

the Jews

A LEADING figure in Jewish community affairs relates that a Jew always eagerly asks, in any situation, "How many are Jews?" And when he gets an answer, he asks suspiciously, "How do you know?"

Self-consciousness, curiosity, pride—all these are Jewish traits; caution, timidity, fear—these are Jewish traits, too. But our interest for the moment is in the more mundane subject of figures.

The U.S. Census does not ask about religion. But sociologists, planners, journalists, and people in general are so interested in this question that it might have done so a long time ago except for, among other reasons, the strong opposition of certain Jewish organizations. At the same time, the Jewish community demands that such figures exist; so Jewish organizations have developed techniques for estimating the Jewish population. In 1957 the census did ask a question about religion, as a pretest for a possible

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question about religion in the 1960 census. Some information from this sample was released before the Jewish organizations that oppose official statistics on Jews had developed pressure enough to seal the returns. This abortive census study had at least the result of loosely corroborating the figures derived in less direct ways.

We know that somewhat more than a *quarter* of the population of New York City is Jewish; that about a *third* of the white and non-Puerto Rican part of the population of the city is Jewish; and that this huge concentration of Jews, the greatest that has existed in thousands of years of Jewish history, forms about two-fifths of all the Jews in the United States. The city and surrounding suburban counties together include about half of the nation's Jews,¹ and almost all the rest have once lived in the city, will at some time live there, or have parents or children who live there. New York is the headquarters of the Jewish group. The euphemistic use of the term "New Yorker" to refer to "Jew," which is not uncommon in the United States, is thus based on some reality.

There have been Jews in New York City since almost its beginning. The first group, which landed in 1654, were "Sephardic" Jews, as those originally from Spain and Portugal are called, and spoke Portuguese. But they were also "Dutch" Jews, for they had been driven from Spain and Portugal at the end of the fifteenth century and settled in Holland. They were also "Brazilian" Jews, having for some decades formed a large and important Jewish community in Brazil until the Portuguese, driving out the Dutch, had sent them on their way again. The synagogue these first Jews established is appropriately named Shearith Israel, "the Remnant of Israel," and in its latest physical form stands at Central Park West and 70th Street. There an ancient form of the Jewish service is carefully preserved and elegantly performed.

The special prominence of Jews in New York is, however, of much later origin. During the middle of the nineteenth century there was a sizable immigration of Jews from Germany. In 1880 there were perhaps 80,000 Jews in the city. Still, they were only 4 per cent of the population, which was then mainly Irish, German, and old-

stock American, and they were mostly German-speaking (from Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, as well as Germany itself). This largely German immigration became concentrated in business, particularly retail trade, and was economically quite successful. The German names of leading department stores in a dozen cities remind us of this wave of immigration. In the 1880's began the enormous migration from Eastern Europe, particularly from the Russian Empire, but also including sizable streams from pre-World-War Austria-Hungary and from Rumania. By 1910 there were a million and a quarter Jews in New York City. They then formed more than a quarter of the population, a proportion they have maintained ever since.

This great migration, which continued, except for the interruption of the First World War, until it was reduced by law in 1924, has stamped the character of New York. The city's Jews are descendants of the Yiddish-speaking, Orthodox and Socialist Jews of Eastern Europe. Despite a half-century of American life, which has made the grandchildren now coming to maturity very different from what their grandparents were, they retain much that recalls their origins.

By 1924 there were almost two million Jews in the city. The old German Jewish community, marked off in language, religion, culture, and occupation from the new immigrants, was a tenth part or less of New York Jewry. When we see the contrast between these two groups (the variations within each were of course also great), we must ask what made them in any sense a single group. The German Jews could have stood off from the East European, Yiddish-speaking Jews and insisted they had nothing in common. Indeed, in practice, tone, and theology, the Reform Judaism of the German Jews diverged from the Orthodoxy of the immigrants as much as the beliefs and practices of Southern Baptists differ from those of New England Unitarians.

Two wills make a group—the self-will that creates unity, and the will of others that imposes a unity where hardly any is felt. Conceivably this will of others had an effect on Jews, for since the 1870's anti-Semitism had been rising in the upper social circles to which the German

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Jews felt closest. Perhaps German Jews feared that, regardless of what they thought and felt, non-Jews would identify them with the new immigrants. Whatever the reasons, they themselves sensed this identity. Out of a multitude of institutions and organizations, a consciously single Jewish community was formed by the time of the First World War.

The identification of the older group with the newer one took many forms. It was evident in the organization of charitable institutions to give immigrants money, guidance, training, and education so as to “Americanize” them. In 1917 a single Federation of Jewish Charities was formed to serve all Jews without discrimination. In 1906 wealthy German Jews founded the American Jewish Committee to defend Jewish interests, which meant, at that time, primarily the interests of East European Jews. Prominent Jews of the German group—Louis Marshall, Louis Brandeis, Jacob Schiff, Oscar Straus—were involved in the great strikes that created the powerful garment trades unions before the First World War. Both the bosses and the strikers were generally East European Jews, and German Jewish dignitaries served as mediators. Both communities cooperated in Jewish relief during the First World War, and elements of both helped create a Jewish state in Palestine. (Elements of both also opposed it.) Since 1920 the new groups that have arrived—Sephardic Jews from Greece and Turkey in the twenties, German refugees of the thirties, or displaced persons of the forties and fifties—have been met not by “German Jewish” or “East European Jewish” institutions, but by institutions that are simply “American Jewish.”

What is this Jewish community? There is no organization that includes all Jews, though the United Jewish Appeal may come close in that it collects from very many. The neat division of “Protestant, Catholic, Jewish” makes it easy to think of Jews as a religious group, but whereas a single organization baptizes and keeps track of all Catholics (at least for statistical purposes), there is no central Jewish religious organization, except for a small coordinating group that links the rabbinical and congregational associations of the three Jewish denominations. In any case, most Jews in New York City belong to no synagogue or temple, and many of them are nonreligious, or

even antireligious. And yet we know from experience that when asked, "What is your religion?" even *these* answer, "Jewish."²

If the category of religion does not define Jews well, neither does the category of national origin or culture, for Jews have come from a score of countries and speak many different languages. The Sephardic Jew has to learn Yiddish expressions just as the non-Jew does; his "Yiddish" is not a German dialect, but Spanish. Nor does a common sentimental commitment to a national homeland define Jews, for, despite the feeling of most Jews for Israel, many are violently opposed to the whole idea. And yet, despite the difficulty of finding the common denominator, there is really no ambiguity about being Jewish, even though people are Jewish in different ways.

There is first of all the fact that the overwhelming majority of American Jews *do* stem from a single culture—the Yiddish-speaking culture of Eastern Europe, which had a single, strongly defined religion, which we now call Orthodoxy but which was once only traditional Judaism, intensified by the isolation of the East European Jews from the surrounding world. This East European group had been stamped with a common character by common experiences: a strong governmental and popular anti-Semitism, and the development in response to it of a variety of ideological movements, such as Socialism and Zionism, as well as the huge migratory movement that dispersed this group to the United States, Canada, Argentina, England, France, Israel, and South Africa. The worldwide migration of this vigorous people makes American Jews at home almost everywhere they go, for other descendants of East European Jews, speaking or understanding Yiddish, will be found almost everywhere.

This dominant group created a Jewish subculture in which almost everyone knew and used a few Yiddish expressions, and which has served as the first stage in the assimilation to America of very different kinds of Jewish immigrants. But there is more to the creation of a Jewish community than the link with Eastern Europe and the creation of a single American subculture. There is also, linking all Jews, the sense of a common fate. In part, the common

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fate is defined ultimately by connection to a single religion, to which everyone is still attached by birth and tradition if not by action and belief. In part, it reflects the imposition of a common fate by the outer world, whether in the form of Hitler's extermination or the mild differential behavior that is met in America today.

This "community," then, is a group that may never act together and that may never feel together, but that does know it is a single group, from which one can be disengaged only by a series of deliberate acts. Only a minority are "Jews" if we use some concrete defining index. Only a minority belongs to synagogues, is sent to Jewish schools, deals with Jewish welfare agencies, is interested in Jewish culture, speaks a traditional Jewish language, and can be distinguished by dress and custom as Jews. But, added together, the overlapping minorities create a community with a strong self-consciousness and a definite character.

The easiest way of identifying a Jew is to ask his religion. Regardless of the low rate of religious identification among the Jews in New York City, only rarely, as we have pointed out, will a person born of Jewish parents not answer "Jewish." The simplest answer to the question "Who is a Jew?" (which became a problem only because Jews broke with their traditional religion in the nineteenth century) is the return question, "Who is not a Jew?" For the purposes of those efficient fund-raising organizations which make it their business to keep tabs on Jews, only those who have converted are not Jews. There are remarkably few of them. So, linked by the strong arm of the Jewish communal organizations, even if resentfully, there is quite a range of individuals—Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and secular Jews, self-conscious and proud Jews and hardly conscious and embarrassed Jews, Jews who know about their history and religion, and Jews who know less about it than any Christian minister.

There is then a reality to this notion of an American Jewish community, though it is not a reality that can be summed up in a simple definition. Aware of all the complexities of being Jewish, of all the groupings and sub-

groups within that category, and of all the ways in which Jews do not act as a group, we can still speak of it as a group.³

THE ECONOMIC BASE

OF COURSE, ONE OF THE REASONS WE CAN SPEAK OF THE JEWISH group is that in a number of ways it is sharply defined, special, and individual. As any casual observer knows, its economic characteristics are particularly striking.

Around the world, wherever they went, the Jews of Eastern Europe became in large proportions businessmen. Too, wherever they went, they showed a fierce passion to have their children educated and become professionals. In these respects, the Jews of England, the United States, Argentina, and South Africa are not very different. The opportunities were different, but in each case, arriving with no money and few skills, beginning as workers or tiny tradesmen, they have achieved remarkable economic success. Indeed, one of the probable reasons that the American Jewish Committee, the oldest of three major organizations interested in the civil rights of Jews (the others are the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the American Jewish Congress), opposed further analysis of the information gathered by the census in 1957 was that it feared anti-Semites could make use of figures on Jewish income.⁴

Income figures are difficult to interpret. One can point out that if Jews have higher incomes than non-Jews, it may be because they are concentrated on the Northeastern Seaboard, which has higher incomes than many other parts of the country; that they are concentrated in big cities, which have higher incomes than rural areas or small cities; that they are among the better educated, who have higher incomes than the less well educated; that they are in business and the professions to a higher degree than other people, and so forth. Presumably one might show that, all these factors taken into account, Jews have incomes no higher than those of other people. But then the factors of Northeastern concentration, urbanism, education, and occupation would have to be explained. Wherever studies have been made, Jews have been found to be moving out of the working class into the middle class at a surprising rate.

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In New York, which once had a huge Jewish working class and in which the great Jewish labor movement arose, there are still large numbers of Jewish workers. Aside from garment workers, there are many Jewish painters, carpenters, bakers, glaziers, and other tradesmen, waiters, barbers, and taxicab drivers. In fact, the tone of New York as a "Jewish" city is communicated to visitors as much by workers as by businessmen and professionals. A study in 1952 showed that manual workers formed a *third* of Jewish employed males (but manual workers formed more than half of all New York City white males). A quarter of the Jewish males worked at white-collar occupations at the subprofessional level and as salesmen. But 15 per cent worked as professionals or semiprofessionals (as against 11 per cent of all white males in the metropolitan area), and 24 per cent were proprietors of their own businesses, managers or officials, as against 16 per cent of the white males of the metropolitan area. The differences between Jews and non-Jews are about the same for women's occupations. There are proportionately fewer manual workers and more clerical and sales workers among Jewish women than in the female population as a whole. But almost a quarter of all employed Jewish women in 1952 worked with their hands, in factories and in service occupations.⁵

Thus there is still a sizable Jewish working class in New York City, but very few Jews are casual laborers, service workers, or semiskilled factory workers. And the Jewish workers are for the most part old, of the immigrant generation. As they retire or die, they are not replaced by either their children or new Jewish immigrants. The unions are increasingly less Jewish. One huge local of the ILGWU which keeps records on the ethnicity of its members—Dressmakers' Local 22—reports a drop in the proportion of Jews from about 75 per cent in the 1940's to 44 per cent in 1958. And this is one of the most Jewish of labor unions. Among the men's clothing workers, there is now only a small percentage of Jews; among painters and carpenters too the percentage has dropped. Within the garment industry, Jews are now concentrated in the better-paying, more-skilled trades, and it is only these that young Jews enter. Just as Jews found when they entered the garment trades at the

turn of the century that the designers and cutters were English and German, so today incoming Negroes and Puerto Ricans find that the designers and cutters are Jewish.

Yet Jewish labor leaders continue to dominate, even though they deal for the most part with non-Jewish workers. At the lower levels of leadership, they must make the same adaptation to foreign-language workers that Jewish peddlers and storekeepers have made to Puerto Rican customers on the Lower East Side. Thus, in the Skirtmakers' Union of the ILGWU, which is half Spanish-American and only a quarter Jewish (the Jews are divided between an East European and Sephardic group), there are four Spanish-speaking business agents, all of whom are Sephardic Jews. Their native language is basically the Spanish of fifteenth-century Spain! ⁶

It will take quite a long time for the union leadership to reflect the new composition of the membership, for, at least in the garment unions, educated Jewish men, often with a background as socialist intellectuals, continue to provide a source of skilled leadership. For example, a new vice-president of the ILGWU, Henoah Mendelsund, perpetuates the old tradition of Jewish union leaders. He is one of the intellectuals and socialists who escaped from Hitler's Europe, and like other wartime and postwar refugees he began work in a garment shop.⁷ Naturally, this kind of ideological background is rare among the newer workers in the industry, most of whom are from other ethnic groups.

The immigration from Hitler's Europe which supplied a few new Jewish labor leaders also supplied a sizable body of workers to the declining Jewish working class of the city. The 150,000 Jewish immigrants who came out of the displaced persons camps after the war were not, like earlier German refugees, highly educated professionals and businessmen. Most of them became workers. Some have already, like Jewish immigrants before them, become small businessmen (a few are wealthy). But most will remain workers, and, in the immigrant tradition, have transferred their hopes to their children. Scenes that were played out on the Lower East Side fifty years ago may now be seen again in the low-rent areas of Brooklyn and Bronx where these newest immigrants have settled. Jewish boys separate

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from their playmates and devote themselves to studies, heading for the academic and specialized high schools. This immigrant group is much too small to do more than slow down slightly the rapid disappearance of the Jewish working class—or the Yiddish press, which it has also stimulated. Furthermore, this group will be assimilated at a much more rapid rate than the Yiddish-speaking workers of fifty years ago, for it does not form a huge and dense concentration, and private organizations, families, and the government will help it move out of the working class.

Thus the Jewish working class is rapidly disappearing, though its unions and other institutions remain. The Workmen's Circle, a great fraternal order that supplied insurance benefits, Yiddish schools, social life, camps, and cultural activities, continues in existence, but despite its name many of its members today are small businessmen and white-collar workers.

In New York, as contrasted with cities where the Jewish community is smaller, there is a huge lower-middle class. Great numbers of Jewish women work in offices, and great numbers of Jewish men work in clerical jobs. One-seventh of the government employees in New York are Jewish. This is smaller than the Jewish proportion in the city, but much greater than the proportion of Jewish government employees in other cities. But even these occupations are probably in decline among Jews. Jewish secretaries are less common than they once were. And in view of the near-universal drive to college education among young Jews, this trend will probably continue.

The teaching force of New York is now, according to one informed guess, perhaps 50 per cent Jewish. A great majority of school principals are Jewish. This is in part a heritage of the depression, when Jewish college graduates found few other occupations that offered comparable income and security. The Board of Education has been forced to close the schools on Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashana, for it simply cannot depend on enough teachers showing up to take care of the children. (It was never induced to take this step by the large decline in pupil attendance on these holidays.) The very large number of Jewish teachers affects the character of New York schools. It is not easy

to figure out what the impact of a largely Jewish teaching force is on students, compared with, for example, the largely Irish and German and white Protestant teaching force of thirty or forty years ago. Yet the groups are so different in their intellectual attitudes, cultural outlooks, and orientations toward education and college that some influence, one can be sure, must be felt. Whether, in their expectation of intellectual competence, the Jewish teachers overwhelm and discourage Negro and Puerto Rican migrant children, or encourage them to greater efforts, would be hard to say.

New York Jews can never become as completely a business and professional group as can Jews in cities where they form, say, only 5 per cent of the population. Yet Jews already constitute a majority of those engaged in many businesses and professions in the city (medicine, law, dentistry). Nor do they any longer meet discrimination in skilled trades or in white-collar and clerical employment, a situation that affected them very deeply in the 1920's and 1930's when they desperately needed such jobs. The wartime shortages took care of that. It is now only at the higher levels of the economy that discrimination arises. But it does arise there, and Jewish civil rights groups wonder what can be done about it.

In the great banks, insurance companies, public utilities, railroads, and corporation head offices that are located in New York, and in the Wall Street law firms, few Jews are to be found. One of the few things that strikes a Jew as unfamiliar in New York, so much a Jewish city, is the life of the junior executive of a great corporation as described recently by *Fortune* magazine, on the assumption, presumably, that such a life is typical in New York.⁸ Jews find equally strange William H. Whyte's descriptions of the life of organization men. Not enough lead such lives to be familiar with their problems, for example, that of being "moved about" by the corporation. The Jewish businessman is traditionally a small businessman, in his own or a family-owned firm. He does not move about except to make sales or buy. The Jewish professional too is characteristically self-employed, a "free" professional—in part because the great private bureaucracies that employ professionals have in the past generally been closed to him. Rooted to his practice,

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he too does not move. This situation is changing somewhat, but very slowly. Where talent counts more than "appearance" or "type," Jews are employed more readily. Thus the Wall Street law firms that have always wanted to get the brightest law school graduates now have numbers of young Jews. And these firms are facing the prospect of having to take on their first, or first few, Jewish partners. The great banks and insurance companies, the corporations and public utilities, do not have a similar problem, so few are their Jewish executives.

Some interesting facts support these observations. An American Jewish Committee study of graduates of the Harvard Business School shows that the non-Jewish graduates proportionately outnumber Jewish graduates in executive positions in the leading American corporations by better than 30 to 1. John Slawson, the head of the Committee, has asserted, "Jews constitute less than one-half of 1 per cent of the total executive personnel in leading American industrial companies." This he compared with the fact the Jews form about 8 per cent of the college-trained in the country.⁹ The Anti-Defamation League has studied employees making more than \$10,000 a year (there were 6,100 of them) in seven insurance companies. While 5.4 per cent were Jewish, they were mostly engaged not in the home offices but in sales jobs—and these naturally reflect the population to which sales are made, as well perhaps as the belief that Jews make good salesmen. Even the relatively small numbers of Jews employed in home offices tend to be technicians—actuaries, physicians, attorneys, accountants. The ranks of general management are surprisingly free of Jews.¹⁰ The Anti-Defamation League has also studied eight of the largest banks in the city. Of 844 vice-presidents and above, only 30 are Jews—less than 4 per cent. Four of the banks did not have a single Jewish officer.¹¹

Obviously, in addition to discrimination, one must also reckon with taste and tradition among Jews, which may have had their origin in discrimination, but which may now lead a good number of Jews voluntarily to avoid huge bureaucratic organizations in favor of greater freedom in small companies, as independent entrepreneurs, and as self-employed professionals. Qualified observers feel,

however, that regardless of tradition many Jewish youth would like a whack at the big corporations. For example, in a study of the values of college youth, little difference was found between Jewish and Christian students. Jews as well as non-Jews emphasized security and the opportunity to work with people, those organization-man values. Jews found adventure, the opportunity to exercise leadership, and other such traits associated with entrepreneurship no more attractive than non-Jews. Nevertheless, the study showed a higher proportion of Jews intending to go into free professions such as law and medicine and preferring, whether as professionals or businessmen, their own firms to other people's firms.¹²

Even if the absence of Jews from large corporations is partly a product of taste, we know enough of the linkage between these posts and social life, and of discrimination against Jews in the latter, to suspect that more than taste is involved. As the chairman of the board of a bank pointed out, "An active banker belongs to every damn club in town; it's part of the game."¹³ However, the clubs he refers to have been closed to Jews, regardless of social standing or eminence, since the 1880's or thereabouts. It is for this reason that the American Jewish Committee is interested in the discriminatory practices of social clubs. If one's opportunities to reach the command posts of the economy are affected by club membership, and the clubs are closed, then so may be the command posts.¹⁴

Thus, for Jews business and the professions do not mean what they do for white Protestants and Catholics. They mean small business and free professions. This kind of career is more hazardous than that of the corporations, but it may also offer greater opportunities. The post-war period gave many opportunities to small businesses, and the tax structure was more favorable to the proprietor of a business than to the salary earner. But the organization man has status. An observer reports that in the bridge groups on the train to Larchmont, a Jew, when asked what he does, will say he is "in textiles" or "plastics" or is an "accountant," the non-Jew will say he is "with" General Electric or Union Carbide, and there is no question who outranks whom.

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Jewish businessmen in large part are not as acculturated as Jewish professionals. Many have not gone to college, they are often self-made, even today they are often immigrants, and they may lack social polish or be aggressive and crude. For these reasons "succession," the problem of what their sons will do, is intense for them. When the father is an immigrant and not a college man, and not the sort of person one sees in the pages of *Fortune*, and the son has gotten a good education, there is great strain involved in his taking up the family business. Too, being a Jewish business it is likely to be of low status—a small clothing firm, an umbrella factory, a movie-house, a costume jewelry manufactory serving Negro or Puerto Rican trade. Though such a business supplied enough to send the children to college and support the family, it might not seem quite the right thing to a son with an expensive education. Thus very often the son of such a businessman goes into the professions, and the family business is regretfully sold or abandoned to partners.

For the Jewish businessman, who is culturally and socially bound to the Jewish community, who perhaps speaks with an accent and would not appreciate an exclusive club even if admitted, a life of associating with largely Jewish competitors, suppliers, and retailers is comfortable and cozy. To his son, who is perhaps a graduate of the Wharton School or Harvard Business School, such a life is not satisfying, even if the income is good. The son wants the business to be bigger and better, and perhaps he would rather be a cog in a great corporation than the manager of a small one. (The complex interplay between business and the professions for Jews has been subtly analyzed by the sociologists Judith Kramer and Seymour Leventman.)¹⁵ He may not enjoy the tight Jewish community, with its limited horizons and its special satisfactions—he is not that much of a Jew any more. But the larger world portrayed in *The Organization Man* and *From the Terrace* is still closed to him, and perhaps for this very reason is glamorous and attractive. Wealth has been achieved by very sizable numbers of Jewish businessmen and professionals, but status may be the driving force of the third

generation, as financial success was of the second. This, at any rate, is the conclusion of Kramer and Leventman.

In 1936, when anti-Semitism was becoming a major issue in American life, *Fortune* magazine examined Jewish wealth and financial influence. *Fortune* pointed out that financial institutions established by German Jews had given prominence to such families as the Lehmans, Warburgs, and Schiffs, but in top finance as a whole Jews were of minor significance, regardless of how awesome they looked to poor Jews or anti-Semites. In three branches of industry Jews were prominent in the mid-thirties: clothing manufacture, department stores, and entertainment. This was enough to support the illusion of Jewish economic significance. The ordinary American who bought at a Jewish-named department store, saw the movies of Goldwyn and Mayer, and had heard of Jewish bankers might presume Jewish financial power was extensive if he wished.

Since the late 1930's a general diversification has taken place. Merchandising, garment manufacturing, and entertainment maintain their importance, but to them has been added a sizable range of light manufacturing, and real estate and building. In the latter, especially, Jews play a prominent role, and important Jewish fortunes have been created. In the great office-building boom that has transformed Manhattan, most of the big builders have been Jews: Uris Brothers, Tishman, Erwin Wolfson, Rudin, Webb and Knapp (Zeckendorf). Perhaps the chief architect of New York office space has been Emery Roth. The Uris Brothers-Emery Roth style of space manufacturing is depressing to those who prefer more elegant structures, but it would be an error to suppose that unexciting, commercial design represents something characteristically Jewish, in taste or attitudes toward money. The finest of the postwar office buildings, Seagram's, which is perhaps the most lavish and expensive in use of space and detail, was erected by a company headed by a Canadian Jewish communal leader, Samuel Bronfman, and it was said to be his daughter's concern for good design that led to the choice of Mies van der Rohe and Philip Johnson as architects. Perhaps the efficient operations of the Urises and Tishmans, and the

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handsome gesture to the city of Seagram's, both owe something to the patterns of the Jewish family.

In other kinds of building Jews have also been prominent. The Levitts have given a word to the English language with their Levittowns. And in the vast apartment house boom in Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, and the suburbs, Jews have again done much of the building. As in the case of the office builders, a variety of trends is apparent: on the one hand, there are the efficient commercial operations which have transformed Queens and are transforming the East Side, to the distress of those who would prefer to see more low-income housing and better central planning and design. On the other hand, there are the nonprofit cooperatives, the only form of new building which can provide middle-income housing in Manhattan. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, and various groups of Jewish radicals and intellectuals experimented with co-op buildings in the twenties. Abraham Kazan, having managed the Amalgamated Co-ops successfully through the depression, played the major role in launching postwar co-ops in the city. The success of these led to other large cooperative developments, which have anchored large groups of middle-income citizens to the inner city and are now spreading to the outer city (the Jamaica race track is to be a huge cooperative community).

Real estate has attracted many Jews. The skill at financial operations that is thought to be a Jewish characteristic has apparently found full play in the huge land boom of postwar America. The acquisition of land sites, the accumulation of enough private and government money to put something profitable on them, the managing of short- and long-term credit and leases and leasebacks, the organizing of large new developments that include a variety of building types—in these, as well as in more mundane forms of real estate enterprise, Jews play a major role. William Zeckendorf of Webb and Knapp has done as much as any man to dramatize such operations. He assembled the site for the United Nations, bailed out Manhattantown and put up Park West Village on the Upper West Side, and built

great new apartment developments at Kips Bay and the Lincoln Square area.¹⁶

The Jewish role in real estate, perhaps the biggest business in the city, is as extensive and various as real estate itself. There is no discernible "Jewish pattern," though skill in financial and business management, derived from a long history in business, has unquestionably served many Jews well in a field that is incredibly complex and laden with pitfalls. Jews can be attacked for all of real estate's social abuses, but they must also be given credit for much that has been accomplished. Some individual Jews are responsible for bad design and good design; for tenement exploitation and for nonprofit cooperatives; for the corruption of the idea of urban renewal (as in Sidney Unger's attempt to get special consideration from Manhattan Borough President Hulan Jack) and for some of its best examples (as in James H. Scheuer's development in Southwest Washington). The Levitts have tried to keep Negroes out of their towns (and even Jews, in one early Long Island development!), but Eichler in California was the only big builder in the country whose developments were from the beginning open to all, and Morris Milgram's Modern Community Developers have built successful interracial housing in Philadelphia and Princeton.

It would be a serious mistake to exaggerate the meaning of the ethnic identity of Jewish businessmen, but in two ways it is important. First, these men are part of the Jewish community. They are related to it by more than origins, for in fund-raising and spending for Jewish communal interests of all kinds they are prominent. At the least they lend their names; very often they are genuinely active in the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, United Jewish Appeal, and other organizations that raise money for Jewish causes in the city and abroad.

Second—and this is much harder to document, being no more than a hunch—there is something in Jewish experience that combines with the pattern of opportunity offered by American society to determine in what areas Jews will become prominent. Jewish real-estate operators might have been just as skillful in managing the affairs

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of big investment banks and insurance companies. But these great institutions do not easily give place to new men from new groups. Their bureaucratic ladders of advancement are relatively impervious to Jewish ascent. And perhaps too it is more than the white Protestant preemption of certain sectors of the economy that is responsible for certain Jewish concentrations. One notices how often Jewish enterprises involve fathers and sons or groups of brothers—and one wonders whether the fact that the Jewish family is in certain ways “stronger” than the typical American (that is, the white Protestant) family has something to do with occupational patterns. And, as we have suggested, skills may be in some measure inherited. Knowledge of business is a transferable skill, one that in parts of Europe was largely a Jewish monopoly. This unquestionably gave some advantage to tradesmen, merchants, artisans (as Jews were) as compared with peasants, nobles, soldiers, priests (as non-Jews were). The Jewish concentration in the garment trades in this country had nothing to do with knowledge of cloth or clothing. Rather, it had something to do with the sudden rise of a new form of business enterprise—the manufacturing of ready-made clothing for the masses. It was because this was a new form of business enterprise involving very little capital that East European Jews could flow into it. The expansion of ready-made clothing in the American economy meant new jobs for immigrants, and entrepreneurial opportunities for those who could scrape together a bit of capital. Similarly, movies were a new field of business enterprise that originally required little capital. Perhaps, then, there is among Jews an accumulation of business acumen, supported by a relatively strong family system that permits mobilization of capital (even if in small sums), and that makes it possible to move into new areas with opportunities for great growth and high profits.

Jewish experience in real estate fits this pattern. Real estate in America is very different from what it has been in Europe. Land has never been held with sentimental attachment, and the first American farmers and tradesmen set the model of viewing land as capital, to be held only until a fat profit could be made on it. Real estate in the postwar boom years was, in a sense, an infant industry

THE PASSION FOR EDUCATION

requiring ingenuity and small capital, like the garment manufacturing and the mass entertainments of early generations. Consequently, it joined these others as an important area in which East European Jews and their children have become prominent.

In considering the pattern of Jewish wealth, it is worth speaking of one more phenomenon, less important certainly than the Jewish role in real estate but significant as representing the first important breakthrough of Jews in heavy industry. *Fortune* magazine has described the "egghead millionaires," young scientists who have found in the development of electronics and highly technical forms of manufacturing a way in which they can put their education and brains to work very profitably. The Bakalar brothers' Transitron Company, *Fortune* estimated in 1959, could be valued at \$150,000,000—a finding which seems to have astonished the engineer-scientist Bakalar, if not the businessman brother.¹⁷ These new companies reflect less the old Jewish business skill than the almost equally traditional Jewish investment in education. In orientation, culture, and outlook, these new scientists in business differ greatly from the traditional Jewish businessman. It is the difference between the Cadillac and the station wagon, Miami vacations and camping in the Sierras, the *Schmoos* on Seventh Avenue and the bull session in the Berkeley or Cambridge coffee-shop. They are very different worlds, yet they are as close as father and son.

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EASTERN EUROPEAN JEWS SHOWED ALMOST FROM THE BEGINNING of their arrival in this country a passion for education that was unique in American history. City College was largely Jewish by the turn of the century, which was as soon as there were enough Jews of college age to fill it; and Jews overflowed into the other colleges of the Northeast.¹⁸ The Jewish tide in the city colleges has receded somewhat. From perhaps 85 per cent Jewish they have fallen to 65 per cent or less, but this is partly because the increasing prosperity of the Jewish community, its rising social status, and the greater availability of scholarships and other aids to education mean that more Jews can go to paying colleges,

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inside or outside the city. The emphasis on getting a college education touches almost every Jewish schoolchild. The pressure is so great that what to do about those who are not able to manage college intellectually has become a serious social and emotional problem for them and their families.

As larger numbers of Americans go to college, the concentration on higher education among Jews will become less distinctive. But for the time being the college-educated proportion is perhaps three times as large among Jews as in the rest of the population. In New York City, Jews constitute half of the college-educated. A study in 1955 showed that 62 per cent of Jews of college age were in college, as against only 26 per cent of the population as a whole.¹⁹

To admissions officers of good colleges, keeping Jewish students to some reasonable proportion of the whole has often been a problem, and they must have wondered how 3 per cent of the population could create such an impact. In the 1930's, medical schools set tight quotas limiting the entry of Jewish students. These practices were often kept secret, but we know a good deal of them. For example, the Cornell University Medical School, located in New York City, limited Jewish students to their proportion in the state of New York, that is, to about 1 in 7. Thus, of 80 places the Cornell school had in 1940, 10 were to be for Jews, 70 for non-Jews. But 7 of every 12 applicants were Jews. Thus 1 of 70 Jewish applicants and 1 of 7 non-Jewish applicants were admitted. So boys seeking entry to medical school took as a fact of life that bright Jews would be rejected in favor of much less bright non-Jews—and this even when both were undergraduates at Cornell and knew perfectly well how one another stood in class.²⁰

In the last decade a number of important developments have changed this situation. First, a state law against discrimination in higher education was passed in 1948. Second, the number of applicants to medical schools has declined precipitously, from a peak of 4 for every place in 1948 to less than 2 for every place in 1960. In addition, the new Yeshiva University Medical School, named after Albert Einstein, and the New York State Medical School

have opened. Qualified Jewish students have no problem getting into a medical school.²¹

The medical school problem has always been a special one, affecting relatively small numbers of students. Besides, the passion for medicine among Jewish boys is declining as opportunities open up in research, teaching, science, and engineering. Getting into the undergraduate college of one's choice is now the great Jewish (and middle-class) problem. The rising wealth of Jews permits many of them to pay tuition at the best schools; their emphasis on education leads them to take for granted that their children should go to the best schools; and since, in contrast to white Protestants, fewer of them have traditional ties to a variety of American colleges, they think first and foremost of getting into the best schools, which are the hardest to enter.

A study of high school graduates who had applied for Regents' Scholarships in New York State in 1958 showed a remarkable preference among Jews for Ivy League schools. In the city one-third of the Jewish high school graduates applied to Ivy League schools, as against a smaller percentage of white Protestant students, and very few Catholic students. In the suburbs the desire of Jewish students to go to these schools was even more marked. Three-fifths of the Jewish students in Nassau and Suffolk applied to Ivy League schools, but only one-quarter of the Protestant students did. In Westchester almost *three-quarters* of the Jewish students applied, against one-half of the Protestant students.

As far as could be seen, there was no discrimination by Ivy League schools against Jewish applicants. In fact, in the city a slightly *higher* percentage of Jewish than Protestant applicants were successful in getting into an Ivy League school. In Nassau and Suffolk, however, a higher percentage of Protestant students gained admission, and in Westchester 63 per cent of the Jewish applicants were admitted as compared with 89 per cent of the Protestants.²² The proportion of Jewish students in the Ivy League schools rose from 15 per cent in 1949 to 23 per cent in 1955, and in the "Seven Sisters" (the female equivalents of the Ivy League) it rose from 10 to 16 per cent.²³ It is interesting that objections to Jewish students in these schools

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were much greater twenty and thirty years ago when they formed only tiny percentages of the student body. It was in 1922 that President Lowell of Harvard openly proposed a Jewish quota, and it was in 1945 that President Hopkins of Dartmouth openly defended a quota policy. The Jewish proportion of students in these colleges is now far greater than it was; yet the desirability of these schools has certainly not declined.

The quotas of the twenties are not to be ascribed to anti-Semitism and left at that. We have pointed out that more Jews than non-Jews once applied to the Cornell Medical School; probably the Jewish average grades were somewhat higher. A strict consideration of scholarship alone in admissions policy might have led to Cornell's becoming almost as Jewish as City College. It was sometimes argued that this could not have happened—that, after all, Jews are not such a large proportion of the population, and that the only reason so many applied was that they were discriminated against elsewhere and had to apply in large numbers to the few that accepted them. There is some truth in this, but unfortunately not enough. For certain colleges and universities may be particularly attractive to Jews, and there will be enough applicants to quite transform them.

Thus, the president of Bard College said a few years ago it was about 80 per cent Jewish. Close to New York, co-ed, and avant-garde, Bard has been very attractive to Jews. Similar colleges such as Bennington and Antioch have also attracted sizable Jewish enrollments, though nothing like the fantastic proportion at Bard, which a century ago was a preparatory institution for the Protestant Episcopal ministry.²⁴ The Cornell Medical School, Bard, and many other colleges were built up by Protestant clergymen and laymen who naturally equated "American" with "Protestant." Even though this Protestant tradition has accommodated itself to the increase of Catholics and Jews in America, it is unreasonable to expect that leaders of institutions founded and financed by Protestants would be content to see them become mostly Jewish.

Jews as well as non-Jews would be unhappy over such an outcome. Part of the attraction of such in-

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stitutions is undoubtedly the chance they give to experience a wider range of American life than is possible in New York, and to be part of an institution traditionally connected with the major stream in American life. But these benefits are denied if the college becomes mostly Jewish. We come up against a problem similar to one we have met before in our discussion of Negro housing patterns. Some American Negroes, perhaps most, prefer communities in which they have white neighbors; most communities will accept almost no Negroes, and those that do tend rapidly to become all Negro. It is for this reason that various people have proposed "benign quotas," limitations on the proportions of Negroes in a development, so that both Negroes and whites may get whatever benefit there is to be gotten from a mixed community.

The Jewish defense organizations have assumed that if one treats every man as an individual, without any thought of his ethnic affiliation or religion, then such problems—in which the concentration of Jews in an institution takes away some of the things that made it attractive to begin with—will not arise. But as a matter of fact, being a Jew does have consequences for one's behavior, and we cannot expect Jews, just as we cannot expect members of any other group, to distribute themselves evenly over all possibilities. So the religion-blind acceptance policy suddenly wakes up to find that something has happened that no one wanted. But just what to do about it, no one knows. The long-range answer is that with the powerful acculturative processes of American life, Jews will become like everyone else, and Bard with its avant-garde character will attract as few of them as it would of any other group. But here it is 1963 . . . and one wonders whether the effect of social progress is to make Jews just like the upper-class Protestant denominations that they begin to approximate in wealth and occupation.

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JOHN HIGHAM HAS POINTED OUT IN A FASCINATING HISTORY OF social discrimination against Jews in America that, owing to their rapid economic rise, Jews very early sought entry into

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the higher levels of society in large numbers. They thus presented a problem new to American society, and it responded by strict exclusion. After about the 1880's, Jews were excluded from social clubs, preparatory schools, "better" neighborhoods, the organized institutions of high society, and even the occupations associated with high status. This exclusion was greatest during the 1920's and 1930's, but the war against Hitler, the strengthening of equalitarian ideology, and probably the affluence of the postwar period led to relaxation of this system after 1945.²⁵ In New York City, only social and golf clubs and high society remain pretty rigorously closed to Jews. No residential areas in the city and only a few in the suburbs exclude Jews, although a number of Upper East Side luxury apartment houses are closed to them.²⁶ However, the breakdown of systematic exclusion has not been followed by "integration" of the Jewish community, and Jews are becoming more and more aware of a new "ghettoization."

Intermarriage, an important sign of integration, remains low among Jews. The 1957 sample census showed that about 31½ per cent of married Jews were married to non-Jews, and the proportion is possibly even lower in New York, where the concentration of Jewish population, as compared with other communities, reduces the probability of intermarriage.²⁷ A sizable proportion of these intermarried couples—possibly about a third—consider themselves part of the Jewish community, and raise their children as Jews. The only studies that have surveyed intermarriage over a long period of time (those from New Haven) show no increase of it since 1930, although in this period the Jews of New Haven became much more acculturated and prosperous.²⁸ This pattern sharply distinguishes the Jews of the United States from those of other countries in which Jews have achieved wealth and social position, such as Holland, Germany, Austria, and Hungary in the twenties. There the intermarriage rates were phenomenally high.

Nor is there a strong tendency toward residential integration of Jews. In the thirties the following areas of New York City had very high Jewish proportions: the Lower East Side and Washington Heights in Manhat-

tan; the Hunts Point, West Bronx, Morrisania, Fordham, and Pelham Parkway areas in the Bronx; and Brownsville, Coney Island, Brighton Beach, Manhattan Beach, Borough Park, Flatlands, East New York, Bensonhurst, and Williamsburg in Brooklyn. All of these were at least two-fifths Jews, and large sections within them were four-fifths and nine-tenths Jewish. These concentrations included both lower-class and middle-class Jews. When the great exodus to Queens, Long Island, and other suburban areas began after World War II, many observers assumed that Jews would cease to be concentrated. While many apartment houses and, in particular, cooperative developments began with a largely Jewish group of renters and co-op owners, many of the suburban small-homes developments were to begin with mixed. However, before long the mixed developments showed a strong tendency to become almost entirely Jewish or non-Jewish. What happened depended on a multitude of factors: a new synagogue might be built before a church, symbolizing the Jewish character of the development; perhaps a particularly good school system might attract an influx of Jews; perhaps the proportion of Jews to begin with (by sheer statistical accident) was too high to keep the non-Jews comfortable, or too low to keep the Jews comfortable.²⁹

Most Jews would deny that they prefer an all-Jewish neighborhood, and most would agree that they are not comfortable in one with "too few" Jews. John Slawson of the American Jewish Committee reports:

"In a suburban city, part of the New York metropolitan area, where only 15 per cent of the population is Jewish, half of the group would like to live in neighborhoods that are at least 50 per cent Jewish; one-quarter would like to live in neighborhoods that are 75 per cent Jewish. When asked whether they would like more opportunity for contact with Christians, two out of ten said yes, two said no, and six said they did not care."³⁰

Fifty per cent would strike most New York Jews as "just right." But 50 per cent, which is twice the proportion of Jews in the city, and three times their proportion in the metropolitan area, would strike most non-Jews as too much. It is probably not a stable proportion in home-owning de-

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velopments (apartment-house areas are different). In some good suburban areas non-Jews have fled from incoming Jews. But this is pretty clearly not the only, nor even the most important, reason for Jewish concentration. Jews prefer to live with other Jews. Owing to these tendencies among Jews and non-Jews, a truly mixed neighborhood in the suburbs is hard to find, as many young Jewish families who have tried can testify.

In Manhattan, the great exception to most statements about New York City, residential areas are much more mixed, and aside from a concentration in Washington Heights (which is more like the other boroughs), Jews live pretty much everywhere. These are the young unmarried people, the young couples without children, the intellectuals and bohemians who are involved in New York's cultural life. They do not share the desire for self-segregation that characterizes many Jews in the other boroughs, and they have a high rate of intermarriage.³¹

The main point is that Jewish residential concentration is not confined to the immigrant generation or the poor. It is characteristic of the middle and upper-middle classes and of the third generation no less than the second. One of the areas of densest Jewish concentration in the city today is the Forest Hills–Rego Park area, which consists almost entirely of new apartment houses. It is two-thirds Jewish, compared with only 5 per cent in 1930. The Jewish concentration in some other new areas is hardly less striking. The Bayside–Oakland Gardens, Central Queens, and Douglaston–Little Neck–Bellerose areas are two-fifths Jewish or more, although almost no Jews lived in them in 1940. Since the Second World War, Jews have moved from one concentrated Jewish area only to create new ones—and largely out of their own desires.

This tendency survives even as the acculturation of Jews proceeds. In the new communities, Yiddish is hardly spoken, and Jewish culture is of no great interest. Nor is it possible to say that Jews have gathered in order to defend their religion. It is true that their concentration helps synagogues as well as nonreligious Jewish institutions. The social pressure of the group is felt on those who might resist participating; large, expensive synagogues and recrea-

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tional-educational centers are made feasible; fund-raising is easier. But the religious institutions are so strong because they serve the social desire to remain separate to begin with.

It is true that among Orthodox Jews there is a religious reason for separation. The Jewish religious law was in the past elaborated consciously in order to make Jews different in dress, custom, and outlook, so that there would be less chance of conversion and assimilation. In part we see this process at work today, when, for example, Orthodox parents send their children to the "Yeshivas," Jewish parochial schools. These all-day schools have been growing rapidly in the past decade and a half, another sign of the segregation of the Jewish community. They enroll 8 per cent of the Jewish schoolchildren of the city, and the percentage may go higher.³² The separation of the Hasidic groups is even more extreme. Living in Williamsburg, one of the oldest Jewish neighborhoods (but now largely Negro and Puerto Rican), and on Eastern Parkway, a much better and newer neighborhood (but one bordering the growing Negro neighborhood of Crown Heights), the Hasidim insist on a more complete separation than other Orthodox Jews. Not only do they have their own schools, more Orthodox than the ordinary Yeshiva, but they retain traditional peculiarities of dress and hair arrangement that marked off Jews from non-Jews in Eastern Europe centuries ago. In this group, one must wear Judaism on one's face in order to strengthen the Judaism of the heart. One of the reasons Hasidim live next door to Negroes in unconcern is because nothing in the modern world—the drive for respectability, fear of Negroes, or what other people think—affects them much.

But the overwhelming majority of Jews do not maintain any of these outward distinctions, and it is not for fear of the loss of religious faith that they congregate, join synagogues, and send their children to Jewish schools. More than a third of the Jewish children in the city and rather more in the suburbs are enrolled in part-time Jewish schools.³³ The teachers and principals of these schools do want to teach Jewish religion and culture, as an end in itself, in order to perpetuate Judaism. But the parents of these children do not want them to be any more

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religious or consciously Jewish than is necessary, and that often means just enough to make them immune to marriage with non-Jews. This fear of intermarriage is also one of the reasons that Jewish centers are so popular; they permit the teen-agers to get together.

This disapproval of intermarriage is remarkably strong, even among the native-born. At least through the third generation Jews tend to accept the notion that intermarriage is probably not good. Erich Rosenthal reports in the *American Journal of Sociology* on a study of a new middle-class Jewish concentration in Chicago (the situation is the same in New York):

When I asked Rabbi Breitbartman [a pseudonym]—as I asked all my informants—what his explanation is for the recent aggregation of the Jewish community on the North Side of Chicago, his reply was that the one thing that parents fear more than anything else and fear more than at any other time in history is amalgamation, the marriage of their children to “outsiders.” While at one time the problem of Jewish identity was no problem for the individual who lived a distinctively Jewish life in his home, his synagogue, and the community, today there is little that marks the Jew as a Jew except Jewish self-consciousness and association with fellow Jews. If one were to depend on the religio-cultural rather than on the associational tie, then large-scale amalgamation would be the order of the day. To forestall this, the parents favor residence in a neighborhood that has such a high density of Jewish families that the probability of their children marrying a Jewish person approaches certainty.

Commenting on religious schooling, Dr. Rosenthal says,

It appears . . . that the basic function of Jewish education is to implant Jewish self-consciousness rather than Judaism, to “inoculate” the next generation with that minimum of religious practice and belief that is considered necessary to keep alive a level of Jewish self-consciousness that will hold the line against assimilation.³⁴

The mere fact that Jews are clustered together may help explain why types of behavior associated with being Jewish that we might have expected to disappear are instead en-

during. These include a strong family life, a low rate of alcoholism, and a high degree of political liberalism.

Studies have long shown that Jewish families break up less than non-Jewish ones.³⁵ (Once again, we separate the integrated fringe from the mass of middle-class Jews.) Rabbis rarely seem to find it necessary to warn their congregations against marital breakup, neglect of children, cocktail-partying, and the like. Although the powerful maternal overprotection that was one of the chief characteristics of the first immigrant generation is perhaps somewhat abated, Jewish parents still seem to hover more over their children and give them shorter rein for exploration and independence than other middle-class American parents. The results seem to be that there is more neurosis among Jews, but less psychosis.³⁶ The fault of Jewish family relations is in the strength of the tie that binds; but the radical disorders that result from the absence of such a tie are less common among Jews than non-Jews.

The study of alcoholism, one of the chief disorders that afflicts this country, has for a long time concentrated on those special groups—including Jews, Chinese, Italians—that show a lower rate of disorder even though they drink. Those who have studied this phenomenon among Jews (very few of whom are teetotalers) explain it by, among other things, the Orthodox religion, which requires a certain amount of ceremonial drinking at the Sabbath meal, Passover Seder, and other times, and also imposes a system of built-in self-control in many ways.³⁷ But this explanation loses force in that even as Orthodoxy has rapidly declined, particularly in the newer areas in which Jews live, alcoholism among Jews does not seem to have increased. Once again, the great exception is the “integrated” Jew, most common in Manhattan. Whatever the sources of the low rate of alcoholism among Jews—and certainly the surviving effects of Orthodoxy may be an important source—the Conservative and Reform Jews of the suburbs seem to have sustained the traditional pattern. At the elaborate Bar Mitzvah parties for thirteen-year-old boys that are held in middle-class Jewish areas, one finds a huge array of liquor, and everyone drinks before, during, and after the meal, but the alcoholic and semialcoholic are nowhere in sight.

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Finally, in these well-to-do areas another old Jewish pattern holds up—liberalism in politics. The Jews of suburbia may have indulged themselves with a few votes for Eisenhower, but the vast majority continue their allegiance to the Democratic party. The surge of city dwellers into New York's suburbs has made them more Democratic, it is generally agreed. But, to be more subtle in the analysis, it is the surge of *Jewish* population that has made them more Democratic. Protestants and Catholics, as their income rises, do turn Republican. But only at stratospheric economic heights, perhaps, are a majority of Jews Republicans. Indeed, nowhere in the metropolitan area does one find such a phenomenon. Their aberrant political behavior is certainly one of the things that will serve to keep Jews somewhat separate and peculiar as their old practices disappear.

POLITICS

THE JEWS OF NEW YORK CITY HAVE HAD FOR THE PAST THIRTY years a kind of split political personality that can be matched only in such areas as the Southern cities that now vote Republican nationally and Democratic locally. No group in the city supports national Democratic candidates as strongly and consistently as the Jews; none except perhaps the white Protestants has been as uncomfortable about voting Democratic locally. The American Labor Party and the Liberal Party have developed in New York City partly in response to this Jewish dilemma.

Jews are not alone in their partisan irregularity in a city where the local machines have often been poor representatives of national Democratic administrations. But no other group is quite so irregular. The white Protestant old stock generally votes for Republicans locally and nationally. The Irish and Italians are torn between a traditional attachment to local Democratic organizations and an attraction, as a result of their own increased social mobility and the Democrats' interventionism in World War II, to the Republicans. The Negroes and Puerto Ricans, following in the path of other new immigrant groups, are solidly committed to the Democrats, both locally and nationally.

What attracts Jews is liberalism, using the term to refer to the entire range of leftist positions, from the mildest to the most extreme. The Jewish vote is primarily an “ideological” rather than a party or even an ethnic one. There is little question that Jews are moved, as other groups are, by issues that affect them alone, such as policy toward Israel. But it is impossible to test the effect of pro-Israel feeling on voting, for political candidates in New York City all profess an enthusiasm for Israel. Nor is it easy to test the pull of a Jewish versus a non-Jewish name in the city. In cases where the non-Jew is clearly identified with the “more liberal” position—as in the 1960 primary between Ludwig Teller, regular organization Democrat, and William Fitts Ryan, Reform Democrat, in the 20th Congressional District on the West Side—there has been little question that the Jewish name helped hardly at all with Jewish voters. The races between Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., and Jacob Javits for Attorney General in 1954, and between Robert F. Wagner and Javits for U.S. Senator in 1956, are not as simple to analyze, for in both cases there was some question as to who was more liberal. It was hard in either case to demonstrate a “Jewish” vote for Javits.³⁸ In 1932, when three liberal heroes, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Herbert Lehman, and Robert Wagner, Sr., were running for President, Governor, and Senator, Wagner pulled a higher vote in some Jewish districts than Roosevelt or Lehman even though he ran against a Jewish Republican candidate, George Z. Medalie.³⁹

The Jewish liberal voting pattern has been of great persistence. The transformation of Jews from a working-class group (as they were in the time of Al Smith) to a middle-class group (as they are in the time of John F. Kennedy) has affected hardly at all their tendency to vote for liberal Democratic candidates. The Jewish vote for a national Democratic candidate has dropped only once in thirty years—in 1948, when Truman ran against Dewey. But then Jews defected not to Dewey, as one might expect of a business and professional community, but to Henry Wallace. The Jewish vote for Truman and Wallace was almost everywhere equal to the Jewish vote for Roosevelt in 1944.

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At the same time, the candidates of the local Democratic organization have generally been unappealing. The same Jewish voters who turned out enthusiastically for Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944 were cold to O'Dwyer, running against La Guardia, in 1941, and they hardly warmed up by 1945, even though O'Dwyer, campaigning in uniform, no longer appeared to Jews to be clearly the favored choice of isolationists and Christian Frontiers.⁴⁰

Upper-income Jews do not seem to be importantly differentiated from lower-income ones in voting habits. All economic levels were enthusiastically for Roosevelt, Lehman, and La Guardia in the 1930's and 1940's. If enthusiasm for Truman was considerably less, it was hardly a class matter—both upper- and lower-income Jews voted heavily for Wallace. Again, both upper- and lower-income Jews were fervently for Stevenson, and both, emerging from their Stevenson mania, decided that Kennedy was perhaps the heir of Roosevelt, and they voted for him more heavily than did the Irish Catholics!

The voting of ethnic groups, as Samuel Lubell pointed out long ago, is not simply a function of ethnic issues or candidates, though it is true that a group wants representatives, and almost any Jewish candidate gets some Jewish votes running against a non-Jew. Rather, ethnic tendencies in voting express the entire culture and traditions of the group. As Lubell said:

Ethnic groups do not now—if they ever did—act simply as cohesive voting blocs. Rather, their influence is exerted through common group consciousness, through the effect of common antecedents and cultural traditions which enable them to view developing issues from a common point of view.⁴¹

The Jewish commitment to the Democratic party is virtually complete today because the Democrats, since 1928, have nominated liberal candidates for the Presidency. East European Jews found the Democratic party much less attractive in the period from the Civil War to Alfred E. Smith, when its candidates were as likely to be conservatives like Alton Parker and John Davis as to be crusaders like William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson. Indeed, German Jews, coming to political maturity and consciousness in the

period of the Civil War, were perhaps predominantly Republican. Their preference for the Republicans on the national level coincided with their local interests, since the Democratic party, in the hands of the Irish, had no room for them. Instead, Jews held office in the Republican party organization. In the 1870's and 1880's Greenpoint had Jewish Republican leaders, and there were Jewish Republican county leaders in Brooklyn before the end of the century. In the 1920's Meier Steinbrink and Samuel Koenig were Republican county leaders in Brooklyn and Manhattan.

Some East European Jews followed the German Jews into the Republican party, and some, like other immigrants, went into the Democratic party. But at least as many became strong Socialists. It was for this reason, as well as because the Irish held tenaciously to their posts, that Jewish progress in the Democratic party was slow.

Woodrow Wilson aroused some enthusiasm among Jews in 1912 and 1916. Henry Morgenthau, Sr., was chairman of the Democratic Financial Committee in 1912, Bernard Baruch was one of the President's advisers, Louis D. Brandeis became the first Jew to serve on the Supreme Court. But it was Al Smith who challenged the power of the Socialists on the East Side and taught Jews to vote for Democratic state and national candidates. In 1922, with Smith heading the Democratic ticket for Governor, four Jews—three Democrats and a Republican—went to Congress from New York City. Two years before, six Jews were elected to Congress from the city, but all except one were Republicans, and the sixth was a Socialist. It was in 1922 that Sol Bloom, Nathaniel Dickstein, and Emanuel Celler began their long service in Congress, in seats that became as safe as any in the South.⁴²

If many Jews had entered the Democratic party, it is very likely that they could have dominated it. They formed, after all, one-quarter of the population from the early twenties on. In addition, Jews became citizens rapidly—much more rapidly, for example, than Italians—they were politically conscious, and they had a high rate of voting participation. But so much of their energy was devoted to the Socialist party that it was not difficult for the

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Irish to maintain control of the Democratic party. Between 1933 and 1945, when Jews were drawn away from socialism by the New Deal, they still did not enter the local Democratic party on a massive scale, for this was the age of La Guardia, and Jews preferred the American Labor Party and Liberal Party and good government groups to the Democratic party clubs. But since the middle forties there has been less and less to keep Jews from becoming Democrats locally as well as nationally. Many have become active as Reform Democrats in the struggle against the regular party organization. In this conflict, Democrats who are identified closely with the liberal Northern wing of the party have sought to take over and reform the party organization in the city, so as to end the power of the old regular party leaders. Control is being shifted from the Irish and their junior partners, the Italians, who organized masses of regular voters from immigrant groups, to professionals and intellectuals who appeal to independent voters. The elections of the past ten years in New York have shown the greater effectiveness of their approach as compared to that of the traditional machine. The college man is taking over in politics as in business; inevitably many Jews are included. With white Protestants, they dominate the reform movement.

This newer generation of Jews in politics has of course very little in common with the Jews who were in the old Democratic machine. These did very well indeed with the old politics. They have received a high proportion of the judicial posts and nominations for the past thirty years. One-third of the Congressmen from the city, and rather more of the judges, State Senators, and Assemblymen are Jewish. Jews have in fact held more judicial and elective offices than their numerical strength in the organization would seem to warrant. Their prominence in this respect reflects their financial contributions to electoral campaigns, the large number of lawyers among them, and their high rate of voting participation, rather than strength on the clubhouse floor. Still, Jews do have an important place in the organization, and in the struggle between the organization and the Reform Democrats we see manifested the same social change that separates the Jewish

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businessman father from his college-trained son. The fathers are slow to realize that in the rich America of today the material reward of the job (in business or politics) is not as important as personal fulfillment. And in defending itself the organization has failed to see that its attackers are not merely a new wave of seekers after jobs but rather a group that hopes to change the nature of local politics.

How successful this new group will be in transforming the politics of the city, which has resisted many such movements in the past, we shall discover in the next few years.

But the reform movement in politics has already become one of those areas in city life in which people of different backgrounds, from different groups, come together not as representatives of groups, not to bargain for group rights and positions, but to work in a common task, as individuals. This happens often enough in New York business, but there the common end is gain. The fact that it happens in politics, where the common end is a general good, is a cause for satisfaction. This is after all the only real basis of "integration"—common work in which one's group characteristics are not primary and therefore of no great account.

Another great area of New York life in which this kind of integration proceeds is in the fields of cultural activity.

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THE GREATEST CITY IN THE RICHEST AND (PERHAPS) MOST powerful nation of the world must be a world cultural capital in which some things are done better than anywhere else in the world (for example, musical plays, postclassical ballet, abstract expressionist painting), in which almost everything in the sphere of culture can be found, in which new things are tried in every field, old things brought to a high degree of finish, and all kinds of cultural products are marketed to a vast audience—the people of the metropolitan area, the country, and the world. This must be so in great cities in great countries at the peak of their power; and if New York is culturally as exciting as any city in the world, this must be ascribed to America, and not to the composition

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of the population of New York. Even if all the Jews had gone to Argentina or Canada, New York would still be New York, and Buenos Aires and Montreal would only be pretty much what they are.

This we think is a fair statement of the larger truth against which we must view the participation of the various groups in New York's cultural life. And yet, the fact that the city *is* one-quarter Jewish; that Jews broke with the most orthodox and traditional of religions to become open to everything new; that they seized upon everything new because the old things were so often tied up with social snobbery, anti-Semitism, obscurantist conservatism—these facts must also be fitted into an understanding of the cultural life of New York.

New York was America's cultural center even when the German Jews arrived, but for the most part they were preoccupied with business, finance, and solid middle-class life. And when, before the First World War, New York's Greenwich Village became a center of revolt against genteel culture, drawing young rebels from all over the country, the bright young men of the first East European Jewish generation were too busy getting into City College and respectable professions to worry much about the avant-garde. The first link between the group in Greenwich Village and the East European Jews on the other side of the island came through interest not in avant-garde culture but in radical politics. The disgust with the older middle-class America that seized so many young people around the turn of the century and drove them to Chicago and New York met something in the young Jews. They too were against "capitalism." Both groups came together in the Socialist party and in Max Eastman's prewar magazine, *The Masses*; compared, however, with similar enterprises of later years—for example, *The New Masses* of the twenties and *Partisan Review* in the thirties—*The Masses* attracted only a small number of East European Jews.

This world of left-wing politics and avant-garde culture, which survives to the present day in New York, was the first important meeting ground for Jewish and non-Jewish cultural figures and bohemians. It has

helped define Greenwich Village and has represented a phase in the career of American creators in many fields. The experience of this milieu has been very different for the Jewish and non-Jewish participants. For the young American from, say, the Midwest, Greenwich Village, whether as art, politics, or just off-beat living, meant a radical break with the past—with a Republican father, a conservative religious mother, and other relatives who could not conceivably understand what was going on. For the young Jewish radical or bohemian, the break was much less sharp. He had come from the Bronx or Brooklyn, or a Chicago or Detroit whose Jewish section was not very different; he went home now and then for the holidays or some family gathering. If he was a Communist, his father had been a Socialist (or vice versa), and regardless of his wild goings-on he could usually depend on a little financial help from anxious parents. The non-Jews in these circles were a million miles from home, the Jews but a subway ride away.

Thus, paradoxically, the non-Jews in New York's bohemia felt uprooted, alienated, alone, and the Jews (who were often envied for it) were by contrast rooted and at home. It is perhaps because for Jews the step to bohemia is not great or decisive that up to now the really creative figures in American culture have not been Jews as often as we might expect. It is difficult to count heads (the question is always, which heads), but in the avant-garde circles of the twenties, thirties, and forties Jews were very often the critics (and entrepreneurs), non-Jews the creators. This was so in literature, painting, music, and the theater.

But if Jews bulked larger among the critics than the creators, they bulked largest of all among the audience. Here, they made perhaps their most important contribution to New York's cultural life. Once again statistics are not available; but it is clear that neither tourists, the working-class masses, nor the small Protestant elite could have filled or could fill today the audiences for chamber and contemporary music, modern dancing, and poetry reading, or the subscription lists for avant-garde magazines. As they have become wealthier, Jews have also become patrons and collectors. Many descendants of the older Ger-

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man-Jewish immigration have played important roles in New York's cultural life as patrons, collectors, and organizers.

Their independence of old American traditions makes Jews a market for the new. They do not as often fill their homes with early American, but they are receptive to new painting, new household design, and new houses. In New York there are relatively few contemporary houses, but outside New York Jews have been among the most important patrons of advanced architecture. It is not uncharacteristic that two of the most striking and widely reproduced symbols of American architecture were commissioned by Jews—Frank Lloyd Wright's Bear Run house and his Guggenheim Museum.

Culture, whether high, middlebrow, or mass, is big business, one of the few big businesses in which Jews have been active and prominent for many years. They are producers of movies and television shows and agents for actors and performers. They have also been the creators of the single most valuable commodity the entertainment industry in New York handles, the Broadway musical. Whether Jews have influenced the character of musicals is another question; Kurt List, the music critic, made the intriguing point some years ago that it was no accident that a string of the most popular musicals by Jewish composers and lyricists (*Show Boat*, *South Pacific*, *The King and I*) had an interracial and intergroup theme.⁴³ *West Side Story* continues the tradition.

In the marketing of culture and entertainment, there is only one business, book publishing, in which Jews were not especially prominent. This is the most conservative of such fields, and for a long time, New York, the center of book publishing, had very few Jewish publishers and editors. Starting with the period of the First World War, some important publishing houses were founded by Jews, in particular, Alfred A. Knopf and Random House. Since the Second World War the Jewish role in publishing has increased in the city, as a result both of creation of new firms and changes in old ones. The rapid development of paperback book publishing in particular has given many opportunities to Jewish publishers and editors.

The involvement of Jews with the new has meant a special role for them too in another area which certainly affects New York's cultural life, that is, psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis in America is a peculiarly Jewish product. This is not only because Freud and many of his early followers were Jews. At most, this reflected only some special aspects of the position of Jews in Central Europe. For the East Europeans who made up the greatest part of New York Jewry, and for the bourgeois German Jews of the nineteenth century and their descendants who made up a smaller part of the community, nothing could have been on the face of it more foreign than psychoanalysis. The East European Jew was blind to many kinds of psychological abnormality: for him there was only one kind of abnormality, the social one, and all his intelligence was applied to changing the abnormal social position of the Jew. Why then do large numbers of psychoanalysts and patients come from this group in the United States?

The explanation probably lies in the effects of secularism on Jews, who have been so rapidly divorced from traditional religion and who have accepted the possibilities of science and intellect so completely that a movement like psychoanalysis—even had its founder been a German anti-Semite—would have been irresistibly attractive. For here was a scientific form of soul-rebuilding to make them whole and hardy, and it was divorced, at least on the surface, from mysticism, will, religion, and all those other romantic and obscure trends that their rational minds rejected. And then too, it was also a new field with room for new people, which fact may explain why so many Jews became analysts. But it is primarily the complete secularization of the second-generation East European Jew in America that explains why so many became patients.⁴⁴

We have spoken about education, politics, and culture as forming the stage on which work and productivity may overcome the significance of group affiliation; but at the same time we have pointed to tendencies among Jews that hold the group together and reestablish a tight, closed community in new middle-class settings. Obviously, a group stays together and maintains common institutions

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to further certain ends. And groups stay together too for no end but simply the simple human pleasure in forming smaller worlds in a big world. Jewish togetherness has a good deal of both aspects. Who else is to raise money for Israel if not the United Jewish Appeal, who else is to raise money for Jewish Old Age Homes if not the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, who is to maintain the Jewish religion if not the synagogues and the temples? Around these tasks social circles are formed. And yet at the same time a good deal of this Jewish togetherness is simply frightened and unimaginative, and its only purpose is to maintain separateness.

Despite economic prosperity and liberalism, all is not well in the Jewish world—or perhaps because of them. When Jews were poor, it seemed reasonable that they should try to become rich; as they emerged from poverty, it seemed desirable that they should remain liberal and sympathetic to the needs of those who were still poor and deprived and those who came after them. But a hard look at the Jewish situation today reveals a number of disturbing elements. Jewish liberalism, it is true, supports the NAACP, CORE, the reform Democrats, freedom riders in the South, and a variety of liberal Democratic candidates who come to New York to refresh their campaigns with Jewish money. But what now supports Jewish liberalism? Many decent impulses, of course, and ties to old friends and early allegiances, but also, simply, an excessive timidity or fright. Reaction and conservatism are so staunchly opposed in part because there is always the fear that it hides anti-Semitism, even though there may scarcely be a hint of it. Perhaps it is unjust to regard as unwarranted strong Jewish concern for anti-Semitism at a time when it is scarcely to be detected as a significant force anywhere in the United States. After all, Hitler did kill six million Jews, and anti-Semites in Argentina have carved swastikas on the breasts of young Jewish women. And yet, where are the dangers to Jews in New York City, or in the United States? Nevertheless, large sums of money (compared at any rate to the sums raised for other causes) can be collected to fight anti-Semitism.

When the American anti-Semite George Rockwell wanted to speak in New York City, Jewish groups

and individuals (not all) put great pressure on the government to prevent him from opening his mouth legally. When young boys painted swastikas on Jewish synagogues, it became a matter for almost hysterical outbursts and elaborate studies—as if no one had written dirty words on appropriate walls before. A few years ago, the Police Commissioner of New York spoke out in irritation against Jewish policemen who were taking off Yom Kippur as a holiday when he needed every man to guard Khrushchev and Castro, who were attending a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. Married to a Jewish woman, knowledgeable about New York and New York Jews, he said that he knew many of them were not planning to spend the day in the synagogue. The outburst against him by Jewish organizations was violent, and when he refused to apologize, he only scarcely retained his job. Such incidents, and they are common in the life of the city, lead one to reflect on the future of the Jewish community. What is it afraid of? What is it defending? Are these minor slights matters that should so deeply concern it?

The Jewish community is affected not only by the context of America in the sixties but by the context of Jewish history. But never in the Diaspora have Jews wielded such weight and power in a great city, and in such circumstances it is necessary to consider how the traditional parameters of Jewish history may, if only for some generations, have been altered. The defense of a minority group and its interests may legitimately be shrill and insistent when it is powerless and weak and there is no one to listen; thus much may be excused the Negroes. But the maintenance of this habit when conditions change may seem to those outside the group arrogance and hypocrisy.

Consequently, Jewish liberalism, which is sound enough perhaps from the perspective of an American nation that is still in many ways remarkably conservative and bound to old slogans, is, in the context of New York, not quite as sound as it should be. There is much self-congratulation on the struggles and successes of the past. Jewish socialists and intellectuals played a great and important role in the building up of the labor movement in the 1930's, but they seem to have been struck dumb by the problems raised for the city by the rise of a new proletariat of Negroes

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and Puerto Ricans. There is no question that these raise far more difficult problems of organization than Jews or other European immigrant groups. Nor is there any question that traditional labor organization itself is an insufficient answer at a time when poverty is so solidly based on lack of skills, training, and education and a heavy incidence of social problems. Yet one must acknowledge that the great tradition of social reform and social engineering that was identified with the Jewish labor unions and the Jewish labor movement in the city seems to have been unable to make any serious impact on this problem. The major social achievement of the Jewish labor movement since the end of the war has been the creation of the great middle-income cooperatives, and this is a real achievement, but it is one that benefits a largely Jewish middle class, and scarcely affects the conditions of the new proletariat.

In 1962 and 1963 a conflict between the NAACP and the International Ladies' Garment Workers broke into the open. Herbert Hill, the (Jewish) labor union expert of the NAACP attacked the ILGWU for discrimination against Negroes. The one attested case was of a Negro cutter who was denied entrance into the union. Just a few years before, a refugee Jewish DP who had arrived in the city, and who had great skill as a cutter, was denied entrance into the union as a full cutter, even though his family in this country included a number of employees of New York labor unions and made every effort to help him. Clearly the problem in the cutters' union was not simply racial discrimination. It was the job monopoly that is found in extreme form in many skilled unions. But even if one could dispute specific points in Herbert Hill's case, one could not dispute the fact that the Negroes and Puerto Ricans had not been brought into the trade union establishment in New York. And it was understandable that it was the Jewish, not the Irish and Italian, unions that were attacked first. More was expected from them. The attack was supported by Jewish writers, sympathetic indeed to the Jewish unions, who nevertheless could look back on their own radical youth and see that something had gone out of the Jewish labor movement in New York.⁴⁵

Consider another area that reveals something of the life of the Jewish group in the city. On the West Side of Manhattan there has existed since the 1920's a large and prosperous Jewish community. Much of the life of the area was and is concentrated in the great synagogues. Jewish religious and political ideals were merged in such liberal rabbis as Stephen S. Wise and Mordecai Kaplan. Since the Second World War, the area has changed. Many Jews moved out, many Negroes and Puerto Ricans moved in. There have been difficult problems, but not different from those in other great American cities. The major attempt to deal with these problems has been through urban renewal—the rebuilding of the area so as to reduce the low-income and increase the middle- and high-income population. This movement has been supported by all the middle-class groups and institutions of the area, who of course would like to see less crime and disorder and crowding and dirt around them. The West Side's solution has been no worse than that of other cities, and perhaps even better, for the largest of these projects will incorporate a considerable number of low-income families. And yet one cannot help but feel that somewhat more enlightened and imaginative solutions could have emerged from the Jewish group of the West Side and from the synagogues. Two of these have already followed their flocks across Central Park to the more expensive and exclusive East Side. As for the rest, if there have been prophetic voices, they have not made themselves heard.

The real achievement of the Jews in America has been the generations of energetic and gifted young people they have supplied to the arts, to radical politics, to the labor movement. Many of these young people were able in the twenties and thirties and forties to find challenging and satisfying environments that were formally or *de facto* Jewish. Even while considering themselves free from all Jewish ties, they worked among Jews in the theater, in political activity, in the unions. One wonders about the supply of such young people in the future—will they emerge from this comfortable middle-class group? One also wonders where they will go. They certainly find little in the formal

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Jewish community of the day that attracts them. Neither the synagogues and temples, nor the charitable and philanthropic work, nor the fund-raising for Israel and defense seems sufficiently vital and relevant for the most gifted young people who are emerging from the community. This is at any rate one conclusion that might be drawn from a remarkable symposium conducted by the magazine *Commentary* in 1961. Nor does that other community that was scarcely less Jewish, that of the radical movements and the unions, engage them much.⁴⁶

But these are the best of the young people, one assumes, those that are repelled by what is increasingly called "the gilded ghetto." What of the rest? Are they likely to find this new ghetto even as stimulating as the ghettos of the past? When the Jews lived on the Lower East Side and in other working-class areas, they led a separate life. But they were intensely curious about everything going on in the outer world, eager to participate in it and to master whatever had to be mastered for this participation. When the Jews were thus most Jewish, when they took their Jewishness for granted, they looked forward to a time when all barriers would be down and they could participate freely in the labor movement, business, politics, culture, and social life. The ideology of the working-class Jews was not separation but the fullest involvement in society; Jewish culture and religion, they felt, could take care of itself.

Now that so many of these barriers are down, and Jews have become less Jewish and more prosperous, there are tendencies to caution and withdrawal. A satisfying pattern of Jewish middle-class life has not yet emerged. This failure in Jewish life reflects the general unease of American middle-class life, as well as the specific Jewish dilemma of finding, in this amorphous society, a balance between separation and the loss of identity.

the Italians

WHEN the Chinese, confident that they were the only civilized people, were confronted by Italian Jesuits in the seventeenth century, and discovered that another people could write, and were even more competent than themselves at clock-building and calendar-making, they decided they would have to add to the number of known civilized nations. They consequently added the Italians, the first Western civilized people with whom they had contact, and the Jews, who had written the book that the Jesuits were trying to propagate.

Thus, to Chinese writers of the early modern period, the Chinese, Jews, and Italians were linked by a peculiar accident as the three civilized nations. Historical accident has again linked them more recently, for in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these three peoples—so different in size, character, and history—became the great migrating nations. In each case, the migrants were im-