college graduates, one is afraid one of the chief associations would be "racist" and "Wallaceite." It is hard to recall any movie of the late sixties, aside from *Pretty Poison,* in which a factory worker was a leading character, and in *Pretty Poison* the factory spewed chemical filth into the countryside, and the worker himself was half mad.[14]

Lower-middle-class statuses have also suffered, but the clerk or teacher or salesman never did do well in the mass media. The worker did; he formed part of that long-sustained and peculiar alliance that has always seemed to link those of higher status, in particular aristocrats and intellectuals, with lower-class people, leaving the middle classes in the middle to suffer the disdain of both. What has happened in recent years is that the lower pole of the alliance has shifted downward, leaving out the working class, and now hooking up the intellectuals and the upper-middle-class youth with the Negro lower class.

The Wallace movement and the Procaccino campaign were in part efforts to take political advantage of the declining sense of being valued in the working- and lower-middle class, and to ascribe to these groups a greater measure of credit and respect, as against both the more prosperous and better educated, who have supported measures designed to assist Negroes and the poor, and the Negroes and the poor themselves. If these class and occupational statuses have been downgraded, by that token alone ethnic identity seems somewhat more desirable. Today, it may be better to be an Italian than a worker. Twenty years ago, it was the other way around.

Thus, one reason we would suggest for the maintenance of ethnic identities is the fact that working-class identities and perhaps some other occupational identities have lost status and respect.

Let us suggest a second hypothesis as to changes in ethnic identity in this decade: international events have declined as a source of feelings of ethnic identity, except for Jews; domestic events have become more im-

portant. The rise of Hitler and World War II led to an enormous rise in feelings of ethnic identification. Nor was there much decline after the war, as the descendants of East European immigrants who had been aroused by Hitler's conquests now saw their homelands become Russian satellites, and as other nations were threatened. But aside from Jews, no group now sees its homeland in danger. (Israel barely qualifies as a "homeland," but the emotional identification is the same.) Even the resurgence of conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland has evoked only a sluggish response among American Irish. By this very token, as involvement with and concern for the homelands decline, the sources of ethnic identification more and more are to be found in American experiences, on American soil. This is not to say that identification with homelands in danger or in conflict cannot rise again. But for the first time a wave of ethnic feeling in this country has been evoked not primarily by foreign affairs but by domestic developments. This is a striking and important development—it attests to the long-lived character of ethnic identification and raises the curtain somewhat on the future history of ethnic identity in this country.

A third hypothesis: along with occupation and homeland, religion has declined as a focus of ethnic identification. Just as ethnicity and occupation overlap, so do ethnicity and religion. For some time, it seemed as if new identities based on religion were taking over from ethnic identities. This was the hypothesis of Will Herberg.[15] The Jews remained Jews, with a subtle shift from an ethnic identification in the first and second generation to more of a religious identification in the third; the Irish became ever more Catholic in their self-image, and so did the Italians. Even the P in WASP stands for Protestant, as part of the identity. Only for Negroes did racial identity seem clearly far more significant than religion. In *Beyond the Melting Pot,* we argued that religion and race seemed to be taking over from ethnicity. Yet in the last few years, the role of religion as a primary identity for Americans has weakened. Particularly in the case of Catholics, confusion and uncertainty have entered what was only a few years ago a very firm and clear identity. Thus, for Irish and Italians alike,

Catholicism once confirmed a basic conservatism; it was not only anti-Communist, obviously, but, more significantly, it took conservative positions on issues of family, sex, culture, education. Catholics formed the core of the Democratic party in New York, which, alongside its pronounced and decisive liberalism in social policy, remained conservative on issues of family and culture. The revolution in the Catholic Church has shaken this monolithic institution, and the identity of Catholic is no longer self-evident, to those holding it or to those outside the Church. The change is symbolized by the radical changes in ritual, in this most conservative of institutions, and in the possibility of changes in such ancient patterns as the celibacy of the clergy.

For the purposes of race relations, the most striking development is the divergence between clergy and laity (some clergy and some laity) on the issue of Negro militancy. When priests marched with Martin Luther King in Chicago, it was reported that Catholic workers who opposed the move of Negroes into their neighborhoods said, "Now even they are with them, and we are alone." Nothing as striking as this has happened in New York, where the laity are not as conservative as in Chicago (with its strong Polish and Lithuanian representation), and where the priests have not come up with a prominent radical leader. But if there is no equivalent of Father Groppi in New York, there are many smaller versions of Father Groppi. Catholicism no longer confirms as fully as it did some years ago the conservative tendencies of Italians and Irish.

We have suggested three aspects of the current prominence of ethnicity: that it is related to the declining merit of certain occupational identifications, that it increasingly finds its sources in domestic rather than foreign crises, and that the revolution in the Catholic Church means that, for the first time, it does not complement the conservative tendencies of Catholic ethnic groups. Now we come to a fourth aspect. In a word, is the resurgence of ethnicity simply a matter of the resurgence of racism, as is now often asserted? Is the reaction of whites, of ethnic groups and the working and middle class, to the increasingly militant demands of Negroes a matter of defense of ethnic and occupational turfs and privileges or is it a matter of racial an-

tipathy, and more of racism, that large and ill-used term, which means, if it means anything, that those afflicted with it see the world primarily in racial categories, in black and white, and insist that black should be down and white up?

In the fifties, Herberg argued that religion was rising, not because of any interest really in its doctrines, but because religion was a more respectable way of maintaining ethnic primary groups than ethnicity itself. To be Italian or Jewish (ethnic rather than religious) was somehow not reputable and raised the issue of conflict with the demands of American citizenship, a potential conflict that became particularly sharp in World War II and that has remained alive for American Jews since the establishment of the State of Israel. Now, it is argued, religion, owing to the liberalism of the clergy, cannot serve to keep the Negroes out—of neighborhoods, schools, jobs. But ethnicity can still serve that function. So, by emphasizing ethnicity and ethnic attachment, the argument goes, one can cover one's racism and yet be racist.

Thus, it may be argued, just as religion in the 1950's covered for ethnicity, ethnicity in the 1960's covers for racism. The issue remains simply one of white against black, and to speak of Jews, Italians, Irish, is merely to obfuscate it. We disagree with this point of view and argue that ethnicity is a real and felt basis of political and social action.

To begin with, we have always been forced to recognize the validity of some degree of discrimination—difficult to call simply racist—if it was for the purpose of defending something positive rather than simply excluding someone because of his race. For example, while city, state, and federal laws prohibit discrimination on account of race, creed, color, or national origin, they do accept the fact that certain institutions will want to discriminate positively, for purposes of the kind of mission in which they are engaged. The headquarters of the Armenian Church will want to hire Armenians, a Polish cultural foundation will hire Poles, and so on. Similarly, when Jewish organizations fought discrimination in vacation resorts in New York State in the 1940's and 1950's, they had the difficult issue of deciding whether the note in resort advertisements, "churches

nearby," indicated discrimination. The argument was made that Jewish resorts could freely advertise, "dietary laws observed." In both cases, one could argue, something *positive* was being accented, rather than something defined as negative excluded. To emphasize the virtues of maintaining an ethnic neighborhood is different from emphasizing the exclusion of Negroes, in sense and logic, though the acts that serve one aim are hard to distinguish from the acts that serve the other.

Legally, the problem of permitting this kind of positive discrimination is enormously difficult. Morally and socially, it appears to have some value. Just as blacks now want to gather together in distinctive institutions where they can strengthen specifically black social, cultural, and political tendencies, so do other groups; in both cases, the pervasiveness of antidiscrimination statutes and regulations introduces difficulties.

It may be granted that there is some legitimacy to what we call positive discrimination, which can be defined simply as the effort to bring together people of distinctive backgrounds or interests or potential interests for some socially valued end. "Religion" is such an end. "Ethnicity" can be considered such an end. But what about "race"? "Race," we all agree, has been rejected as such an end. Thus, we do not want to see "white" institutions maintained or established in this country. For the purpose of "white," as most of us see it, is not to defend or maintain a "white" culture or religion but to exclude blacks. By the same token, is not the maintenance and creation of black institutions illegitimate? We do not think so, because whatever some black militants may think, "black" defines not a race but a cultural group, in our terms, an ethnicity. Thus, it is hardly likely that Moslem, Swahili-speaking blacks of Zanzibar would find much in common with the black institutions and culture that are now being built up in this country. They would not have any predilection for soul music or soul food, would find the styles of dress, hair, walk, and talk that are now popular as defining blackness distinctly foreign. "Blackness" in this country is not really and simply *blackness,* it is an American Negro cultural style. Blackness would be as unacceptable in this country as white-

ness, if it were really only blackness. We can accept it because we recognize in blackness not simply the negative exclusion of white but the positive discrimination designed to strengthen and develop a distinctive group, with a distinctive history, defined interests, and identifiable styles in social life, culture, and politics.

But the matter is not so simple. This is one way of seeing blackness, of course, and a way that makes it conformable to the main trends in American society, where ethnic distinctiveness is to some degree accepted and accommodated. But it is not necessarily the way blacks see it today or will see it. Certainly, many blacks *do* insist on the racial formulation. They base it on the common oppression of all "colored" races by all "whites," and even more by "capitalistic" and "imperialistic" whites, something that is a rough summary of history, but very rough indeed, when one considers that Japan built up a great empire over other yellow and brown people, that Arabs for centuries dominated and enslaved black Africans, that Russia maintains dominion over white groups, and so on. To our minds, whether blacks in the end see themselves as ethnic within the American context, or as only black—a distinct race defined only by color, bearing a unique burden through American history—will determine whether race relations in this country is an unending tragedy or in some measure—to the limited measure that anything human can be—moderately successful.

Indeed, much of the answer to the question we have posed—ethnicity or racism?—is a matter of definition and self-definition, and much of the future of race relations in the city and the country depends on what designations and definitions we use. For just as a "nigger" can be made by treating him like a "nigger" and calling him a "nigger," just as a black can be made by educating him to a new, proud, black image—and this education is carried on in words and images, as well as in deeds—so can racists be made, by calling them racists and treating them like racists. And we have to ask ourselves, as we react to the myriad cases of group conflict in the city, what words shall we use, what images shall we present, with what effect? If a group of housewives insists that it does not want its children bussed

to black schools because it fears for the safety of its children, or it does not want blacks bussed in because it fears for the academic quality of the schools, do we denounce this as "racism" or do we recognize that these fears have a base in reality and deal seriously with the issues? When a union insists that it has nothing against blacks but it must protect its jobs for its members and their children, do we deal with those fears directly, or do we denounce them as racists? When a neighborhood insists that it wants to maintain its character and its institutions, do we take this seriously or do we cry racism again?

We believe the conflicts we deal with in the city involve a mixture of *interests:* the defense of specific occupations, jobs, income, property; of *ethnicity:* the attachment to a specific group and its patterns; and of *racism:* the American (though not only American) dislike and fear of the racial other, in America's case in particular compounded by the heritage of slavery and the forcible placing of Negroes into a less than human position. We believe we must deal with all these sources of conflict, but to ignore the ethnic source, or the interest source, in an exclusive fixation on the racist source, will undoubtedly encourage the final tearing apart of the community and the country between groups that see each other as different species rather than as valued variants of a common humanity.

Politically, we think it is wise to recognize these varied sources of conflict. Empirically, we think that to insist that ethnic concerns are only a cover for racism is wrong. Recent research throws some light on the persistence of ethnic cohesion, and it lasts longer than many people believe. The sociologist Nathan Kantrowitz, studying the patterns of residence of racial and ethnic groups in the New York City metropolitan area, points out that the degree of separation between white groups that we often consider similar is quite high. No group, except the Puerto Rican, is as segregated from others as the Negro. When we contrast the residence of Negroes as compared with the residence of foreign-born whites and their children, we find a "segregation index" averaging 80; that is, 80 per cent of Negroes would have to move to be distributed throughout the metropolitan area the way specific groups of foreign-born whites

and their children are. We find the same figure when we compare the residences of Puerto Ricans and foreign-born whites and their children; by this measure, then, Puerto Ricans are as segregated as Negroes. But when we compare different *white* groups, we also find a high degree of separation. Thus, for example,

> The segregation index between Norwegians and Swedes, 45.4, indicates a separation between two Protestant Scandinavian populations which have partially intermarried and even have at least one community in common (the Bay Ridge neighborhood in Brooklyn). But the high [segregation index] does represent ethnic separation, for each national group still maintains its own newspaper, and each lives in neighborhoods separate from those of the other. If Swedes and Norwegians are not highly integrated with each other, . . . they are even less integrated with other ethnic populations.[16]

And if this is the case for these groups, we would expect Italians and their children, immigrants from Russia and their children to have even *higher* segregation indices—and indeed they do.

Thus, the data show, on at least this point of residential segregation, that the pattern of distinctive residence characterizes almost all ethnic groups. This is not to say that they all face discrimination: they do not. Negroes do face discrimination in housing, and as we know, severe discrimination. But if groups that do *not* face discrimination *also* show a high degree of segregation, we must resort to two additional explanations of the Negro pattern of residence: one is the economic—they can't afford to move into many houses and many areas (as is true of Puerto Ricans, and, in lesser degree, of other groups); and the second is simply that there is also a positive element in the association of Negroes in given areas, something which is very often totally ignored. Formal and informal social life, churches and other institutions, distinctive businesses, all serve to make neighborhoods that are desirable and attractive for a given group, and to think that this pattern, which operates for all groups, is suspended for Negroes, is to be racist indeed.

AFFLUENT BLACKS AND POOR WHITES

THE SAME KIND OF DIVERSITY WE FIND AMONG WHITES PREVAILS among the newer and poorer groups that are now considered in opposition to whites, that is, Negroes and Puerto Ricans (who are also mostly white, which demonstrates one weakness in phrasing the struggle in racial terms). Indeed, much of our thinking about racial and ethnic conflict in the society has been badly flawed by our tendency to see two "sides," and to ascribe uniformity of one kind or another to both. All the whites are affluent, all the blacks and Puerto Ricans are poor. Or all the whites are racists, all the blacks are militant. (Once again, people think less about Puerto Ricans.) These black and white visions have limited the range of possible tactics and policies by political leaders and administrators, and indeed, have helped encourage the creation of a situation in which all the blacks would, in fact, become militant and all the whites racists, even if they did less to create a situation in which all the whites became rich and all the blacks poor. The emphasis on black poverty was designed to increase sympathy. But in the white working class it very often created a mystified response: Why such poverty and misery? Jobs are available (every issue of the newspaper reported job shortages). Why were there so many children in the television reports and so few men? What was going on and wasn't it their fault? And if it was their fault, why the militancy, the insults, and the denunciation? The prevalent style of reporting and of political response only increased the fear and antagonism.

The fact is, of course, that there are many, many working-class and middle-class Negro and Puerto Rican men, working hard and supporting families—indeed, far more than those who are not—but they are rarely considered. These elements of the community were ignored by almost all those engaged in the problem. They were ignored by the black militants, unless they were denounced as Uncle Toms, or more recently "Negroes" (this term, for which various Negro organizations had fought, now became to many militants a sign of unworthy and unmanly accommodation to "the man"). They were ignored by the white mass media. They were very often ignored by the political

leaders. As a result, the self-confidence of these elements disintegrated. The Invisible Man once meant the black man without a job, without a home, truly invisible, not even counted in the census. In the 1960's, the black Invisible Man became the working class and the middle class, people who had been leaders in their communities. They were now pushed aside by young militants, who were supported by white mass media and some white political leaders.

Thus, a good deal of the practical, effective work in raising the income and power of individual blacks and of the black communities was totally ignored by whites and blacks. Perhaps the best criticism of this whole style in race relations was made by Matthew Holden, Jr., a political scientist now at the University of Wisconsin, at a conference, typical of the times, held in 1967 by the City of New York Commission on Human Rights on "Community Values and Conflict." The nature of the conference can be well imagined by anyone who has participated in other similar exercises. What was completely not to be expected was Professor Holden's remarkable critique at the end. He began with a criticism of the character of the conference, asserting it had

> resolutely refused to face the most critical issues which have to be understood if there is to be a forward movement in American race relations. It has not dealt in realities, but in rituals. . . .
>
> If . . . the conference has ducked, rather than faced, the hard issues . . . , is not one reason that the very structure of the conference is decisively unrepresentative of the urban Negro communities? Every important segment in the urban Negro communities ought to be represented. . . . However, there are at least two vital segments which are absent, which ought to be present, and their presence would have changed the tone of the discussion.
>
> First, this conference distinctly under-represents, and systematically under-represents, the urban Negro middle class. The 1960's have seen a novel phenomenon in American history. For the first time, there is an urban Negro middle class which is substantially similar to the urban white middle class, in its educational levels, its income levels, and its occupational tendencies. That Negro

middle class, embodied in such people who can raise more than $100,000 in Detroit (via a $100 per couple dinner) for the Legal Defense Fund, is playing an increasingly crucial role in public affairs generally, and is increasingly ready to assume a full responsibility within the Negro community. To come here and pretend that it does not exist is sheer fantasy. To come here and denounce it for "deserting" is sheer dishonesty.

Secondly: this conference also neglects and ignores the Negro "working class." Every city in the country has a fully stable and responsible Negro population, which is just above the poverty line (and sometimes below it), the interests of which have not been articulated here in the past two days. These people do not go to national conferences. . . . They are the mainstay of the religious, fraternal, and other private institutions within the Negro communities. They are the prime support of Negro politicians and Negro business establishments. They are the people whose children, deep in the worst slum schools, provide the stabilizing element which makes it possible for teachers to teach at all. . . . Their aspirations are as "middle-class" as you can get, and they . . . need little except to have institutional barriers knocked down. They are the people who *actually* provide "grass-roots" leadership. (Who else were the elected candidates in poverty agencies in Cleveland and Philadelphia?)

Any public policy which ignores both these groups will be based upon unreal expectations.[17]

And yet in large measure, public policy in New York City in recent years has ignored both these groups. In doing so, it even fosters the illusion in the black community itself that they do not exist. When militant groups—representing whom, no one knows, and at best only a handful of the population—took over the site of the proposed state office building on 125th Street in Manhattan, a spokesman was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying of the people who came to camp on the site, "They were the people who truly represent the community—the welfare mothers, the students, a lot of the young bloods." What a fantastic view of the community! What a degrading one! And what an amazing transvaluation of values! (Presumably, even in referring to "students," the spokesman did not have in mind those who were studying but those who

were demonstrating.) Thus, excluded from the community were the professional men, the businessmen, the civil servants, the workers, all of whom might well have given overwhelming approval to the building of a state office building in Harlem.

The 1960's have seen an enormous increase in the number of Negroes in stable jobs, with some degree of security; it has simultaneously seen an enormous increase in militancy. It is quite common for spokesmen for Negroes, in the multifarious public bodies that now exist, to insist that nothing has changed, indeed that blacks are worse off than before, and to act as if they are totally ignorant of the real changes. We think one policy in improving the tone of race relations in New York City would be to give a fair and honest picture of the Negro and Puerto Rican communities. The image projected by political leaders and mass media should not fudge the reality of poverty and degradation: poor housing for very large sections of these communities, high rates of unemployment, the grim fact that one-third of the black and more of the Puerto Rican population are dependent on welfare. But it should not limit the story to this.

While our statistics are poor, and we do not know the full range of change in New York's deprived groups during the past decade (even after the 1970 census, we will still wonder whether we have managed to count the black males of whom probably 60,000 in the city alone were missed in 1960), we still know enough to know there has been substantial progress in the creation of a stable working and middle class among Negroes in New York City. The following are only a few of the evidences:

One-half of the Transport Workers Union of 36,000 are now estimated to be Negro. These now have the security of well-paid jobs with many fringe benefits, including retirement after twenty years of service if the employee is fifty years or over.

About one-third of the members of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees union, which represents 115,000 city workers in varied agencies and occupations, are Negro and Puerto Rican, and they are covered by strong contracts that will

give a minimum of $7,000 a year to every city employee by June, 1970.

There has been a transformation in the position of voluntary hospital employees, largely Negro and Puerto Rican. The union that represents them, local 1199 of the Drug and Hospital Workers Union, has 40,000 members, in large measure Negro and Puerto Rican, and has changed their position in ten years from wages below the minimum wage, to wage levels considerably above the minimum wage.

We have seen a transformation in the position of Negro and Puerto Rican workers who formerly had no or weak unions and worked at low wages, and we have seen the movement of Negroes into existing strong unions. We are now seeing Negroes moving into many skilled trades where formerly their representation was infinitesimal. In the Cutters local of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union—the highest-paid occupation in the industry—there were, in 1962, about 250 Negro and Spanish-speaking cutters, mostly the latter. In 1968, of 6,843 dress cutters, 283 were Negro and 513 Spanish-speaking; and in that year, of 392 new members of the union, 178 were Negro and Spanish-speaking.

Among the Cloak Pressers, another high-paid local of the I.L.G.W.U., of 1,396 members, 659 are now Negro, Spanish-speaking, or Oriental.*

* These estimates and figures are from union officials and from stories in the *New York Times* (and once again these are probably from union officials). A letter to the *New York Times* on December 3, 1969, from the chairman of the Rank and File Committee of the Transport Workers Union, Mr. Joseph S. Carnegie, asserts 70 per cent of operating personnel of the transit system are black. The letter is moderate and persuasive and suggests that the voice of many unionized black employees is quite different from that of black militants who get more publicity. Mr. Carnegie writes:

The Rank and File Committee of the Transport Workers Union . . . was formed nine years ago to promote democratic reforms within that union. It has never been 100 per cent black, although its leadership has been predominantly black. As a matter of fact, in 1965 the Rank and File Committee ran a slate in opposition to the leadership of the T.W.U. for top offices, and four of our six candidates were white. . . . The leadership of the T.W.U. has always reflected the group which once made up the majority of its workers: The Irish. Why are we now labeled "black separatist" when we only seek to organize a democratic union which will fight in the interests of all workers and reflect in its leadership the ethnic composition of the industry?

Mr. Carnegie's letter has certainly not hurt his cause.

As is well known, the construction industry (except for laborers) has remained for many years almost Negro-free, and its complex modes of recruitment—through apprenticeship, and through the adoption of journeymen who have achieved membership in other cities—have been peculiarly resistant to efforts to bring Negroes into these high-paying trades. Bald or subtle discrimination has played an important role in severely limiting jobs for Negroes in the building trades. Finally, after many years of frustration, Negroes are coming into these unions. One of the most impressive roles in bringing this about has been the Joint Apprenticeship Program of the Workers Defense League and the A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund. The story of how they decided to train young Negroes to the point where they could pass the difficult examinations required for entry into apprenticeship is a remarkable one, for it involved the devising of new teaching techniques to do in a few weeks what the schools had not done in years. In the last three years, 700 to 800 have been placed in building and apprenticeship programs in New York City. Minorities are now beginning to enter these most difficult-to-enter trades in proportions closer to their proportion in the city's population as a whole. About 20 to 30 per cent of new apprenticeship classes are black or Puerto Rican. Since apprenticeship training is not open to workers over 26, there is a serious need for *lateral* entry into the building trades of black and Puerto Rican journeymen and journeymen-trainees. Lateral entry is common in the building trades, but Negroes have rarely entered that way. The idea of journeymen-trainees is important because there are many partially skilled Negroes over twenty-six who could become journeymen with some intensive on-the-job training. If this is done in tandem with apprenticeship programs, blacks and Puerto Ricans will soon control a fair share of the high-prestige, high-wage building trades jobs.*

* See "Testing Human Potential: Report of Conference for Testing New Techniques for Selecting Employees from Minority Groups, April 25, 26, 1968" (mimeographed), The City of New York Commission on Human Rights, pp. 68–71, for an impressive account of the work of this project by Dennis A. Derryck. An earlier publication of The City of New York Commission on Human Rights gives a picture of the slow progress and the complex barriers in this field, "Bias in the Build-

There have been similar changes in the area of white-collar work. Negroes have shown a much greater increase in the percentage holding white-collar jobs than whites. The percentage of Puerto Ricans holding white-collar jobs has, according to the same surveys, declined. But as we pointed out earlier, those of Puerto Rican parentage, born on the mainland, do show a substantial increase in percentage holding white-collar jobs.[18]

In March, 1968, the Commission on Human Rights held hearings on minority employment in the

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ing Industry, an updated report, 1963–67." It reports that in 1963 and 1964 changes in federal and state legislation provided for the selection of apprentices on the basis of merit. As New York State law and implementing regulations put it, "Apprentices shall be selected on the basis of qualifications alone, as determined by objective criteria which permit review." "As a result," the report continues,

> the previous "father-son" clauses and the "sponsorship" requirements were eliminated. . . . The new procedures based on objective criteria showed the first encouraging results at year-end 1966 and in early 1967. The statistics and the testimony indicate that non-white apprentices have been admitted into certain crafts for the first time. In some cases, they represent a substantial percentage of the new admissions. The most dramatic results took place in the Ironworkers. Of 55 applicants admitted, 15 were Negroes, 2 were Indians, and 1 was a Filipino. In the Sheetmetal Workers, 14 out of 60 were non-whites in one test, and 24 out of 60 passed the last test . . . in the Stone Derrickman's Union, 3 of the 8 successful candidates were non-whites; . . . in the Electricians union . . . 40 of the 161 successful candidates were non-whites.
>
> The commission notes with interest that all except one of the successful candidates were recruited and tutored for the tests by a private civil rights agency, the Workers' Defense League in association with the A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund. (Pp. 31–32)

There are three observations to be made on this story: (1) One area of control in the hands of skilled workers has been reduced—the "father-son" clauses and the "sponsorship" clauses permitted fathers and uncles to make it easier for sons and nephews to get into high-paid occupations. Admittedly this reduction of power was necessary to increase opportunities for blacks. Yet middle-class professionals who secure their children's futures by means of expensive private school and college education should appreciate the feelings of workers who secure their children's futures, insofar as they can, through control of jobs. And if blacks are resentful because they lack sufficient power, understandably workers become resentful at the loss of some part of theirs. (2) The shift to merit standards, combined with the creative tutoring and training programs of the Joint Apprenticeship Program, was able to secure substantial percentages of places for blacks and other minority group members. (3) In 1969 quite new tactics to increase these proportions of blacks in the building trades made their appearance: blocking construction on various sites (Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Tufts and Harvard Universities) and the demand for fixed quotas.

advertising and broadcasting industry. It had surveyed the degree of such employment in September, 1967. A program of affirmative action was devised after the hearings, and a new survey of minority employment was conducted in September, 1968. One year after the first survey, and only seven months after the hearings, the following changes were recorded:[19]

	September, 1967		September, 1968	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Thirty-five Advertising Agencies				
Total employees	17,008		16,062	
Negro	609	3.5	829	5.1
Puerto Rican	265	1.5	287	1.8
Three Broadcasting Networks (ABC, CBS, NBC)				
Total employees	10,888		10,703	
Negro	572	5.3	721	6.7
Puerto Rican	141	1.3	216	2.0

Obviously, there are various ways of looking at these figures. As Daniel Bell says about a glass with water halfway up to the brim, we can consider it half-full or half-empty. Regardless of how we consider it, the change in one year, in industries with declining or stable numbers of employees, is remarkable. It is quite clear that new employees are being drawn disproportionately from minority groups, a situation which is as it should be if they are to improve their economic position.

Of course, these percentages are averages between tiny proportions of Negroes and Puerto Ricans, if any, in high-paying and policy-making jobs, and larger proportions in jobs of inferior income and status. Yet the numbers in the higher levels increased at a faster rate than the over-all increase in Negro personnel. And this was the work of one year. How much we may ascribe to the action of the Commission on Human Rights and how much to the simple reality of increasing numbers of qualified Negro and Puerto Rican individuals getting jobs through the regular operations of the labor market is unclear, but we suspect as much is owing to the latter as to the former.

We may point to other areas where Negroes are taking up not only white-collar jobs with security but jobs with some authority. Substantial numbers of Negroes

hold important jobs in city government. The number of Negro professional employees in the unions with large Negro membership has in the last few years increased rapidly. For example, 40 of the 100 professionals on the staff of the State, County and Municipal Employees union are now Negro and Puerto Rican. In other unions, Negroes are now pushing to take over top leadership. (Top leadership in unions, as is generally known, is peculiarly long-lived.) But Negroes are still underrepresented in the top offices of unions in which they form a large part of the membership. We expect this will change rapidly in the next few years.

Another area of professional jobs and policy-making in which Negroes now dominate is the neighborhood-oriented programs spawned by the poverty program and the related programs of manpower development, model cities, neighborhood school districts, and the like. These programs, whatever changes occur at the top, are here to stay. Some form of community organization and community-related social programming is inevitable. How many Negroes and Puerto Ricans work in this field it is hard to say, but 14,300 persons are employed in the anti-poverty programs of the Human Resources Administration, and the great majority of these are Negro and Puerto Rican.[20]

There are scattered figures that we suggest mark a trend: the incorporation of greater and greater numbers of Negroes and Puerto Ricans into stable working-class and white-collar occupations, with some degree of security and of the fringe benefits—vacations, medical benefits, sickness pay, retirement benefits—which the ordinary American worker has achieved. Yet the official orientation to race relations in the city has ignored this large, stable working-class and middle-class group. If policy-makers had been more consistently aware of this group, the perverseness of believing, as some seemed to, that the Negro community is made up only of welfare mothers, demonstrating students, and "young bloods" would have been avoided.

The more conservative tendencies in the Negro community have gone underground, for a variety of reasons. One is that the mass media and public figures did not recognize them, and certainly we are given a sense of

our identity and numbers by an outer, symbolic acknowledgment. The mass media and public figures did recognize, seek out, and direct the full thrust of their policy to the excluded groups, a laudable aim but one which also had the political disadvantage of losing white sympathies, as they, too, fell in with the illusion that this was all that the Negro community consisted of. In addition, the militant elements gained support from the youth of the better-off working-class and middle-class Negroes. These were influenced by the great change that overtook American political thinking in the 1960's, a change which reawakened and strengthened many old radical interpretations and understandings of American society. The force and strength of these new tendencies, in the black communities as well as the white, silenced older and more moderate elements, which (and again these tendencies were supported by the mass media) were confused by self-doubts.

In the case of the Puerto Ricans, militant elements were weaker, and conservative, traditional, and reformist elements were stronger.[21] Puerto Ricans received only a fraction of the attention that policy-makers and mass media lavished on black militants. Traditional approaches to social mobility, such as the work of "Aspira" in getting Puerto Rican youngsters into college, played a larger role in the over-all pattern than in the black community.

And yet a policy that assumed that all Negroes were militant, just as a policy that assumed all were poor, was seriously mistaken.

First, the facts themselves indicated that militants could elect almost nobody in black communities; the elected officials tended to be from the major moderate groups, even though their rhetoric began to reflect the change in the Negro communities.

Second, certain policies were adopted which ignored the feelings and desires of the stable working-class and middle-class groups. One example of such policies was the effort to build public housing on land adjacent to the apartment houses and homes of the stable working class and middle class. One of the chief misfortunes facing Negroes in this city, as we pointed out in *Beyond the Melting Pot,* is that, owing to discrimination in housing and a lim-

ited housing choice, they cannot choose their neighbors. The respectable are forced to live next to those they dislike and despise. A policy that insists that housing for the lower classes should be built in carefully protected stable neighborhoods hurts working-class and middle-class blacks more than it hurts whites. For the whites *did* have larger choices, the blacks were more limited. To a liberal mind, it seems reasonable that all people should live together. To a man painfully working himself up, the opportunity to escape from his problem-ridden neighbors is far more important than this abstract ideal. This was true for the immigrants of the early twentieth century. It was only ironically when the Negroes were ready to make this change that ideology insisted they should not escape.*

Third, policies directed to the militants strengthened the militants. Very often what they wanted was so poorly thought out or presented that no policy could accommodate them, but they personally could be accommodated. They could be listened to by boards and commissions, placed on them, given television time, taken seri-

* For a criticism of this policy, see Irving Kristol and Paul Weaver, "Who Knows New York? Notes on a Mixed-up City," *The Public Interest,* No. 16, Summer, 1969, pp. 41–63. Mark Zussman, "Superblock in Bed-Stuy," in *The Village Voice,* December 11, 1969, describes the effects, in one case, of ignoring the reality that there are middle-class and working-class stable homeowning black families as well as lower-class unstable ones, and that the first do not think their children or their immediate neighborhoods will be improved by close contact with the second. The story records the effort of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation to build a "superblock," linking two blocks more closely together through elegant contemporary urban design. The better-off families on one of the blocks resisted the link.

A story in the *New York Times* of December 28, 1969, gives another example of the conflict between poorer and better-off blacks. It reports the dismay of homeowning Negroes in two school districts on Long Island at the increase in the number of welfare families (black) among them. The issue is not racial at all: white homeowners would resist the increase in welfare families (white or black), and black homeowners resist the increase in welfare families (white or black).

> Many black middle class residents in both communities have come to resent the fact that their schools have had to absorb such a large number of welfare students. Many feel that the quality of education in their district has gone down because of the high proportion of students on welfare: 50 per cent in Wyandanch and 30 per cent in Roosevelt. The children of the welfare clients are often behind in reading and other subjects. As a result, some middle-class blacks have become part of a second migration out of the communities. . . .

ously. Their nonsense was very often accepted as simple decent common sense that everyone must accept.

One of the most striking examples of the disasters that ensued from considering militants the sole voice of the Negroes and Puerto Ricans could be seen at the City College of New York in the spring of 1969. Here Negro and Puerto Rican militant students demanded 50 per cent of the entering places at the college for Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Apparently no one argued with them, to say, for example, that this was far more than their proportion among high school graduates in the city; that to abandon standards for admission was to reduce the value of the City College diploma for those who did get in; that it was unfair to hundreds of Negroes and Puerto Ricans (leaving aside others) who had worked to attain the high standards for admission; that it would destroy a major resource by which poor groups in the past had improved themselves. That resource, the City College of New York, was created not by a distinguished faculty, or lavish resources, or prestige based on class and connections but by only one thing—a student body selected on the basis of academic qualifications alone. Destroy that, and City College would mean no more for those who attended it than a hundred community colleges around the country.

All these, and there were probably other good arguments, seem to have played no role in the negotiations that followed (which were, in any case, conducted in private). From whatever leaked out, the only point of the negotiations was to determine how the initial demand could be accommodated without it appearing as if a simple racial and ethnic quota had been established. It was no wonder that when candidate Mario Procaccino, a City College graduate, went to court to force the reopening of the College, he created what turned out to be one of the most potent issues in the Democratic primary.[22]

We do not know how hard-working middle-class and working-class Negroes and Puerto Ricans responded to this sad story. One suspects they were at least torn, for their efforts to instill in their children the desirability of hard work and discipline were undermined by such a demand.

Just as one illusion of racial politics in the 1960's in New York was that all blacks were poor and militant, another illusion was that all whites were affluent. Most of the Irish had taken three generations to work themselves out of poverty, the Italians two, the Jews had moved somewhat faster. But all these groups knew they had worked their way out of poverty at a time when government aid to the poor was nonexistent or more moderate, when mass public education was more restricted, when manpower development programs did not exist, and they found it difficult to understand the demand of "high income and high position now." That was in effect the demand: not jobs now, because jobs existed; not poverty-level maintenance income for those who could not work, for that, too, existed; but high income and high position now.[23] These groups had been trained in working and waiting a long time to achieve high income and high position. We have pointed out in *Beyond the Melting Pot* how endless was the process whereby, in the Irish Catholic controlled Democratic party, a man achieved high position. He began work at the bottom, in the precinct, and might in decades work himself nearer to the top. The same was true in the government jobs that many Irish, Italians, and Jews took.

The white ethnic groups were familiar with the processes of bureaucratic advancement—how long a time was necessary at one level to reach the next. Many Negroes, excluded from this kind of experience, were not, and were unaware when they made demands for Negroes in high position in various bureaucratic organizations, government and nongovernment, how shocking and immoral these demands appeared to those who had served their time.

At one of those conferences in which businessmen meet with Negroes (generally, alas, black militants who move from conference to conference providing denunciation for whites), a company president described the program of his company in bringing Negroes into various jobs. A Negro demanded: "How many Negroes run your plants?" The businessman, taken aback: "None." "Why not?" "Well, it takes a long time to learn how to run a plant, maybe twenty-five or thirty years. It's a very responsible job, most of our Negro employees have only been with the company

a short time." "Do you expect Negroes to wait *that long* for a good job?"

There is an answer to this, "Everyone else has." Unfortunately, many Negroes, and in particular militant leaders, are not aware of this. And if everyone else has waited, they don't see why Negroes shouldn't wait, too. Obviously, there are rights on both sides here. Negroes must be advanced rapidly to high and authoritative positions as symbols of the fact that they form a full part of the society, as encouragement to others, to utilize their real talents, and primarily to create a unified and integrated society. But if one does not recognize that there are rights on *both* sides, one's policies will be clumsy, obtuse, and ineffective.

One key fact that is often ignored is that most members of the white ethnic groups are *not* successful. And just as race relations policy should take into account working-class and middle-class Negroes, so should it take into account not-so-affluent whites. We do not know just how ethnic groups are distributed by income and occupation, since the census gives us little assistance and is, in any case, badly out of date. But a sample survey of New York adults taken in 1963 offers some ground for thought on this issue. Thus, if we consider professional employment alone, 9.5 per cent of Negroes were so engaged, compared to 3 per cent of Puerto Ricans, 5 per cent of Italians (first and second generation), 9 per cent of Irish (first and second generation), 11 per cent of other Catholics (including third and higher generations of Italian and Irish), 10.5 per cent of foreign-born Jews, 21.5 per cent of native-born Jews, and 22 per cent of white Protestants. From the point of view of the Puerto Rican, using this measure alone, the Negro is doing quite well; from the point of view of the Italians, Negroes include a large number of professionals. More of the Negro professionals are women. But even when we consider men alone, 8.5 per cent of Negroes are professionals, compared to 4.7 of Puerto Ricans, 7.7 of Irish first and second generation, 8.1 of Italian first and second generation, and higher proportions of the other groups. The proportion of Negroes who are in professional statuses one would guess has increased more rapidly than for other groups since 1963.[24] But the point of these statistics is simply to argue that it is

not true that every white sees every Negro in an inferior and deprived position. In consequence, it is not true that every white opposing policies and demands that are aimed at raising the number of Negroes in good jobs and high-paying jobs is simply acting out of racism. He may be acting as much out of a sense of fair shares, the proper reward for merit, the right relation between effort and income. In this case, to attack his resistance on the ground that he is being racist and selfish is politically totally ineffective and self-defeating; to understand that his resistance is based on a sense of what is right and proper, a sense that we would not want to destroy, is to come closer to finding approaches to moderating white resistance to policies that will improve the economic position of Negroes.

THE CATHOLICS AND THE JEWS

CONTRIBUTING TO THE MALAISE OF THE WHITE WORKING AND lower middle classes in the city has been the startling decline in the power of the Irish and Italian groups, and by the same token, of Catholics, for in New York, as we have pointed out many times, to name an occupational group or a class is very much the same thing as naming an ethnic group, and to name an ethnic group is very much the same thing as naming a religious group.

Among the most notable events in New York City during the 1960's was the decline, almost the collapse, of Catholic power. This is not a misnomer. "New York," we wrote in the opening sentence of the chapter on "The Irish," "used to be an Irish city." That meant a Catholic city as well: one in which the Church had temporal as well as spiritual power. This culminated, even as it declined, in the long reign of Francis Cardinal Spellman as Archbishop of New York, ruling from his episcopal throne in St. Patrick's Cathedral. Spellman was feared, disliked, and heeded. It went on too long by half. His successor, whom he had chosen (having first, some said, laid it down to Rome that either he would be permitted personally to pick the next man or he would refuse to die), seemed almost to sense this and promptly assumed a posture much more in keeping with reality. New York's Catholics might still be, probably were, a majority of the population, but

in all other senses—of political power, of wealth, of intellect, of energy—they were a minority and had best get used to behaving as such.

A series of events brought all this about. As with all ethnic history in New York, the most important event was the arrival of new groups. The era of Catholic ascendancy in New York came to an end in the aftermath of the arrival, for the first time in large numbers, of the Jews and then the Negroes. The process was slow at first but then accelerated and became almost vengeful. By the end of the decade, in the entire hierarchy of government officials elected in statewide or citywide elections, there was but one lonely Catholic, Malcolm Wilson, the lieutenant governor. In New York City, following the 1969 election, the powerful Board of Estimate, consisting of the mayor, the comptroller, the president of the council, and the five borough presidents, consisted of five Jews, one white Protestant, one black Protestant, and, again, one lonely Catholic, Robert T. Conner. (Significantly, both he and the lieutenant governor were Republicans. Catholic Democrats had disappeared altogether.) In the weighted voting of the Board of Estimate, Jews had fourteen votes, Protestants six, Catholics two. In 1963 when *Beyond the Melting Pot* was first published, the Catholic representation was quite the reverse. The Board of Estimate had five Catholics, two Jews, and one black Protestant. The voting strength was Catholics fourteen, Jews six, and Protestants two.

This process had been predictable enough with respect to the decline of Irish power, and we had so predicted. But the decline of Catholic power was not, at least by us, foreseen. Nor, in retrospect, is it easily explained.

One element not to be overlooked is the almost mechanical process whereby a dominant group fractionates and creates the conditions for its own decline. Once securely in power, Catholics began to fall out with one another, in the seemingly fixed pattern of these things. (Al Smith remarked that the only time the Irish stood together was for the Last Gospel at Sunday Mass.) Interestingly, it is the Jews, who have replaced the Irish in power and influence, who are now the most politically divided group in

the city. But this is not the whole of the story. The Jews did not merely fill a vacuum; their success involved something more than "just being around," the phrase with which Smith was wont to describe the source of his rise in the scheme of things. The Jews also *ousted* the Catholics. They did this in direct toe-to-toe encounter in a hundred areas of the city's life, and, also, they carried out a brilliant outflanking maneuver involving the black masses of the city, which combined in inextricable detail elements of pure charity, enlightened self-interest, and plain ethnic combativeness.

A full analysis of this complex process has to consider some matter-of-fact political realities. Before the fifties, Jews in New York City were divided among the Democratic party, Republican party and fusion, and left and liberal third parties—Socialists, American Labor, Liberals. In the fifties and sixties, they increasingly concentrated in the Democratic party. Meanwhile, Catholics, concentrated in the Democratic party in earlier decades, divided by moving into the Republican and new Conservative parties. But simultaneously Jews maintained their attachment to liberals of any party and religion. The result was to eclipse Catholic power within the Democratic party, and limit any rise outside it. But this is only one element in Catholic decline.

At the beginning of the century, the Catholic population had its share, at very least, of the most vibrant people of the city in politics, in business, and in the arts, and were quite dominant in areas of immigrant achievement such as sports (where, indeed, they had created a pattern of upward mobility via the prize rings, and the like, that others were to follow precisely). A third of a century later, this was no longer so clearly the case. The Jews were beginning to make their impact. They dominated radical politics, were well established in business, and already intellectually ascendant (withal the nation did not yet realize it). The La Guardia administration for the first time brought Jews in large numbers into positions of political influence.

In the middle third of the century that followed, the Jewish position was expanded and consolidated. This process was hastened, and even in ways made possible,

by the rise of Hitler in the 1930's and the extraordinary economic expansion in the United States that commenced in the 1940's. The first led to an intense sense of group identity and group interests among New York Jews—a tradition common enough with them in any event—and also added to their numbers through immigration a small but amazingly gifted group, the German and Central European refugees.[25] The founding of Israel further intensified this development. Economic expansion brought wealth to the businessmen, influence to the professionals, and something very like power to the Jewish scientists and intellectuals. It may be the cold war should be listed here as well. Jews were the dominant group in the American Communist party during the thirties and forties.[26] But they were also the dominant group among the Socialist groups, of the left and right, that opposed the Communists, and dominant in the increasingly important intellectual opposition to the Communists that grew in this country in the thirties and the forties. When the cold war broke out, they inevitably supplied a good number of the experts—who else had spent their college (and even high school) years fighting the Stalinists? And, in addition, Jews had entered the new social sciences in enormous numbers: sociology, economics, political science. Thus, Jews were prominent among the intellectuals who developed the military and diplomatic strategies of the 1940's and 1950's—and also among those who opposed them.

In the new scientific elite, which also played its role in the developing cold war, Jews were again everywhere and often on both sides of each issue. Oppenheimer confronted Teller, and Lewis Strauss turned the issue into one of the great dramas of postwar American history.

The point is that the Jews were everywhere, doing everything. In New York, with the largest Jewish population in the world, they simply outclassed their competition, which was Protestant in business, professional, and intellectual circles, and Catholic in the political ones.

Of all the triumphs of the Jewish style in America of the 1960's, none, surely, was as bizarre or unlikely as the radicalizing of the elite youth of the Eastern seaboard patriciate. By the end of the 1960's, the best preparatory schools of the area were torn with doctrinal dis-

putes between leftist factions anathematizing one another over alleged deviations from doctrines setting forth the true role of the working class in a prerevolutionary phase. Pure C.C.N.Y., circa 1937. And if the prep school boys did not do it especially well, it must surely be marveled, as Dr. Johnson said of the lady preacher, that they did it at all.

All this happened to Jews at a time when rather the opposite was happening to Catholics. The intellectual and cultural sterility described in *Beyond the Melting Pot* gave way before the combined influence of Pope John and the *embourgeoisement* of large sectors of the Catholic population, and was followed by a period of considerable vitality, in comparison at least with the past, but also considerable fractionating.* The embattled solidarity of the anti-Communist period also broke up as that issue gradually became, or seemed to become, less central to the nation's life. Catholics started popping up on every side of the political and moral issues of the day. Thus, in 1969, Monsignor, now Bishop, Fulton J. Sheen declared himself in favor of the United States getting out of Vietnam, and doing so quickly. The nation, he declared, was suffering a nervous breakdown over the whole affair. Doubtless, good sense. But, also, in a curious way, a confession of failure. All those speeches to the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick had been pretty poor stuff, had they not? Poor *intellectually.* The New York Catholics had been so very right about a limited number of things—Joseph Stalin was *not* a nice man—only in the end to be judged to have been wrong about most. Their cultural history, like the history of their politicians, would be written by their enemies or their betters. After fifty years and more of maintaining the loyalty of the American working class to democratic institutions, they would be judged to have done little more than to have

* The 1960's were not at all a barren period for Catholic scholarship. To the contrary, in a period when Jewish and Protestant radical intellectuals became political actors of some consequence, with an accompanying decline in the quality of their work, theologians at institutions such as Fordham began to do quite serious work. It was just that—serious work—and had no popular impact save indirectly through the peace movement, but the foundations of some future influence were perhaps being laid. It is at least worth noting that Eugene McCarthy was by far the most intellectual political figure the Democrats had produced since Wilson.

contributed the term "McCarthyism" to the language. And now, they couldn't even get elected to the Board of Estimate any more.

In largest measure, the passing of the Catholic ascendancy, as a normal, predictable, understood fact about the city, arose from a failure of intellect. There just weren't enough smart Catholics around: smart as district leaders, as playwrights, as professors of molecular biology. The century and a half of unprecedented support of a private educational system had come to little, certainly nothing distinctive. But there was a further factor involved. The 1960's brought the issue of race to the city as it had not existed before. In New York, as elsewhere in the North, this created a range of conflict situations in which Negroes confronted *Catholics.* Not just Irish and Italian Catholics, but also a great range of middle Europeans with very little political or public presence (so little that they could all be lumped under the common term of "Ethnics") but with a sizable interest in the maintenance of patterns of residency, employment, and education that Negroes now threatened by the simple fact of their presence and consequent need for a place to live, a job to provide income, a school to provide education. There followed a classic encounter between working-class and middle-class styles in politics, which, in New York, had come to be Catholic and Jewish styles, respectively. A clue can be found in Selig Perlman's analysis of trade unionism, which arose, he concluded, from a pervasive sense among workers of the scarcity of economic opportunity. (Middle-class intellectuals typically get this wrong, ascribing all manner of universalist and egalitarian intention to what is in fact an effort to keep other people from invading what is seen as a limited and threatened means of making a living.) The newcomers inevitably aroused anxieties. Theirs was a very real threat, and it soon enough acquired substance as black neighborhoods grew, job markets were transformed, schools changed, and so through the various forms by which a new group makes its presence felt.

In New York a game followed in which there were in essence the five players constituting the groups described in *Beyond the Melting Pot* and, in addition, an

elite Protestant group. The play went something as follows. The Protestants and better-off Jews determined that the Negroes and Puerto Ricans were deserving and in need and, on those grounds, further determined that these needs would be met by concessions of various kinds from the Italians and the Irish (or, generally speaking, from the Catholic players) and the worse-off Jews. The Catholics resisted, and were promptly further judged to be opposed to helping the deserving and needy. On these grounds their traditional rights to govern in New York City *because they were so representative of just such groups* were taken from them and conferred on the two other players, who had commenced the game and had in the course of it demonstrated that those at the top of the social hierarchy are better able to empathize with those at the bottom. Whereupon ended a century of experiment with governance by men of the people. Liberalism triumphed and the *haute bourgeoisie* was back in power.

The ethnic politics of New York in the 1960's can be understood only if this not especially pleasant process is seen for what it is. Or was. The Catholic ascendancy in New York had been based first on numbers, but second on a reasonably well grounded assumption that they, normally as Democrats, would best look after the interests of ordinary people, and would be especially concerned for the least well off, being themselves only recently emerged from that condition. The Protestant elite of the city had always challenged that assumption, asserting instead that the Tammany bosses were boodlers, pure and simple, or in a slightly different formulation, such as that of Lincoln Steffens, were merely paid lackeys of the really Big Boodlers. Either way the charge was that they did not truly represent the people as they claimed to do. In three elections out of four, the masses would choose to believe Charlie Murphy's version rather than that of the *New York Times*. But the effort persisted and in the 1950's acquired a new and devastating tactic. The educated middle class, mostly in the form of young Jewish liberals, began competing for control of the Democratic party machinery itself. In the 1960's they succeeded in breaking Carmine DeSapio, who will probably be regarded as the last of the powerful Democratic party chieftains. (As remarked in *Beyond the Melting Pot,* they could

destroy DeSapio, but they could not replace him. In the process, they had destroyed a style of politics.) And almost at that moment, the central issue of politics in the city turned from "Bossism" to "Racism," and here, the Catholics were wholly outclassed. And also, in a way, outmaneuvered. For when the city turned to the issue of race in the mid-1960's, it did not thereby turn away from the issue of who would control the political system. To the contrary, the struggle over racial issues became in many ways a surrogate struggle for control of the city government and the Democratic party. In the end, the Catholics, who had dominated both, lost out.

Many things happened, of which the most important is that from the outset, Jews, in a great variety of roles, defined the new problem. (Not all of them public roles by any means. During this period, if a famous civil rights leader made a speech, the chances were at least even that it had been written by a Jewish speech writer.) And the first thing they did was to define the difficulties facing the Negroes as being in most respects identical to those earlier faced by Jews. In essence, this was the situation of the approach of a highly competitive group so threatening to the established position of others that artificial barriers are raised to restrict and limit the success experienced by the new group (for example, quotas in medical schools).

Reality was almost completely the opposite. The black immigrants in New York City in the 1950's and 1960's were a displaced peasantry, not at all unlike their Irish and Italian predecessors, most, in truth, like the Irish, who arrived with all the stigmata acquired from living under rulers of a different race. (The gulf between ruler and ruled in, say, eighteenth-century Ireland was just as great as that between black and white in the American South.) The Negroes were not highly competitive; they were undercompetitive. They had been raised that way in the South, and were not instantly transformed by Bedford-Stuyvesant, which became not a ghetto but a slum. Taking all references to racial or ethnic identity out of university admission applications, and forbidding photographs, would not automatically double or triple the proportion of Negroes admitted to the Columbia Medical School. It might have

quite the opposite effect. But, nonetheless, in one form or another, the situation of the black masses was likened to that of an earlier group that had been artificially and systematically denied successes that would otherwise have accrued to them by a process of discrimination. The response of society would have to be to forbid such discrimination and to punish the discriminators by opening up their restricted preserves to equal opportunity.

Stated in these terms, which are simplified but not exaggerated, it will be seen that this interpretation of the situation of the blacks served a very considerable agenda. It was, first of all, responsive to the genuine concern of New York Jews for the desperate conditions in which so many blacks lived in New York, and the hideous past from which they had escaped. (How could they fail to interpret such things in light of their own experience?) It was responsive to the enlightened self-interest of the Jews, and any other group in the city, to see the black newcomers grow prosperous and successful, as had their predecessors in one degree or another. *But it also served to ascribe, or impute, a good deal of wrongdoing to working-class Catholics who weren't especially conscious of wrongdoing at all.* Moreover, it set up situations of conflict between black and white working-class interests which, no matter who won the battle, ended with the white workers losing the war. No matter what happened, *they* ended up as "racists" and "bigots." And at no cost to upper-middle-class players. It was demanded that trade unions be opened up to the newcomers, with all the primitive fears that would arouse. But it was rarely argued that blacks must be admitted to brokerage firms or law offices. (More to the point, when it was so argued, concessions were easy to make. The upper-middle-class persons involved were not gripped by concern over the scarcity of opportunity. They were more likely to be concerned by the scarcity of Harvard Law School graduates to help with the burgeoning practice. Significantly, when the generalized threat of black competition made its way into the school system, where lower-middle-class Jewish teachers —persons not unlike building trade unionists, trained to one job, and not likely to get another one as good—were exposed, New York experienced the most dangerous racial

crisis in its history.) In any event, as this process continued, the fitness of the Catholic majority of the city to govern was increasingly and effectively challenged. On the day after Mayor Lindsay, in 1969, was defeated by an Italian Catholic for renomination by his own party, he ascribed his defeat to "bigots." And although he was later thought to be paying not a little attention to the bigot vote, the fact is that, on this issue, he won reelection against quite extraordinary odds. It was in this election that the Catholic ascendancy in New York City finally dissolved. Without doubt, there will be periods of Catholic rule in the future. But the era is over.

One aspect of the decline of Catholic power has been the failure of the Italians to make a larger impact on the city scene. Everything we have said of the Catholics holds even more strongly for the Italians. The working-class style as against the middle-class style marks them, even as they move in larger and larger numbers into the middle class. Their ability to take over leadership, in the mass media, in education, in the newer sectors of economic development, in politics, even in the Church, has been limited. In *Beyond the Melting Pot* we explored some of the aspects of the Italian-American cultural and social style that seem to have contributed to these limitations. The ties of family, neighborhood, friends, the choice of these over against the claims of higher education and lonely ambition, have produced many of the most attractive families, neighborhoods, and friendships in New York. (Italians have a genius for making cities livable.) But somehow the ethos has not gone beyond that to create a presumption of leadership in city affairs.

The reasons are complex. But high among them would have to be listed the curse of the Mafia. In the 1960's the curse compounded. Not only did the Italian population continue to suffer from the exactions of its criminal element—a basic ecological rule being that criminals prey first of all on those nearest them—but also the charge, or fear, or presumption of "Mafia connections" affected nearly the entire Italian community. Injustice leading to yet more injustice: that is about what happened. During the 1960's the mass media, *and the non-Italian politicians,*

combined to make the Mafia a household symbol of evil and wrongdoing. Television ran endless crime series, such as *The Untouchables,* in which the criminals were, for all purposes, exclusively Italian. Attorneys General, of whom Robert F. Kennedy was the archetype, made the "war against organized crime" a staple of national politics. As Attorney General, Kennedy produced Joseph Valachi, who informed the nation that the correct designation of the syndicate was not Mafia but "Cosa Nostra"—"Our thing." True or not, the designation was solemnly accepted by the media, with an air almost of gratitude for the significance of the information thus divulged. On the occasions that a reputed "family head" would pass away (often as not peaceably, amidst modest comfort in Nassau County), the *New York Times* would discourse learnedly on what the probable succession would be.

This is rather an incredible set of facts. Ethnic sensitivities in New York, in the nation, have never been higher than during the 1960's. To accuse a major portion of the population of persistent criminality would seem a certain course of political or commercial disaster. But it was not. The contrast with the general "elite" response to Negro crime is instructive. Typically, the latter was blamed on white society. Black problems were muted, while Italian problems were emphasized, even exaggerated. Why?

We do not know. There may have been some displacement of antiblack feeling to Italians, possibly as a consequence of the association of the Mafia with the drug traffic, and the latter's association with high rates of black crime.* It may be that society needs an unpopular group around, and the Italians were for many reasons available. Democratic reformers, in largest number Jews but also including among them political figures who had come from the Irish Catholic and white Protestant groups, were

* Blacks were increasingly sensitive to this issue. In 1969 a pamphlet distributed by the Blackman's Development Center in Washington, D.C., raised the matter directly. There are relatively few Italians in the capital, but the appearance of the drug traffic there was generally attributed to the New York Mafia. The leaflet called for action. "The only people that can break white-face dog Mafia, Mafiosi and Costra-Nostra [sic] selling illegal heroin and other dope to our school children, our families is *ourselves.*"

able to use the Italian association with crime to topple any number of Italian political leaders and, perhaps more important, to prevent others from acquiring any ascendancy.* Many political figures thus gained advantage. But in the end it was the weakness of the group itself that was decisive.

This might be symbolized by the near to total failure of the Italian-American "Anti-Defamation League" established during the 1960's to combat anti-Italian prejudice. It was not only modeled, it was apparently named after the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, but the results were in no way similar. The ADL has access to an extraordinary range of Jewish intellectuals, writers, professors, publishers, publicists, moving picture and, more recently, television executives, who happen to be Jewish. These in turn connect with almost the entire network of public opinion making in America. In New York this is known as clout. It is something which in this field Italians simply do not have. Whether they shall ever, as a group, remains to be seen. There are uncertain signs. Mario Puzo's *The Godfather,* a benign, even romanticized account of the long life and happy death of a particularly repelling brute of a Mafia chieftain, was 40 weeks on the *Times* Best Seller list for 1969, equaling *Portnoy's Complaint.* This is the mark of an emergent self-consciousness but not necessarily of emerging competence in the encounters that count. It is likely that Portnoy will continue to be "Assistant Commissioner for the City of New York Commission on Human Opportunity" under the Lindsay Administration and its successors (there is money to be made in poverty), while the sons and daughters of Puzo's saga will continue to find themselves exploiting themselves and exploited by others. For the rest of the city it has at least been an example of reasonably good grace under pressure.

Of the Catholic groups of the city, none ended the 1960's in less-promising circumstances than did the Puerto Ricans. The expectation voiced in *Beyond the*

* The reformers' luck held in one respect. At the end of the decade DeSapio was convicted on a corruption charge of the kind repeatedly insinuated when he was in power.

Melting Pot that they would leapfrog their black neighbors does not seem to have occurred. To the contrary, Puerto Ricans emerged from the decade as the group with the highest incidence of poverty and the lowest number of men of public position who bargain and broker the arrangements of the city. They had no elected officials, no prominent religious leaders, no writers, no powerful organizations. In the 1969 municipal elections, all 5 of the Puerto Rican candidates (among 246 running for office) lost. Their relations with blacks were not good, especially as the latter took advantage of the opportunities for middle-class persons created by the antipoverty program. But neither could they make much common cause with the coreligionists who had preceded them to the city. In a way, this left the Catholic Church with one of the most serious problems it had yet faced. The religious observance of Puerto Ricans was mixed, but so was that of Italians when they first arrived. Prosperity makes persons more, not less, concerned with such matters. But Puerto Ricans also showed great interest in Pentecostal Protestantism. (An interesting continuity. The first Irish and then Italians to rise to prominence in public affairs in the city were Protestant. So with the first Puerto Rican, Herman Badillo.) If the Puerto Rican mass should abandon Catholicism, or split on the issue, Catholics would shortly become a numerical as well as a political and cultural minority in the city.

And yet, even though Puerto Ricans have done badly, economically and politically, the seventies may be the decade in which the optimism of *Beyond the Melting Pot* is fulfilled. It may still be argued that their poverty and powerlessness is accompanied by little despair and a good deal of hope. Certainly, even though the Negroes are (statistically) better off economically and have much larger representation politically, they show much more despair and much less hope. The explanation for this paradox, we suggest, is that Puerto Ricans still see themselves in the immigrant-ethnic model; that is, they see their poor economic and political position as reflecting recency of arrival and evil circumstances that can still be overcome. Thus, they have an explanation for their poor circumstances that does

not demand revolutionary change. This immigrant-ethnic model is strengthened by the fact that so many new Spanish-speaking immigrants to the city during the 1960's are refugee Cubans and voluntary migrants from various Central and South American countries, who, even more than the Puerto Ricans, see themselves as classic immigrants, fleeing political persecution and economic deprivation to find opportunity in a new country. These non-Puerto Rican Spanish-speaking migrants are, willy-nilly, identified by the rest of the city as "Puerto Rican." Perhaps a new ethnic group, the "Spanish-speaking," is emerging to replace the Puerto Rican. Certainly, the term is coming into widespread use in the city. The Puerto Ricans have to struggle between a conception of themselves as "colonized" and, therefore, "exploited," and a conception of themselves as "immigrants." The first leads to bitterness, the second to hope. The other Spanish-speaking migrants have much less occasion to think of themselves as colonized (though there is an ideology to justify that, too!).

Not that the "colonized" pattern does not have attractions for Puerto Rican youth and intellectuals. There are some stirrings of alliance with blacks who think in this way. A stronger drive in Puerto Rico for independence will affect Puerto Ricans on the mainland. The radical white college youth, who are now so influential in the mass media, will try to convince them they are "colonized." And yet, one detects a strong resistance to this interpretation of the Puerto Rican position becoming popular.

What are the signs that the Puerto Ricans might be following the ethnic-immigrant pattern rather than the colonial pattern? Some are the moderate tone of their politics; their resistance to full identification with militant blacks; the emphasis of their social institutions, few as they are, on personal mobility; their continued emphasis on business, and creating new business, with little outside support (the colonized pattern would be to call for "expropriation"). The 1960's may go down as the worst decade for the Puerto Ricans in New York. Or, we may be wrong, and the long-range economic and political changes in city and country may record the continued agony of the Puerto Ricans in the city.

THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE

AT THE CLOSE OF THE 1960's, THE DEMOCRATS WERE MORE completely out of power in New York state and city government than almost at any time in their history. The oldest organized political party in the world was reduced by way of officeholders to the comptroller in Albany, Arthur Levitt, who had long since become a politically neutral figure, and the comptroller in New York City, Abraham D. Beame, whose career would have to be judged to have passed its apogee.

The decline of the Democrats accompanied, and to some degree merely reflected, the collapse of Catholic power. On the other hand, it is not likely to be a permanent or even a prolonged condition. In party politics prolonged failure typically creates the conditions of eventual success. Thus, by 1970, as Governor Rockfeller completed his third term in office, Republicans had controlled the state government for all but four of the preceding twenty-eight years. By definition, Democratic chances became better. Similarly, the prospect of Mayor Lindsay succeeding to a third term, or of his being followed by another Republican, would not, on form, be good. The Democrats will rise again.

They will not, however, ever be the same. The process of disestablishing the party machinery, which was described in *Beyond the Melting Pot,* has continued almost to the point where there is no machinery. In any number of Eastern cities the decline or destruction of the Democratic working-class parties was followed by the rise of organized crime as the single most effective system for organizing power and influence. (It was, and remains, the theme of many middle-class commentators that organized crime was somehow brought into existence by the "corrupt" party machines. This would seem not at all the case. The relationship was more often that of competing power systems, with an Irish-Italian overlay.) When the Democratic party declined in New York, a quite different group took over, one which had helped engineer that decline, and which benefited from it. It is a group impossible to locate and difficult to describe save perhaps to say that its nucleus, or one of its nuclei, could be said to be those persons who, at a succession of breakfast meetings in Manhattan in 1968–

69, raised fortunes for the campaigns of first Eugene McCarthy, then Hubert H. Humphrey, then John V. Lindsay, and then began gathering to consider who they would raise money for in the coming gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns. Although of distinctly liberal cast of mind, the general sociological point could be made that, in terms of occupation and income and social background, the group was not greatly to be distinguished from the patriciate-plutocracy that in most American cities does try to have a say in things, and usually manages to do so.

To identify this group as "limousine liberals," as Mario Procaccino did in the 1969 mayoralty campaign, or to refer to it as "the Manhattan arrangement," is not far from the facts. It is also a fact that this group beat Procaccino. And herein lies the problem that will continue to plague the Democrats and the city for years to come, whatever the ups and downs of party politics. The Democratic coalition in New York City was shattered in the 1960's. It will never be put back together as a normal condition of politics. In rough terms, this was a coalition of Irish, Italians, Jews, and blacks against the field. They added up to a majority, and they usually won, but those days are now past.

The sources of Irish and Italian-Catholic distaste for and fear of the commercial success and high culture of the Jews (a success increasingly taking the form of familiar WASP power) were described in *Beyond the Melting Pot.* A word may be in order about reciprocal distaste and not so much fear as disdain by the ascendant group.

In an important article that appeared in 1969, Michael Lerner laid out the essentials of this relationship.

> When white . . . students denounce the racist university or racist American society, one has little doubt about what they refer to. One also has little doubt about the political leanings of the speaker. He is a good left-liberal or radical, upper-class or schooled in the assumptions of upper-class liberalism.
>
> Liberal-to-radical students use these phrases and feel purged of the bigotry and racism of people such

as Chicago's Mayor Daley. No one could be further from bigotry, they seem to believe, than they.

But it isn't so. An extraordinary amount of bigotry on the part of elite, liberal students goes unexamined. . . . Directed at the lower middle class, it feeds on the unexamined biases of class perspective, the personality predilections of elite radicals and academic disciplines that support their views.

There are certainly exceptions in the liberal-radical university society—people intellectually or actively aware of and opposed to the unexamined prejudice. But their anomalousness and lack of success in making an ostensibly introspective community face its own disease is striking.

In general, the bigotry of a lower-middle-class policeman toward a ghetto black or of a lower-middle-class mayor toward a rioter is not viewed in the same perspective as the bigotry of an upper-middle-class peace matron toward a lower-middle-class mayor; or of an upper-class university student toward an Italian, a Pole or a National Guardsman from Cicero, Illinois—that is, if the latter two cases are called bigotry at all. The violence of the ghetto is patronized as it is "understood" and forgiven; the violence of a Cicero racist convinced that Martin Luther King threatens his lawn and house and powerboat is detested without being understood. Yet the two bigotries are very similar. For one thing, each is directed toward the class directly below the resident bigot, the class that reflects the dark side of the bigot's life. Just as the upper class recognizes in lower-class lace-curtain morality the veiled uptightness of upper-middle-class life, so the lower-middle-class bigot sees reflected in the lower class the violence, sexuality and poverty that threaten him. The radical may object that he dislikes the lower middle class purely because of its racism and its politics. But that is not sufficient explanation: Polish jokes are devoid of political content.[27]

Significantly, by way of illustration, he cited a world-famous Yale professor of government who, at dinner, "on the day an Italian American announced his candidacy for Mayor of New York," remarked that "If Italians aren't actually an inferior race, they do the best imitation of one I've seen." (It was later also said of Mario Procaccino that he was so sure of being elected that he had ordered new linoleum for

Gracie Mansion. No one said much of anything about John J. Marchi, the Republican and Conservative candidate, whose Tuscan aristocratic style was surely the equal of Lindsay's WASP patrician manner, and who conducted perhaps the most thoughtful campaign of the three.) Procaccino was made out a clod, and was beaten.

These are not unfamiliar sentiments in the world. But they do destroy coalitions, and that has happened in New York. Moreover, in New York City, ethnic tensions were greatly exacerbated by the rise during the 1960's of a peculiarly virulent form of black antiwhite rhetoric that the white elites tolerated and even in ways encouraged because it was, in effect, directed to the same lower-middle-class and working-class groups which they themselves held in such disdain. Lerner* noted an essential fact concerning the Yale professor's comment about Procaccino. "He could not have said that about black people if the subject had been Rap Brown."

Even more essential is the reverse fact that Rap Brown was, at this time, in a metaphoric sense, pretty much free to say anything he wished about the professor, or rather, about "whitey." Indeed, the more provocative the remark, the more likely it was to be taken seriously. This constituted a grievous departure from the rules of ethnic coalition and clearly made an enormous impact on the Democratic party.

In the course of the 1960's, the etiquette of race relations changed. It became possible, even, from the point of view of the attackers desirable for blacks to attack and vilify whites in a manner no ethnic group had ever really done since the period of anti-Irish feeling of the 1840's and 1850's. This was yet another feature of the Southern pattern of race relations, as against the Northern pattern of ethnic group relations, making its impress on the life of the city. There was, of course, an inversion. The "nigger" speech of the Georgia legislature became the "honky" speech of the Harlem street corner, or the national television studio, complete with threats of violence. In this case, it was the whites who were required to remain silent and im-

* Note, there was seemingly no Italian about in 1969 to make Lerner's analysis.

potent in the face of the attack. But the pattern was identical.

The calamity of this development will be obvious. The whites in the North responded much as did the blacks in the South. In New York City it was especially difficult for the white working class to understand. What had *they* done? What were the blacks complaining about? The point here is that the white worker in New York in the 1960's readily enough came to see that *a portion* of the black population of the city had achieved what was, in effect, a privileged status. Thus, Whitney M. Young, Jr., in a public address, could dismiss whites as "affluent peasants," [28] in the certainty that such abrasiveness would in no way jeopardize his well-paid job as director of the National Urban League, his office as president of the National Association of Social Workers, and so through the very considerable perquisites of a race man in New York in the 1960's. Young would reply, and with justice, that such rhetoric was necessary to maintain his "credibility" with black militants. (He was speaking to the separatist, or separated, Association of Black Social Workers, whose numbers in New York alone came to 3,000.) But this hardly improved his credibility with white workers, who almost certainly at this time could sense that social workers are not an especially exploited people.

Doors were opened to blacks everywhere in the city, which would never have been opened to a Pole or a Slovak with similar credentials. And the blacks took it as their due.* Which, in any large perspective of American history, it most certainly was, but this was not necessarily self-evident to white workers two or three generations away from the life of peasants on the feudal estates of Europe. Their reaction to the black rhetoric, increasingly accompanied by threats of violence (again the Southern model), was predictable, and it was not always attractive. The anguish of the black slums was something they knew too little (or too much) of to keep steadily in mind. The ag-

* Early in 1969, the black director of an urban studies program at one of the major universities of the city, a fine man with a fine career behind him, including an ambassadorship bestowed by President Kennedy, noted in an address that he was a lawyer, one of his brothers a doctor, and the other a dentist. These, he explained, had been the only occupations open to blacks when he was a boy.

gression of the black leaders against whites in general was, in any event, too threatening, too disorienting to maintain a focus on these other matters. On every hand, persons in positions of ostensible authority seemed to be denying reality. (In his address, Young, a fair man, had noted that "being black can be an asset" to a fortunate minority of the black population. This became a self-evident fact in New York in the 1960's. But all the white elite leaders talked about was discrimination. A similar phenomenon arose as the white elites persistently denied the growing problem of crime, imputing racist motives to anyone who made an issue of it, when for the great mass of the city population it had become a very real issue indeed.) The result was a further delegitimation of authority, a general rise in fear of aggression from other groups (many Negroes at this time became obsessed with the prospect of genocide), and a spreading conviction that the city was "sick" and "ungovernable."

In New York, the 1960's ended much worse than they began. It will now be much more difficult to bring about the gradual incorporation of blacks into the ethnic pattern of the city. If it should turn out to be impossible, the 1960's will be the period in which the direction of things turned.

A NOTE ON ETHNIC STUDIES

IN THE OPENING SENTENCE OF *Beyond the Melting Pot,* WE describe it as "a beginning book." It was, we said, "an effort to trace the role of ethnicity in the tumultuous, varied, endlessly complex life of New York City." By "beginning," we meant it was partial and incomplete, and we hoped there would be more. There is a magnificent tradition of course of immigrant and ethnic group history and sociology. After the work of Marcus Hansen, Oscar Handlin, W. I. Thomas, Robert E. Park, Louis Wirth, Everett C. Hughes, to mention only some leading scholars, we could scarcely make any claim to originality in directing attention to ethnic issues. But at the time we wrote, most of the major work in ethnic history and sociology was already old, not much new was being done, and many seemed to think there was not much more to say. We disagreed.

We had hoped, writing at the outset of the 1960's, that some higher level of intellectual effort and scholarly attention might be paid to the persistence of ethnic ties in American society, a phenomenon that had not been forecast and had to be explained. This was, moreover, not an isolated phenomenon but, rather, one central to the American experience. Andrew Greeley (a Catholic priest and a sociologist), speculating as to what the social historians of, say, the twenty-third or twenty-fourth century will find notable about our era, lists three things: the demographic revolution, the Westernization and industrialization of the non-Western world, and "The formation of a new nation on the North American continent made up of wildly different nationality groups." [29]

We would agree, and we would suppose that, by now, the subject would be considerably developed as an aspect of American studies. But, in this, we would be wrong. Writing now, at the beginning of the 1970's, we find the literature of ethnicity hardly more advanced than when we sent forth our "beginning book."

One would have thought that the crisis of race relations would have led to a better and fuller knowledge by now of the life of blacks and Puerto Ricans in New York and other Northern cities, even if white European immigrant ethnic studies were ignored. On the contrary, those peaks of black scholarship of the forties, E. Franklin Frazier's *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) and St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's *Black Metropolis* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1945) stand alone, even more alone than ten years ago. The sixties, whatever they have done for black self-consciousness and pride, have not seen any flowering of black scholarship. One looks back on the sixties and finds only two books that serve as a somewhat adequate general introduction to the situation of blacks in the urban North: Charles Silberman's *Crisis in Black and White* (New York: Random House, 1964) and Kenneth B. Clark's *Dark Ghetto* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). There are valuable and insightful works of urban ethnography: Elliot Liebow's *Tally's Corner* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) and Charles Keil's *Urban Blues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1966). The work directed by Lee Rainwater in St. Louis has provided important additions to our knowledge of the urban black situation, but as yet only one book, David A. Schulz's *Coming Up Black* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), gives a hint of the further insights locked in doctoral dissertations and unpublished research.

Gerald D. Suttles's *The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and Territory in the Inner City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) deals with more than Negroes. His analysis of ethnic groups in contact in Jane Addams's old Near West Side Chicago neighborhood—Italians, Negroes, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans—contains some of the most insightful and perceptive sociology of the 1960's.

The situation of Puerto Rican studies is hardly better. One must record with a sense of shock that the only broad general survey of New York Puerto Ricans is based on research of the mid-forties, C. Wright Mills, Clarence Senior, and Rose Goldsen's *The Puerto Rican Journey* (New York: Harper, 1950). The major addition to the literature on Puerto Ricans in New York since the publication of *Beyond the Melting Pot* is Oscar Lewis's *La Vida* (New York: Random House, 1965), a powerful but limited book. Black academic intellectuals seem to have been largely silent during the sixties, except on political issues. Puerto Rican academic intellectuals have only barely begun to appear.

The fertile Jewish group continues to provide analyses of its own group as well as others, but even though the literature on American Jews has been enriched by Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum's *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), the first analysis of some length of the upper-middle-class style of Jewish life that is becoming the norm for the group, any serious analyst of American Jewish affairs is aware of enormous gaps in knowledge. Even the size of the Jewish population in New York City is unknown. It was once possible to estimate it, badly, by school absences on Yom Kippur. Yom Kippur is now a school holiday. We are, consequently, left in the dark on even the size of the Jewish population of New York.

We are left even more in the dark when it

comes to other groups of the second migration: Italians, Poles, South Slavs, and others, who make up so large a part of the white population of New York and other cities. Leonard Covello's valuable thesis, *The Social Background of the Italo-American School Child* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), is now available in more than the one copy in the New York University Library that was once the only means of reading it. Ironically, it has been published in the Netherlands. Another Netherlands publisher has printed the report of the major research undertaking of Joshua Fishman, *Language Loyalty in the United States* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), which throws further light on some of these groups.

Our theoretical understanding of ethnicity in American life is scarcely better advanced. One must mention here Milton Gordon's useful *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford, 1964). There, the complex issue of what "assimilation" of ethnic groups in the United States actually has been, its forms and distinctions, and what it might be, is considered and illuminated. And one must mention, too, Milton Gordon's valuable Prentice-Hall series on American ethnic groups: Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider's *Jewish Americans* (1968), Alphonso Pinkney's *Black Americans* (1969), and Harry Kitano's *Japanese Americans* (1969) have already appeared; Murray Wax's *Indian Americans* and Joseph Fitzpatrick's *Puerto Rican Americans* are on the way.

There is one area in which new statistical techniques have given us a better understanding of one important aspect of ethnicity, residential segregation and integration. Two works in particular should be mentioned: *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities,* by Stanley Lieberson (New York: The Free Press, 1963), and *Negroes in Cities,* by Karl E. and Alma F. Taeuber (Chicago: Aldine, 1965). We have already referred to the work of Kantrowitz on the same theme (see pp. xli–xlii).

There is another area in which our understanding of ethnicity has been advanced by new techniques of research. The monumental study of *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (James Coleman and others, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Edu-

cation, 1966) provided a mass of material on the educational achievement of whites, blacks, American Indians, and Oriental Americans. It has been subjected to intensive reanalysis, which has perhaps raised more questions than it has answered, but still our understanding of the complex relationships between group social characteristics, family characteristics, and school characteristics has been considerably advanced. (This analysis has been presented in a special issue of *Harvard Educational Review,* Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter, 1968, and is developed at much greater length in the forthcoming collection of studies on the Coleman report edited by F. Mosteller and D. P. Moynihan.)

One must record the work of Susan S. Stodolsky and Gerald Lesser on the distinctive patterns of achievement of different ethnic groups. Their paper, "Learning Patterns in the Disadvantaged" (*Harvard Educational Review,* Vol. 37, No. 4, Fall, 1967, pp. 546–593), presents research of extraordinary elegance and insight. Four groups of school children—Chinese, Jews, Negroes, and Puerto Ricans—were selected for study. Two samples of each were selected—a lower-class and a middle-class sample. Four tests (of verbal ability, reasoning, number facility, and space conceptualization) were given. The striking results were that, for each group, a distinctive profile of achievement emerged, which remained the same for the middle-class and the lower-class children. Though the middle-class children scored, in each case, better than the lower-class children, the profile remained intact. Chinese scored highest on space conceptualization, Jewish children highest on verbal facility.

The study is of particular virtue in marking the beginning of quantified and replicable observation of ethnic distinctness. It also raises, only by implication, the sober question of how a society dedicated to achieving a larger measure of equality responds to such striking and enduring differences.[30] There would appear to be reasons beyond any conscious policy, for example, that might explain the Chinese bulge in schools of architecture.

The work of historians, on whom we have leaned so heavily in *Beyond the Melting Pot,* and on whom we must all depend for an understanding of ethnic groups and their relations, has proceeded during the 1960's,

but no more—and probably less—has been added than in the previous decades. Once again, it seems not to have been a decade for ethnic studies. One historian remarks to us that this was the decade of urban history rather than ethnic history. The history of racism, slavery, and the American Negro has however been illuminated by a number of valuable works, among them Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); Gilbert Osofsky, *Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); Allan H. Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); August Meier, *Negro Thought in America, 1880–1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963); Henry A. Bullock, *A History of Negro Education in the South: From 1619 to the Present* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

Thomas N. Brown's *Irish-American Nationalism, 1870–1890* (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1966) is a model of ethnic history, pointing out *inter alia* the role of nationalist sentiment ostensibly directed to the politics of the old country in giving cultural validity and political cohesion to the immigrant group in the new one.

As usual, the newer white ethnic groups, aside from Jews, have received little attention, though that hopefully is changing. One should mention the work of Timothy L. Smith, who has conducted and directed a good deal of research into these less-studied white ethnic groups; there are already interesting findings, and one looks forward to more (see "Immigrant Social Aspirations and American Education, 1880–1930," *American Quarterly,* Fall, 1969, pp. 523–543.)*

In the near future, we believe the need

* It cannot be without interest to the student of ethnic matters that, to our knowledge, half of the approximately thirty authors and scholars mentioned are Jews, three Negroes, three or four Catholics. This brief survey of some of the work relevant to ethnic studies in the sixties is, we know, partial, reflecting limitations of knowledge, and we present it without any implied judgment on other work and writers.

for ethnic studies will become ever more urgent, simply because ethnic issues have been raised as policy issues so sharply in the sixties. Initially, of course, they have been raised by Negroes. But there has been a response by Mexican Americans, American Indians, and other groups that find themselves in similar depressed circumstances. All of them have become more self-conscious. Now white ethnic groups seem to be developing a perhaps protective greater measure of self-consciousness.

We think the gap in ethnic studies is a misfortune, because such research potentially can be of considerable value to the larger society, primarily by sensitizing it to the opportunities and the difficulties involved in certain types of social change. A society more sensitive to these matters would, for example, have seen with Greeley that "The term 'white ethnic racist' is as pejorative and deceptive as the term 'nigger' or 'damn Yankee' (and perhaps every bit as much a therapeutic ink blot, too)." Such a society would have been much more sensitive to the tradeoffs between one group and another when large social undertakings are launched. It would, if we are correct in our analysis, have perceived and responded to the black experience in the North in quite different terms from those that actually shaped the legislation and domestic programs of the decade, a decade which ended in an ominous mood of more trouble to come.[31]

The rise of the black studies movement would appear to be the first systematic effort to teach ethnic history in elementary and secondary schools and in colleges and universities. We welcome this altogether. However, we would argue that if it is to be *only* black studies, the result will be very much less than satisfactory, for here we are again with the Southern model of race relations: blackey and whitey, two characters in a Beckett play. Doomed together. Polish history and Italian history and Southern white history, all those histories need to be studied and taught. Not least important, if blacks are to learn the history of slavery and not know anything of the histories of how other peoples treated one another in other countries and continents, they can become only yet more persuaded of the fundamental evil of American society. Similarly, if all whites

know about the ethnic past is that blacks were slaves, never learning a thing really about the life of the Polish peasant, a not dissimilar distortion of reality is encouraged. Either way, separatism grows.

A point we also tried to make in our opening paragraph was that ethnic studies can be very painful. Carried at the level of the speech to the American Irish Historical Society (p. 253), "While we know that an Irishman was in Columbus' crew on his first voyage to the New World . . . ," they do no great harm, but neither is it clear how much good they do. That is to say, ethnic studies as a form of self-celebration and group reassurance have a place in the scheme of things. But there is also a place for a true historical, sociological effort. *And this will not be pleasant. The results will not be welcomed.* But the effort is necessary if we are going to acquire a deeper understanding of ourselves and a better capacity to determine our future.

FOR THE PRESENT . . .

POLICY, OF COURSE, IN MOST AREAS, CANNOT WAIT ON RESEARCH, however enlightening research might be. What proposals for an ethnic policy—a policy conscious of the reality of the distinctive ethnic and racial groups, with distinct interests, with specific and general conflicts, some reaching to the foundations of the society—can one give? We orient our suggestions to New York City, though they are applicable in major degree to every large city in the country. They are offered in humility, but actions will be taken, and these considerations, we suggest, should guide action.

First, we must be aware that all policies in the city *are* inevitably policies for ethnic and race relations. This is inevitable, because the ethnic and racial groups of the city are *also* interest groups, based on jobs and occupations and possessions. Nor are they interest groups alone; they are also attached to symbols of their past, they are concerned with the fate of their homelands, they want to see members of their group raised to high position and respect. But, aside from all this, owing to the concrete nature of their jobs (or lack of jobs), their businesses, and their professions, they are also defined by *interest.* And since they are interest groups, and since all policies affect interests

differently, they also affect group relations. This is the first thing one must be aware of. If one does something that affects the position of organized teachers, one does something that affects the attitudes of the Jewish community, for half the teachers are Jews, and they have relatives. If one does something that affects policemen, one affects by that token the attitudes of the Irish, for a substantial part of the police force is Irish, and they have relatives. (How many is impressive: the study of Brooklyn voting on the police civilian review board shows that 54 per cent of Catholics in Brooklyn have relatives or close friends on the police force. Even 21 per cent of Jews have relatives or close friends on the police force!)[32] If one affects the position of people on welfare, one immediately touches one-third of the Puerto Ricans and Negroes in the city. If one affects the interests of small homeowners, one touches the Italian community. If one affects the interest of small shopkeepers, one has touched the Jews and Italians. And so it goes. Thus, a policy that affects race relations for the city must be a policy that affects all policies in the city. Each of them must be judged from the point of view of its impact on race relations. This impact must be a criterion, not the sole criterion, in every policy one undertakes. It should not be possible for a political leadership ever again to find itself in the position of pressing for a major policy, such as school decentralization, without at least considering in advance its impact on race relations, and how it might be moderated.

Second, policies must be based on the reality that the great majority of the people of the city are workers, white-collar workers, businessmen, and professionals, white and black, who are not aware that their position in life is based on massive governmental assistance. The great majority do not believe that they subsist on the basis of the exploitation of the black and the poor. And their interests and morality must serve as major limits to policy. Many people believe if the interests and morality of these groups are determinant, then nothing can be done for the poor and the black, and, therefore, the interests and morality of the workers and the middle class must be attacked in head-on and destructive conflict. Thus, one often hears the argument that one reason that the people on welfare have such a hard

time is that whites and middle-class people refuse to see that work is not superior to nonwork, a point which is presented as an essential insight for the better society of the future. If, indeed, the progress of the poor and the black depends on such a change of values, then we will have to wait a long time for progress. Or we will have to devise means, in a democracy, by which policies can be carried out in the face of the opposition of the great majority. But to say that policies must take into account the interests and morality of the workers and the middle class is not to say that no decent policies are possible. The people of the city do support strongly policies to root out discrimination and prejudice. They do support policies to increase the number of jobs, income from jobs, security from jobs. Policies along these lines, which, of course, must involve state and federal as well as city government, would do much to make jobs more attractive and, by the same token, welfare less attractive.

Third, policies must accept the reality, at least for some time to come, of ethnic communities with some distinctive social concerns, and of people who prefer living with other members of their group. The positive aspects of ethnic attachment should be recognized; the general approval of efforts to build up black pride and self-confidence and self-assertiveness will encourage this. This is perhaps the most difficult point to make, for we believe it would be a disaster for the city if ethnic divisiveness is fostered. But we can *accept* the reality of group existence and group attachment, yet not allow it to become the sole basis of public decisions. The city should not be a federation of nations, with protected turfs and excluded turfs. The organization of the groups should be, as it has been in the past, voluntary. Public action should operate not on the basis of group membership but on the basis of individual human qualities. It has been the curse of this country for so long that this did not happen in fact, and that Negroes—and other groups, in lesser degree—were excluded from even-handed public action. We must not now move to another extreme, in which the sense of injustice is implanted in other groups.

A subtle mix of policies has emerged in the city, in which group existence is recognized and tolerated,

in which groups move upward, economically, politically, socially, in which individuals are free to associate with ethnic groups or not as they will, in which groups are given recognition informally but not in formal and fixed procedures. In other words, New York City is neither Lebanon, where Moslems and Christians have formal and fixed constitutional roles, nor Malaysia, where, again, the groups are recognized in public policy and their place and privileges fixed. Nor should it be. How to maintain respect for group feeling and identity while maintaining the primacy of individual rights and responsibilities is perhaps the most difficult task of government, yet the history of New York City gives us some insight into this difficult task, and should not be ignored.

Fourth, one of the chief problems of race relations in this city is the disproportionate presence of Negroes and Puerto Ricans on welfare. As long as one-third or more of the members of these groups are on welfare, as long as welfare remains, as it has become, the largest single item of expenditure in the city, it is hard to see how race relations in the city will not be basically and deeply affected. (One could say the same of the disproportionate Negro role in street crime and crimes of violence.) We know this is a national problem, but it is in even larger measure a New York City problem, for no other city, even those with higher proportions of Negroes and equally generous welfare provisions, shows such huge numbers on welfare. Obviously, this is a problem in its own right, and it is not easy to know what one might do about it. The solution to this problem, if there is one, lies more at the federal than the city level. The Nixon administration has moved strongly to propose a radical revision of the welfare system, one which would tie it in more closely to work, encouraging those requiring government aid to work on the one hand and giving government aid to those who work at low wages on the other, while providing assistance to city and state governments suffering under the strains of increasing welfare needs. This is not the place for an analysis of the problem of welfare in its own right. But there is a role for city government in this respect. As long as the great majority of the population is a working population and a tax-paying population, and

as long as welfare aid goes disproportionately to certain ethnic and racial groups, the city government must not place itself in the position of appearing to encourage welfare or of actually encouraging it. Aid to the deprived is a right and an obligation of government. But, as Tocqueville pointed out long ago, rights vary in dignity and virtue. The right to welfare should not be endowed with the same dignity and virtue as the right to work. This can only exacerbate racial and ethnic tensions in the city. Meanwhile, the amelioration of the problems of welfare, which must be sought at many levels both of government and policy, should be pursued.

Fifth, a higher level of civic amenity must be attained to reduce the frustrations and miseries of the poor and the indignation of Negroes and Puerto Ricans. It is easy to say this, impossible to prescribe within present budgetary limits. The mayors are already a powerful lobby demanding more help from the federal government for this purpose. The streets should be cleaner, the subways less of a misery, the parks and playgrounds more numerous, policing—including local constabularies—more effective, and so on. If more money can regularly flow to such urban needs, one hopes that, in some measurable degree, anger will decline.

Sixth, one must beware of encouraging and supporting purely divisive groups and philosophies. The difficult question that we face today is whether black groups that insist—rhetorically or not, who is to tell?—on armed revolution, on the killing of whites, on violence toward every moderate black element, should be tolerated. Even if they are, however, they should not receive public support and encouragement. Intellectuals in New York have done a good deal to encourage and publicize this kind of madness.* The strong corporate feeling today in black commu-

* Not just in New York. The president of a middle western university, prominent in civil rights activities, learned of this phenomenon in a most direct way. He recruited to his campus a young Negro law professor and gave him special responsibilities to deal with minority students. Before many months had passed, the professor submitted his resignation. His life had been threatened. The president was indignant: he asked for the name of the student and vowed he would be off the campus in twenty-four hours. The professor was not moved. Not just his life had been threatened, but that of his wife and child. He had no

nities makes actions against even the least representative and most dangerous groups difficult. Persecution will probably make these groups stronger and will gain them sympathy from moderate blacks, not to mention white liberals. Perhaps the most that can be said at this point is that they should not be encouraged. More positively, this means that every element in the Negro community that *does* believe an integrated, democratic society is possible should be encouraged. There are many such people, and many of them are now cowed by the verbal (and not only verbal) violence of black militants and the unthinking and dilettantish support they now receive from such wide strata of white intellectuals and liberals. Those elements that do believe there is hope for American society should be given recognition and support. They have organizations: these should be given important roles to play in the economic and political improvement of the Negro communities. They have leaders: they should be recognized. They have ideas: they must have the opportunity and power to carry them out.

Seventh, all institutions that wield great power—we think primarily of government, business, labor unions, universities and colleges, hospitals—must be constantly aware of the need to place significant numbers of blacks and Puerto Ricans in posts of responsibility and power. To prescribe how this is done in each area is beyond the confines of this article. Government has been perhaps most active in this respect. Labor unions have been among the more backward, yet owing to the large numbers of Negroes and Puerto Ricans who now make up the working population of New York, and who will make up ever larger proportions in the near future, they have a particular responsibility to develop Negro and Puerto Rican leadership more rapidly. They should have more black and Spanish-speaking business agents, organizers, representatives, union presidents. One can envisage the New York City labor council conducting a serious leadership training for young blacks

choice but to leave. The incident is worth reporting because the university president in question had earlier been thoroughly resistant to the idea that such things were taking place. In truth, white liberals have come close to sacrificing the interests of black moderates in order to sustain their own threatened ideology of race relations.

and Puerto Ricans, both in and outside the labor movement, with a guarantee of jobs to successful graduates. This might provide one kind of constructive channel for the driving energy of so many young blacks today, and it might help to provide new vigor to an institution in American life that has done more than any other to raise the position of the poor and the worker. Obviously, similar programs would be a good idea in other major institutions, too.

Eighth, a good deal still devolves upon the complex public and private machinery that has been built up in the city to promote good race relations. We think in particular of the Jewish defense organizations, which have substantial resources and staffs, and which represent the largest single group in the city, the traditional Negro organizations (NAACP, Urban League), the City Commission on Human Rights, and the state agency with parallel responsibilities to fight discrimination and promote good race relations. Obviously, as we argued in our first point, race and ethnic relations are no longer specialized functions for specialized groups. They are issues that must be in the consciousness of public and civil leaders, no matter what area of policy they deal with. Yet there is one major area of tension and conflict in which these specialized agencies can play an important role, and that is the area of Negro-Jewish relations. We discussed the reasons for this tension in *Beyond the Melting Pot* in 1963, and they remain the same. The ironies of history have placed Jews disproportionately in positions of landlord, merchant, doctor, teacher, and social worker; and Negroes, disproportionately, in the positions of tenants of these landlords, customers of these merchants, patients of these doctors, pupils of these teachers, and clients of these social workers. These primary reasons for conflict have existed for a long time, and they have by now, in large measure, effaced the strong alliance that, in the forties and fifties, made New York State and New York City a leader in the passage of civil rights legislation and the development of programs for integration. New sources of tension have been added, in particular, the alliance between American black militants and the revolutionists of the third world. This turns many black leaders into stated ene-

mies of Israel, even if this is not a particularly salient part of their political outlook.

There is no easy way to get at the sources of the conflict. Changes are occurring. Tenement landlords are, owing to varied developments, rapidly abandoning many of their properties, and small businessmen are abandoning theirs. The American Jewish Congress has been instrumental in launching a program to transfer Jewish business properties in black areas to blacks. There are programs to increase the number of Negro doctors. There has been a huge increase of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the City Colleges, which will increase the number of teachers and social workers. One can think of many other programs that will perhaps more rapidly increase the number of Negro and Puerto Rican landlords, merchants, doctors, teachers, and social workers. All these will have a potential for increasing conflicts between groups, but in the long run we believe they must reduce them.

The voluntary organizations and the city and state agencies can play important roles in all these areas. The voluntary agencies in particular can and should continue the efforts they have carried on throughout the years to promote more direct discussion and meeting between people of different groups. In the end, a good deal must depend on the political intelligence of Jews and Negroes, the two chief groups in conflict. Leaders on both sides can inflame passions. The voluntary organizations that have worked together in the past should be in the best position to educate members of both groups to the enormous dangers in such a path, to spread sound information, to promote tolerant and understanding attitudes.

This is a small budget of suggestions, indeed, for a big problem. Certainly, we are now living through the severest test that New York as a multiethnic society has ever experienced. As we see how other multiethnic and multiracial societies solve or, rather, do not solve their problems, we cannot be too encouraged. And yet, in some respects, the United States, and in particular the great cities, have developed unique approaches to a multiethnic and multiracial society. They may be sufficient for the test.

. . . . . .

For the second edition of *Beyond the Melting Pot,* we have not attempted any extensive revision or updating of the text of the book. In the seven years since the book was published, errors have been pointed out to us, interpretations have been attacked and challenged, and, most important, enormous changes have occurred in the relationships of racial and ethnic groups, in the country as a whole and in the city. This introduction to the second edition tries to take account of some of these changes. But we have not tampered with the text of the book, aside from the correction of a few errors, the straightening out of some clumsy language, and the correction of a few formulations. The distance between 1963 and 1970 is simply too great to permit extensive revision and updating of a book conceived in the late fifties. The body of the book must stand uncorrected as a record of whatever understanding we had of these issues when we composed it. We wish to express our gratitude to David Riesman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Joe Glazer, who read drafts of this introduction and provided insightful comments and helpful data.

Parts of this introduction, in somewhat different form, appeared as articles by Nathan Glazer in *The Public Interest* ("A New Look at the Melting Pot," No. 16, Summer, 1969, pp. 180–187) and in *Agenda for a City: Issues Confronting New York,* edited by Lyle C. Fitch and Annmarie Hauck Walsh, Sage Publications, 1970.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
January, 1970

Nathan Glazer
Daniel P. Moynihan

NOTES

1. *See Police, Politics, and Race: The New York City Referendum on Civilian Review,* by David W. Abbott, Louis H. Gold, and Edward T. Rogowsky, with an Introduction by Daniel P. Moynihan, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969; and Arthur Klebanoff, "Is There a Jewish Vote?" *Commentary,* Vol. 49, No. 1, January, 1970, pp. 43–47. These two studies trace the history of the split in Jewish political orientations in New York, along the lines indicated in the text.

2. For the history and analysis of the undercount of Negroes in the census, see "Social Statistics and the City," David M. Heer, Ed., *Report of a Conference Held in Washington, D.C., June 22–23, 1967,* Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1968.

3. For one attempt to determine the distribution of in-

come in New York City by income classes and ethnic groups, see David M. Gordon, "Income and Welfare in New York City," *The Public Interest,* No. 16, Summer, 1969, pp. 64–88. This argues the case that there has been real stagnation in the economic position of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in New York City during the sixties. But the matter is still not beyond dispute. Among the challenges to David Gordon's estimates is an analysis of census data by the Center for New York City Affairs of the New School for Social Research (*New York Times,* February 23, 1970).

4. See "Trends in Social and Economic Conditions in Metropolitan Areas," U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports,* Series P-23, February 7, 1969, pp. 55, 61.

5. Nathan Kantrowitz, "Social Mobility of Puerto Ricans: Education, Occupation, and Income Changes Among Children of Migrants, New York, 1950–60," *International Migration Review,* Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring, 1968, pp. 53–71.

6. After the writing of the passage in the text, the following data came to hand: In 1968, Negro husband-wife families outside the South, with heads of family aged 14 to 24 years, had median incomes that were 99 per cent of the median incomes of comparable white families. For Negro husband-wife families with family heads aged 25 to 34, outside the South, median income was 87 per cent of the comparable white families. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Special Tabulation.) It remains the fact that convergence in material circumstances has been accompanied by increasing strength for militant political attitudes based on the denial that anything of the sort is happening.

7. See Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* New York: The Free Press, 1969, for an analysis of the rise of this doctrine.

8. Arthur Klebanoff, "The Demographics of Politics: Legislative Constituencies and the Borough of Brooklyn, 1950–1965," unpublished senior honors thesis, Yale University, 1969.

9. See Theodore Draper, "The Fantasy of Black Nationalism," *Commentary,* Vol. 48, No. 3, September, 1969, pp. 27–54, for a scholarly and insightful history and analysis of black separatism.

10. For a description of the Southern model, nothing will serve better than this letter, published in the *New York Times* on December 29, 1969. The writer, Mr. Vincent S. Baker, is second vice-president, New York City Branch, NAACP.

> The Convention held in Harlem on the proposed state office building has implications far more important than the building, and the truth about what happened there should be known and remembered.
>
> Though the convention chairman, Judge James Watson, tried to be fair, free discussion could not take place in that atmosphere of violence and intimidation. The fact that an effort was made to drag me from the hall, and that my life was twice threatened by speakers on the convention floor without a word of reprimand from convention officials leaves no doubt that anyone wishing to disagree with the hooligan element could do so only at the risk of personal injury or even death. . . .
>
> The truth is that the Dec. 13–14 Convention, whatever the intention of its planners, was the opening phase of a drive by

latter-day fascists to impose upon Harlem a despotic rule for their own power and profit. . . ."

New York, Dec. 17, 1969

11. Fred Ferretti, "Carey into the Breach," *New York Magazine,* March 24, 1969, p. 44.

12. For the remarkable similarity between the Harlem riots of 1935 and 1943 and the Northern urban riots that began in New York City in 1964 (and went on to strike every major Northern city), see Harold Orlans's contemporary account of the 1943 riot, "The Harlem Riot: A Study in Mass Frustration," Social Analysis Report No. 1, 1943. The pamphlet is not easily accessible, but it is quoted in Nathan Glazer, "The Ghetto Crisis," *Encounter,* Vol. 29, No. 5, November, 1967, pp. 15–22.

13. The estimates of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the city have some official standing; they are from the City Planning Commission. The others are based on sample surveys conducted for the 1969 election. These are rather contradictory, and we have simply made some educated guesses.

14. See William Simon, John H. Gagnon, and Donald Carns, "Working-Class Youth: Alienation Without An Image," *New Generation,* Vol. 51, No. 2, Spring, 1969, pp. 15–21.

15. Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew,* New York: Doubleday, 1955.

16. Nathan Kantrowitz, "Ethnic and Racial Segregation in the New York Metropolis, 1960," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 74, No. 6, May, 1969, 685–695.

17. From *Community Values and Conflict, 1967: A Conference Report,* sponsored by the City of New York Commission on Human Rights; the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University; and Brotherhood-in-Action, in cooperation with the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice, 1967, pp. 116–119.

18. Data of the Health Population survey of New York City, compared with Census data of 1950 and 1960, show the following changes in the percentage of nonwhites and Puerto Ricans in white-collar occupations between 1950 and 1965:

Percentage Employed in White-Collar Occupations

	Employed Men		Employed Women	
	1950	*1965*	*1950*	*1965*
Total	45.9	47.2	56.7	61.3
Nonwhite	21.4	28.5	16.1	31.0
Puerto Ricans	17.3	12.1	12.5	24.9

The increase in the number of nonwhite professional and technical workers was from 3.3 per cent in 1950 to 8.3 per cent in 1965. (M. J. Wantman, "Population Health Survey Research Memorandum," RM 1–67, Health Services Administration and the Center for Social Research of the Graduate Center, The City University of New York.)

For the more substantial progress of second-generation Puerto Ricans, see Note 5.

19. These tables are compiled from two reports of the City of New York Commission on Human Rights, "Report of the Public Hearing on the Employment Practices of the Broadcasting and Advertising Industries . . . held by the City of New York Commission on Human Rights, March 11–12, 1968," and "Report, Affirmative Follow-up to Advertising and Broadcasting Hearing, November, 1968."

20. The figure is from Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, "The Community Revolution," *The Public Interest,* No. 16, Summer, 1969, pp. 142–179. This article also gives the best current account of the developing pattern of community government in New York which is providing the jobs for Negroes and in much lesser degree Puerto Ricans that the old political machine system once provided for earlier groups. This pattern was radically restricted by the rise of civil service, which, whatever its other virtues, has made it very difficult for some branches of city government (for example, the public school system) to reflect in its better jobs the changing ethnic composition of the city. There are still only 35 Negroes among the 900 principals of New York City's public and high schools, and of these only 4 are regularly licensed. (*New York Times,* November 5 and 13, 1969.)

21. For a picture of Puerto Rican leadership in New York which supports this characterization, see John Warren Gotsch, *Puerto Rican Leadership in New York,* Master's thesis, Department of Sociology, New York University, 1966.

22. The best account of the City College story is by Lloyd P. Gartner, "The Five Demands at New York City College," *Midstream,* Vol. 15, No. 8, 1969, pp. 15–35.

23. For the argument that welfare in New York City provides poverty-level maintenance, see Nathan Glazer, "Beyond Income Maintenance—A Note on Welfare in New York City," *The Public Interest,* No. 16, Summer, 1969, pp. 102–122. Two signs of the times on the argument as to what kinds of jobs are available: a headline in the *Boston Globe,* December 18, 1969, reads, "Puerto Ricans face $2.00 an hr. or relief." The point of the article is that the only alternative to welfare is work at $2.00 an hour. A placard in the New York City subways in November, 1969, reports the availability of $143 a week jobs for helpers in many categories in the transit system; the jobs give vacations with pay, social security, sick leave, retirement at half-pay after twenty years, and require either a trade-school diploma or some experience.

24. Jack Elinson, Paul W. Haberman, and Cyrille Gell, "Ethnic and Educational Data on Adults in New York City, 1963–64," School of Public Health and Administrative Medicine, Columbia University, 1967; and Note 18.

25. See Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, Eds. *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960,* Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969.

26. Nathan Glazer, *The Social Basis of American Communism,* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961, Chapter IV.

27. Michael Lerner, "Respectable Bigotry," *The American Scholar,* Vol. 38, No. 4, Autumn, 1969, pp. 606–607.

28. *New York Daily News,* October 27, 1969.

29. Andrew Greeley, "The Alienation of White Ethnic Groups," Paper delivered at a Conference on National Unity, Sterling Forest Gardens, October 21–22, 1969, Mimeographed, p. 4.

30. Some of these implications are considered in Nathan Glazer, "Ethnic Groups and Education: Toward the Tolerance of Difference," *Journal of Negro Education,* Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer, 1969, pp. 187–195.

31. This, of course, has taken the form, *inter alia,* of considerable trouble for the Democratic party. In his study, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), Kevin P. Phillips contends that, as the Democrats shifted from the economic populist stand of the New Deal to what he terms "social engineering," their coalition collapsed. As a result, he writes, "In practically every state and region, ethnic and cultural animosities and divisions exceed all other factors in explaining party choice and identification."

32. See p. 27 of Abbott, Gold, and Rogowsky, Note 1.

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Preface

THIS is a beginning book. It is an effort to trace the role of ethnicity in the tumultuous, varied, endlessly complex life of New York City. It is time, we believe, that such an effort be made, albeit doomed inevitably to approximation and to inaccuracy, and although it cannot but on occasion give offense to those very persons for whom we have the strongest feeling of feliowship and common purpose. The notion that the intense and unprecedented mixture of ethnic and religious groups in American life was soon to blend into a homogeneous end product has outlived its usefulness, and also its credibility. In the meanwhile the persisting facts of ethnicity demand attention, understanding, and accommodation.

The point about the melting pot, as we say later, is that it did not happen. At least not in New York and, *mutatis mutandis,* in those parts of America which resemble New York.

This is nothing remarkable. On the contrary, the American ethos is nowhere better perceived than in the disinclination of the third and fourth generation of newcomers to blend into a standard, uniform national type. From the beginning, our society and our politics have been at least as much concerned with values as with interests. The principal ethnic groups of New York City will be seen