

mad dogs, and we fought until night separated us and then, as I have said, we retreated with great caution for great companies of them came following after us. We got our allies off the causeway, for many more of them had come than there were before, and we retired to our huts and at once went on guard all of us together, and we supped while keeping watch, as I have often related before, and by early dawn we were fighting again, for they did not give us much rest.

In this way we held out for many days, and while it went on another bad change took place, and it was that an army got together from the three provinces called Mataltzingo and Malinalco and some other towns called (I cannot now remember the name of them, but they were eight or ten leagues distant from Mexico) ready to fall upon us while we were fighting with the Mexicans and attack us in the rear and in our camps so that when the Mexican forces could sally out, and with one force on one side and the other force on the other, they thought that they would rout us. As other discussions took place, I will go on to say what happened about it.

CHAPTER CLV.

How Guatemoc had arranged with the provinces of Mataltzingo and Tulapa and Malinalco and other pueblos to come to his assistance and make an attack on our camp, which is that of Tacuba, and on that of Cortés, and how the whole force of Mexico would sally out while they were fighting with us and would attack us on the flank, and what was done about it.

So that this may be clearly understood it is necessary to go back and speak of the time following the defeat of Cortés, when they carried off sixty and odd soldiers to be sacrificed, and I may as well say sixty eight for they

amounted to that number when they were carefully counted. I have also said that Guatemoc sent the heads of the horses and the faces which they had flayed and the hands and feet of our soldiers whom they had sacrificed, to many pueblos and to Mataltzingo and Malinalco and Tulapa, and he sent them word that more than half of our people were already dead, and he begged them, in order that they might kill every one of us, to come and help him and to attack our camps by day or night so that we should be forced to fight and defend ourselves, and while we were fighting they would come out from Mexico and attack us on the other side, so they would conquer us and capture many of us for sacrifice to their idols and [be able] to satiate themselves on our bodies. He sent to say this in such a manner that they believed it and took it to be true. Moreover Guatemoc had many relations on his mother's side in Mataltzingo and in Tulapa, and when they saw the faces and heads of our soldiers that I have spoken about, and heard what he sent to tell them, they promptly set to work to get together all the forces they could raise to come in aid of Mexico and their relation Guatemoc. They actually were already on their way against us, and on the road they passed three pueblos of our allies, and they began to attack them and to rob their farms and maize fields and to kill children for sacrifice. These pueblos sent post haste to let Cortés know about it, so that he might send them help and assistance, and he at once sent Andrés de Tápia with twenty horsemen and one hundred soldiers and many Tlaxcalan allies to succour them effectively, and they made them (the enemy) retire to their pueblos and then came back to camp, at which Cortés was much pleased.

In the same manner and at the same moment there came other messengers from the town of Cuernavaca to claim assistance, for these same people of Mataltzingo

and Malinalco and Tulapa and other provinces were coming down upon them, and [they begged Cortés] to send help. For this purpose he sent Gonzalo de Sandoval with twenty horsemen and eighty soldiers, the soundest that were in all three camps, and many of our allies. God knows that those left behind ran great personal risk in all three camps, for nearly all were wounded and they had no comforts whatever with which to refresh themselves.

A great deal might be said about what Sandoval did and how he defeated the enemy, but I must omit saying more than that he returned very quickly to the relief of his camp (that of Sandoval), and that we brought with us two chieftains of Mataltzingo, and left them (the pueblos) more peaceful than before. That expedition was of great advantage, on the one hand in preventing our friends from receiving more damage than they had already received, on the other in preventing them [the enemy] from coming to our camps to attack us as they had set out to do, and, furthermore, in showing Guatemoc and his captains that they could no longer look for help or favour from those provinces, or say (when they were fighting with us,) that they were going to kill us with the help of Mataltzingo and the other provinces as their idols had promised them.

Let us cease talking of this expedition and the assistance that Sandoval rendered and turn to relate how Cortés sent to Guatemoc to beg him to make peace and he would pardon all that had passed, and to tell him that the king our Master had lately sent to order him not to complete the destruction of the city, and for this reason during the past five days he had not attacked nor entered it fighting. Let him (Guatemoc) observe that he no longer had any supplies of food nor water and that more than two thirds of the City were levelled with the ground, and, as to the help that he expected from Mataltzingo, let

him enquire from those two chieftains whom he [Cortés] now sent to him and what had happened to them on their expedition. He also sent to tell him other things [in the nature] of many promises. There went with these two messengers the two Indians from Mataltzingo and six Mexican chieftains who had been taken prisoners in the late battles. When Guatemoc saw the prisoners from Mataltzingo and learned from them what had happened he would give them no answer beyond telling them to return to their pueblo and leave Mexico at once.

Let us leave the messengers : The Mexicans promptly sallied out on three sides with the greatest fury that we had seen up to this time, and fell upon us in all three camps and made a fierce war upon us, and as we wounded and killed a great many of them it seemed to me as if they wished to die fighting. Then when they were pressing on us most fiercely, fighting hand to hand (they killed ten of our soldiers whose heads they cut off) that they had and said to us “ Quitlenquitoa rrey castilla quitlenquitoa ” which means to say in their language, which is the same as they speak to-day, “ The King of Castille ” and with these words they began to shoot javelins and stones and arrows which covered the ground and causeway. Let us leave this, for we were already advancing and capturing a large part of the City, and we noticed that although the enemy were fighting very manfully fewer squadrons than usual came in relief, and they no longer opened canals or [broke down] causeways ; but another thing they most certainly did, which is that at the time when we retired they followed us until they could lay hands on us. I also wish to say that we had already finished our powder in all three camps, and just then a ship had arrived at Villa Rica belonging to the fleet of a licenciado Lucas Vásquez de Ayllon, which was lost or destroyed in the Island of Florida, and this ship made that

port and some soldiers and powder and crossbows came in it. The lieutenant who was in Villa Rica, named Rodrigo Rangel, who was in charge of Narvaez, promptly sent the powder, crossbows and soldiers to Cortés.

Let us get back to our conquest, so as to be concise ; Cortés settled with all the other captains and soldiers that we should push forward into the City as far as we were able until we reached Tlatelolco, which is the great market place where there were seven lofty Cues and Oratories, and Cortés on his side, and Gonzalo de Sandoval from his, and we from ours advanced capturing bridges and barricades. Cortés advanced to a little plaza where there were some oratories and small towers,¹ and in one of the houses there were some beams set upright and on them many of the heads of our Spaniards whom they had killed and sacrificed during the recent battles, and their hair and beards had grown much longer than when they were alive, and I would not have believed it if I had not seen it. I recognized three soldiers as my comrades, and when we saw them in that condition it saddened our hearts. At that time we left them where they were, but twelve days later they were removed, and we took those and other heads that had been offered to the idols and we buried them in a church that we made, which is now called The Martyrs near the bridge named El Salto de Alvarado (Alvarado's leap.)

Let us stop speaking about this and say that the ten Companies of Pedro de Alvarado advanced fighting and reached Tlatelolco, and there were so many Mexicans guarding their Idols and lofty cues, and they had raised so many barricades that we were fully two hours before we were able to capture them and get inside. Now that the horses had space to gallop, although most of them were

¹ Zacaculco, now the church of Sta. Ana, 26th July.

wounded, they helped us very much, and the horsemen speared many Mexicans. As the enemy were so numerous the ten¹ companies were divided into three parts to fight against them, and Pedro de Alvarado ordered the company commanded by a captain named Gutierre de Badajoz to ascend the lofty Cue of Huichilobos which has one hundred and fourteen steps, and he fought very well against the enemy and against the many priests who were in the houses of the oratories, but the enemy attacked Gutierre Badajoz and his company in such a way that they sent him rolling down ten or twelve steps, and we promptly went to his assistance.

Let us leave the combat in which we were engaged with many of the enemy ; as we advanced the squadrons with which we were fighting followed us, and we ran great risk of our lives, but nevertheless we ascended the steps which as I have said before were one hundred and fourteen in number. It is as well to mention here the great danger we were in, both one [company] and the other, in capturing those fortresses which I have already said many times were very lofty, and in those battles they once more wounded us all very badly, nevertheless we set them [the oratories] on fire and burned the idols, and we planted our banners and were fighting on the level after we had set fire [to the oratories] until night time, but we could do nothing against so many warriors.

Let us stop speaking about it and say that Cortés and his captains saw the next day, (from where they were fighting on their side, in other districts and streets far from the lofty cue,) by the sudden blaze of flame, that the great Cue was burning, for it had not been extinguished, and on seeing our banners on the top he was greatly rejoiced, and

¹ In the text "dos capitánias" evidently a mistake for "diez capitánias" as above.

he wished that he also was there, and they even say that he was envious, but he could not have done it, for it was a quarter of a league from one place to the other, and there were many bridges and water openings to be captured, and wherever he turned they made fierce attacks on him, and he could not advance as quickly as he wished into the heart of the City, as we of Alvarado's (company) had done. However, within four days both Cortés and Sandoval joined us, and we could go from one camp to the other along the streets over the houses that had been pulled down and the bridges, barricades, and water openings, now all filled in.

At this time Guatemoc and all his warriors were retreating to a part of the City within the lake for the houses and palaces in which he had lived were already levelled to the ground, but with all this they never ceased to turn out every day to attack us, and when it was time for us to retire they followed us up closer than ever. When Cortés saw this, and that many days passed and they did not sue for peace, and had no thought of doing so, he agreed with all our captains that we should form some ambuscades, and this was the way of it. From all three camps we got together about thirty horsemen and one hundred soldiers, the most active and warlike that Cortés could find, and he sent to summon from all three camps one thousand Tlaxcalans, then we placed ourselves in some large houses which had belonged to a Mexican Lord. This was done early in the morning and Cortés made his advance along the streets and causeways with the rest of the horse that were with him, and his soldiers, crossbowmen and musketeers fighting in the usual way and pretending that he was filling in the water openings and bridges. The Mexican squadrons that were ready for the task were already engaged with him, and also many others whom Guatemoc had sent to guard the bridge. When

Cortés saw that the enemy were in great numbers, he pretended to retreat and ordered the allies to be got off the causeway, so that they [the enemy] should believe that he was retreating, and they came in pursuit of him, at first slowly but when they saw that he really acted as though he were fleeing, all the troops that were on the causeway rushed after him and attacked him. When Cortés saw that they had passed a little beyond the houses where the ambush was placed, he ordered two shots to be fired close together, which was the signal that we were to sally out of the ambush. The horsemen came out first and then all of us soldiers, and we fell on the enemy as we chose. Then Cortés quickly turned round with his men, and our friends the Tlaxcalans did great damage to the enemy so that many were killed and wounded, and from that time forward they did not follow us when it was time for us to retire. Another ambush was laid for them in the Camp of Pedro de Alvarado, but it came to nothing. On that day I was not present in the Camp of Pedro de Alvarado as Cortés had sent me orders to go to his camp for the ambush.

Let us leave this and say that as we were all of us in Tlatelolco, Cortés ordered all the companies to take up their quarters, and keep watch there, because from our camp we had to come more than half a league from where we were now fighting. So we stayed there three days without doing anything worth mentioning, because Cortés ordered us not to advance any further into the City nor to destroy more houses, for he wished to stop and demand peace. During those days that we were waiting in Tlatelolco Cortés sent to Guatemoc begging him to surrender, and not to have any fear, and with many promises he undertook that his (Guatemoc's) person should be much respected and honoured by him, and that he should govern Mexico and all his territory and cities as

he was used to do, and he sent him food and presents such as tortillas, poultry, tunas and cacao, for he had nothing else to send. Guatemoc took counsel with his captains and what they advised him to reply was that he desired peace but that he would wait three days before giving an answer, and that at the end of three days Guatemoc and Cortés should meet and make arrangements about the peace, and that during those three days they would have time to know more fully the wishes and reply of their Huichilobos, and [he might have added] to mend bridges and to make openings in the causeway and prepare arrows, javelins, and stones and make barricades.

Guatemoc sent four Mexican chieftains with that reply, and we believed that the [promise of] peace was true, and Cortés ordered the messengers to be given plenty to eat and drink and then sent them back to Guatemoc, and with them he sent more refreshments the same as before. Then Guatemoc sent other messengers, and by them two rich mantles, and they said that Guatemoc would come when everything was ready. Not to waste more words about the matter he never intended to come, (for they had counselled him not to believe Cortés and had reminded him of the end of his uncle the great Montezuma, and of his relations, and the destruction of all the noble families of Mexico; [and had advised him] to say that he was ill) but intended that all should sally out to fight and that it would please their Gods to give them the victory they had so often promised them. As we were waiting for Guatemoc and he did not come, we understood their deceit and at that very moment so many battallions of Mexicans with their distinguishing marks sallied out and made an attack on Cortés that he could not withstand it, and as many more went in the direction of our camp and in that of Sandoval's. They came on in such a way that it seemed as though they had just then

begun the fighting all over again, and as we were posted rather carelessly, believing that they had already made peace, they wounded many of our soldiers, three of them very severely, and two horses, but they did not get off with much to brag of, for we paid them out well. When Cortés saw this he ordered us again to make war on them and to advance into the City in the part where they had taken refuge. When they saw that we were advancing and capturing the whole City, Guatemoc sent two chiefs to tell Cortés that he desired to speak with him across a canal, Cortés to stand on one bank and Guatemoc on the other and they fixed the time for the morning of the following day, Cortés went, but Guatemoc would not keep the appointment but sent chieftains who said that their Lord did not dare to come out for fear lest, while they were talking, guns and crossbows should be discharged at him and should kill him. Then Cortés promised him on his oath that he should not be molested in any way that he did not approve of, but it was no use, they did not believe him and said "lest what happened to Montezuma should happen to him." At that time two of the chieftains who were talking to Cortés drew out from a bag which they carried some tortillas and the leg of a fowl and cherries, and seated themselves in a very leisurely manner and began to eat so that Cortés might observe it and believe that they were not hungry. When Cortés observed it he sent to tell them that as they did not wish to make peace, he would soon enter into all their houses to see if they had any maize and how much more poultry.

We went on in this way for another four or five days without attacking them, and about this time many poor Indians who had nothing to eat, would come out every night, and they came to our camp worn out by hunger. As soon as Cortés saw this he ordered us not to attack them for perhaps they would change their minds about

making peace, but they would not make peace although we sent to entreat them.

In Cortés's camp there was a soldier who said that he had been in Italy in the Company of the Great Captain¹ and was in the skirmish of Garallano and in other great battles, and he talked much about engines of war and that he could make a catapult in Tlatelolco by which, if they only bombarded the houses and part of the city where Guatemoc had sought refuge, for two days, they would make them surrender peacefully. So many things did he say to Cortés about this, for he was a very faithful soldier that he [Cortés] promptly set to work to make the catapult and they brought lime and stone in the way the soldier required, and carpenters and nails and all that was necessary for making the catapult, and they made two slings of strong bags and cords, and brought him great stones, larger than an arroba jar.² When the catapult was made and set up in the way that the soldier ordered, and he said it was ready to be discharged, they placed a suitable stone in the sling which had been made and all this stone did was to rise no higher than the catapult and fall back upon it where it had been set up. When Cortés saw this he was angry with the soldier who gave the order for making it, and with himself for believing him, and he said that he knew well that in war one ought not to speak much about a thing that vexes one, and that the man had only been talking for talking's sake, as had been found out in the way that I have said. This soldier was called, according to his own account, something de Sotello, a native of Seville. Cortés at once ordered the catapult to be taken to pieces. Let us leave this and say

¹ Gonzalvo de Córdoba.

² Arroba—a weight of twenty-five pounds, here, a sort of demi-john.

that, when he saw that the catapult was a thing to be laughed at, he decided that Gonzalo de Sandoval should go in command of all the twelve launches and invade that part of the City whither Guatemoc had retreated, which was in a part where we could not reach the houses and palaces by land, but only by water. Sandoval at once summoned all the Captains of the launches and what he did I will go on to relate.

CHAPTER CLVI.

How Gonzalo de Sandoval with twelve launches entered into the part of the City where Guatemoc was [had taken refuge] and took him prisoner, and what happened about it.

As I have said Cortés not only saw that the Catapult was useless but was angry with the soldier who advised him to have it made, and in consequence of Guatemoc and his Captains not wishing for peace of any sort, he ordered Gonzalo de Sandoval to invade that part of the City where Guatemoc had taken refuge with all the flower of his Captains and the most distinguished persons that were in Mexico, and he ordered him not to kill or wound any Indians unless they should attack him, and even if they did attack him, he was only to defend himself and not do them any other harm, but he should destroy their houses and the many defences they had erected in the lake. Cortés ascended the great Cue of Tlatelolco to see how Sandoval advanced with the launches, and at that time Pedro de Alvarado, Francisco Verdugo, Luis Marin and other soldiers were there with Cortés.

Sandoval advanced with great ardour upon the place where the Houses of Guatemoc stood, and when Guatemoc saw himself surrounded, he was afraid that they would