

**PART V**  
**THE DYNAMICS OF THE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES**

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## CHAPTER I

### THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN-MAGYAR HEGEMONY

As we have repeatedly emphasized, the political struggles of the last half-century of the Habsburg monarchy were chiefly determined by the so-called Compromise (*Ausgleich*) which the Dualistic Constitution settled in 1867, the essence of which was the political domination of the Germans in Austria, and that of the Magyars in Hungary. On the one side the "kingdoms and countries represented in the Austrian parliament, *Reichsrat*," the seventeen so-called crownlands (*Kronland*), under German supremacy, on the other side "the countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown," which phrase included, besides Hungary proper, Croatia and Slavonia as annexed countries and the city and district of Fiume as a "separate body" (*Separatum Corpus*) of the Crown of St. Stephen. We shall discuss later this strange political structure and its grave political consequences.

This is the more important because that process of the national awakening which I outlined in the last chapter of Part VII, did not signify in itself a centrifugal tendency but only the endeavor of each nation to develop its own national existence and culture. This endeavor became centrifugal only by the fact that the other non-German and non-Magyar nations of the monarchy felt the German-Magyar hegemony as a burden and there was a growing conviction among them that under this hegemony they were incapable of developing those economic, intellectual, and moral values which they considered as their national right. This struggle against the German-Magyar hegemony—as we shall see in detail—was complicated by other national struggles also among the so-called "oppressed nations" and what was still more dangerous was the fact that the two leading nations themselves fought each other more and more bitterly.

Another important fact realized by all objective observers was that these national struggles, growing in passionate intensity, showed directly opposite tendencies in Austria and in Hungary: in the former, political evolution went on manifestly in the direction of national equalization and federalization, whereas in the latter—at least seemingly—toward a unitary, unilingual, Magyar national state in which only one political nation was acknowledged as the force maintaining and directing the state. In the following treatment, therefore, we must separate completely the analysis of national struggles in Austria and in Hungary. But, before entering upon the investigation of these two different processes, I would like to point out some important facts

which will elucidate the very nature of the German-Magyar hegemony.

Above all there can be no doubt that the Dualistic Constitution was not created out of nothing by the Compromise of 1867, that it was not a sheer excogitation of Beust and Deák for the oppression of the other peoples, but it was only a jural fixation of a historical situation of several centuries. It was a jural recognition of the facts that the Austrian half of the monarchy consisted of a rather mechanical agglomerate of countries and provinces completely conquered and unified by the Habsburgs, deprived of their former constitutional independence; whereas, on the other hand, the Hungarian half constituted a country more or less independent for a thousand years, controlled by a feudal constitution which was successful until the end in retaining, partly by passive resistance and partly by armed insurrection, the unifying and Germanizing attack of the Habsburgs. This meant at the same time that the Habsburgs were incapable of incorporating Hungary into the uniform system of their other countries and territories and of reducing it to the rôle of a simple *Kronland*. This situation found for the last time an almost symbolical expression in the War of 1848–49 between Hungary and the Habsburgs when the latter could only suppress the Hungarian “rebellion” with the help of the Russian Tsar. This issue demonstrated clearly that there was a certain parity of forces between Austria and Hungary, or better, between Habsburg and Hungary. In 1867 the Emperor acknowledged simply this fact in a new jural form. Unifying absolutism capitulated before Hungarian “constitution and independence.”

It is not less clear on the other hand that this Dualistic Constitution was not based upon the ethnographical distribution and the numerical forces of the peoples and nations of the monarchy. In order to get an adequate idea of the ethnic forces of the monarchy, we must regard separately its constitutional units. Austria proper, Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia, and the last conquest of the Habsburgs, Bosnia, and Herzegovina (a kind of a constitutional mystery which did not belong, strictly speaking, either to Austria or to Hungary) constituted both from a historical and an administrative point of view distinct divisions inside of which the dynamics of national forces manifested themselves under different forms.

The distributions of the nations of Austria is shown in Table IV. Round numbers only are used for the sake of simplicity.

Table IV clearly shows that in the Austrian part of the monarchy the ratio of the leading German element was only 35.58 per cent and it was confronted by a great Slav majority of 60.65 per cent. Speaking in round numbers we may say that of the total population of Austria less than ten million Germans lived with a majority of eighteen million non-Germans.

The hegemonous rôle of the Germans was further endangered by

the fact that as a colonizing element it was present everywhere in the monarchy but it lacked a solid ethnographical central point from which its economic and cultural forces could have radiated throughout the whole territory. Different nations constituted an absolute majority in various provinces: (1) Germans in Salzburg, 99.73 per cent; in Upper Austria, 99.70 per cent; in Lower Austria, 95.91 per cent; in Vorarlberg, 95.36 per cent; in Carinthia, 78.61 per cent; in Styria, 70.50 per cent; in Tyrol, 57.31 per cent. (2) Czech-Moravian-Slovak in Moravia, 71.75 per cent; in Bohemia, 63.19 per cent. (3) Poles in Galicia, 58.55 per cent. (4) Slovenians in Carniola, 94.36 per cent; in Görz and Gradiska, 61.85 per cent. (5) Serbo-Croats in Dalmatia, 96.19 per cent. (6) Italian-Ladins in Trieste, 96.19 per cent.

National particularism was further accentuated by the existence of three provinces where the leading nation constituted only a relative majority. These provinces and their leading nations were: (1)

TABLE IV

Nations	Total Number	Percentage of Total Population
1. Germans.....	9,950,000	35.58
2. Czechs-Moravians Slovaks....	6,436,000	23.02
3. Poles.....	4,968,000	17.77
4. Ruthenians.....	3,519,000	12.58
5. Slovenians.....	1,253,000	4.48
6. Serb-Croats.....	788,000	2.80
7. Italian-Latins.....	768,000	2.75
8. Rumanians.....	275,000	0.98
9. Magyars.....	11,000	0.04

Germans in Silesia, 43.90 per cent; (2) Ruthenians in Bukowina, 38.90 per cent, and (3) Serbo-Croats in Istria, 43.52 per cent.

Generally speaking, Austria had only six provinces which could be regarded as nationally homogeneous: the German Lower and Upper Austria, Salzburg, Vorarlberg, the Slovenian Carniola, and the Serbo-Croat Dalmatia. German hegemony was further hampered by the fact that national minorities lived often not in close settlements but were found in a very mixed population in the various districts, cities, and communities which was a serious obstacle to the formation of homogeneous administrative divisions. For instance, in Carinthia, the settlements of the Slovenians permeated deeply the German regions. Bukowina was a kind of an ethnographical museum where, beside the two chief nations, there lived Germans, Jews, Poles, Magyars, Slovaks, and Lippovans, not only dispersed in the towns, but sometimes in close settlements. Purely German villages were adjacent to purely Magyar ones.

Also two other factors made German hegemony fragile. The one

was of a historical nature: the Germans were confronted by peoples of a very developed national consciousness who like the Czechs, the Italians, and the Poles were animated by a more positive state conception than the Austrian-Germans who with their Janus-faced policy could not choose between the Greater German and the Austrian-German state conception.

The other factor was the awkward geographical formation of Austria. Our economic survey has sufficiently proved how ill-founded the theory was (advocated especially during the World War from Austrian-German side) concerning the geographical unity of the monarchy. The truth was that the monarchy contained various mountain and river systems with no organic connection with Vienna. For instance Galicia and Bukowina had no real contact with the other parts of the monarchy, Tyrol projected like a wedge into the Swiss mountains and Upper Austria might have belonged with equal right to Ba-

TABLE V

Nations	Total Number	Percentage of Total Population
Magyars.....	9,945,000	54.5
Rumanians.....	2,948,000	16.1
Slovaks.....	1,946,000	10.7
Germans.....	1,903,000	10.4
Serbs.....	462,000	2.5
Ruthenians.....	464,000	2.5
Croats.....	195,000	1.1
Others.....	401,000	2.2

varia. If Hungary would have been a real and organic part of the empire, there could have arisen some kind of unity. But Hungary itself was a closed geographical unity admired by Elisée Reclus and other experts in geography, the historical consciousness and constitutional scheme of which was rigidly opposed to an Austrian state unity. With such a centrifugal Hungary in its background, Austria was like a fan which had only a periphery without a central part.

From many points of view the ethnographic and geographic basis of Magyar hegemony in the Hungarian countries was of a different nature. In studying these conditions we must separate Hungary proper from Croatia-Slavonia which had a distinct territorial autonomy. According to the census of 1910, Hungary in the restricted sense had an ethnographical distribution such as is shown in Table V.

These results of the official Hungarian statistics were often attacked by the advocates of the national minorities of Hungary by asserting that this numerical supremacy of the Magyars existed only on paper, and was due partly to the pressure and retouching of the ad-

ministrative organs and partly to the superficial assimilation of the Jews<sup>1</sup> and the renegades of the other nationalities who joined the Magyars *en masse* in order to share the advantages of their domination. This criticism was not entirely baseless but a detailed analysis of the whole process of assimilation in Hungary led me to the conclusion, in my book already quoted, that the results of Table V may be accepted as a roughly adequate description of the situation. Even applying the utmost caution we may accept it as a fact that the Magyars constituted in pre-war Hungary (Croatia-Slavonia not included) though a small, nevertheless an absolute majority. This conclusion is the more important because at the settlement of the *Ausgleich* (Compromise of 1867) the Magyar element constituted only 44.4 per cent of the whole population of the country. The Magyarization of the country made an important step forward. No honest observer will deny that in this process the artificial political assimilation, of which we shall speak later, was not a negligible factor. Nevertheless more important and more natural causes were operative in the growth of Magyar hegemony. I am compelled to enumerate these causes very briefly:

1. The powerful natural unity of the Carpathian basin held together by two large rivers furnishing a natural division of labor between the mountainous peripheries and the Hungarian plain.

2. The Magyar nation occupied the richer plains of the country and, in its central position, it exercised a great attraction on the nationalities of the peripheries. At the same time, the growing capitalism of the country accentuated this process as the leading elements of capitalism were intimately connected with the Hungarian government. These and other factors concurred with the result that the Hungarian towns with a Magyar majority became six times greater in population than they were at the end of the eighteenth century, whereas the towns with a non-Magyar majority could only double their population in the same period.

3. The cultural and intellectual distance between the Magyars and the other nations of the country was far greater than between the Austrian-Germans and their more developed neighbor nations, for instance, the Czechs, the Italians, and the Poles. The greatest part of the Hungarian nationalities, as the Rumanians, Ruthenians, and the Eastern Slovaks were scarcely awakened from their bondsmen stupor, whereas the more developed German minorities (in the first place the Saxons of Transylvania) had a tendency to unite with the Magyars for certain cultural or political privileges against the other nations.

4. While in Austria the capitalistic evolution created a strong

<sup>1</sup> According to the same census there lived in Hungary 911,000 Jews or 5 per cent of the population. Therefore, if the Jews had been treated as a separate nationality, the Magyar majority would have disappeared.

class differentiation in the ruling German nation, and at the same time caused the formation of an important middle class among the non-German nations, in Hungary this process was only at the beginning; the country remained in its bulk agrarian, and the industrial development of the country, even at the time of the collapse of the monarchy, was scarcely more striking than that of Austria in the eighties of the last century. Therefore, the political unity of the historical society remained far more compact and the leading rôle of the feudal classes, animated by the ideology of Magyarization and national unification, far less contested.

5. But all these factors were surpassed in significance by the following: in Hungary there were no crownlands which could foster the particularist consciousness of the various nations. The particularism of the county organization, already mentioned, was not national but only administrative. This organization stood entirely under the sway of the local wealthy nobility, almost exclusively Magyar or assimilated by the Magyars. These feudal elements opposed vehemently all attempts at national organization of the non-Magyar peasantry because they understood very well that the national emancipation of these masses would have meant also their social and political liberation. A natural result of this situation was that, almost until the hour of dissolution, there was in Hungary proper no national minority which aspired to an independent state as was the case of the Czechs, Poles, or Italians in Austria.

This transitory supremacy of the Magyars, however, was weakened by the fact that in three important regions of the country the non-Magyar nations constituted the majority. In the so-called Left River district of the Danube, the Slovaks constituted 58.8 per cent of the population; in Transylvania the Rumanians, 55 per cent, and in the region called the Tisza-Maros angle again the Rumanians had a relative majority constituting 39.5 per cent of the population. A further fateful trait of Hungarian hegemony was that the pressure of the *latifundia* weighed more heavily upon the Magyar small peasantry than upon the non-Magyar.

Even more uncertain will appear the numerical basis of Magyar hegemony when we consider the fact that the settlements of the various nations varied as mosaically as in Austria. It often occurred that Magyar, German, Rumanian, and Serb villages adjoined each other. In such cases generally the chief law of assimilation went on as the process of the sea which determines in the long run the ethnic composition of the islands. In the midst of the large compact popular settlements, the smaller enclaves were swept away by the waves of this sea. The Magyars, as the most intellectual and proletarianized element of the country, moved toward the greater urban agglomerations



and Magyarized them. On the other hand in the smaller villages, included within non-Magyar majorities, the opposite tendency was prevalent.

The numerical hegemony of the Magyars appears even more endangered when we consider the entire territory of the Hungarian crown comprising the ethnic conditions of Croatia-Slavonia. Here in opposition to the kaleidoscopic ethnic relations of Austria and Hungary an almost complete homogeneity prevailed. Of the 2,622,000 inhabitants of this country, 2,283,000 were Serbo-Croats, that is, 87.1 per cent of the population. Confronted with this large majority the rôle of the Germans with 5.1 per cent and the Hungarians with 4.1 per cent was quite insignificant the more so as the Germans were mostly town-dwellers, whereas, among the Magyars, the officials or workers sent from Budapest constituted an important contingent. If,

TABLE VI

Nation	Total Number	Percentage of Total Population
Germans . . . . .	12,011,000	23.38
Magyars . . . . .	10,120,000	19.71
Rumanians . . . . .	3,222,000	6.27
Slavs . . . . .	23,416,000	45.59
Others . . . . .	2,585,000	5.05

therefore, we take the whole Hungarian crown into consideration, that is, Hungary proper *and* Croatia-Slavonia, the reader will clearly realize that the hegemonic Magyar element was on this territory a minority similar in position to the Germans in Austria. The ten million Magyars constituted only 48.1 per cent of the whole population, and beside them there were 10,800,000 non-Magyars.

If we remember finally that of the 1,932,000 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina there were 1,823,000 Serbo-Croats, that is, 96 per cent of the whole population, we see that the two hegemonic nations, the Germans and the Magyars, were in a distinct minority compared with the other nations. If we group the chief ethnic elements of the whole Austro-Hungarian empire, we are faced with the figures shown in Table VI which gives the percentages of the total population of 51,355,000.

Table VI demonstrates that the two hegemonic nations, the Germans and the Magyars together, with 22,131,000 constituted only 43.09 per cent of the whole population whereas the other nations of the monarchy formed a majority of 29,223,000 which is 56.91 per cent of the whole.

Under these conditions the Dual Constitution based on the German-Magyar hegemony was doomed to come into conflict sooner or later with the will of a considerable majority of the nations. In spite of this the constitution was capable of maintaining itself for half a century, and under its rule a conspicuous material and cultural development of the monarchy cannot be denied. It is, therefore, evident to anyone who is not a naïve admirer of the theory of violence that the German-Magyar political hegemony, not based upon the numerical preponderance of the two nations, must have been rooted in other important facts. I have already several times alluded to these facts in the course of this book. The Austrian half of the empire was a result of the German colonization, and the culture which united its economy, administration, and the army was in the main German culture. Similarly in the capitalistic era the new bourgeois class, which exercised

TABLE VII

Nationalities	Population	Number of Universities	Number of High Schools
Germans.....	9,000,000	5	180
Czechs.....	6,000,000	1	83
Poles.....	4,200,000	2	35
Ruthenians.....	3,400,000	0	3
Slovenians.....	1,200,000	0	0
Serbo-Croats.....	700,000	0	6
Italians.....	700,000	0	8
Rumanians.....	230,000	0	0

the economic leadership, was in its large majority of a German-Jewish character. In the Hungarian half of the monarchy we encounter an analogous situation. The feudal structure of the big landed interests which determined the course of the political and social life was the Magyar nobility and those elements of the middle classes and of the non-Magyar nobility which became entirely assimilated in tradition and ideology with the Magyar upper classes.<sup>2</sup>

It is easy to demonstrate, by means of outstanding facts of economic and cultural life, that this historical German and Magyar hegemony was very preponderant until the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. I shall quote only some facts, almost at random, in order to give a more concrete idea to the reader of the nature of this hegemony. Let us begin with Austria. The Germans constituting only 35.58 per cent of the population paid 63 per cent of the direct taxes in the first decade of the present century. A German paid on an av-

<sup>2</sup> Before the constitutional era there were about 550,000 nobles in Hungary. Among these 466,000 Magyars, 58,000 Germans, and 21,000 Rumanians. The "national" mission of the nobility was recently reassured by Julius Szeckfü, *Three Generations* (Budapest, 1922). In Hungarian.

erage twice as much in taxes as a Czech or an Italian, four and a half times more than a Pole, and seven times more than a southern Slav.<sup>3</sup>

The same preponderance of the Germans is shown in Table VII by the figures of higher education at the end of the nineteenth century.

The national distribution of officials and officers make the picture drawn by the figures in Table VIII even more impressive.

No detailed statistics were published concerning the nationality distribution of the officers in the army, but there can be no doubt that even in 1910 at least 85 per cent of the officers were Germans. This

TABLE VIII

Nationalities	Distribution among 1,000 Austrians	Nationalities	Distribution among 1,000 Officials
German.....	357	German.....	479 (+122)
Czech.....	232	Czech.....	232
Pole.....	165	Pole.....	125 (-40)
Ruthenian.....	132	Ruthenian.....	29 (-103)
Slovenian.....	46	Slovenian.....	32 (-14)
Serbo-Croat.....	27	Serbo-Croat.....	12 (-15)
Italian.....	28	Italian.....	35 (+7)
Rumanian.....	9	Rumanian.....	4 (-5)

TABLE IX

NATIONALITIES AMONG 1,000	OCCUPATIONS			
	Agriculture and Forestry	Industry	Commerce and Transportation	Intellectual
Germans.....	335	383	134	148
Czechs.....	431	365	93	111
Poles.....	656	148	112	84
Ruthenians.....	933	25	17	25
Serbo-Croats.....	869	46	38	47
Slovenians.....	754	134	35	77
Italians.....	501	234	127	138
Rumanians.....	903	27	25	45

fact is the more significant because according to an official record of 1900 there were in the joint army 400,000 Slav, 227,000 German, 220,000 Magyar, 48,000 Rumanian, and 14,000 Italian soldiers.

No less enlightening are the results of the statistical compilations, shown in Table IX, concerning the professional classes<sup>4</sup> and the manner in which they were employed.

Table IX demonstrates that the Germans were far more active in industry and commerce than the other nations of the monarchy which

<sup>3</sup> Heinrich Rauchberg, *Die Bedeutung der Deutschen in Österreich* (Dresden, 1908), p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> O. Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage*, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

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explains their economic leadership. At the same time these figures verify the conclusion that national consciousness grows usually in direct proportion to the industrialization and commercialization of the various nations.

It would be an easy task to demonstrate the great economic and cultural predominance of the Germans also in other fields. But the foregoing examples give a sufficiently clear idea of how preponderantly the former Austria of the absolutistic period was a German state, when after the passionate struggles of more than a century, it retained still its German character.

Even still more striking was the economic and cultural hegemony of the Magyars in Hungary proper. I must restrict myself here to a few examples. Among the towns and bigger villages above 10,000 there were 80 with a Magyar, 9 with a German, 8 with a Slovak, 6 with a Serb, and 2 with a Rumanian majority. This signifies that 76.09 per cent of all the urban agglomerations was Magyar. We reach the same conclusion if we regard the ethnic composition of the towns. Table X, according to the census of 1910, gives the percentages of the various nationalities among the total urban population.

TABLE X

Nationalities	Per Cent
Magyars . . . . .	76.6
Germans . . . . .	9.7
Slovaks . . . . .	4.3
Rumanians . . . . .	3.6
Ruthenians . . . . .	0.1
Croatians . . . . .	0.5
Serbs . . . . .	2.3
Others . . . . .	2.9

Knowing the intimate connection between the urban agglomerations and the spirit of culture and democracy, we are entitled to draw the conclusion that the distribution of the spiritual and economic forces of former Hungary coincided approximately with the foregoing figures. Other facts will corroborate this hypothesis.

Among the intellectual professions the Magyars, whose percentage of the total population was only 54.5 per cent, show the figures in 1914 as given in Table XI.

TABLE XI

Professions	Per Cent
State Officials . . . . .	95.6
County Officials . . . . .	92.9
Judges and Prosecutors . . . . .	96.8
Lawyers . . . . .	89.1
Clergy . . . . .	63.7
Teachers in Elementary Schools . . . . .	81.9
Teachers in High Schools . . . . .	91.5
Teachers in Universities and Colleges . . . . .	93.4
Physicians . . . . .	89.1

We find approximately the same ratio among the students of the middle and higher education.

Table XII shows the percentages of the various nationalities among the students graduated from high schools or similar institutions in 1913.

TABLE XII

Nationalities	Per Cent
Magyars . . . . .	82.0
German . . . . .	7.8
Slovaks . . . . .	2.1
Rumanians . . . . .	5.7
Ruthenians . . . . .	0.1
Croats . . . . .	0.2
Serbs . . . . .	1.6
Others . . . . .	0.5

Similarly among the students in the universities and colleges 89.2 per cent were Magyars in the first semester of the year 1913-14.

Not less conspicuous was the hegemony of the Magyars in the walks of economic life. Whereas, among the independent artisans working without apprentices, the percentage of the Magyars corresponded roughly to their percentage in the general population, among the more prosperous artisans employing apprentices the percentage of the Magyars amounted to 71 per cent. Generally speaking the larger an industrial plant was, the more its Magyar character became prominent.

Among the 2,884 proprietors of plants employing more than 20 apprentices, 2,228 were of Magyar tongue according to the census of 1910. Among 1,657 proprietors of estates containing above 1,420 acres, there were 1,515 Magyars. Of the intellectual leading staff of the larger industrial plants the Magyars held a percentage of 83 and of the qualified workers, 63.

If we compare the taxes paid by predominantly Magyar regions of the country with those paid by the predominantly non-Magyar districts, we find that the taxes of the Magyar counties amounted in 1907 to 101,000,000 crowns whereas the non-Magyar counties contributed only 81 millions. Budapest alone paid in direct state taxes a sum which equalled the financial contribution of the whole of Transylvania and of the Left River district of the Danube, which was the biggest part of the non-Magyar territory.

In order not to burden the reader with other facts, I beg only to emphasize one more outstanding feature of the situation. Table XIII will show the newspapers and periodicals published in 1909 in the various languages of the country.

In connection with these figures it will perhaps be interesting to note that among the ninety-four libraries of the former Hungary

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which possessed more than 10,000 volumes, there were eighty-five Magyar, six German, two Serb, and one Rumanian.

In these and similar facts we find the real basis of the Magyar and German hegemony. No honest observer of the situation would pretend that all these facts were only a result of the natural development of the social forces. There can be no doubt that the political system and the state administration influenced them to a certain extent. But it is

TABLE XIII

TYPES OF NEWSPAPERS	LANGUAGES IN WHICH PUBLISHED				
	Magyar	German	Slovak	Rumanian	Ruthenian
Political . . . . .	248	50	5	17	0
Local . . . . .	287	38	1	4	0
Literary . . . . .	50	4	2	5	0
Technical . . . . .	771	55	3	18	1
Others . . . . .	21	3	0	0	0
Total . . . . .	1377	150	11	44	1
Percentage . . . . .	80.67	8.79	0.64	2.58	0.06

no less manifest that this hegemony was not an artificial one and was not based on sheer force but was a result of a long historical evolution of effects determined by the German dynasty, bureaucracy, militarism, and capitalism on the one hand, and by Magyar feudalism and finance on the other.

The struggle of the other nations was directed against the economic and cultural monopolies of the two hegemonic nations. This could only be accomplished by the transformation of the whole former political structure.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CHIEF TENDENCY OF THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL STRUGGLES: THE MOVE TOWARD NATIONAL EQUALITY

The struggle, which went on in Austria for more than half a century with growing ardor and bitterness and which led very often to the obstruction of the Parliament and many of the Diets, accompanied by political persecutions, street riots, military sieges, and imprisonments, assumed sometimes the forms of a chronic civil war. For instance, in 1895 the government of Count Badeni made an end to an absolutistic régime in Bohemia which lasted more than two years. During this time 7 journals were stopped, 17 associations dissolved, and 24 papers were put under daily censorship. One hundred and seventy-nine accused were put before exceptional tribunals and punishments of imprisonment were sentenced which totaled 278 years.<sup>1</sup>

This struggle was in its deepest root the fight between two antagonistic principles and world views. The one was the point of view of the *beati possidentes* (those in power), tending to maintain the historical character of the state, the centralized bureaucratic empire under German hegemony. The other was the point of view of those outside the controlling power, of the oppressed or at least second-rank nations tending to remold the old Austria into a decentralized state of nationalities or of equal nations more or less on a confederative basis. Centralization under German hegemony or federalism, conscious of the fact that Austria possessed a Slav majority and therefore, willing to open a way to this majority will—these were the two antagonistic conceptions lying at the bottom of the kaleidoscopic national struggles of Austria.

Naturally this statement is far too abstract and schematic. The struggling masses and even their leaders very often had not a clear comprehension as to the nature and tendency of their fight because, in politics, the contending parties are led less by principles than by the conflicts of daily interests. It is quite clear that the Germans, full of the traditional conception of a German world-empire; or the Czechs, cherishing the brilliant memories of Hussitism and emphasizing more and more clearly the unity of the Crown of Wenceslaus; or the Polish nobility, regarding their nation as “the Christ of the Nations” and continuing the dream of the empire of Jagello from coast to coast; or the Italians, looking always wistfully toward the end of

<sup>1</sup> Richard Charnatz, *Österreichs äussere und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914* (Leipzig u. Berlin, 1918), pp. 20–21.

the Italia Irredenta had quite another political idea and could use quite other means than for instance the Ruthenian, Rumanian, or Slovenian peasants with their undeveloped historical consciousness and small social differentiation.

But not only was the national consciousness and conception of the various nations radically different, but even inside of the single nations the ideology of the struggle assumed very changing colors according to the classes which appeared in the arena of political life. For instance, in the consciousness of the historical nobility, the national problem appeared in the first place as the struggle of the crowns in an endeavor to maintain the particular life and historical privileges of their countries under their political hegemony. For the bourgeois classes and especially for the intelligentsia the national problem signified first of all a growing participation in the administrative positions and in the economic advantages dependent on state power. The struggle for national rights was in their eyes identical with the claim that not strangers but the national intelligentsia should occupy the administrative positions, both large and small, and that "national" industry and commerce should enjoy the commissions of the state and its facilities in transportation and taxation. And, as this struggle of the second-rank nations was directed as a matter of fact primarily against the leading German bureaucracy and bourgeoisie, it was only natural that the leading classes reacted with a defensive nationalism against the aggressive nationalism of the rising nations. The "maintenance of the German character" of the endangered cities and regions became a passionate shibboleth arousing broad popular movements. That this so-called national struggle signified very often sheer financial efforts of a private character was conclusively demonstrated by the famous Kestranek affair, when this gentleman, the leader of a great German industrial concern, showed before a tribunal in Prague that a state minister and other influential official personages were mobilized against his industrial plant menacing it with an anti-trust legislation, with the lowering of the iron duties, and other important economic measures motivated by the sole purpose of extorting from it cheap raw material for a screw plant which a Czech member of Parliament intended to establish.<sup>2</sup>

Again quite different was the attitude of the small bourgeoisie. In their eyes the national struggle was above all a "struggle for the customer" in order to assure a national clientele for their shops, inns, and artisan enterprises. And when, in consequence of the repeated extension of suffrage, broader circles of small business men and artisans appeared in political life, national struggles assumed a particularly acute and demagogic accent. The "maintenance of the national

<sup>2</sup> Similar interesting facts will be found in Paul Samassa, *Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat* (Leipzig, 1910), p. 58.



character" or "the reconquest of the old national settlements" were the slogans behind which the class interest of the small bourgeoisie took refuge. In this heated atmosphere, a great number of so-called national cultural associations arose for the "defense and organization" of the endangered national positions. These societies furnished social prestige, and frequently, remunerative jobs to the leaders of the small bourgeoisie who had an outstanding interest in the maintenance of the struggling attitude of their fellow-citizens by fomenting a kind of a fear complex of national aggression. When capitalism became stronger, and, when as its consequence, an industrial migration took place which concentrated the surplus population of the villages in the large industrial centers and created there important enclaves of foreign nationalities which as a matter of fact put forth the claim for schools and administration in their own language, this fear complex grew into an almost hysterical terror which denounced every movement or organization of the national minorities as political plots or "Pan-Slavistic" or similar dangerous schemes. How exaggerated and embittered this public mood had been, was curiously demonstrated by the fact that the pan-German circles of Vienna in the last decades of the previous century were seriously alarmed by the fear that the Imperial City might become Slavized. The superficial observer, hearing only the political orations and the demagogic utterances in the national-cultural associations and witnessing very often the street riots and the bloody scuffling of the students and the inflamed articles of the leading newspapers, would have thought that one nation would be exterminated by the other or at least its former position would become precarious. Just the opposite was the truth. All these political troubles and harangues scarcely touched the masses of the two nations which worked side by side in complete peace and the traditional national settlements of which remained almost unaltered. For instance concerning the German-Czech situation where the so-called national struggle was the loudest, sometimes even desperate, the careful investigations of Professor Heinrich Rauchberg have demonstrated that the national forces, after the embittered fights of half a century, remained practically the same.<sup>3</sup>

Substantially different was the mood and attitude of the peasant masses concerning national problems. Both the constitutional point of view and the prospect of economic and administrative monopolies were foreign to their simple and very often primitive standard of living, but more important for them was the land problem in regions where the large estates of a foreign upper class checked them in their cultural and economic development. The national struggle, therefore, signified for them a desire for the expropriation of an alien system of

<sup>3</sup> *Der Nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen* (Leipzig, 1905), I, 662.

feudalism. Besides with growing transportation and market economy the peasant masses also became more and more anxious to have popular education and administration in their national tongue.

Finally the appearance of the industrial working-class in economic life and the political struggles gave also a new color and accent to the national problems. The industrial workers of the cities regarded for a time disinterestedly the struggle of the feudal crowns and the fight of the bourgeoisie for administrative positions and economic advantages. These struggles not only did not interest them but they were even irritated by them because the proletariat had the impression that the national struggles signified for the middle classes a sort of "veiling ideology" as it was happily called:<sup>4</sup> the bourgeoisie make national struggles intentionally more acute in order to divert the attention of the masses from economic and cultural issues. This point of view was not without foundation, but in the same ratio in which the working-classes had an increase in the participation of the cultural and political life of their country, they became more and more aware of the fact that the national problem was only another side of the social problem without the solution of which its emancipation could not be achieved. And as very often in many places it occurred that the working-masses were confronted with employers of a foreign tongue, especially with Germans and Jews, class antagonism often assumed the character of national antagonism. Otto Bauer was to a certain extent justified in saying that "national hatred is only a transformed class hatred."

But however many-sided and variegated the nature of national struggles may have been among the various nations and among their particular classes, the essence of the whole process cannot be doubted. Everywhere we witnessed the same tendency: each nation tried to secure its own individuality, and tried to develop its economic, cultural, and political forces in order to attain an *optimum* situation realizable under the given conditions. Baron Eötvös emphasized as the fundamental character of these struggles the fact that every nation feels its own essence, its own cultural and historical conception to be higher and more valuable than that of other nations. I would be inclined to challenge the correctness of this statement. At least one may ask whether the late imperialistic developments of nationalism do really emanate from the genuine sources of the national idea and not from the monopolistic interests of certain groups which were alien to the original conception of national aims? Be that as it may, the aspect of the national struggles in Austria makes it manifest that the program and purposes of the national struggles are in a constant flux and that

<sup>4</sup> The political significance of this type of theory was vigorously demonstrated by Paul Szende in his "Enthüllung und Verhüllung: Der Kampf der Ideologien in der Geschichte," *Archiv für Geschichte des Sozialismus*, 1922.

their final limit is, if not domination as Eötvös asserted, at least *equality of rank*. Nations, as individuals cannot in the long run permit themselves to be treated as inferior persons. Even the most modest nation—to use an expression of Napoleon—feels in its knapsack its marshal baton, the idea of perfect national independence.

That is the reason why the nations could not be satisfied and calmed by *ad hoc* advantages and transitory reforms. The difficulty of the national problem in Austria increased exactly to the same extent to which the various nations grew in economic strength, and in political and cultural rights. There can be no doubt that the weakest nation of Austria enjoyed in real life more rights and privileges than the strongest non-Magyar nation in Hungary. In spite of this fact the superficial observer might well have believed that in Hungary there was no national problem, whereas Austria ran from crisis to crisis in consequence of this problem. Paradoxical as it may seem, one may say without exaggeration that *the more the former claims were satisfied, the more the nations felt themselves oppressed*. For example, the national struggle of the Czechs became the loudest in those decades in which they built up their whole educational organization from the elementary schools to the universities and when they occupied many outstanding administrative and judicial positions. The more the former German ruling nation was put on the defensive, the more the Czechs and the other former servant-nations began to feel that their situation was shameful and the more their orators hurled philippics against foreign domination and oppression. In this relation only the situation of the Poles was an exceptional one. The former revolutionary nobles became the most loyal supporters of the Austrian state since, as a consequence of the Compromise of 1867, the Crown and the German bourgeoisie made an alliance with them. The Poles supported the new constitution with their votes, and as the price of their loyalty, they obtained an almost state-like independence in Galicia. Under the protection of this *de facto* home rule the Polish upper class could establish without hindrance its own administrative organization and cultural life and was checked very little in the exploitation of the other great ethnic element of Galicia, in the economic and political domination of the Ruthenians. The Poles of Galicia were perfectly aware of the fact that their condition was excellent compared with that of their brothers in Prussia and in Russia, and, therefore, they were willing to accept Austria “as a tolerable though transitory domicile” until the millennium of the Jagellonian state ideal should be achieved.

But all the other nations did not and could not obtain such a relative equilibrium. Foreign observers have often expressed the opinion that the chief cause of national unrest in Austria was due to the oppressive and Germanizing tendencies of the Germans. This judgment

needs at least a strong qualification. Disregarding the episode of the Bach system, we may safely say that there was no conscious Germanization in Austria, and the conception of a unified German nation as the ruler of a nation state was never a political idea as in Hungary where the hegemony of the Magyars was the fundamental dogma of political life. Both in the schools and in the administration the language of the various nations was acknowledged and the state was anxious to develop a bureaucratic class in every nation capable of carrying on state affairs in the maternal language of the population. Paragraph 19 of the fundamental law of 1867, which codified the principle of national equality, did not establish a revolutionary doctrine but rather emphasized a more or less acknowledged practice, saying:

All the nationalities of the State are equals in right and each of them has the inalienable right to maintain and to foster its own nationality.

The equal right of all the languages of the country in the schools, in administration, and in public life, is acknowledged by the State.

As a matter of fact never, not even in the time of the so-called liberal German rule, did we witness any effort to introduce German as the official language of the state or any attempt at the denationalization of the other peoples.

German constraint which the other nations of Austria felt more and more as an unsupportable burden was of a quite other nature. It was a haughty attitude of cultural predominance, the belief that the economic and cultural hegemony of the Germans was a historical necessity for all time. F. Kleinwaechter characterizes excellently this offensive attitude, so dangerous for the Germans too:

The Germans were accustomed to their hegemony based not so much on power as on their cultural superiority through centuries. They were the calm possessors and enjoyers. Such a position gives no opportunity for thinking of struggles. The Czech uprising came, from a historical point of view, with an amazing rapidity. But for those who lived in this period, it came not in a day. From the program of Palacký to the establishment of the Czech University in Prague was thirty-three years. It was a whole generation. For the German contemporaries, therefore, the evolution was very slow and one which only sharp eyes could discover. I spoke with old people who lived at the time when the Czech nation was a quite unimportant factor in political life and who now stood startled before the new developments. This may be understood more clearly when I mention that Prague, in which scarcely a single German word has been heard for many years, was, in the youth of my father, a completely German city. The political possessors of power are under the sway of a curious psychology. They believe that nothing can happen to them. More likely that the Heavens will collapse than that a change in the political powers should occur. The law of inertia dominates also the human soul.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Der Untergang, op. cit.*, pp. 139-40.

Under the sway of the same illusion Emperor Francis Joseph, when he visited Prague in 1868, made the characteristic remark: "Prague makes a completely German impression."

This haughty and naïve belief in the unalterable mission of German hegemony, which was further strengthened and developed by the example of the German empire of a united national character, made the creation of a political atmosphere propitious for the fair discussion and solution of the national problems almost impossible. A dangerous situation because the more Austria progressed in its industrial development and the more democratic concessions to the masses became inevitable by the extension of the suffrage, the more as a matter of fact the old German character of Austria crumbled, the more grew the claims of the non-German nations for cultural and administrative self-expression. This natural and unavoidable process, however, was only realized by a small élite of the Germans. The great majority lived in the unshakeableness of their Pan-German hegemony or regarded the national problems from the narrow, local point of view of their crownlands. One could truthfully say that the political leaders of the Austrian-Germans (with the exception of the Socialists and some isolated political thinkers) were unable to grasp until the collapse of the monarchy the fact that the old hegemony of the Germans was coming into a more and more acute antagonism with the very facts of the economic and cultural evolution, and that, therefore, the state could only be maintained by a prudent progression toward federalism, which, as Albert Schäffle said, besides the *unitas in necessariis* would have opened the way for every nation in the realization of its political and cultural life. The reader will remember that Palacký, the great leader of the Czechs, offered the plan in the constitutional committee at Kremsier of dividing the Czech and the German settlements from an administrative point of view in the Bohemian and Moravian territories in order to make a compromise easier. This measure could have eliminated most of the antagonisms between the two tribes and would have made it possible for the German minority to avoid all dangers of future oppression by a complete national autonomy. But in those times the Germans still felt themselves the masters of the situation and opposed the division of the traditional crownlands giving to them an uncontested hegemonial position. This claim became later the chief war cry of the Germans when they assumed the defensive as a minority but at this time the Czechs felt themselves already sufficiently strong to meet the struggle against the *Länderzerreissung* (the dismemberment of the Czech crown) and for the restitution of the historical unity of the Czech territories. Something similar happened in 1871 on the occasion of the so-called Hohenwart-Schäffle experiment when the government succeeded in making a reasonable compromise with the Czechs in the spirit of a very moderate federalism.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See pp. 113-14 of the present book.

This plan of reform could have been a real turning-point in the history of the monarchy. Without doubt it was not yet a scheme of federalism but, by the satisfaction of the historical claims of the Czechs for the constitutional unity and independence of their country, it would have opened the way for the remolding of the artificial scheme of Dualism into the voluntary co-operation of all the peoples of the monarchy. This, however, was exactly the thing which the two hegemonic nations of the monarchy abhorred the most and they left no attack and no intrigue unutilized in order to induce the emperor to break his word given to the Czechs, to overthrow the Compromise, and to offend gravely by a harsh declaration the whole Czech public opinion.

This haughtiness brought the Germans later into a more and more difficult position. As we saw above, the hegemonic nations refused for a long time to learn the language of their former servants and lackeys, whereas the Czech youth and the youth of the other nationalities eagerly learned the German language as an indispensable condition in their administrative career, for the German language, though not a state language in the official sense, played a preponderant rôle in the so-called inner administration of the country. In consequence of this behavior, the German intelligentsia remained in its majority unilingual whereas the Czech became bilingual. The result was that later when, due to the cultural and political progress of the Czechs, the government of Count Badeni issued in 1897 his famous decree concerning the use of languages in the German-Czech territories, according to which after 1901 each official would be compelled to have perfect command of both languages in speaking and writing, this measure, undoubtedly just and fair in itself, evoked a paroxysm of indignation among the Germans. It came to street riots and to ultra-chauvinistic manifestations and made the system of Parliamentary obstructionism almost chronic, because today the Czechs, tomorrow the Germans (according to the changing tendency of the governmental policy) impeded the legislative procedures not only by long-winded speeches and repeated calling of the roll but very often by automobile horns, by destruction of the seats, by the casting of books and documents, and often by brutal wrestling.

And though every year, the natural development of economic and cultural life made, as a matter of fact, the relation among political powers less and less advantageous for the Germans (for they had already an almost mature national culture, whereas the non-German masses were building their own step by step), their leading elements disliked to face this situation and shoulder its political consequences. Instead of this they forged artificial plans in order to maintain their hegemony, opposed more and more by the facts of real life. So for in-

stance in 1882 they delineated in the so-called "Linzer Program," a picture of an Austria being with Hungary in a purely personal union (the community of the person of the sovereign) whereas inside of Austria, Galicia, Dalmatia, and Bukowina would have obtained a far-reaching autonomy in order to establish in this restricted Austria a compact German majority over the Slavs. Naturally such a plan could not be carried out even in the time of limited Austrian suffrage in a Parliamentary way, and the keener Austrian politicians realized the dangers of such a procedure. But this same unhappy project, as was already mentioned, reappeared during the early successes of the World War when, in the claims of the so-called *Belange*, the German bourgeoisie would have liked to utilize the suspension of the constitution for the refoundation of the German hegemony. So little had the German bourgeoisie learned even in the last hour from the national struggles of a century and there can be scarcely a doubt that the Crown itself under the Great German influences would have been favorable to such a coup d'état if the sudden outbreak of the Russian Revolution had not terrified the young Emperor and a part of his entourage. This change in the Habsburg attitude was quite openly complained of by a German writer of the Reich during the war in the following characteristic utterance:

The hopes of the Germans for the carrying on of their intentions were again frustrated by their greatest enemy, democracy. In the moment in which it was determined in Vienna with regard to the Russian Revolution to convoke Parliament and to transfer to it the revision of the constitution, any chance for the accomplishment of the German claims disappeared . . . . at least temporarily. . . .<sup>7</sup>

This statement was perfectly true from the point of view of German domination, from the point of view of the dogma of German hegemony. Really, democracy was the greatest enemy of the Germans because the gradual emancipation of the Slav masses was irreconcilable with the rule of the Germans. That is the reason why every enlargement of the suffrage both under Hohenwart and Taaffe and later in consequence of universal suffrage "Slavicized" Austria necessarily and inevitably and undermined more and more the fragile edifice of the Dualistic Constitution. And the evil was not the process itself, as superficial observers announced it, not even from the point of view of the well-understood interests of the Germans. The real evil which shattered the intellectual and moral forces of the monarchy was the fact that this very natural process was undirected, the growing national forces were uncanalized by any statesmanlike conception either in internal or external policy. With the exception of Kremsier and the Hohenwart experiment the national problem was never treated as

<sup>7</sup> Wilhelm Schüssler, *Das Verfassungsproblem im Habsburgerreich* (Stuttgart und Wien, 1918), p. 194.

the most fundamental problem of Austria but only as a matter of tactics. The chief political task never was how, out of the decaying feudal castle a comfortable, modern home could be created for all the peoples of Austria but rather how this unhygienic slum could be further rented with the help of superficial and cheap alterations.<sup>8</sup> The government dared not introduce any reform principle because the smallest issue of a national character would cause its ruin. For instance in 1895 the coalitional government of Prince Windischgrätz fell because it tried to introduce some parallel classes beside the Germans in the mother-tongue of the population in the high school of the small Slovenian city of Cilli. Very often not even compromises of an objective nature (for instance the establishment of a national office or school) were made by the government, but it distributed jobs and economic concessions among the influential personages of the various nations who were capable of mitigating the momentary troubles of the government in the Parliament or the Diets by their personal influence.

A further great difficulty in solving the national problems of Austria was the system of the crownlands, this feudal and plutocratic self-government of the local territories, which came into acute conflict both with the economic and the national claims because they separated from each other peoples and regions which were already unified in culture, economic life, or national affinity. These anti-democratic structures envenomed further the development of the nations by the fact that the spirit of local patriotism pressed upon them which did not see or recognize the general interests of the state. In these crownlands each nation which constituted a majority tried to dominate the nations in the minority and to maintain for itself certain administrative, cultural, and economic privileges. That is the reason that these crownlands became the hotbed of national struggles and rivalries. Whereas in the Parliament of the empire, in the atmosphere of the metropolis, and in the presence of the representatives of all nations, sometimes a tendency toward justice and mutual consideration could be observed, in the atmosphere of the crownlands, in the surroundings of local interests, and of local notabilities the rule of national demagoguery was almost unchecked. The nations in the majority, for instance the Czechs and the Poles, held rigidly to the maintenance of the autonomy of their crownlands and the Germans also in those territories where they formed a majority. On the other hand the minority nations, as the Germans in the countries of the Crown of Wenceslaus or the Slovenians and the Italians in their respective crownlands, demanded a territorial autonomy on the basis of the division of the national settlements. National autonomy on the one side and a struggle

<sup>8</sup> Compare with pp. 115-17 of the present book.



against the dismemberment of the country on the other side were the two contending ideologies according to the minority and the majority interests.

One of the best connoisseurs of this system, the later Austrian chancellor, Karl Renner, characterized it as follows:

The crownlands are the inner foe of the Habsburg monarchy. They and no others are the real fostering soil of the *Irredenta*, they create the desperate minorities and the cruel majorities. But just because the crownlands give hope to their national majorities for national domination, are the majorities of all the crownlands and, therefore, that of the Parliament, too, attached to them, the Germans not excepted! The Germans in Northern Bohemia suffocate under the pressure of the Bohemian crown and cry for help, but the Germans in the Alpine countries will remain citizens of Styria, Carinthia, and Tyrol. As long as this spirit of a past epoch, the idol of the country unity, is not buried, we cannot dream of national peace. . . .<sup>9</sup>

The situation became indeed insupportable and the various crownlands with mixed nationalities became paralyzed by the obstruction in their Diets. The picture became more and more the picture of anarchy and the crownland system was compared by a foreign observer in a witty way with "cages in which wild animals wrestle with each other" (Schüssler).

The situation was still more complicated and envenomed by the fact that not only the non-German nations faced the Germans with hostility but often also acute struggles arose among the so-called oppressed nations. This observation leads us to the darkest point of the national struggles both in Austria and in Hungary. Namely we see that the same nations, which carried on the most exacerbated fights through generations against foreign oppression and the system of a forcible assimilation and which denounced this system as wicked and immoral before the public opinion of the whole world, did not hesitate to apply this same system when the wheel of history turned and they gained the ruling position. The Magyars for instance who struggled for centuries against the Austrian policy of assimilation, when they "got into the saddle" had no scruples against the application of the same methods not only toward the nationalities of the country which they regarded as inferior but also against the Croats, the national distinctness of whom was at least theoretically acknowledged. The Poles who threw the force of their indignation against the cruel system of Russian oppression refused to recognize the national independence of the Ruthenians, and brutally exercised against them Polish supremacy. The Italians, too, who themselves experienced all the sufferings of foreign oppression vindicated on their own account a ruling position over the big majority of the Croats in Dalmatia. The

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

hatred and rivalry between the closely related Croats and Serbs was for a long time an easy means of domination for Magyar absolutism in Croatia-Slavonia.

We find everywhere the same spectacle: the political morality of an oppressed nation changes completely when it attains a ruling position. The former claim for national equality easily drops into a claim for national supremacy. At the beginning of the struggle we ordinarily hear the vindication of national autonomy. Later when they become a majority they assert the political unity of the country against the former rulers now in a minority. When they acquire still more power, they begin to lay plans for the reconquest of territories for which they have a so-called historical claim but from which they were ousted by foreign rule. From here it is only a step to a naked imperialism when a victorious nation announces as its cultural and historical mission the occupation of the settlements of weaker foreign nations.

It is evident that we face here a very deep problem which demonstrates that the solution of the national struggle is in its essence a moral issue. As in Eastern and Middle Europe it is impossible to dismember the states so as to establish everywhere united national territories but there will always remain in most of the states national minorities: these problems could only be solved in a wholesome and permanent way if the nation having a majority would be animated by a spirit of justice. Without such a moral attitude all technical or juristic solution is useless. I scarcely know a more important task in civic education than to inculcate into the souls of future citizens this elementary idea of national justice in states where an ethnographically mixed population is living. Unfortunately, among the so-called statesmen only very few realize that without a new ethical orientation national problems remain practically unsolvable. So in the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Only isolated thinkers, like a Fischhof, a Schäffle, a Deák, an Eötvös, a Palacký, and a few others were animated by this higher moral conception. A real historical monument of this new kind of political morality was erected by Albert Schäffle who, when his plan of compromise with the Czechs was undone by the intrigues of the German and Magyar upper classes, wrote the following memorable passage in a letter to the Emperor in which he resigned from his ministry: "Following the general moral law, according to which we should not treat others in a manner which we ourselves would dislike, my conscience does not permit me to have any share in the carrying on of a plan laid down by the state council."<sup>10</sup> (Schäffle refers here to a plan excogitated by the beneficiaries of the dualistic system which made any compromise impossible for the Czechs and maintained the Magyar-German hegemony unaltered.) This incident

<sup>10</sup> *Aus Meinem Leben* (Berlin, 1905), II, 57.

and some other episodes from the history of the monarchy, for instance, the Constitution of Kremsier, the publicistic work of Dr. Fischhof for peace and justice, the humanitarian Slavism of Palacký, and the nationality policy of Deák and Eötvös, animated by a spirit of fair compromise, could have been worthy topics for a civic education eager to inculcate a more humane spirit of justice into the peoples of the monarchy. But I do not know a single textbook or popular writing which fostered this more moral conception of nationality. Civic education was imbued with quite another spirit as we shall see later in detail. The entire lack of a spirit of political fair play was the chief reason why the national problem could not be solved. But such an attitude could only have been the result of a highly developed system of local autonomy. For the national problem is not only a moral but at the same time a "cellular" problem. The centralized, bureaucratic state cannot establish national peace, not even theoretically, because the most important connections of the national struggles are those which are attached to the daily life of the common man. Only a very intense municipal and county self-government could have brought the citizens of the various nations into a peaceful co-operation. But such a real popular self-government was entirely absent in Austria. Under these circumstances, the spirit of the crownlands swallowed the spirit of the state which existed only in the weak endeavors of the leading bureaucrats. In the lack of real co-operation among the nations the problems of the empire became so complicated that not even the leading statesmen could grasp them. Therefore it is not a rhetorical formula but the expression of reality when one of the most venerable Austrian statesmen of the last decades, Premier Wladimir Beck, sighed because of the pitiful rôle of an Austrian premier who should overcome difficulties such as "eight nations, seventeen countries, twenty Parliamentary bodies, twenty-seven Parliamentary parties, two complicated world views, the intricate relation with Hungary and the cultural differences of eight and a half degrees of latitude and longitude. . . ."

If we look over again all these great and many-sided obstacles, we must be really surprised seeing those considerable results which the growing culture and democracy, the quick development of industrialism, and the more European atmosphere of the Viennese *Reichsrat* achieved on the field of the national problem. In spite of parliamentary obstruction, passive resistance of various nations, absolutistic measures, press confiscations, patriotic *Bummels* (provocative promenades of the German students on the main street of Prague) followed by the not less patriotic street riots of the Czech nationalists and in spite of the growing demagogy of the daily press and the patriotic associations, Austria made from year to year a considerable step toward the national equality of all its various nations, each of

which attained an honorable minimum of cultural existence, and some of them, as the Czechs and the Poles, a high cultural standing even from a more Western point of view. The most fundamental administrative and cultural necessities of the various nations were, almost everywhere, satisfied in the mother-tongue of the masses. Even a nation which played a rather stepchild rôle in Austria, as the Ruthenians, ruthlessly oppressed by Polish feudalism, progressed considerably in the last decades both from the administrative and the cultural point of view. An impartial observer writes:

In Eastern Galicia the Ukrainian language was accepted as the official language, there arose every year new elementary schools and high schools with instruction in the Ukrainian language and in the University of Lemberg were created Ukraine chairs. Many cultural institutions and scientific and literary associations were inaugurated. The number of the Ukrainian officials grew from year to year. In the economic field also they achieved great results.<sup>11</sup>

But not only in the field of the national daily work (*Kleinarbeit*) but also in institutions of a more general importance the Austria of the last decades achieved substantial progress. The system of the "National Cadasters" (the national division of the electorate), advocated so strenuously by the socialists, was introduced into Moravia and Bukowina and the bifurcation of the cultural offices began in Bohemia. And, if the World War had not broken out, in the crownlands too the anachronistic electoral system of the Curias would have been replaced by universal suffrage. This really revolutionary measure in the best sense would have eliminated the feudal and oligarchic monopolies and brought into direct connection the various nations in the Diets. We would have witnessed, it is reasonable to believe, the revival of the spirit of Kremsier.

And however great the wrongs against the weaker nations may still have been and however much the sins of the past pressed upon the peoples of Austria, there can be no doubt that the Austrian half of the dual monarchy made gigantic efforts toward the solution of the national problems, and it was not an exaggeration when certain Austrian scholars emphasized the fact that never in the history of the world was the principle of national equality in a great empire and under so many different nations carried so far as in former Austria. And the best expert and theorist of the Austrian national struggles, the later socialist chancellor of the Austrian Republic, Dr. Renner, was fully entitled to write an article for an English magazine under the resigned title "Stifled Germs." As a matter of fact the first foundations of a state based on national equality were laid down in these tempestuous decades.

<sup>11</sup> Jacob Rappaport, "Die Nationalitätenfrage in Polen," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie* (Karlsruhe, 1927), Vol. III.

Superficial observers did not realize the meaning of this process. They saw only the continuous crises in Parliament and the Diets, they were aware only of the street manifestations and riots which accompanied the travail of the popular chaos for national emancipation. These observers turned away from the "Austrian anarchy" with a contemptuous gesture and regarded with admiration the other half of the monarchy, Hungary, showing the example of a state advancing toward national unity. Here they did not see dissatisfied nations but they were impressed by a unified, conscious, national will. The glorifiers of the Magyar hegemony became more and more numerous. Only a few keen students of the Austro-Hungarian reality perceived the fact that this so-called Magyar hegemony would become the gravedigger of the monarchy because this was the *rocher de bronze* on which every effort for the federalization of the monarchy broke down. For the advance of Austria in the direction of national equality, without an adequate reform of the general constitution, had an inevitably destroying influence on the state. It is quite evident that the growing culture and consciousness of the non-German nations enhanced unavoidably their aspirations toward a constitution which, on the ruins of the Dualistic system, would have secured the political *Ebenbürtigkeit* (equal dignity) among the various nations. The legal fiction of the unitary Magyar state made such an evolution impossible.<sup>12</sup> Why and how the next chapter will demonstrate.

<sup>12</sup>The fundamental antagonism between the development of the nationality problem in Austria and Hungary was sharply stated in the essay by Friedrich Tezner, "Das staatsrechtliche und politische Problem der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie," *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts*, 1913. The same problem aroused the gravest apprehensions of Crown Prince Rudolph.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE CHIEF TENDENCY OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL STRUGGLES: THE MOVE TOWARD A UNIFIED NATIONAL STATE

The general process of the origins and dynamics of the national struggles, delineated in the foregoing chapter, is further corroborated by the Hungarian example, however different this evolution may have been in its concrete manifestations, colors, and rhythm. Though it is a favorite dogma of the official historiography in Hungary to demonstrate the continuity of the Magyar national consciousness through a thousand years and to force the modern national ideology of the nineteenth century on St. Stephen, the first king of Hungary, on the feudal warfare of the Middle Ages, on the civil wars of throne-pretenders, and on the feudal rebellions against the Habsburgs, there can be no doubt that the modern national idea, the effort toward the unification of the masses akin in language and culture and toward economic and administrative unity, was absent from Hungarian history until the end of the eighteenth century as completely as from the history of the other Central European peoples.

Having scrutinized all those movements of the past which were described until the end of the eighteenth century under national captions by the historians of the noble classes (for in Hungary with very few exceptions the whole study of history was biased by the ideology of the ruling classes in the absence of a bourgeois class in a Western sense) I could easily demonstrate in my book already quoted that all these movements were influenced by economic, class and religious considerations but never by a national conception because in those epochs all the factors were lacking which created later the national movement. In want of an urban culture, a more intensive communication, press and school, national currents could not become manifest for the unification of the country in a common law and culture. The atmosphere of the society in Hungary continued, far into the nineteenth century, to be the spirit of the famous *Opus Tripartitum* codified by Stephen Verböczy, one of the most rapacious oligarchs of the epoch, in the second decade of the sixteenth century. This law book made the upper and lower nobility, the so-called *una eademque nobilitas*, the exclusive beneficiary of all private and public rights. It laid down the conception of "Hungarian liberty," the chief pillars of which were the non-taxation of the nobility, its exclusive right to have landed property, the monopoly of all administrative offices, and the right of resistance of the Crown if it should offend feudal privileges. As a prod-

uct of feudal reaction against the peasant upheaval of Dózsa, it deprived the peasantry of its right of migration, bound the serfs completely to the soil, which meant the practical introduction of slavery. Acsády writes:

From this time there were properly speaking two nations in Hungary, the "Hungarian lords" [*Magyari urak*, as they were called in this period], the ruling class and the millions of slaves, the working-classes. The two nations glared with a wolfish hatred at each other, the master did not regard his serf as a man whereas the latter waited like a shackled beast for the occasion of attacking again his tyrant.

This feudal petrification of the Hungarian society was also clearly felt by some keen foreign observers, among them the greatest poet and genius of Germany, Goethe, who in a conversation in 1821 emphasized the total impossibility of introducing useful reforms in Hungary as long as the feudal rule was not uprooted by violent interference.<sup>1</sup>

This old immobile feudal state collapsed only in 1848, or rather under the system of Bach when the liberation of the serfs was practically carried out. This demonstrates that in a society in which, until the middle of the nineteenth century the nobility remained the exclusive owner of the land, and under a constitution which gave all political rights in a population of eleven millions into the hands of 136,000 noblemen, the really democratic and cultural content of the modern national movement could only be expressed in a very rudimentary way. This unified nobility, the political and colloquial language of which was Latin for centuries, made, so to speak, the emergence of the national problem impossible because in the hothouse of the feudal privileges the nobility of the non-Magyar nationalities became entirely assimilated in interests and culture with the Magyar ruling class and regarded with horror any conscious movement of the masses aspiring toward economic and national emancipation. The more wealthy elements of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia of the towns, mostly Germans, became also permeated by the atmosphere of the ruling nobility or in some parts they lived a hermetically closed life, like the inhabitants of a Greek city-state.<sup>2</sup>

It is quite evident that in such social surroundings the national idea could manifest itself at best as a solidarity with the interests of the nobility, as a tendency toward keeping away foreign bureaucracy and militarism or as a hatred of the serfs, especially those of a foreign tongue. Particularly in Transylvania where the problem of the bondsmen became very acute the idea of the noblemen was closely associated with Magyar rule, whereas among the masses of the serfs there arose a kind of Rumanian affinity and solidarity against the oppressors of

<sup>1</sup> Viktor Bibl, *op. cit.*, II, 416.

<sup>2</sup> Oscar Meltzl, *The Position of the Transylvanian Saxons in Hungary* (Nagy-Szeben, 1878), p. 31. In Hungarian.

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a foreign tongue. The hostile ardor of this antagonism was clearly expressed in many popular verses and dicta. For instance the state of mind of the noble manors is well characterized by the following rhymes :

Under human form, wild animal, murderous Wallachian,  
Old dog, biting Actaeon, snapping at his master,  
Sprung from a mountain rat, suckled by a shabby wolf. . . . .

It must be remembered that the Magyar upper classes used the expression Wallachian (*Oláh*) instead of Rumanian intentionally and in a deprecatory sense in order to repudiate the Rumanian hypothesis of the Roman origin of the Rumanian people. I scarcely exaggerate the situation when I say that this derogatory denomination caused more hatred and suspicion among the two nations than many administrative or cultural grievances.

On the other hand the peasant masses amid the double pressure of the feudal oligarchy and Austrian militarism sighed in the following dicta: "The Magyars hung my father with the *Approbata and the Compilata* [a famous law book of Transylvania], whereas the Germans deprived me of all my possessions by the *Aufnahm' and the Protocol*" (German official proceedings). Nevertheless, it was a time-old tradition of the Rumanian people that their lot was much harder under the Transylvanian princes than under the Habsburgs.

But in spite of this class and racial division there was never in the past a policy on a strictly national line. On the contrary in the peasant upheavals Magyar and Rumanian masses allied with each other against the common oppressors. For instance in the serf riots in 1437 in Transylvania the Magyar element played the leading rôle, while the result of this civil war, which became the very basis of the constitution of Transylvania, the *unio trium nationum* (the union of the three nations), signified the alliance of the Hungarian nobility, of the Székely (a distinct tribe of the Magyar stock) small peasant nobility, and of the Saxon urban citizenship in order to maintain their domination over the Magyar and Rumanian peasant masses. On the other hand foreign aggressors, as the dukes of Wallachia or the Habsburgs, could often mobilize the Székely and Magyar masses against the Magyar oligarchy. And whenever a movement was started capable of uniting the privileged classes, in their struggles against Austria for their independence, with the social dissatisfaction of the masses or with the defense of their attacked religion, as for instance at the time of the insurrections of Bocskay and Rákóczi, the bondsmen without national discrimination followed the flag of the nobility. Among those so-called *Kurucz* songs which are a striking echo of the popular upheavals against Habsburg absolutism, there are many of purely Rumanian origins.



As has already been shown in an earlier chapter, differentiation on a truly national line was a comparatively recent event, belonging to a period when Hungary changed from a cattle-breeding to an agricultural stage, when the first results of more extensive popular education and more efficient transportation became manifest, when the victorious Habsburgs introduced a defensive policy in the interests of the peasants and when the liberal and democratic principles of the French Revolution penetrated into a part of the Hungarian nobility and middle classes. These new ideas and the reaction against the absolutistic Germanization of Joseph II stirred up, in the first place, the semi-dormant circles of the Magyars as the most developed element of the country both from the political and the economic point of view. Beginning with the Diet of 1825 the national consciousness of the Magyars became more and more active. Since the forties of the last century, this national consciousness has assumed decidedly democratic and liberal forms. The growing bankruptcy of serf economy, the thrilling influence of Western ideas, the hatred of Habsburg absolutism, and the chronic danger of peasant upheavals, created a new ideology uniting the constitutional claims for independence of the former feudal rebellions with the aspirations of a modern democratic and national state. This movement was led (in the absence of a conscious bourgeois or peasant class) by the liberal wing of the Magyar nobility which became the real *tiers état* of Hungary. This fact which was in perfect harmony with the structure of the country, still preponderantly feudal, had very important consequences. One of them was that this revolutionary nobility remained as a matter of fact under the stress of the old, inherited anti-Habsburg, *Kurucz* ideology, whereas the new ideal of the French Revolution constituted, in their consciousness, only an acquired character. From the beginning, therefore, we witness a tendency in this revolutionary nobility to weaken the democratic and social content of the national revolution and to safeguard their ancient monopolies as far as possible. At the same time they renewed with the greatest enthusiasm the old constitutional struggle for national independence against the Habsburgs and they were successful in mobilizing, for this idea, not only the smaller nobility but also the great masses of the peasants and of the urban population, which were for the first time emancipated from the feudal yoke. The program of Louis Kossuth and his adherents was the coalescence of the constitutional traditions of the nobility with the claims of Western democracy. The proclamation of the liberation of the bondsmen became the great act of liberalism in the interests of national unification.

Another consequence of the leading rôle of the nobility was that the traditional, purely jural kind of thinking influenced deeply the revolutionary struggles. The paragraphs of the old lawbooks were

far more important for them than the technical and social exigencies of the new period, and the more so because these paragraphs were very advantageous to them whereas the modern exigencies were detrimental to their former privileges. The overwhelming majority of feudal society, until the collapse of the monarchy, gloated over the traditional constitutional debates and the interpretation of the ancient codes while they regarded with distrust, nay with a kind of awe, modern economic and social problems. In the Habsburgs they hated not only Germanizing absolutism but also their introduction of the pernicious microbes of state bureaucracy, capitalism, general taxation, and equality before the Imperial law. This constitutional Talmudic method made modern orientation of the nobility difficult. In the independence of the country they saw rather a jural and constitutional problem and not those fundamental economic, cultural, and moral reforms which the genius of Count Stephen Széchenyi had advocated with prophetic clear-sightedness. The ideology of constitutional independence meant always two things for the privileged classes of Hungary. The one was the passionate indulgence in the traditional efforts for national independence against the Habsburgs. The other was a kind of defensive mechanism, a political *Verdrängung*, used for the purpose of diverting the economic and social dissatisfaction of the masses in another direction. By means of this mechanism they were successful in canalizing the popular passions which would have turned more and more against their own privileges and estates, against Vienna and the "Habsburg Camarilla." This explains the military and jural nature of the Hungarian nobility which the keen eye of Bismarck discerned by characterizing the leading Hungarian class as a "nation of Hussars and lawyers."

But it would be an error to thus characterize the whole Magyar feudal class, because the higher nobility and higher clergy were largely created by Vienna or consisted of elements which were obedient instruments to Habsburg power. Therefore the real bearers of the ideology of independence became the middle and small nobility which after the division of the legislature into two houses was also, from the constitutional point of view, a distinct part in the more and more dissolving unity of the *una eademque nobilitas*. This class, which since the eighties of the nineteenth century liked to call itself, after the English fashion "the gentry," comparing proudly on the basis of a superficial analogy its feudal constitution with the English, was in its standard of life, culture, and aspirations totally different from the very mixed and international aristocracy which followed the fashions of Vienna, Paris, and London. This middle and small nobility, the roots of which extended into the upper strata of the peasantry (for during the feudal struggles against Austria some insurgent leaders gave privileges of nobility to entire villages in order to gain them for

their cause), became the real leaven of the anti-German, anti-Habsburg, and anti-Clerical movement. A very considerable part of this middle nobility and free peasantry was Calvinist. This Calvinist stratum, recruited from the purest racial element of the country and called, not without a certain haughtiness, its religion the "Magyar religion." This Calvinism centering around the big peasant town, the strong and proud "Calvinistic Rome," Debreczen, was through three centuries a real bulwark of the Magyar spirit against the Catholicizing and Germanizing tendencies of Vienna and developed a very keen racial and national consciousness which was sentimentally backed in its religion by the doctrine of predestination. It seems to me a fine and intuitive remark of Joseph Redlich when he compared this Hungarian Calvinism with the Dutch, English, and Scotch Puritanism which in its haughty religious individualism and independence, felt as God's destiny, became the kernel of a vast Colonial culture. This strong, courageous, prudent, and tough race became the real bearer of constitutional independence amidst the noble society. And when, in consequence of the penetration of the democratic world-spirit and the deep economic changes already mentioned, the old feudal society collapsed, the rich Habsburgist aristocracy was forced back in leadership by the middle nobility; and at least in the political arena the significance of the gentry became preponderant. The outstanding leaders of the gentry at this time showed a remarkable intellectual ardor and, according to reliable witnesses, it was not a rarity to see in their pockets a volume of Volney or of Rousseau. The intellectual and moral atmosphere of their manors was very high and exercised great influence on the bourgeois elements of society. This democratic and liberal attitude of the élite of the nobility, which made a desperate effort to remold in the last hour the old petrified feudal state into a state of law based on Western parliamentary principles, made a great appeal both abroad and at home. It was the time when, regarding the heroic struggle of the Magyars for independence and democracy, Heinrich Heine, the great German poet, wrote the enthusiastic rhymes: "Whenever I hear the name Magyar my German jacket becomes too tight," and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels extolled the revolutionary rôle of the Magyar nobility against the "reactionary Slavs," calling them tools of the Habsburg absolutism. At the same time at home great masses of the peasantry joyfully accepted the leadership of the nobility which promised to them their liberation from the feudal yoke and the non-Magyar elements of the cities (constituting there very often a majority), the Germans, the Slavs, and especially the Jews were eager to be taken into the new society of the revolutionary nobles. After the establishment of the Dualistic Compromise this process continued with even greater intensity and the "gentry" grew into a far larger concept. It signified a class whose members had accepted

the standard of life, the customs, and the political ideology of the gentry. The possession of a larger noble estate was no longer regarded as the attribute of this class but many German and Jewish elements and also camp followers of the non-Magyar middle classes adhered to it. The custom of the Magyarization of the family names which later gained official sanction made it possible that foreign racial elements could play the rôle of the gentry in the political and social life. By this process the old *Kurucz* ideology of independence acquired a very extensive and heterogeneous following which included besides the historical gentry and the free peasantry also the more ambitious elements of the new bourgeoisie, successful lawyers, writers, the lower clergy, and the more energetic elements of the Jewish intelligentsia.

This leadership of the nobility as a matter of fact dulled the edges of the economic and social claims of the lower classes but reinforced at the same time the constitutional vindications against Austria and the Habsburgs. This situation had a great effect also on the Habsburgist aristocracy which we shall analyze later. At this juncture I must emphasize another consequence of the leadership of the nobility, fatal from the point of view of our problem. That is the relation of the Magyar revolutionary movement toward the non-Magyar nations of the country which the nobility refused to accept as equals. Louis Kossuth himself said at the beginning of the revolution *that there were many nationalities in Hungary, but only one nation, the Magyar*. This point of view, running as a red thread throughout the whole modern history of Hungary, became one of the chief causes which finally destroyed the monarchy. The ruling element of the Magyars was not willing to apply also in the national field, those democratic and liberal principles upon which it tried to remold the state. On the contrary when the Magyar nobility reached the plenitude of its national consciousness and bursting the age-old cloud of medieval Latinity made a wonderful effort for the re-creation of their national language and culture, it was unable to imagine the new state in formation otherwise than of an exclusively Magyar nature. In place of the Latin, and in every relation, it tried to introduce the Magyar language. It was not willing to acknowledge the distinct national individuality of the other peoples. Beginning with the twenties of the last century, a more and more intolerant effort toward Magyarization became manifest which tried to reconstruct the new state emerging from feudalism into a unified and homogeneous Magyar national state. Already at the Diet of 1825-27 when the first efforts were made to make the Magyar the official language of the state together with the Latin, the Croats advocated the same right for the Croat language in their own country, but this claim was flatly repudiated. And when in 1835 the Diet demanded the exclusive usage of the Magyar language, the Croat

deputies accused the Magyars of inconsequence for they formally protested against the endeavors of the Russian government to enforce the Russian language on the Poles but now, "they try to enforce the Magyar language upon the Croats."<sup>3</sup> This current captured so fully even the best minds of the period that such a prudent and humane statesman as Francis Deák, commonly called the "sage of the Fatherland," defended the point of view in the Diet of 1839 that the Croats do not constitute a distinct nation and that Croatia has no rights which cannot be dealt with by the Hungarian parliament. In this spirit a law was passed in 1843-44 which obliged all the Croat authorities to learn the Magyar language so that, at the end of a period of six years, all official intercourse between the two countries should be carried on in Magyar. If this was the attitude toward a people, the national independence of which was acknowledged to a certain extent, one can imagine how haughty was the point of view of the ruling class concerning the national claims of the non-Magyar peasant minorities.

This claim seemed to the Magyar ruling class entirely extravagant though at this time the bulk of the Hungarian nationalities (so for the sake of brevity, will I call according to the official Magyar doctrine, all the non-Magyar nations of Hungary in order to distinguish them from the Magyar state-nation) were not animated by any desire for secession and with the exception of the Croats they had no conception of an independent state life. That for which they aspired was no more than an administrative autonomy of their closed national settlements, entire liberty for the development of their languages and cultures and an adequate national representation in the common organs of the state. In spite of this the Magyar leading class felt these claims as entirely unacceptable, as a kind of rebellion or high treason, though in 1787 only 29 per cent of the population was of Magyar stock and even in 1842, according to the calculation of a very conservative author, of a total population of about 13 million, less than 5 millions (4,812,000) were Magyars. They were opposed by 1,600,000 Slovaks, 1,270,000 Germans, 2,200,000 Rumanians, 900,000 Croats, 1,200,000 Serbs, 440,000 Ruthenians, 240,000 Jews, and several other smaller nationalities.<sup>4</sup> Under such circumstances it is difficult to understand how the leaders of the Magyars and among them many eminent scholars and statesmen, equipped with the best culture of the epoch, could imagine that against the will of all these nationalities, forming the vast majority of the country, they would be capable of accomplishing the miracle of rebuilding and reorganizing their state as a unified Magyar nation-state.

This question must be carefully answered because this rigidly

<sup>3</sup> Szilágyi and Collaborators, *op. cit.*, IX, 388-89.

<sup>4</sup> Julius Szekfü, *Three Generations*, p. 171. In Hungarian.

megalomaniac point of view dominated the Hungarian state, with the exception of a unique *lucidum intervallum*, until the collapse of the monarchy. The repulsive attitude of the Magyar upper class against the aspirations of the nationalities originated from several sources. One was the ancient envenomed class struggle between the nobility and the bondsmen. They regarded their serfs, especially those of a foreign tongue as an inferior race, incapable of understanding their thoughts and feelings. That these century-old servants and slaves began now to demand the same national rights as those claimed by the "conquering and state-building" Magyar nation seemed to them as an effrontery, almost as a rebellion. They accepted the necessity of the liberation of the serfs and their equality before the law as a universal claim of the epoch, but that the community of these former serfs should now establish themselves as a nation, and should assume the same national rights as the former omnipotent rulers of the country, this claim after centuries of feudal domination appeared to them as the most daring impertinence. Behind this indignation, however, there were not only sentimental motives but also those of a strict class domination. For the organization of the nationalities as distinct nations, the acknowledgment of a territorial autonomy for them would have signified not only the jural but also the *de facto* cessation of the administrative privileges of the nobility and finally the expropriation of their estates for the benefit of the peasants.

Another source of the hostile attitude of the Magyar nobility against the nationalities of the country was their rigid jural-historical point of view already mentioned which never regarded the most important facts of state life as primarily economic, cultural, and social problems, but as issues of historical rights. From this point of view it could not be contended that the Magyars as the conquering race had special rights over the country beside which the nationalities could have played only a tolerated rôle in state life. The right of conquest, based on the sword, was always hidden more or less consciously behind the doctrine of Magyar supremacy and the unified national state. That the old feudal society at the beginning of the modern era was entirely hypnotized by this historical point of view of force will surprise no one who knows that this conception remained unaltered in the Magyar ruling class until the end of the monarchy and thereafter.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The rigidity of this conception found a characteristic expression in a pamphlet of Dr. John Karácsonyi, a canon of Nagy-Várad, a member of the Hungarian Academy, and an acknowledged historian. (Written in 1912 under the title of *A Hundred Thousand Evils and a Million Woes for an Error*.) According to this distinguished author the whole dangerous Magyar-Rumanian controversy was due to a historical error committed by the Italian scholar Bonfini who, in a famous book written in the fifteenth century at the court of the great Hungarian king, Matthias (himself of Rumanian origin), made the thoughtless remark that the Rumanians of Transyl-

The Magyar conception, repudiating the claims of the nationalities, however, had a deeper and more serious motive, especially in the consciousness of Kossuth and of his best liberal staff. These men (in the same manner as Marx and Engels) felt the rising of the Slav and Rumanian masses as something artificial, as a plot of the Viennese court, trying to counterbalance the liberal and democratic movement of the revolutionary Magyar nobility by the mobilization of the uncultured and reactionary masses of the Slav and Rumanian serfs. In this observation there was indeed an element of truth. The Viennese court, terrified by the revolutionary movement and by the menacing independence of Hungary, embraced intentionally and energetically the literary, cultural, and political movements of the non-Magyar nationalities (some of their leaders were really Austrian agents) because the shrewd imperial bureaucrats understood accurately those powerful forces which slumbered in the national movements and could be directed against the Magyar efforts for unification. Kossuth and his friends, however, saw only, one might say, the tactical part of the problem and did not perceive that the same historical situation which developed the revolutionary nationalism of the Magyars, Poles, and Italians would inevitably arouse the same movement also among the more backward peoples of the monarchy.

Kossuth and his adherents underestimated the national movements of the former bondsmen and were convinced that the Magyar society would easily solve these problems on its own national basis because in the atmosphere of the liberation of the serfs and of democratic rights and liberties, the former feudal particularisms would cease and the masses of nationalities would find an adequate place in the blood circulation of the unified Hungarian State. Kossuth experienced this process in his own life. If he, the small nobleman of Slovak

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vania are the remnants of the Roman population of the ancient Dacia under Trajan. The book of Bonfini had a wide circulation and in the eighteenth century fell into the hands of some Rumanian youths who completely lost their heads and, animated by the fallacious myth of having an older and nobler origin than the Magyars, claimed equal rights with them. This doctrine, however, was erroneous because the Rumanians did not come into the country until 1182 and therefore cannot have the same rights as the Magyars. Now Dr. Karácsonyi was convinced that by his important historical revelations the whole Magyar-Rumanian conflict would be eliminated, because the Rumanians instructed by him concerning the real facts, namely, that they were in the Hungarian state only for the short period of 800 years and that they hadn't so distinguished a pedigree as that light-minded Italian had asserted, would be brought to their senses and would recognize that they can have only a subordinate rôle in Hungary.

In this manner this serious and scholarly man and with him the feudal society conceived the complicated economic, social, and psychological problem of nationality struggles to be exclusively an issue of historical right, accepting the naïve theory that the Rumanian went into the Revolution in consequence of the erroneous teaching of Bonfini. (By the way, the historical thesis of Karácsonyi is more than doubtful. Besides, the Slav inhabitants of Hungary constituted the earliest population of the country and therefore the theory of "historical right" expressed by Karácsonyi would have meant a Slav hegemony in Hungary!)

extraction, who, according to a reliable tradition, in his early childhood still read the Slovak prayer book in the church, had become such a passionate, ardent, and sincere supporter of the Magyar democratic state ideal, how could he doubt that the Slav peasant masses, without any culture and historical continuity, and also the other nationalities, would accept with joy and love the new Hungarian state, offering to them, on the ruins of the feudal state, a perfect equality before the law with all the political liberties of the western states? For the reader should not forget that the eyes of Kossuth and of the other great figures of the Hungarian Revolution were constantly fixed on the historical example of the great western national states, on English and French constitutionalism in which there was no place for a separatist movement of nationalities. They were perfectly convinced that the policy of Magyarization signified at the same time a policy of democratization and that the Magyar cause was the cause of Liberty and Reason against the claims of the nationalities fostered and directed by the Viennese absolutism. They were perfectly convinced that the new liberal and democratic state would exert a powerful attraction on all its citizens, both Magyars and non-Magyars.

And this conception was without doubt not entirely erroneous. Our history is full of the remembrances of enthusiasm created among the non-Magyar nationalities by the proclamation of emancipation of the serfs. There can be no doubt that if, parallel with the economic liberation of the peasantry, their national claims would also have been acknowledged and guaranteed in a reasonable way in the cultural policy and public administration (especially in local self-government), the new Hungarian state could have developed centripetal tendencies, sufficiently strong to counterbalance all irredentistic currents. The model economic and geographical unity of the country, the unrivaled economic and cultural preponderance of the Magyars, the lack of state formations or provinces inside the Hungarian crown, and the sober and forbearing character of the Magyar people were factors which could have made the solution of the nationality problem in Hungary incomparably more easy than in the other part of the monarchy. There began, however, a more and more energetic process of a forcible and artificial assimilation which became the chief obstacle to a fruitful co-operation between the Magyar and the other races.

#### A. CONFLICT BETWEEN MAGYARS AND NON-MAGYARS

The policy of an exaggerated unification and an artificial Magyarization carried on by the revolutionary nobility led to a fatal conflict between the Magyars and the other peoples of the country. Space forbids me to illustrate in detail the growing spirit of national chauvinism. I would only quote from a characteristic speech delivered by



Count Charles Zay, general inspector of the Slovak-Lutheran church and schools at the beginning of the forties of the last century. Among other patriotic utterances he made the following statement:

Every idea, every aspiration to hinder Magyarization and to spread other languages besides the Magyar would signify the undermining of the intelligentsia, of the constitutional principles, nay of Protestantism itself. The Magyar language is the staunchest defender of liberty and Protestantism in our country. The victory of the Magyars is at the same time the victory of Liberty and Reason. The Magyarization of the Slavs is the holiest duty of any true Hungarian patriot, of any fighter for Liberty and Reason, and of any loyal subject of the Habsburg dynasty. . . .

This doctrine repeated in various forms found its expression not only in rhetorical formulas but also under the slogan, "the fight against Pan-Slavism." Professors and students with Slav feelings were persecuted. The spirit of an intolerant Magyarization penetrated more and more the whole public life. Naïve and adventurous plans were in circulation concerning the rapid and complete Magyarization of the country. Winged words of hatred were used against the nationalities envenoming the social atmosphere. ("Potato is not a food, a Slovak is not a man. . . ." "The stinking Wallachian. . . ." "The German is a rogue. . . .")<sup>6</sup>

The danger of this current was already perceived by the keener contemporary observers, both foreign and Magyar. Count Leo Thun, an eminent Austrian statesman, attacked the point of view of Francis Pulszky (one of the most enthusiastic adherents of Louis Kossuth, a man of broad European culture) according to which "the Slav people stands on the lowest level of culture, their nobility is Magyar, the chief pride of their citizens is to appear German even though they were born Slav and, therefore, only poor Protestant clergymen are interested in the Slav literature. . . ." To this attitude characteristic of the conception of the period, but totally misunderstanding the dynamics of the nationality problem, Count Thun answered perspicaciously (manifestly based on the knowledge of the more advanced nationality problem of Austria) that, even if the Magyars would check the free development of the Slovaks under their hegemony, "nevertheless the Slavs would victoriously fight for their cause; but before a final settlement should be reached, how many sorrowful things would happen on both sides, how much this attitude would hinder the cause of a social and humane progress in Hungary!"<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The use of such and similar invectives, however, was not a specialty of the Magyars. Anton Springer gave a long list of nicknames used extensively through the whole monarchy among the various nations (*Geschichte Österreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden* [Leipzig, 1865], p. 5. Interesting data concerning the Czech-Slovak antagonism will be found on pp. 28-29).

<sup>7</sup> *Die Stellung der Slovaken in Ungarn* (Prag, 1843), pp. 4, 5, 18.

Not only a distinguished foreigner but the most brilliant figure of the Hungarian Renaissance, a man who did more than anyone else for the reinforcement of Magyar culture, Count Stephen Széchenyi, observed with despair this advance of a megalomaniac chauvinism and, in a festival address which he delivered in 1842 at the assembly of the Hungarian Scientific<sup>8</sup> Academy, he gave a real philippic against the fatal spirit of an intolerant Magyarization which he called "a current of dementia," accusing everyone of high treason who dared only to contradict this incessant provocation and persecution of the non-Magyar citizens.

Unfortunately this and similar admonitions were useless. The spirit of a forcible assimilation grew rapidly and the situation became more and more dangerous in the proportion in which the antagonism between Habsburg absolutism and liberal Hungary, fighting for its independence, developed more acutely. And when in 1848 events led to a definite rupture between the dynasty and the revolutionary Magyar nobility, the latter found itself bitterly opposed not only by Vienna but also by a great part of the Hungarian nationalities which now made a common cause against the Magyar rule, menacing their independence. The intolerant words of Kossuth against the Serb claims in which he appealed to the sword as the final judge<sup>9</sup> and the general inability of the Magyar revolution to satisfy the national needs of the non-Magyar nationalities exploded in an extremely bloody civil war in which Jugo-Slavs and Rumanians gave ear to the propaganda of the Viennese Camarilla and sustained the claims of absolutism against Hungarian constitutionalism, unwilling to give national independence to the non-Magyar peoples. This civil war became the chief cause of the collapse of the Hungarian Revolution and, at the same time its bloody memories survived until the end of the monarchy, rolling a veritable sentimental rock between the Magyars and the nationalities. Especially in Transylvania these tragic events envenomed the whole social atmosphere.

The leading Hungarian circles realized belatedly that the wrong treatment of the national problem would push the country into an inevitable catastrophe. Only at the last minute did they try to retrieve the sins of the past and Bartholomew Szemere, Minister of Interior under Kossuth, in July, 1849, three weeks before the final collapse in the battle at Világos, introduced into parliament an extremely liberal bill for a nationality law in order to calm the non-Magyar masses.

<sup>8</sup> "Science" in Hungarian does not mean natural science alone, but all kinds of human knowledge.

<sup>9</sup> According to the reminiscences of certain contemporaries, Louis Kossuth, after a hot debate with a Serb delegation (April, 1848), uttered the words: "In that case the sword must decide." Kossuth later, at the time of his emigration, denied the veracity of this statement, but it continued to live in the memory even of subsequent generations.

It is characteristic that even then, at the moment of the approaching catastrophe, it was difficult to get the bill passed. Szemere announced emphatically—writes Michael Horváth, the contemporary historian of the Hungarian Revolution—that “the aristocratic conception of the claims of the other nationalities, if the nation did not abandon it at the last moment, would destroy Hungary. . . . Under the sway of this brilliant oration the sham democrats and radicals were dumbfounded and humiliated, men who always did lip-service to the liberty of the people but limited it to their own interests.” And the bishop-historian added that this law of fundamental importance which solved radically the nationality problem, guaranteeing complete liberty to each nationality for its natural development without doing any harm to the political unity of the country . . . had only one fault in its result, namely that it was not created in March of 1848. . . .<sup>10</sup>

Even more clear than this was the declaration of Bartholomew Szemere himself, one of the outstanding figures of the period, who knew the most intimate details of the inner history of the Revolution. In 1859 he made the following confession in a Hungarian newspaper concerning the real causes of the débâcle of the Magyar Revolution:

In 1848 was finished the great work of national unification, the last obstacle to which [the feudal system] was definitely eliminated. What is the reason that the nation just as it attained its fullest vigor, had lost the battle? The reason was that in the lapse of time, half secretly, half openly, there was born, developed, and matured a new idea, the idea of nationality, the immense power of which in the foreign races we did not realize and, therefore, did not take into sufficient consideration. I know very well the secret and public intrigues of that period and I know equally well the effect of the Russian army upon the historical conclusion: but in spite of all this we must confess that we did not understand the great importance and immense motive power of the idea of nationality which seemed to us to have broken out by accident though it was the result of an inner process of fermentation. We took for an artificial noise what was the thunder of Heaven. . . . We thought the earth was shaken by the feet of an army when in reality it was a veritable earthquake. . . . The entire foliage of a forest will never be moved unless there is a tempest which blows. . . .<sup>11</sup>

#### B. THE NATIONALITY-PLAN OF KOSSUTH DURING HIS EXILE

The bloody shadows of the Hungarian Revolution and of its suppression by the help of the Tsar weighed heavily upon the souls of the contemporaries during the sorrowful years of absolutism, the centralization and Germanization of Bach. Not only the vanquished Magyars who, according to the Austrian theory, had forfeited their

<sup>10</sup> M. Horváth, *History of the Struggle for Independence of Hungary* (Pest, 1871), III, 315–17. In Hungarian.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted by Benedict Jancsó, *Our Struggle for Independence and the Daco-Rumanian Aspirations* (Budapest, 1885), p. 186. In Hungarian.

right to the Constitution but the former allies of the Viennese Court, the Jugo-Slavs and Rumanians, too, felt themselves deceived and duped by the renewed system of absolutism. All that happened could have given a powerful lesson to the Magyars and the non-Magyar nations in favor of democratic institutions and of a just compromise. Actually we find that the best representatives of the Magyars and the nationalities reached a better conception of the problem.

In the first place the Magyar emigration, under the leadership of Kossuth, acknowledged completely the errors of the past. The chief care of Kossuth was the finding of a policy which would satisfy the interests of the non-Magyar nations and by this to guarantee the independence of Hungary against Habsburg absolutism. This aim led Kossuth to two great political conceptions. The one was his idea of the solution of the nationality problem on the basis of the "principle of personality." In his constitutional plan of 1851 he elaborated a program which coincided in its essence with that advocated by the Austrian Social-Democratic party half a century later. The fundamental thought of this plan has even now an ardent actuality for all those countries which face the nationality problem. Therefore, it will be perhaps not without interest to set forth here its main features. As religion, nationality, too, is a social interest. The state as such, has nothing to do with either. The Constitution guaranteeing the right of coalition, the citizens have a perfect liberty to unite and form associations for their national interests, as well as for other interests, in every village or county or in national corporations exactly in the same manner as the Protestants are united from the point of view of their religious interests in the villages, counties, and districts. But like these religious associations, the national ones also, would have no right to demand state authority in civic administration, they should be restricted to the cultivation of their national interests. But from this point of view, they would enjoy complete liberty, they could elect their chiefs, hold their meetings, and make decisions limited only by law and the Constitution. This principle will be equally applied to the Magyars and to the other nationalities, nobody will have fewer privileges and the government as such will favor no one to the detriment of the others. And as the government, the legislature, the county, and the village need an official language, the principle above stated will be enforced in such a manner that everywhere the majority will decide in what language public affairs should be carried on, but assuring at the same time the right of the minority. The government, too, will be obliged in its intercourse with a county which uses another tongue to attach to all its decrees issued in the official Magyar language a translation in the tongue of the county, and the same procedure should be adopted by the county toward the villages in its territory. In the same manner the county, if its language is not the

Magyar, will attach a translation to its requests addressed to the government. All the laws of the country should be translated and promulgated in all the languages of the country. . . . But Kossuth did not stop here. In the solitude of his exile, haunted by the memories of the past, he realized that the Hungarian nationality problem was not only a problem of the internal policy of the country but was also dependent on the policy which Hungary should carry on in regard to the neighboring national states, then in formation, which had large numbers of co-nationals in Hungary. All efforts for independence against Habsburg absolutism must remain unsuccessful as long—and this was the second leading conception of Kossuth—as Hungary does not maintain an intensive co-operation with its neighboring states. From this point of view he elaborated the famous program of a *Danubian Confederation* which only a few of his contemporaries could understand, though it was an ingenious anticipation of a historical necessity. Only an economic and political alliance between Hungary and Rumania and Serbia (and later with Bohemia) would be capable of guaranteeing the independence of these smaller states against Pan-German and Pan-Slav pressure and at the same time, in connection with the solution of the nationality problem, to maintain efficiently the peace of Central Europe.

With far-seeing eyes he emphasized the problem which became half a century later really the destroyer of Hungary. He wrote:

We must take into consideration that due to natural instinct among our non-Magyar citizens the Slovaks of Upper Hungary must have an eminent interest in the fights for independence of Bohemia, the Rumanians for those of Rumania, and the Serbs for those of Serbia. Therefore, they must wish with the utmost desire for all which would foster the attainment of this independence. Consequently it is impossible not to perceive that, if Hungary would take a position and follow a policy in harmony with these interests, the nationality problem could be solved without the slightest difficulty. . . . Whereas, if Hungary would take a position and follow a policy contrary to these interests, the problem of nationality cannot be solved because, maintaining a hostile attitude in the international field against the natural instinct of the national aspirations, even the most extensive administrative concessions could create only a transitory and artificial peace which would collapse at the very moment in which the policy of Hungary would come into antagonism with the efforts for independence of Bohemia, Rumania, and Serbia. . . .

The scrupulous and thoroughgoing satisfaction of the claims of the Hungarian nationalities and a policy of confederation toward the co-nationals of these people in the neighboring countries, that was the message of Kossuth from his exile, the echo of the catastrophe of Világos in the soul of the great tribune. "The solution lies in the words," he wrote, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and, if not in these, then there is no solution."

## C. THE NATIONALITY LAW OF DEÁK-EÖTVÖS

The new conception of Kossuth in which he abandoned completely his former chauvinistic policy, was as a matter of fact without any effect on Hungary, languishing under the yoke of Habsburg absolutism, especially since the development of the foreign policy, particularly the turn of French diplomacy, destroyed all hope of restoring the independence of the country with foreign help and by revolutionary means. Therefore, only a handful of his closer adherents continued the policy of Kossuth whereas the weight of public opinion felt his plans to be adventurous and utopian. In consequence the leading statesmen of the period tried to find a tolerable compromise with the Habsburg dynasty in the spirit of the Constitution of 1848, restoring the independence of the country, and maintaining intact the political hegemony of the ruling classes. The débâcle of Königgrätz and the policy of revenge of Beust against Prussia made this way practicable (as it was demonstrated in our historical study), and a compromise was made in 1867 which guaranteed the independence of Hungary, with the exception of military affairs and of foreign policy, and put the control of the whole internal policy of the country into the hands of the Magyar ruling classes with entire exclusion of the imperial administration and bureaucracy. The new dualistic order was shaped by Francis Deák, a symbol of constitutional liberalism and of the continuation of historical right.

Immediately after the introduction of the dualistic system, in 1868, a nationality law was passed which reflects in the first place the thought and the ideology of a man unrivaled by anyone in Europe in the study and deep sociological and philosophical conception of the national problem. This law of Baron Joseph Eötvös was one of the most important and original endeavors to solve the national problem. No one could have been better fitted for this task than this great "doctrinaire" in whom the spirit of a scientific analysis was fortunately intermingled with a profound poetic and religious intuition. Bluntschli himself admired his daring perspective. Already, before gaining power in several fundamental works, he admonished his countrymen and the leaders of Austria of the dangers of the nationality problem, of a forcible assimilation. At the same time he was entirely aware of the fact that in Serbia and in the new Danube principalities there had arisen new *Piedmonts* for the Jugo-Slav and the Rumanian races. He wrote on one occasion:

That the various nationalities of the country should lose the consciousness of their nationality, that they should not be filled with enthusiasm for their nationality, this we shall not attain in this way as others did not who had experimented with the same methods against the Magyar nationality. The only result which we could expect would be that the movement, pushed

away from the surface of public life, would gain the more in depth and that the antagonism which is turned today against the Magyar language would direct itself against the unity of the country. . . .

These prophetic words of the great statesman were fulfilled in a few decades.

On the basis of these principles which were in perfect harmony with the point of view of the leading statesman of the epoch, Francis Deák, Joseph Eötvös began his great work of making peace with the nationalities of the country. The task was really not an easy one. At the time of the conclusion of the dualistic system, even according to the most optimistic calculations, in Hungary proper six million Magyars were faced by seven and a half million non-Magyars. These masses of nationalities were already comparatively advanced in their national consciousness, in consequence of the Revolution and of the Bach system. The bloody reminiscences of the Civil War weighed still heavily both upon the rulers and the nationalities. The co-nationals of the Hungarian nations living outside the Hungarian frontiers made great progress in national consciousness and in the building up of an independent state.

The way chosen by the Hungarian statesman, which in his nationality law led to the codification of the whole complex problem, was a compromise between the intransigent standpoint of the nationalities and the conception of the Magyar chauvinists. The nationalities maintained their former platform, originated before the Revolution, according to which the country should be divided into distinct administrative territories on a national basis, the Magyar chauvinists adhered without any change to the conception of a unified Magyar national state. Eötvös repudiated both points of view, and in the spirit of the Diet of 1861 sought a solution which tried to satisfy the administrative and cultural claims of the nationalities without the disruption of the political unity of the country.

In order to attain this aim the law of Eötvös provided that the nationalities should have their own elementary and middle schools and a certain share in the higher education; that they should develop without any restraint their ecclesiastical institutions; that the non-Magyar middle classes should have an adequate participation in the offices of the state; that the local administration in the counties, districts, and villages should be carried on in the maternal language of the native population; and, in general, that the development of their cultural and national life should be unimpeded. The whole conception was based on the idea that the nationalities should not form distinct territorial units or nationally organized corporations, but as individuals should enjoy the same rights and opportunities as the Magyar citizens. According to the official doctrine they became "equal mem-

bers of the Hungarian nation," and this term "Hungarian" (in the spirit of the feudal centuries which included not only the Magyar but all the other noblemen of the various nations) meant now not only the Magyars but all the citizens of the country.

This point of view did not satisfy the nationalities. Though they accepted the theory of the political unity of the country, they regarded the concessions of the nationality law as not an adequate guaranty for their national life and they aspired for a territorial autonomy. Considering this dissatisfaction, one small group of Magyar politicians, close adherents of the policy of Kossuth, influenced by the idealistic personality of Daniel Irányi, tried to form a new compromise in 1870 with the leaders of the nationalities on the basis of a conception which excluded the idea of a Magyar hegemony.

This extreme point of view, quite in antagonism with the existing relations among powers, had no foundation at all in Hungarian public opinion and in a comparatively short time the nationalities of the country became aware of the fact that the law of Deák and Eötvös was in harmony with their well-understood interests. They perceived it in a period when, after the departure of the great liberal generation of 1848, the ruling circles of Hungarian politics began not to apply and to elude this law. If any one beholds the history of Hungary from a retrospective point of view after those embittered struggles of half a century which in public life and even more in secret and underhanded ways ground up the moral unity of the country, he must acknowledge, if he wishes to be fair, that the compromise of Eötvös signified a point of view which, carried out loyally, could have really solved the nationality problem. For almost two decades I had the opportunity of being in touch with most of the leaders of the nationalities and I knew sufficiently well their attitude as well as the mentality of the popular masses. On the basis of this knowledge I am convinced that, if the Nationality Law had been applied from the beginning without hesitation and without mental reservation, though it would not have been the last word in the solution of the nationality problem (sooner or later it would have become unavoidable to give also some kind of territorial autonomy to the various nations in their local administration) still this liberal and humane law would have surely created that atmosphere of mutual trust and flexibility which would have extracted the aching tooth of the national struggles. This opinion was held not only by the few sincere Hungarian adherents of the policy of Eötvös but also by those foreign observers who studied the Hungarian nationality problems carefully and loyally. For instance R. W. Seton-Watson, in his valuable researches before the war, always emphasized the significance of this law and called it a basis on which the national struggles of the country growing more and more acute could be cured.



Similarly Louis Eisenmann in his classic work on the Austro-Hungarian Compromise stated the following:

The provisions of the Hungarian Nationality Law could have perfectly achieved the result of which Deák and Eötvös dreamed; not the Magyarization of all the inhabitants of the country, a standpoint which Eötvös called "dementia," but their transformation into loyal citizens of the Hungarian state; not an exterior, formal unity but a unification in feeling. . . .<sup>12</sup>

#### D. WHY THE NATIONALITY LAW WAS NOT PUT INTO PRACTICE

But this wise law was never carried out, it remained on paper, as a constitutional show-window for international use whereas, at home, a policy was launched which was in flagrant antagonism both with the spirit and the positive statement of the Nationality Law. The nationalities urged in vain the application of the law, but their voices were feeble against the growing noise of chauvinistic nationalism. The Magyar ruling classes repudiated more and more openly the spirit and practice of the law. We must consider somewhat in detail the psychological causes of this change because the understanding of this process is important not only from the point of view of the Hungarian nationality problem, but also from that of the collapse of the whole Habsburg monarchy. One could hear opinions to the effect that the ruling Magyar classes never took this law seriously and that they passed it only to appease certain Viennese circles, with the deep design that later they would not apply it in practice, that the secret point of view of the ruling classes in 1867 was the same as in 1848: the entire assimilation of the nationalities.

This opinion is manifestly false if we consider the standpoint and ideology of the leading statesmen of that period. It is impossible that these men who embraced the best culture of Europe of their day could have upheld for a moment the idea that they would be capable of Magyarizing by forcible or shrewd means the larger half of the country in a period when national consciousness was already high in the monarchy. But Deák and his collaborators were led not only by a clear intellectual vision but also by a scrupulous morality in these questions. Arminius Vámbéry, the great scholar and explorer, narrated to me this episode: on one occasion not long after the Compromise, when he expressed before Deák his concern as to whether the Hungarian state could be maintained against the will of the majority of its citizens who by the force of a sociological law will become more and more conscious of their distinct nationality, the founder of the Compromise answered:

You are right, the country is not yet a true state. There is still lacking that spontaneous co-operation which is absolutely necessary for the mainte-

<sup>12</sup> *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois* (Paris, 1904), pp. 552-53.

nance of a state. But in spite of this I am not pessimistic. The Magyar must become so magnanimous, so just that those still backward peoples with which we live in an age-old community would look upon us as on an elder brother who will not dominate over them, but lead them on the paths of law and culture. . . .

And this was his standpoint not only in his intimate circle but in the political arena also. He defended repeatedly, with his whole moral weight, his law in Parliament and urged its loyal application. For instance in a discussion as to whether a Serb theater should get a state subsidy in addition to the subsidy of the Magyar national theater in 1868, Deák advocated the point of view that if there was not sufficient money for the subsidy of both, then neither should have support: "I cannot reconcile with justice that the state which is from the political point of view a united and undivided Hungarian State should expend from the common taxes for the benefit of one single language and people." (What a deviation from this noble sense of justice took place in Hungarian public life in the later period is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the system of protecting Magyar culture alone, so explicitly condemned by Deák, became the common opinion and practice of the following generations. And even more than this, after the burning of a private German theater at Budapest in the nineties of the last century, there was no state minister who would give a concession for its rebuilding—a mere concession, not subvention—in spite of the fact that in this time about 120,000 Germans were living in the capital.)

The former enlightened spirit was not an isolated instance of the leading statesmen, but one could easily gather testimonies to prove that the better elements of the generation of the Compromise realized the extreme importance of the nationality problem and treated it with far more delicacy and justice than did the subsequent generations. According to the happy statement of Louis Mocsáry, the distinguished follower of Louis Kossuth already quoted, the Nationality Law was the codification of the moral atmosphere of the fifties and sixties of the last century, of the ideology of a generation which lived through the dark period of the civil war and absolutism. But this spirit of tolerance was only a transitory one.

Since the death of Deák in 1876 a new generation occupied the political arena, a generation of the "gentry" which forgot the great lessons of 1848–49 and which regarded the situation of the country exclusively from the point of view of their momentary interests. The leader of this generation, Prime Minister of the country between 1875 and 1890, Koloman Tisza, came into power by cynically abandoning his principles advocated against the Compromise of Deák during several years, after having spread vehement propaganda against the

common institutions of the monarchy and in favor of an independent Hungarian army. The new ruling party, called the "Liberal Party," a fusion between the parties of Deák and Tisza, had nothing liberal in its character (except its benevolent attitude toward Jewish finance and big business) but was simply an organization for the *à tout prix* maintenance of the Compromise and for the domination of the country by big landed interests. In this political atmosphere a new spirit was developed concerning the nationality problem which, pushing back the meaning and the statement of the Nationality Law, began to propagate, first in a low voice, later more loudly, a policy of Magyarization, the necessity of the creation of an exclusive Nation State as a kind of a *summum bonum* for the realization of which Machiavellian principles were advocated. And as the maintenance of the Dualistic Constitution became more and more difficult against the rising tides of nationalistic feeling, administrative corruption, the distribution of important jobs and sinecures became more and more a governmental principle. (The ruling party was satirically called *The Mamelukes*.) And as the influential positions and offices were comparatively rare, an ideology was needed which excluded the whole middle class of the nationalities from political competition. The so-called self-government of the counties was put more strictly under governmental control in order to secure a reliable majority for the Compromise and at the same time to reserve the administrative jobs for the gentry. Whereas at the beginning of the Constitutional era, following the Bach administration, many representatives of the nationalities occupied important offices in the state and local government, with the arrival of the "Liberal party" these elements were driven out systematically. Parallel with this process the Magyar language was enforced more and more in public instruction, and all the cultural institutions of the country became instruments of Magyar national assimilation.

This current became even more preponderant after the last decade of the nineteenth century when a third generation appeared in public life which, under the sway of a chauvinistic education, knew nothing about the true history of the Revolution and the Civil War, and which in the atmosphere of reactionary nationalism lost its contact with the ruling ideas of Western civilization. Also important economic and social changes augmented the nationalistic and chauvinistic feeling of this new generation. Large strata of the gentry collapsed before the competition of economic liberalism. Unaccustomed to any serious productive work, they were ousted both in the economic and cultural field. The non-Magyar nationalities and the Jews were successful in developing an energetic and prosperous middle class which menaced more and more the leading position of the former noble classes. And as the co-operation of the Jews was for a long time unavoidable for the maintenance of the economic efficiency and intel-

lectual level of the Magyar State,<sup>13</sup> the gentry, which used to call itself the "historical class of the country," felt a growing antipathy against the middle class of the nationalities and a kind of a "Magyar Monroe Doctrine" was established against the representatives of the nationalities in the field of governmental and local administration. The meaning of this Monroe Doctrine was in the keen formulation of Mocsáry: "You are traitors of the country. Hands off!"<sup>14</sup>

This economic, intellectual, and moral decadence of the former ruling class, saturated with many foreign elements especially of Germans and Jews, had created since the eighties of the last century an imperialistic doctrine of Magyar nationalism. It became a political axiom that either the Magyars would assimilate the nationalities or the nationalities would destroy the Hungarian state; that only united nation states have a future whereas the polyglot Austria is a disgusting example of a nationality state; that all those who refuse to learn the Magyar language are traitors and conspirators; that the establishment of a nation state of "thirty million Magyars" according to the teaching of the leading chauvinistic daily, the *Budapesti Hírlap*, is a possibility of the near future if we would only discard the naïve and sentimental law of old Deák and Eötvös; that there is only one possible culture in the country, the Magyar culture, whereas all the endeavors for fostering the cultures of the other nationalities were only the work of certain intellectuals wishing to fish in troubled waters; that the nationalities abuse ignominiously the unheard of magnanimity of the Magyars, who gave them a home in spite of their right of conquest when they try to establish their own culture and autonomy in the Hungarian state.

This new doctrine accompanied by a more and more intolerant school policy and a demagogically vociferous daily press had become, since the nineties of the last century, the ruling theorem of the Magyar public life, accepted by all the parties and politicians. Even the party which regarded itself as the heir of the political traditions of Kossuth became a victim of this boisterous nationalism, nay it began to utilize them against the parties of the Compromise, asserting that the wicked nationalities were the chief abettors of Vienna in the breaking down of the struggle for independence in 1849, and that only a completely Magyarized Hungary would be capable of carrying on the decisive fight against Austria.

<sup>13</sup> To give only significant data: the number of the attorneys grew between 1890 and 1900 7.2 per cent, whereas those of the Jewish attorneys 68.6 per cent; there were in 1900, 4,807 physicians, among them 2,321 Jews (48 per cent).

Even in the possession of landed property, the advance of the Jews was quite disproportionate. In 1884 there were 1,898 Jewish proprietors retaining a territory of about 1,750,000 holds. In 1894 there were 2,788 Jewish proprietors retaining a territory of about 2,620,000 holds.

<sup>14</sup> *The Balance Sheet of the Dualistic System* (Budapest, 1902), p. 232. In Hungarian.

Not only irresponsible public opinion, the noisy patriots and stump orators abandoned the spirit of Deák and sought the solution of the nationality problem in the methods of an artificial assimilation, but the leading statesmen themselves made more and more dangerous concessions to the jingo ideology. Among them, besides those who, like the politicians of Transylvania, were envenomed by the traditional hatred of the Rumanians, a veritable fear psychosis (especially Baron Desiderius Bánffy, a former, and Count Stephen Bethlen, the present Hungarian Premier), there were also some moderate statesmen who often preached tolerance toward the nationalities. So, for instance, Coloman Széll, a so-called liberal Premier, who regarded himself as the follower of the traditions of Deák, made in a speech in 1908 the following declaration:

We have only one single categorical imperative, the Magyar state-idea, and we must demand that every citizen should acknowledge it and subject himself unconditionally to it. From this point of view we, all politicians of Hungary, are intransigent. . . . I shall tell why. Because Hungary has its age-old, holy, and legitimate rights to strengthen the idea of such a state. The Magyars have conquered this country for the Magyars and not for others. The supremacy and the hegemony of the Magyars is fully justified. . . .

And the same point of view was echoed two years later by Count Stephen Tisza though he was very much impressed by the gravity of the Rumanian problem: "Our citizens of non-Magyar tongue must, in the first place, become accustomed to the fact that they belong to the community of a nation state, of a state which is not a conglomerate of various races. . . ." Behold, four years before the world catastrophe the most powerful statesman of the monarchy did not realize that Hungary, even according to very optimistic statistics included a 45.5 per cent non-Magyar population and, therefore, could not remain a unified nation state but was under the necessity of imitating the example of the despised Austria and to remold the old aristocratic state into a confederation of nations.

This total change of Hungarian public opinion concerning the Nationality Law was a very complicated mass-psychological process which cannot be explained exclusively by the moments of class struggle referred to above. Space does not allow me a detailed analysis, I must therefore allude only to the most important factors. After the Dualistic Compromise, a comparatively strong economic uprising took place and the natural assimilation of the non-Magyar masses proceeded very rapidly in the economically more advanced regions of the country; the cities and the towns, formerly with a preponderant German and Jewish element, adopted the Magyar language and culture with a spontaneous eagerness; Magyar officials, judges, industrialists, and educators became the leading elements in all the parts of the

country. As a consequence of great railway constructions and regulations of the rivers, the whole territory of the country became a far more real unity than ever before; the Magyar cultural institutions enjoyed exclusively the protection of the state whereas those of the nationalities were intentionally repressed; the whole administration of the country was entirely dominated by the Magyar ruling class or by elements thoroughly assimilated by them; the leading banks of the country, mostly in Jewish hands, were obedient instruments of the government in every effort at Magyarization; the whole economic and cultural life of the country was concentrated at Budapest, the splendor of which obscured all other parts of the country; the growing influence of the industrialization of the country and of the industrial working-class (in 1900 already 20.7 per cent of the total population) was also subservient to the process of Magyarization because the Magyars were the most proletarianized and intellectually and economically the most mobile elements of the country; the whole system of education became more and more an instrument of Magyarization and the great majority of the middle nationality classes wrote and spoke the Magyar language perfectly; the Magyar daily press, the unique beneficiary of financial and state subventions, gained an almost inconceivable ascendancy and under an unscrupulous capitalistic management did not care much for principles but regarded nationalistic demagoguery as the best business enterprise; the so-called Magyar cultural associations grew like mushrooms and their haughty nationalistic declamations filled the air with an atmosphere of chauvinistic megalomania.

All these economic and social factors fostered the self-reliance of the Magyar society, strengthened by the spirit of civic education which we shall consider in another connection. The very existence of the nationalities was almost forgotten in the chauvinistic public opinion which regarded them as mute personages in the scene of the glorious national drama. This pathological state of mind was still more envenomed by certain important psychological facts.

The first was an optical illusion according to which Magyar public opinion and also a considerable part of foreign opinion, completely misunderstanding the whole historical process, looked down with a pitying condescension upon Austria, lacerated by national struggles, with its parliament paralyzed by constant obstructionism. On the other hand Hungary showed for a long period the spectacle of a happy unity, of a compact national force with its anti-democratic parliament, exclusively dominated by the ruling classes. What was in reality the mechanical suppression of popular public opinion (with the help of an anachronistic and corrupt electoral system) was interpreted as the sign of national power and cohesion. As a matter of fact the united Magyar feudal parliament became generally victorious in

all constitutional controversies against the more democratic Austrian legislative body in which, in consequence of the national struggles, the government was seldom backed by a reliable majority. It became a fashion to put as an example the "united" Hungary before the "sick" Austria, enfeebled by the national struggles.

At the same time the spirit of artificial Magyarization was enforced by the attitude of the Crown itself. The Magyar ruling classes knew very well the ultra-conservative personality of Emperor Francis Joseph who could scarcely imagine a constitution not based upon the Hungarian noble class. This was, by the way, also the attitude for a long time of the Austrian bureaucracy and the German bourgeoisie, because the German hegemony in Austria could only be maintained with the alliance of the Magyar feudal classes. Therefore, both to the Emperor and to his bureaucracy any experiment seemed extremely dangerous which would have tried to replace the Magyar nobility by uncultivated or semi-cultivated Rumanian, Slovak, or Serb peasant masses, the leaders of which belonged to the small bourgeoisie devoid of the higher forms of social life. As a matter of fact the Emperor remained until the end a loyal Hungarian king who was in sympathy with the Magyar noble classes, the standard of life, and the smartness, stylishness, and "chivalrousness" of which was agreeable to his taste. Francis Joseph accepted as an unchangeable political dogma the hidden contents of the Dualistic Compromise according to which the Magyar feudal classes guaranteed to the crown the unity of his army and foreign policy whereas the crown gave to them an absolute mastery in their internal policy and especially in their domination over the nationalities of the country. He repudiated consequently and energetically all the efforts of the nationalities by which they sought his imperial protection against the policy of assimilation of the Magyars. For instance when in 1892, 300 Rumanians came to Vienna asking for an audience in order to present to the Emperor a memorandum concerning their complaints against the Magyar domination, he refused to receive the deputation, sent the memorandum back, and without a word of objection permitted the Hungarian government to subject the undersigners of the memorandum to judicial proceedings and to condemn several of them to heavy imprisonments by a Magyar jury. The official theory was that the initiators of the Memorandum Movement committed high treason because, though Hungarian citizens, they sought the defense of the Austrian emperor against the Hungarian king.

Similarly when in 1903 a large deputation of the Jugo-Slav members of the Austrian parliament from Dalmatia and Istria appeared before the Emperor to protest against the oppression of their brothers in Croatia-Slovenia by the Magyar absolutism, he refused to give them an audience. (This episode had a great significance in the grow-

ing trend of Jugo-Slav irredentism.) One will scarcely exaggerate the situation in asserting that the Emperor's complete disregard of the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary was a dominant factor in the process of dissolution. Joseph Redlich himself, though extremely indulgent with the hero of his book, calls this policy of Francis Joseph, "his gravest political sin."

Another factor in the line of Magyarization was the very mechanism of the Dualistic Compromise by which the whole military strength of the monarchy would have backed the Magyar assimilation in case of a revolt of the dissatisfied nationalities. (As a matter of fact the joint army was often applied during the parliamentary elections as a means of deterring the voters of the candidates of the nationality parties.) Seeing this situation Louis Mocsáry wrote that there is "a system in the dementia of Magyar chauvinism like in the system of the insanity of Hamlet." This system was to abandon Hungarian independence and, as a reward for this sacrifice, accept the help of the Austrian bayonets of the joint army in order to make the work of assimilation more effective. Only after the complete Magyarization of the country could the fight for national independence begin.<sup>15</sup> This situation was bitterly felt by the leaders of the Austrian nationalities because all the Hungarian nationalities were of the same racial stock as themselves and, therefore, their complaints and irritation envenomed the whole atmosphere of the monarchy. Under the growing pressure of these circumstances the Austrian parliament adopted a motion unanimously (December, 1907) the so-called Resolution Šilinger with the following text:

In regard to the recently growing persecution of the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary the Imperial-Royal government is invited to call the attention of the Royal-Hungarian government as the second contracting party of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise to the fact that the interest of a prosperous co-operation of all the peoples and the strengthening of the whole monarchy demands peremptorily that the Hungarian Nationality Law of December 1868, should be carried out as soon as possible in the spirit of complete freedom, justice, and humanity.

Naturally nothing could be done by the Austrian government in this direction because the chief idea of the Compromise was to establish an absolute Hungarian sovereignty in all matters belonging in the internal administration of the country.

Another factor in line with Magyar supremacy was equally operative: "the rôle of the renegades."<sup>16</sup> The Hungarian upper class was permeated by foreign elements, especially by Germans and Jews. These assimilated races made the ideology of the ruling class more

<sup>15</sup> *The Balance Sheet of the Dualistic System*, pp. 226-27.

<sup>16</sup> The same problem was already treated from another point of view, pp. 174 ff.



acute and intolerant. It belongs to the nature of the renegades to serve the interest which they adopted as their own by loud and showy means. Besides the material and social advantages other motives also contribute to this result. In the first place the renegade wishes to extinguish the memories of his past by overbidding the claims of the ruling class. There is also an almost biological factor in his behavior. The men of the ruling class in the traditional enjoyment of their power are somewhat unaccustomed to fighting, they are more passive and apathetic, more epicurean, and too lazy to carry on a continuous struggle. But the neophyte, or the newly assimilated, belongs generally to the less prosperous classes. Finally, the old, privileged elements live far from real life, mostly in the atmosphere of a closed and antiquated ideology, and they do not know the thousand small and hidden springs of the daily life outside and below. But the proselytes are men of this fighting and ascending world. They know and realize very well the economic and social motives of the ideological currents. Besides the adoption of the ideology of the ruling class signified for them, especially for the Jews, an "attitude of defense." In the eighties of the last century there arose a very loud and demagogic anti-Semitism which culminated, in 1882, in the ill-famed process of Tiszaeszlár where Jews were accused of having killed a Christian girl for the purpose of blood sacrifice. After some hesitation the government took energetically the part of the Jews and suppressed the movement animated by superstitious and unclean motives. This sorrowful episode contributed to the growing Magyar nationalism of the Jews who wished to demonstrate their fidelity to the Magyar state ideal.

But it would be erroneous and unfair to attribute the Magyar nationalistic attitude of the Jews and of other assimilated elements exclusively to considerations of expediency. There can be no doubt that a large mass of these assimilated elements adopted their new ideology quite spontaneously and enthusiastically out of a sincere love of the new fatherland. For a long period the traditions of the liberal spirit of Deák and Eötvös made a powerful appeal on the half-assimilated elements of Hungarian society. Besides, when in Austria a noisy and irritative anti-Semitism dominated the public atmosphere, the Hungarian Jewry was not molested by such a current and their upper elements were even the pets of the government. But perhaps the most important factor in this process of assimilation was the rôle of the capital, Budapest, which with a surprising intellectual elasticity was marvelously active in art, science, and literature. This intellectual splendor of the metropolitan city attracted into its sphere of influence all those elements of the country which were eager to embrace Western culture. Only very few keen observers realized that there was something distinctly pathological in this splendor because this hyperintellectualism and hyperaestheticism of the few thousands was

confronted by the unculture and intellectual destitution of the vast majority.<sup>17</sup>

But more important than all these factors animating Magyar chauvinism and nationalism was the psychological attitude of the ruling classes of society. The more unpopular the policy of the ruling party became, the more class antagonism became acute, the more the proletarian and nationality masses agitated the enlargement of the suffrage, the more agrarian Socialism menaced the monopolies of the large estates, the more the middle class of the nationalities claimed a larger share in the administration of the country: the more did the "nationality danger" (the nationality bugbear) become the fittest ideological instrument for social conservation. A doctrine was more and more established according to which a democratic suffrage would be an impossibility in Hungary in consequence of the growing danger of the nationalities. For the same reason must the reign of the system of *latifundia* be maintained and the corrupt county administration be left unaltered. It was emphatically asserted that the idea of democracy and of a Magyar nation state are irreconcilable. At the same time the idea that Hungary should follow the example of Austria and should remold its constitution in the spirit of the Nationality Law of Deák, that the political supremacy of the Magyars should be changed step by step into a cultural and economic hegemony, seemed to the ruling class as a devilish doctrine which could not even be discussed without the flagrant delict of high treason. This fear complex of the nationality danger systematically developed by press and school and by parliamentarian and social oratory paralyzed all the efforts of three generations and made any serious social or economic reform impossible. Only very few careful observers realized that this doctrine was only a bulwark for the maintenance of feudal privileges. (The post-war experiences, however, gave an evident demonstration of this truth. Though the peace treaty of Trianon made of Hungary really a united nation state consisting almost exclusively of a Magyar population, the ruling class eliminated universal suffrage, re-introduced the old corrupt electoral system, and maintained the overwhelming influence of the large estates and the domination of the gentry administration in the counties. The pretext of the nationality danger ceased, but the system of class domination continued. The theory of the "Nationality bugbear" was transformed into that of the "Jewish bugbear!")

In consequence of the causes elucidated a new spirit drew out the liberalism of Deák and Eötvös, a system in which the Magyar nation state and the nationality bugbear became the leading conceptions of

<sup>17</sup> The brilliant analysis of the Jewish Society in Paris given by Romain Rolland in one of the volumes of his *Jean Christophe* shows a startling analogy of the Jewish situation in pre-war Budapest.

the Hungarian policy. The whole parliament and the entire public opinion stood under its hypnosis. It was shouted by the demagogues, defended by the publicists, carried out even by those statesmen who publicly advocated liberalism toward the nationalities according to the principle: *N'en parlons jamais, y pensez toujours*. . . .

#### E. THE PROCESS OF ARTIFICIAL MAGYARIZATION

It is impossible here to enter into the details of the process by which the growing chauvinistic spirit of the ruling classes had built up a very complicated machine of artificial and forcible assimilation. Not only space forbids me from doing it but also a kind of moral repulsion at the thought of indulging in the faults and crimes of the past in a period when Hungary under the pretense of a punishment was hard and in many respects unjustly hit, and when we witness that same policy, for which ostensibly Hungary was dismembered, is in many cases continued by those who were its former victims. Therefore, I shall restrict myself to the reconstruction of the general moral and social atmosphere in which the system was carried on and to its most outstanding results. As to the details and technicalities of the process a comparatively large literature has been written which will give to the reader a comprehensive picture of the whole.<sup>18</sup> This literature or at least the greatest part of it was and is still denounced by official Hungarian historians and publicists as a devilish misrepresentation of the facts, and as a literature of traitors or of spys in the

<sup>18</sup> From this literature I shall quote only the most important contributions: Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (2d ed.; Vienna, 1924); Brote, *Die rumänische Frage in Siebenbürgen und Ungarn* (Berlin, 1895); R. Charmatz, *Der Demokratisch-Nationale Bundesstaat Österreich* (1904); R. Charmatz, *Deutsch-Osterreichische Politik* (1907); André Chéradame, *L'Europe et la Question D'Autriche* (1906); Louis Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867* (Paris, 1904); Fr. Guntram Schultheiss, *Deutschtum und Magyarisierung in Ungarn* (München, 1898); "La Hongrie Contemporaine et le Suffrage Universel," published by the magazine *Huszadik Század* (Paris, 1909); Oscar Jászi, *The Evolution of the Nation-States and the Problem of Nationality* (Budapest, 1912). Oscar Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (London, 1924); Anonymous, *Die Magyarisierung in Ungarn*, Nach den Debatten des ungarischen Reichstages (München, 1879); Otto Lang, *Das Österreichische Staatsproblem und seine Lösung* (1905); Aurel C. Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Osterreich* (Leipzig, 1906); Stephen Radić, *Die Slawische Politik in der Habsburgermonarchie* (1902); Paul Samassa, *Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat* (Leipzig, 1910); R. W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London, 1908); R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London, 1911); R. W. Seton-Watson, *Corruption and Reform in Hungary*, a study of electoral practice (London, 1911); R. W. Seton-Watson, *Absolutism in Croatia* (London, 1912); Wilhelm Schüssler, *Das Verfassungsproblem im Habsburgerreich* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1918); Theodor von Sosnosky, *Die Politik im Habsburgerreiche* (2d ed.; Berlin, 1913), Vol. II; M. Spalajković, *La Bosnie et l'Herzégowine* (Paris, 1899); Rudolf Springer (Karl Renner), *Der Kampf der Österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (1902); Rudolf Springer, *Die Krise des Dualismus* (1904); Rudolf Springer, *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie* (Wien, 1906); Walter Schücking, *Das Nationalitätenproblem* (1908).

service of Pan-Slavism or Daco-Romanism or Pan-Germanism. The psychology of these accusations has already been explained or will be later elucidated. It is very characteristic that, for instance, a man of the moral integrity and scientific objectivity of Mr. Seton-Watson was always described by the Magyar press and politicians as a greedy adventurer or as an idiot misled by the nationalities of the country. Articles could even be found which advised the government to buy off this undesirable foreigner.<sup>19</sup> As to the general value of this literature I must say that, as it was written partly by the members of the persecuted nationalities or by foreigners informed by them, its descriptions are sometimes too gloomy and one-sided but for the most part its facts and demonstrations are correct. I could only repeat in this behalf the statement of a high Magyar official of a large Rumanian county, when I asked his opinion concerning the accusations of the Rumanians. This man who was a solitary admirer of the policy of Deák told me: "Subtract one-third of all the accusations of the Rumanians, exaggerated by hatred or fear, and you will have the entire truth."

Generally speaking I would say that the methods and practices of the Magyar nationality policy were in their essence the same as those applied by all those countries which tried to assimilate their citizens of a foreign tongue by forcible or artificial means. The policy of Russian Tsarism against the Poles, the Finns, and the Ruthenians; the policy of Prussia against the Poles and the Danes; and the policy of feudal England against the Irish reflects the same spirit and methods however widely they may differ in the concrete details.

As a matter of fact in the first place the educational system of the country appeared to be an adequate instrument for the aims of Magyarization. We witness really that each subsequent minister of Public Instruction became more and more impatient in this work. Beginning with the elementary-school law of 1879, continuing with the law of secondary education of 1883, and terminating with the law in regard to the kindergarten education of 1891, there was a continuous and ever growing endeavor to Magyarize the teaching staff, to expand public instruction in the Magyar tongue and to restrict that in the non-Magyar tongue. For this purpose the denominational schools of the nationalities were subjected to a vexatious control and the state established extensively state schools in the Magyar language in the nationality regions to counterbalance the schools of the nationalities which were generally poor and inefficient. At the same time the agricultural proletariat of a pure Magyar stock was being deprived of the most needed elementary instruction because the wildly Magyariz-

<sup>19</sup> As a matter of fact this English traveler, the later "Scotus Viator," came into the country as an ardent admirer of Louis Kossuth, with the intention of refuting the "calumnies" of the nationalities against the Magyars.

ing state did not have sufficient funds for them and the amount of illiteracy in some districts of the Magyar plains was terrifying.

A similar intolerant attitude was applied against the secondary schools which were considered as the most important instruments of assimilation because the leading intelligentsia of the country was recruited from them. "The secondary school is like a big engine," said Béla Grünwald, who was not a common demagogue but one of the most distinguished spirits of the period, a great historian and sociologist, "which takes in at one end hundreds of Slovak youth who come out at the other end as Magyars." From this point of view the secondary schools, too, were submitted to severe control and the chief care of public instruction was not so much the imparting of useful knowledge as a sentimental education according to the ideology of the ruling class. And when state control seemed to be not thoroughly efficient the Slovak high schools were closed under the pretext of Pan-Slavistic intrigues and the only non-Magyar college of the country, the German

TABLE XIV

NATIONALITY	ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS		
	Language of Instruction	Number of Pupils	Number of Teachers
Magyar.....	12,784	1,050,579	26,270
Non-Magyar.....	3,712	853,541	5,547

Law School of Nagyszeben, was similarly discontinued. This spirit of distrust and assimilation was so manifest that an acute French observer, Louis Eisenmann, wrote the following characteristic statement:

One would believe that the Hungarian state is continually menaced by a gigantic plot. If its Slovak citizens claim some rights for the Slovak language, they are called "Pan-Slavs." If the Rumanians do the same, they are called "separatists" or "Daco-Romans"! Even the children in the kindergarten are apt to threaten the security of the state and the Hungarian state takes measures of precaution against the rooms of the nurseries. . . .<sup>20</sup>

By means of these and similar measures they succeeded in augmenting disproportionately the number of schools in the Magyar tongue and in repressing those of the nationalities by manifest violation of the law of nationalities.

Table XIV demonstrates that the Magyar population, compared with the non-Magyar population of an almost equal size, had at their disposition in their mother tongue four times as many schools and five

<sup>20</sup> *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois*, p. 558.

times as many teachers. The participation of the Magyar students in secondary and higher education varied between 79.9 per cent and 88.8 per cent and that of the Magyar professors was 75.5 per cent.

In spite of these numerical results the real achievements from the point of view of Magyar assimilation were very doubtful. Where the nationalities lived in compact masses and where intercourse with the Magyars was rare, the Magyarizing drill of the elementary schools was only good for learning patriotic verses and songs by rote but the non-Magyar youth paid an enormous price for this instruction: they did not learn adequately either their mother-tongue or the Magyar. "The time spent in learning Magyar," wrote a noted Hungarian expert, "without obtaining the desired end, impedes the relative efficiency of the other branches of instruction."<sup>21</sup> And studying repeatedly the linguistic conditions in the nationality regions, I wrote (1912) the following concerning the enforcement of the Magyar tongue:

The forcible Magyarization in the schools is one of the chief causes of the pitiful cultural backwardness of the non-Magyar peoples. For, where the nationalities live in their close settlements far away from the Magyar culture, all school Magyarization is impossible because the school with its four hours of instruction is quite impotent against the twenty hours of real life. If, in every village of the great Rumanian settlement in Transylvania, every elementary school were to consist of children blessed with the linguistic talent of Count Albert Apponyi [in those times the chief exponent of this policy of artificial Magyarization] and if every elementary school were a model institution and not a single crowded room with one or two poorly paid and poorly qualified teachers, even then the Magyar language of instruction, forcibly imposed could have only the result that the children would learn some phrases in Magyar which life would soon erase from their memory, whereas they could not learn many useful things indispensable to daily life. . . .<sup>22</sup>

The situation in the secondary schools was quite another as instruction was far more intense here and the schools were situated in larger towns where, even in the nationality regions, there was always a certain amount of Magyar social life. As a matter of fact the greater part of the intelligentsia of the non-Magyar peoples learned the Magyar language very well, nay some of them became excellent Magyar orators and writers. But from the point of view of Magyar assimilation there was no advantage in this process because the non-Magyar youth, recruited from these schools, became the most ardent supporters of the claims of their races, and the mechanical drill of Magyarization had as its result the embittered fight of these "Mag-

<sup>21</sup> S. Kunfi, *The Crimes of our Popular Education* (Budapest, 1908). In Hungarian.

<sup>22</sup> *The Evolution of the Nation States*, pp. 471-72.

yarized elements" against the school system of assimilation and sometimes against the Hungarian state itself which they identified with the system of forcible Magyarization. Another part of the non-Magyar youth went abroad into the schools of their co-nationals beyond the frontiers and this intercourse kindled even more the fire of irredentism. Prague to the Slovak youth, Bucharest to the Rumanian, and Belgrade to the Serb appeared as a kind of national Eldorado and there began a mass emigration of the souls which was even more dangerous than the physical emigration in consequence of the pressure of the large estates.

Another important instrument of Magyarization seemed to be the administrative machinery, especially the local administration of the counties. Instead of rebuilding the former organs of the feudal self-government of the counties into those of popular self-government (as the founders of the Nationality Law had imagined) in which, without hurting the unity of the state, the cultural and administrative needs of the nationalities could have been easily satisfied, they became more and more monopolistic positions of the landed nobility and of the elements attached to it, a kind of a nursery of the gentry in which those members of this class who were unfit for economic or other professions, found elegant and secure jobs. This tendency of the ruling classes to secure for themselves all the more influential offices in the state and in the local administration became a chief factor in the growing intensity of the nationality struggles because this effort, as it has been already emphasized in another connection, was accompanied by the ideology that the middle class of the nationalities is traitor to the country, is infiltrated with Pan-Slavistic and Daco-Rumanian ideas and, therefore, must be kept away from the more important offices and should be employed only in the lowest grades of administration. As a matter of fact this doctrine was applied with the utmost lack of consideration, and there was not the slightest possibility of a social and moral penetration between the Magyar ruling class and the middle class of the nationalities. Only some few renegades of the nationalities were accepted by fashionable society which fomented even more the exasperation of their self-conscious elements. The Jew in the Middle Ages could not have lived more in isolation in their ghettos than the middle class of the nationalities in the capitals of the counties. Louis Mocsáry regarded this situation with despair because he foresaw its outcome quite accurately. At the end of the eighties of the last century he made a calculation according to which out of 9,541 officials employed in the more important branches only 199 were Rumanians, a fact upon which he made the following comment: "Of the officials just quoted only 2 per cent are Rumanian whereas the Rumanians constitute 20 per cent of the total population and even these 2 per cent are

employed in the lowest grades. . . ."<sup>23</sup> This ratio was even more disadvantageous from the point of view of the weaker nationalities with the exception of the Saxons of Transylvania who were utilized by the government as suitable allies against the Rumanian masses. The cause of this fact must be sought in the economic and cultural significance of the Transylvanian Saxons which surpassed not only the Rumanian average but in some respects also that of the Magyars.

This administrative monopoly of the Magyar ruling class made the state seemingly unilingual, but behind this uniformity of language was lurking the backward cultural state of the masses and the exacerbation of the middle class of the nationalities. This latter class, in order to get its livelihood, sought employment in the establishment of a network of financial institutions, introducing a fanatically chauvinistic spirit into a kind of economic activity which anywhere else foments rather international feeling. The situation was further envenomed by the spirit of this "national administration" the exponents of which, as has already been shown, regarded themselves not as public servants, but rather as the masters of the people by the right of conquest. The whole population of the country, not only the nationalities but the Magyar peasants and workers also were surrendered to the arbitrary will and corruption of this administration. But whereas these administrative abuses were represented by the Magyar people as social evils, the nationalities regarded them as proofs of Magyar oppression. Nothing could be more detrimental from the point of view of a rightly understood Hungarian state ideal than this exclusive Magyar rule.

But even more pernicious than the brutality and corruption of the system was its total misunderstanding of the popular currents and aspirations. The oligarchic ruling class had not the least interest in coming into closer contact with the real or imaginary needs of the people. Only under such an administration could have occurred, for example, the terrible massacre of Csernova in 1906 when it tried to force the meek population of this small Slovak village to abandon its cherished priest (the popular Slovak leader, Hlinka) and to compel its new church to be dedicated by two unknown clergymen. The people resisted, whereupon the gendarmerie, held in anticipation, began to shoot, causing the death of fifteen and the more or less serious wounding of sixty.

As a matter of fact this cultural and administrative policy could be carried on only with the help of that antiquated and corrupt electoral system which we have already described in a previous chapter. The chief evil of this system was not so much the small number of the

<sup>23</sup> In his pamphlet, *Some Words on the Nationality Problem* (Budapest, 1886). In Hungarian. This just and brave man adduced many other important facts in order to convince his compatriots and his party of the extreme danger of the situation.



voters, not even the excessive gerrymandering to the detriment of the nationalities and of the Magyar small peasantry who favored the traditions of Kossuth. (The so-called "Democratic Circles" of the Magyar peasantry continuing the traditions of Louis Kossuth and urging the distribution of the big landed estates were ferociously suppressed immediately after the establishment of the Compromise.) That which made this electoral system according to the judgment of Rudolf Kjellén "the most reactionary system of Europe," and Hungarian electoral corruption according to the statement of Joseph Redlich "unique in Europe,"<sup>24</sup> was the fact that even this restricted and artificial arrangement was not carried out in a fair way but was falsified by pressure and violence for which the ignominious institution of "public voting" gave ample occasion. Very often public voting was not even employed, but the electorate was simply kept away from the polls by *vis major* artificially created. Cases occurred when bridges were destroyed or declared impassable in order to compel the voters of the opposition parties to make a long detour on foot; when all the horses in remote villages were put under veterinarian control by false pretext in order to check the transportation of the electorate; when the main roads of the district were reserved exclusively for the use of the governmental party, whereas the opposition was driven to use side roads in very poor condition because of bad weather; when the electors of the opposition were exposed for the whole day of election to rain or snow in order to persuade them to abandon their attempts to vote or to vote for the candidate of the government.

These administrative chicaneries were supplemented by an intricate system of corruption, by regaling the electorate with eating and drinking, by intoxicating them with alcohol, by buying their votes in open market, by promising them governmental jobs or by menacing them with their withdrawal, by a sudden execution of the arrears in taxes, and by giving abrupt notice of withdrawal of their bank loans. But generally even these procedures did not suffice to break the will of the electorate. In such cases the joint army of the monarchy was utilized, without scruple, to curb the renitent masses. For instance on the occasion of the last general elections before the collapse (1910), we witnessed such a concentration of the army that it gave foreign observers the impression of a general mobilization. In spite of the fact that there were in those times 120 battalions of infantry and 72 squadrons of cavalry in Hungary (not counting the national *Honvéd*-formations) large masses of troops were imported from lower Austria, Styria, and Moravia. The opposition accused the government of having employed troops in 380 out of the 413 constituencies of Hungary.

<sup>24</sup> It is questionable, however, whether after the terrible experiences of the post-war period these distinguished authors would uphold their statements without further qualifications.

As an answer to this criticism, an official statement was issued declaring that the calculation of the opposition press was an erroneous one and "only" 194 battalions of infantry and 114 squadrons of artillery were used "to maintain public order." Even the more far-sighted leaders of the army were, as has already been emphasized, deeply alarmed by this procedure because they foresaw that it would augment the centrifugal tendencies in the monarchy. It became a favorite topic of foreign newspapers to describe the Hungarian electoral atrocities. These foreign observers, however, did not see that the method of intimidation of the electorate was not only applied against the nationalities but that the same practices were in use with equal ruthlessness and unscrupulousness also against the Magyar masses who opposed the Dualistic System or tried to break the monopolies of the large estates. This will explain the widely spread Magyar proverb: "Politics is the roguish trick of the gentlemen."

This system restricted more and more the participation of the nationalities in the legislation of the country. For instance in 1887 in consequence of the electoral atrocities the two and a half millions of the Hungarian-Rumanians were only represented by one single deputy, by a former general of the joint army, Trajan Doda, but even he resigned with a declaration that he was incapable of defending the interests of his nation alone against more than 400 deputies. And as he expressed himself in passionate language in his resignation, he was brought before a tribunal which condemned him to two years in prison. Also the Slovak deputies were continually persecuted because of their "seditious behavior." In 1894 the Rumanian National Party, the only political organization of the Rumanian people, was dissolved as "unconstitutional" by an administrative act of the government.

These few facts and instances will sufficiently characterize the whole electoral system and explain how it was possible that there was not a single representative of the working-classes and of the landless peasantry (the great majority of the country) in the pre-war Hungarian parliament and that there were only 8 Rumanians and Slovaks out of a total membership of 413 in a country in which only 54 per cent of the inhabitants spoke Magyar as their mother-tongue. (We can omit in this respect the Saxon deputies of Transylvania because they belonged always to the inventory stock of the government.) But even these few representatives of the nationalities did not have a fair opportunity to express the aspirations of their peoples. It was a custom in the Hungarian parliament to shout down these men whenever they dared to denounce their national offenses. They were simply treated as traitors to the country. In this manner there was no opportunity for the nationalities to express their grievances; not even in the press, because the crime called "instigation to national hatred" gave sufficient opportunity to the juries, recruited exclusively from

the Magyar speaking population, to send to prison the writers of the nationalities who attacked the policy of Magyarization. Concerning these persecutions the statistical figures, shown in Table XV, were gathered by the nationalities relative to the period 1886–1908.

TABLE XV  
CONDEMNATIONS

	Cases	Years	Months	Days	Fine (in Crowns)
Slovaks, 1896–1908.....	560	91	7	26	42,000
Rumanians, 1886–1908.....	353	131	10	26	93,000
Germans, 1898–1903.....	14	2	10	10	7,000
Ruthenians, 1904.....	7	5	.....	.....	2,000
Serbs, 1898–1906.....	4	1	1	.....	2,000

See for detail: Scotus Viator (R. W. Seton-Watson), *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London, 1908), pp. 441–66.

At this juncture it must be emphasized very strongly that the doctrine according to which the nationalities must be excluded from parliament and the doctrine that the Magyar State was incompatible with a truly democratic system of representation were not only the outbursts of demagogic passion fomented by the jingo press and by politicians eager to become members of parliament, but were the central dogma of all the responsible Magyar statesmen of the last generation before the collapse. In this connection Michael Károlyi who knew the leading men more intimately perhaps than any other contemporary (it was often stated that Hungarian political life was almost exclusively directed by three or four leading counts and their family clique; by the Tiszas, Andrássys, Apponyis, and Károlyis) and who until the War shared their nationality bias, narrates the following interesting observations in his memoirs which characterize the situation better than any abstract considerations:

In 1910, when I was still under the influence of Tisza's impassioned reasoning, . . . he once expounded to me his contention that first of all the non-Magyar half of the twenty million Hungarian citizens had to be Magyarized, and that only when that had been accomplished would it be possible to consider democracy for Hungary. . . . Julius Andrassy and Albert Apponyi held precisely the same views as Tisza on the question of the nationalities. But Tisza was more consistent than they. He scouted the idea of democracy. Andrassy and Apponyi flirted with it. . . . Apponyi imagined that the country could be cut into two parts like a cake: into Magyar and non-Magyar districts. He would have accorded to the Magyars, in theory at any rate, the very rights which he flatly refused the non-Magyars. On this point, for all his sensitive and delicate tact, he had lost the sense of what might be reasonably advocated in public and what could not; in his speeches he made no attempt to conceal his intention to rob half the population of the country of their national rights. . . .<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 67–69.

There were also other methods which were applied in order to build up a unitary Magyar state. Such were: the Magyarization of village names even in regions where there was practically no Magyar-speaking population; the Magyarization of family names which was in many cases the expression of a sincere loyalty but later it was extended by governmental pressure in order to manifest the Magyar character of the state before foreign public opinion; Magyar agricultural colonization in the midst of compact nationality settlements which had naturally no other result than the assimilation of these Magyar islets in the sea of the nationalities; the distribution of Magyar nobility which had a great prestige value, especially among those who tried to be accepted by the gentry. But a greater and more dangerous effect than these petty means had the so-called "Magyar Cultural Associations." Such associations were sorely needed in the country, indeed, because the Magyar people were terribly diminished by tuberculosis and emigration, the infant mortality was very high, and the illiteracy of many regions made a healthy cultural life impossible. The promoters of these associations, however, did not care for the cultural elevation of the Magyar masses but their aim was the quick Magyarization of the Rumanians, Slovaks, Germans, and Serbs. And they tried to obtain this purpose not so much by cultural means, by the establishment of libraries, museums, hospitals, dispensaries, better means of communication, industrialization of the country, or by the distribution of scholarships; but they were rather satisfied by the arranging of noisy banquets, denouncing on every occasion the treasons of the nationalities, and by instigating the government and the counties to apply more efficient and energetic means of Magyarization. Of course the only result of this "cultural activity" was the establishment of certain sinecures for the members of the privileged classes and the heightening of the exasperation of the nationalities which established their own cultural associations, tried to develop the national consciousness of their peasant masses, and opened their hearts and ears to hidden irredentist propaganda.

If we take into account all these methods and instruments of Magyarization, we can understand that even a scholar so friendly to the Magyars and so sincere an admirer of the greatness of Francis Deák and Joseph Eötvös, as Joseph Redlich, wrote the following destructive judgment concerning this policy:

In the whole history of the nineteenth century—omitting the oppressions of the Poles by the Russians—there was scarcely a second example of such a comprehensive and premeditated denial and annihilation of all legal enactments and procedures concerning the majority of the total population of the country, disregarding the political rights and privileges accorded by

law by the Magyars to the nationalities, than that carried on by the Magyar upper classes and rulers of the country since 1867, against all their citizens of a foreign tongue and culture.<sup>26</sup>

This statement of the eminent scholar, however, needs certain qualifications. Before all there was a certain equality in the system. In the social and administrative field the same feudal methods were applied, as already mentioned, against the Magyar landless peasantry and the whole Magyar proletariat. And without justifying at all the Magyar manners against the nationalities I would say in fairness that they never reached the brutality of the English against the Irish or that of the Prussians against the Poles. Besides, the formal injustice was considerably alleviated by the indolence and inertia of Magyar administration. And what is still more important, the pressure of the whole system was felt far more by the small strata of the intelligentsia of the nationalities than by the bulk of the population which in its backward cultural state did not fully realize the importance of the issues. Finally, it must be emphasized that in many districts the Magyar nobility and their assimilated elements spoke to a certain extent the language of the people and therefore the Magyar administration pressed less heavily on the daily life of the peasant masses.

#### F. MAGYAR CURRENTS AGAINST MAGYARIZATION

In this connection a fact of great importance, already alluded to, must be emphasized which had a considerable rôle not only in the Magyar problem but in all cases where a fanatical nationalism tried to assimilate the racial minorities. The process delineated above did not manifest itself at all in the consciousness of Magyar public opinion as a forceful oppression. On the contrary, the majority of those who applied this system and the bourgeois and intellectual circles were deeply convinced that in Hungary there was no nationality persecution, but that the Magyar nation had accorded so many liberties and privileges to those "inferior" peoples with which it lived that its liberalism was unparalleled in history. At the same time it was regarded as an unheard of ingratitude that these second-rank peoples rewarded this generosity by accusations and calumnies inciting foreign public opinion against the Magyar nation. This public opinion was to a large extent a *bona fide* conviction, as a result of the Magyar civic education and press propaganda not counterbalanced by any other influences. The more cultured and more highly politically trained circles of the Magyars, as already mentioned, were in no contact with the intelligentsia of the nationalities. They had not the slightest idea of their points of view and aspirations, even when they lived in the

<sup>26</sup> *Das Österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem*, II, 290.

same town with them. They never observed the realities of daily life but knew only the commentaries announced by the chauvinistic politicians, publicists, and teachers concerning them. Now according to these commentaries the nationalities had an excellent situation in Hungary, and if they were still complaining, it could be only the result of some foreign plots or irridentic agitation. Anyone was called Pan-Slav or Daco-Rumanian who dared to criticize the Hungarian conditions, especially the electoral and the administrative systems. Even less was sufficient to involve anyone in the suspicion of high treason. I remember that in the fashionable Magyar society of a Slovak county I heard on one occasion the following remark: "It is unbearable with what openness and impertinence these Pan-Slavs have begun to behave themselves. Today, for instance, I was compelled to travel in a first-class compartment with five Pan-Slavs who did not even hide what they were." Inquiring about the circumstances of this terrifying experience, I was informed that those gentlemen conversed with each other in the Slovak tongue and from this fact the Magyar observer drew the conclusion that they were Pan-Slavs because no gentleman would speak Slovak. Similarly a Slovak or Rumanian song or the bearing of the popular colors by the people could arouse grave suspicions of international complications in some regions excited by national struggles.

If such was the attitude of the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie, we can imagine how this problem was visualized by the so-called "historical classes" during the decades of this policy of assimilation. Among these and the masses of nationality, there was such a feeling of historical and social distance that even the idea of the oppression of the nationalities was absurd. John Stuart Mill once made the keen observation that true morality is possible only between equals. This statement is even more true concerning political morality because men feel far less those injustices which are the results of political means. There are many people who would be incapable of stealing or of attacking someone on the street. But this same man will settle political monopolies detrimental to the public interest or let the gendarmerie shoot into masses exasperated by a policy of exploitation. The inherited feudal attitude, the right of conquest, the dogma of "we are here masters and we will remain masters" made an equitable discussion of the nationality problem in these circles impossible. National oppression could not even exist on the basis of historical right. Magyar domination was a command of Destiny. Only a traitor of the country could protest against it.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> That was the real attitude of the system which often even foreign observers of first rank misunderstand. So, for instance, Louis Eisenmann, one of the most astute students of the problem of the dual monarchy expressed recently the opinion that the effort of the Magyarization was not sincere, but was only an endeavor to impede the cultural and moral evolution of the non-Magyar people. [See his re-

There were only very few who realized the impossibility of such a policy of assimilation and who perceived that the "Magyar national state" remained a pure fiction, a sheer façade which could be maintained only on the basis of the cultural backwardness of the masses and of an oligarchical absolutism. Perhaps nobody saw these truths more clearly than Louis Mocsáry, the last guardian of the Kossuth traditions in the Party of Independence, emphasizing the fact that the country would never be capable of securing its independence from Austria as long as the Habsburgs could continue the old recipe of 1849, mobilizing the nationalities against the Magyar efforts. In a parliamentary speech of 1887 he said the following:

The Magyarization of Hungary is a utopian idea and only demonstrates that the Magyar cannot acquiesce in the thought that there are citizens of another tongue in this country because he believes that a good patriot of the fatherland can be only a man who speaks Magyar. That is a fatal error. . . . It seems to me that the government does not regard as its proper task the checking of chauvinism in its wrong and aimless rampages but it fosters it rather by its complacency. This attitude gives rise to the surmise that all is allowed for the propagation of Magyarization, that the aim sanctifies the means, that one can acquire by such deeds immortal merits. . . . I do not think that such should be the task of the government but rather a pure objectivity on behalf of the nationalities. . . . The government should never forget that it governs a country of many tongues, that it should be equally a government of the Magyars, of the Slavs, and of the Rumanians, that the country is not a "cultural association" but that there are living citizens of various nationalities with whom not only the burdens but also the right should be divided in equal ratio.

In many other utterances and writings he emphasized the same point of view, denouncing the nationality policy of the country as a system of "unfortunate hallucinations." And nothing demonstrates more clearly the terrible growth of Magyar chauvinism than the fact that this man of a brilliant capacity, noble character, and complete financial independence, and what counted more in Hungary, belonging to the oldest nobility in the country, remained entirely isolated in Hungarian public life and was expelled by his own party, usurping the name of Kossuth.<sup>28</sup> This result appears even more strange when one knows that Kossuth did not cease to maintain his policy of compromise toward the nationalities. He denounced the policy of Mag-

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markable essay, *La Hongrie Contemporaine, 1867-1918* (Paris, 1921), p. 152]. This ultra-Machiavellian point of view seems to me erroneous. The truth is that the desire for Magyarization, the aspiration for a united nation state was backed by an enthusiastic and sincere public opinion and it was the *only* "moral force" of the whole system. That was the case, even in the mass of the party of Tisza, though naturally, its feudal elements were more interested in "domination" than "assimilation."

<sup>28</sup> On one occasion when he finished his speech in favor of the nationalities, a member of his own party shouted, wildly applauded by the majority, "And now let us open the windows!"

yarization as an impossibility and when Mocsáry paid a visit to him in his exile, the great statesman flushed with indignation when his guest mentioned the nationality policy in Hungary.<sup>29</sup>

After the political retirement of Mocsáry, Magyar nationalism rolled on without any serious check. At the beginning of the present century the spirit of an intolerant jingoism invaded even the most conservative circles of society which in other countries tried to mitigate social and political conflicts.<sup>30</sup> Only Julius Justh, a strong and noble man, a convinced follower of Kossuth and for a short period the speaker of the House, tried to soften and counterbalance the spirit of growing chauvinism whose danger for the cause of Independence he thoroughly realized. Beside him a very small group of the Hungarian Socialists and the Sociological Society of Budapest (the so-called "Magyar Fabians") acknowledged the fatal gravity of the nationality problem and tried to draw the attention of the country to its dangers lest it would not be solved in the spirit of justice and equity. This supreme aim was before the eyes of the writer of this book when, in the two decades of the present century, he published many treatises and a comprehensive book concerning the problem of nationality in Europe and particularly in Hungary. He tried to demonstrate that the experiences of the forcible assimilation in Hungary corroborated completely those made by Bernard Shaw concerning the English-Irish, by Hugo Ganz concerning the German-Polish, and by Johannes Tiedje concerning the German-Danish nationality struggles. All these experiences had convincingly demonstrated, both in Hungary and in the foreign countries the following sociological generalizations:

1. The policy of a forceful assimilation leads in the oppressed people to the strengthening of its own national feelings and aspirations. Whereas the patriotism of the ruling class becomes more and more a jingoism, void of any constructive content, in the persecuted nationalities, there arises a current of a sincere and self-sacrificing patriotism.

2. The policy of forceful assimilation demoralizes the ruling nation, while it elevates both intellectually and morally the better elements of the oppressed nationalities. It is an extremely dangerous moral attitude to shoot from well-guarded positions, protected by the whole state power, on unarmed, poorly equipped masses. It is inevi-

<sup>29</sup> *The Balance Sheet of the Dualistic System*, p. 216.

<sup>30</sup> In this regard, the following highly characteristic little episode is narrated by Joseph Kristóffy (former minister of the Interior and the man who tried to introduce universal suffrage into Hungary): On one occasion he was walking with Alexander Dessewffy, bishop of Csanád and member of the House of Lords, through the latter's garden discussing the problem of suffrage. Dessewffy asserted that "there does not exist a problem of nationality in Hungary," and, menacing with his cane he shouted that not a single nationality deputy would be allowed to enter into the Hungarian parliament. When such was the attitude of the *grands seigneurs* we can imagine how chauvinistic the stump oratory was!



table that a moral brutalization should befall those who continue this policy. A psychosis of the battue will soon follow. At the same time the policy of the forcible assimilation has the effect of a wedge on the moral standard of the oppressed: it debases even more the worthless elements but it heightens the morally healthy.

3. The policy of forcible assimilation results in the fact that the solidarity of the oppressed nationality will conquer all class divisions because it cannot realize other problems than those of its racial oppression. This retards economic and social progress.

4. The linguistic results of the policy of forcible assimilation, in every case where the work of the schools is not protected by the real atmosphere of economic and social life, are very poor and lower the general standard of culture.

5. The policy of forcible assimilation damages the general culture not only by the anti-pedagogic enforcement of the linguistic instruction in a foreign tongue but also by its method of making the schools a kind of a chauvinistic nursery. This nationalistic mechanical drill spoils the intellectual elasticity of the souls of the children.

6. The forcible assimilation impedes not only the economic and cultural progress of the oppressed nationality but, at the same time, that of the whole country.

7. The forcible assimilation makes a real assimilation in feelings and interests impossible. The natural assimilative forces of a higher culture become bankrupt in the face of those repulsive tendencies which the anti-economic means of violence arouse. All real assimilation in modern times can be based only on the spontaneous exchange of spiritual and economic values. This exchange is uprooted by the policy of forcible assimilation.

I endeavored to prove these propositions by facts from the history of the nationality struggles in Europe and finally submitted the following, almost mathematical calculation to the Magyar chauvinists. I so wrote in 1912:

. . . . Behold only the experiences of foreign countries, 52 million Germans were incapable in spite of their colossal military and economic supremacy of assimilating by force 3 million Poles, 210 thousand French, and 160 thousand Danes; 42 million English, in spite of their world domination, were incapable of overcoming 3 million Irish and they apply now toward them a method of complete liberalism; the Russian colossus with its 90 million Great Russians stands impotent against 7 million Poles, 3 million Germans, and as many Armenians, nay even against 5 million Jews. Looking upon these facts who could be so naïve or silly as to think that 9 million Magyars could assimilate by forceful means the other half of the country, 9 million Magyars saturated with half-assimilated elements, in constant conflict with the economic and political supremacy of a colonizing Austria? And they are faced not by small nationality diasporas but there live as many or more Germans, Slovaks, and Rumanians in Hungary as

Denmark, Alsace-Lorraine, Greece, Norway, and Serbia have inhabitants. Is it not money, etc. . . . thrown away, every million which we devote to the Magyarization of the nationalities with the only result that we arouse hatred and distrust against us utilizable by Austria for the promotion of her antagonistic interests? And if the English world-capitalism could regard apathetically for a long time the misery of Ireland, the cultural backwardness of the Celtic fringe of Wales and Scotland, can poor Hungary suffer the impeded economic and cultural life, the terrible atrophy of production and consumption of half of the country? If the policy would be really the carrying out of the principle of Bentham, this whole problem could in half an hour be taken from the hands of crude and impotent assimilation by force.<sup>31</sup>

But I knew very well that the Benthamite principle had nothing to do with the Magyar nationality policy and such and analogous facts as these had the least effect on the ruling political classes. Progressive Hungary unfortunately never had a word in the directions of the affairs of the country. And when finally, in the days of the catastrophe, in November, 1918, I had the opportunity of announcing to the Rumanian leaders in Arad my old policy as the platform of the government of Count Károlyi and to offer them an honest scheme of national autonomy, it was too late: they preferred to join Rumania rather than to accept a belated compromise.<sup>32</sup> Only in the younger generation and in the ranks of the proletariat did there begin to dawn a better conception. At the same time Andrew Ady, the greatest poet of the period before the collapse and a real national prophet, admonished his people with the great power of his genius that they were on the wrong track which must lead to a new Mohács, a new catastrophe. In many writings and poems he preached accordance and harmony with the nationalities and his powerful muse impressed large strata of the intelligentsia with a new vision. Let me quote one of his mighty rhymes in a pale translation:

Why out of a thousand stiffened desires  
Doesn't there arise a solid will?  
Yet Magyar, Wallach, and Slav sorrow  
Remains always the same sorrow. . . .

Yet our disgrace, our grief and pain  
Are since a thousand years akin  
Why do we not meet, roaring,  
On the barricades of the Spirit?

<sup>31</sup> *The Evolution of the Nation-States*, pp. 486-92.

<sup>32</sup> To which Colonel Glaise-Horstenau, a great admirer of Tisza and hater of Károlyi, remarks: "Had Tisza offered them the same thing two years before—full autonomy in the frame of an Eastern Switzerland—the thought would probably have fallen on propitious ground. Now it was too late. . . ." I think the Colonel errs. The personality of Tisza was so unpopular with the Rumanian people and the rigidity of his feudal attitude was so well known, that nobody would have believed in the sincerity of his promises.

Similar messages were sounded by some impartial and acute foreign observers. So among others Otto Bauer, the Austrian Socialist leader already quoted, answering a questionnaire which I submitted in 1908 to several leading intellectuals of Europe when Count Julius Andrassy introduced his new electoral bill trying to paralyze the Magyar agrarian proletariat and the non-Magyar voters by a system of plural votes and open ballot, thus expressed the opinion that the continuance of the exclusion of the non-Magyar nationalities from political participation

will push Hungary into a course which will lead inevitably toward political catastrophies. . . . The rise of the working-classes and of the nationalities will be accomplished in any case; but if the road of a calm parliamentary evolution will be closed, then it will come to the general strike of the industrial workers, to the revolts of the landed proletariat, and to irredentistic agitations. Such an evolution will become, for the Hungarian state more dangerous since the state constitutions of Eastern Europe are by no means so rigid as the nationally homogeneous states of the West. . . . If an inevitable social and national process will be turned aside from a peaceful road into revolutionary tracks, then these movements will enter into a many-sided and reciprocal action with those upheavals which will happen on the stage of the surrounding countries. . . . Then, in the coming political catastrophes which the infatuation of the ruling class conjures up in Hungary, nothing less will be at stake than the very existence of the Hungarian State.<sup>33</sup>

But the leading classes of the country followed the old way. Immediately before the World War, Count Stephen Bethlen, the present Hungarian Premier, wrote a pamphlet in which he advocated a policy against the Rumanians of Transylvania, analogous to that which was applied in Posen by the Prussians against the landed property of the Poles.<sup>34</sup> And when under the pressure of circumstances the crown urged the extension of the suffrage, the three drafts of a bill, prepared successively by Count Andrassy, Count Tisza, and Dr. Vázsonyi (the last already during the World War) all started from the axiom that Magyar supremacy must be maintained in the old artificial way and the nationalities must be further restricted by the old procedures.

The nation ran toward disaster and the ghost of the nationality problem, which already in 1848 defeated Hungary and led toward Világos, now in the World War raised its head again and drove the country toward Trianon.

<sup>33</sup> In *La Hongrie Contemporaine et le Suffrage Universel*, pp. 229-30.

<sup>34</sup> *Magyar Landed Property Policy in Transylvania* (Budapest, 1913). In Hungarian.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE AUSTRIAN AND THE HUNGARIAN SYSTEM

This very summary parallel between the chief tendencies of the Austrian and Hungarian nationality policy will suffice to make the reader understand the basic and unbridgeable antithesis of the two systems.

Though, as we saw, the old feudal structure survived in Austria too and manifested its influence conspicuously in the more backward parts of the country, nevertheless the general character of life became more and more bourgeois-like in the Austrian part of the monarchy and the control of the great popular parties had a growing influence. Even the most casual observer could realize very easily the great change in the inner and outer character of social life when he passed the Austrian frontier and entered Hungary. Putting in a single formula the whole difference, I would say that Austrian feudalism became more and more bureaucratized whereas Magyar bureaucracy became more and more feudalized. City life had a decisive influence on Austria, while in Hungary the village character of the country continued. And this village character was substantially colored by the masses of a wretched, uncultured, agricultural proletariat. Even the great urban agglomerations, especially in the Magyar plains, retained this distinctly peasant character. For instance, in 1912, in sixteen important provincial towns there was not a single public bath, a situation the more amazing as there were practically no private baths in the single apartments. The intellectual consumption was of a similarly low level. Charles Keleti, a noted Hungarian statistician, came to the conclusion that under normally healthy conditions—according to their financial possibilities—at least 100,000 men should buy and read books in Hungary whereas even popular works seldom reached a circulation of 2,000 to 3,000 copies, while a scientific book had 1,000. On the basis of such and similar facts a careful Hungarian observer, Dr. Robert Braun, who made a comparison between the Austrian and the Hungarian cultural structure, came to the conclusion that the relative cultural power of the Hungarian cities in the second decade of the present century was not greater than that of the Austrians about 1880.<sup>1</sup>

This contrast becomes even more striking if we compare the composition of the Austrian and the Magyar Parliament. The Austrian

<sup>1</sup> "A Parallel Between the Austrian and the Hungarian Inner Policy," in the review, the *Huszadik Század*, September-October, 1917. In Hungarian.

parliament, based on universal, equal, and secret ballot, was a tolerably true expression of the relative force of the various nations.

Among the chief parties of the Austrian parliament the seats were divided in 1911 as shown in Table XVI.

On the other hand in the Hungarian parliament in 1910 there were as already mentioned 405 deputies belonging to the Magyar parties and only 8 deputies (3 Slovaks and 5 Rumanians) belonging to the nationalities; whereas, if the nationalities had been represented according to their ratio in the population, 215 Magyar and 198 non-Magyar deputies would have been seated in the Hungarian parliament (Croatia-Slavonia excluded). But if we assume a cultural and economic advantage of 100 per cent in favor of the Magyars and if we further assume that the Magyars would have conquered in consequence of this supremacy 100 mandates more than corresponded to

TABLE XVI

Parties	Mandates
German . . . . .	185
Czech . . . . .	82
Polish . . . . .	71
Jugo-Slavs . . . . .	37
Ruthenians . . . . .	30
Italians . . . . .	16
Rumanians . . . . .	5
Socialists . . . . .	81
Other smaller groups . . . . .	9
Total . . . . .	516

their numerical strength (manifestly a very improbable assumption), even in this case beside the 315 Magyar deputies there should have been 98 non-Magyar deputies in the Hungarian Parliament!

This difference in the social and political structure makes us understand that, whereas the nationalities of Austria progressed year by year on the road of their national culture, the nationalities of Hungary showed rather an opposite tendency and the strongest Hungarian nationality was in its political and public life weaker than the weakest of the Austrian nationalities. So for instance 3 million Hungarian-Rumanians sent to the Hungarian parliament as many deputies as less than 300 thousand Austro-Rumanians sent into the Austrian but with the difference, however, that whereas the Rumanians were almost outcasts in the former, it became a custom in the latter to retain one of the vice-presidencies for the Rumanian club.

In the cultural fields we find this same glaring contrast. The Hungarian writer just mentioned compared the cultural situation of the strongest of the Hungarian nationalities, of the Rumanians (2,948,000) with that of one of the weakest Austrian nationalities, the Slovenians (1,250,000), on the basis of the latest statistical figures before

the war. His chief results were as follows: the number of university students were 414 Rumanians, and 375 Slovenians; the number of polytechnical students were 54 Rumanian, and 141 Slovenian; the number of middle schools were 1 Slovenian, and 7 Slovenian-German, giving a total of 8; 5 Rumanian (2 of them with lower classes), and 2 Rumanian-Magyar, totaling 7; the number of the students in middle schools were 4,164 Rumanian, and 3,827 Slovenian; the number of elementary schools were 2,257 Rumanian with 227,234 students, and 995 Slovenian with 167,915 students; the number of newspapers were 39 Rumanian, and 101 Slovenian; the number of dailies were 2 Rumanian, and 5 Slovenian; the number of literates were 830,809 (28 per cent) Rumanian, and 952,234 (76 per cent) Slovenian.

And whereas the Slovenians had a very intensive political and cultural life and the organs of local administration were mostly Slovenians, the political and cultural life of the Rumanians of Hungary was severely controlled and persecuted by the police, and the number of Rumanian officials compared with the Magyar employees was the following: in the state administration there were 135 Rumanians, and 8,124 Magyars; in the county administration there were 137 Rumanians, and 4,130 Magyars; in the city administration, 91 Rumanians, and 4,680 Magyars. This disproportionate participation becomes even more conspicuous when we know that the Rumanian officials occupied generally the lowest grades in administration.

If we compare the elementary education of the two countries (which is the most important from the point of view of the masses), we can generally say that it was an acknowledged principle in Austria that the peoples should be instructed in their maternal tongue from which there were only rare exceptions, as survivals of older conditions, whereas in Hungary there was a constant tendency, which became very much accentuated after the eighties of the last century, to enforce Magyar public instruction to the detriment of the languages of the nationalities. The results of this policy have been already explained.

Parallel with these cultural and political facts, the ideology of the public life was diametrically different in the two countries. The equality of all the nations was a political axiom in Austria, at least theoretically accepted, while the idea of the united Magyar national state and of the Magyar supremacy was the common dogma of all the Magyar parties, the questioning of which was equivalent to high treason. There was no official state language in Austria, the German had a certain hegemony only as far as the inner language of the central administration made a certain unification necessary. (*Innere Amtssprache.*) In Hungary the Magyar state language was enforced even in the smallest spheres of local administration. This antagonism found an almost symbolical expression in the common notes of the Austro-

Hungarian bank. Whereas on the Austrian side of these notes the inscriptions were made in the languages of all the peoples of Austria as coequals in the state, on the Hungarian side only Magyar inscriptions could be read. (And what is still more characteristic of the mental attitude of the two countries is that after the World War, when in consequence of the Peace Treaties, Austria became an almost exclusively German state and Hungary almost exclusively Magyar, the Austrian bank notes of today have only German inscriptions whereas the Magyar notes are printed not only in Magyar but also in the languages of all those nations which previously belonged to Hungary in order to emphasize the inalienable right of the Crown of St. Stephen to the "conquered territories.")

This fundamental contrast between the Austrian and Hungarian system made, as a matter of fact, a more intimate moral penetration between the two countries impossible. On the contrary, the more the nations of Austria progressed along the road of national self-determination, the greater was the contempt of the Magyar upper classes concerning this so-called "confused conglomerate of peoples." And what was still more dangerous for the future of the monarchy was that the more the nations of Austria grew in political and cultural power and the more they demanded the remolding of the dualistic, oligarchical Constitution into a new one satisfying the claims for national independence of the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs, the more vehement and exacerbated became the reaction of the Magyar ruling classes against these endeavors which menaced not only their political and administrative monopolies in the empire but, at the same time, their national supremacy in Hungary proper. Therefore, any serious effort for the reform of the Constitution broke down on the irresistible wall of the Magyar oligarchy. Even so late as 1917 when the menacing dissolution of the monarchy became manifest, Dr. Wekerle, the Hungarian premier, declared emphatically that the Hungarian parliament would not tolerate any plan for the federalization of the monarchy and the old frontiers of the crownlands must be maintained.

The German-Magyar hegemony, however, offended more and more the feeling of *Ebenbürtigkeit* ("of equal dignity") of the other nations, exactly to the extent to which their equality in actual life was established. For instance the Czechs could employ against the Magyar monopoly in constitutional life the following arguments: "On the basis of what right did the Magyars arrogate to themselves a monopolistic situation in the Constitution of the monarchy, when our industry surpasses conspicuously the Magyar; when we have practically no illiterates in contrast to the 31 per cent illiterate in Hungary; when in our Czech elementary schools we have as many pupils as they have in their Magyar schools; when we have in the Czech university of Prague 4,200 Czech students, that is, only 1,800 less than

are Magyars at Budapest University but at the same time we have 3,000 Czech students at our polytechnical schools at Prague and Brünn, that is, almost 800 more than the Magyars have at their polytechnical institution at Budapest; when the 1,500 Hungarian newspapers are confronted by 1,300 Czech; when the co-operative organization of the Czech peasants is far more democratic and efficient than that of the Magyars? Or do you oppose our equality on the basis of historical right? But your greatest men, Széchenyi and Kossuth themselves acknowledged that we have the same right of national independence as you have. . . .”

Such and similar facts began to attack the Dualistic Constitution, which lost more and more its basis in the economic and cultural conditions. Austria, however, menaced in its existence, could not rejuvenate itself because the Magyar upper classes in the possession of their “united national parliament” shouted a *noli tangere* against all plans of reform of the Constitution which would diminish their relative influence in the monarchy. Hungary was sufficiently powerful to force Austria to remain in the Procrustean bed of the Dualistic Constitution.

Therefore an impossible situation arose which could only have been transitorily maintained provided the two hegemonic nations, the German and Magyar, had stood in a close alliance with each other and the Magyars had established a tolerable compromise with the Croats. But just the opposite happened, there broke out a violent constitutional crisis between the two hegemonic nations and the Magyars came into a violent conflict with the Croats. The German-Magyar conflict manifested itself at the same time as one between the Magyar upper classes and the Crown because the Dualistic System was a compromise between these two factors of the Constitution. In this manner not only the unsolved national problems of a dozen peoples but also two grave constitutional conflicts pressed heavily upon the Habsburg monarchy. We must now turn to the analysis of these conflicts.



## CHAPTER V

### HUNGARY VERSUS AUSTRIA

As we have seen, the chief cause of the Dualistic System was the débâcle at Königgrätz and the longing of Habsburgs for revenge against triumphant Prussia. That is the reason why the new era inaugurated by Beust tried to appease Hungary at any price. Without a loyal and satisfied Hungary nothing could be undertaken for the restoration of Austrian hegemony. In order to achieve this aim the Emperor guaranteed the independence of Hungary in the spirit of the laws of 1848, restored the rule of the Magyar noble classes in the internal administration of their country, and delivered his former allies, the nationalities of Hungary, without any check or counterbalance to the will of the Magyar ruling classes. On the other hand the Dualistic Constitution, with the help of an artificial electoral system, secured the supremacy of the Germans in Austria who received at the same time, as a second gift of the Compromise of 1867, the "Constitution of December" on the basis of a parliamentarian government. As compensation for these concessions the German liberals accepted, though unwillingly, the Compromise which the Emperor concluded almost without their consultation with the Magyar ruling classes.

There can be no doubt that Austrian public opinion (not only the Slav but the German too) regarded the Dualistic Compromise with great dissatisfaction, and from the beginning serious voices arose which denounced the *Reichsteilungspakt* ("the Empire-Division Pact" as it was bitterly called) as shaking the very foundations of the monarchy. Later events demonstrated that this point of view was justified because the Compromise concealed in itself the germs of unavoidable crisis. The chief cause of this uncertain equilibrium was the fact that the new "constitutionalism" which the Compromise created, delivered the great majority of the peoples of the monarchy to the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy on the one hand and to the Magyar feudalism on the other. In both countries the system from the beginning was only workable on the basis of a very restricted and artificial electoral law which was combined in Austria with the application of the ill-famed "paragraph 14" of the Constitution (giving to the crown practically an absolute power in all issues which could not be settled by parliament) and in Hungary with administrative corruption and use of armed force in the face of electoral difficulties. But what made the situation even more unbearable was the fact that both the Germans and the Magyars became more and more resentful against the Compromise which was the very basis of their hegemony in spite

of its beneficent economic results for the ruling classes of both countries, and in spite of the opulent monopolies which these classes enjoyed in the administration of their countries and in the leadership of the monarchy. As a matter of fact antipathy grew from year to year against the Compromise and its maintenance faced graver and graver difficulties.

The cause of this strange phenomenon was in the first place a historical one. The Compromise was born out of the spirit of mutual distrust. It was the result of an embarrassing situation. The Emperor needed the Magyars for the realization of his anti-Prussian policy whereas Hungary tortured, dismembered, and weakened by the absolutistic régime needed a breathing period for the regeneration of its economic and political forces before the old struggle for independence could be resumed. The two contracting parties, therefore, were animated by just opposite desires. The Emperor tried to maintain as far as possible the unity of his empire in his army, in the direction of the foreign policy, and in the main economic issues, whereas Francis Deák tried to develop, as far as possible, the entire independence of the Magyar state. The point of view of Deák was the traditional Magyar principle which beyond the community of the crown, established by the Pragmatic Sanction, was not willing to accept any kind of a common empire, or a common state life, or a common government. The very words of "emperor," "empire," "joint government," or "common parliament" sounded almost like an insult to Hungarian public opinion. On the other hand the Emperor, too, had a vivid recollection of the "rebellions" of the Magyar nobility, of its "disloyalties," of its conspiracies with foreign powers and, therefore, his primary effort was to maintain his royal privileges intact in the matter of his army and the foreign policy of the country and to safeguard the unity of the empire in the most important issues.

Out of this mutual distrust and of this half conscious, half unconscious mental reservation, there was born a very vague, very uncertain, very loosely defined law in which both parties sought for formulations which would sustain their hidden point of view. The Hungarian Law of 1867, XII, put an end to the unity of the former absolutistic monarchy (which as we saw was never completely achieved) and established two distinct states. One, the historical Hungary (the dismembered parts of which were again reunited), the other, Austria proper, called by some Austrian patriots with bitter irony, the "anonymous Austria" which did not even have a distinct name but was generally mentioned as "the other countries of His Majesty" or "the kingdoms and countries represented in the Central Parliament (Reichsrat)." These two distinct states had a completely separate parliament, administration, and judiciary system. Even the common sovereign (in Austria called Emperor and in Hungary King) had often

a different title according to the different historical past of the two states. (For instance Emperor Charles VI in Austria was King Charles III in Hungary; Emperor Charles I in Austria was King Charles IV in Hungary, etc.) But in spite of this the two states assumed a certain unity from the point of view of international relations because the community of the army and of the diplomatic representation was acknowledged as a corollary of the unity determined by the Pragmatic Sanction. On the basis of this conception there were established three governments: two open and one hidden; one Austrian, one Hungarian, and one common, consisting of the three joint state departments, War, Foreign Affairs, and Finance (as far as the budget of the common administration was concerned). There was also, properly speaking, a need for three parliaments. Again two open and one concealed; one Austrian, one Hungarian, and the so-called "Delegations" which were committees sent out by the Austrian and the Hungarian parliament on the basis of parity for the discussion of the joint affairs. The situation was made even more complicated by the fact that though the community of the international, commercial, and custom relations as well as that of the state bank were not acknowledged as joint affairs emanating from the Pragmatic Sanction, nevertheless they were regarded as affairs which should be settled by a common accord and, therefore, periodically (generally every ten years) new compromises were made between the two governments in order to establish the common principles of their handling.

This constitutional construction, very complicated in itself, became confused by the loose stipulation of the law, already mentioned, in such a manner that even Hungarian jurists were debating for generations concerning the jural nature of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, whether it should be regarded as a "personal" or a "real" union between the two countries. As a matter of fact the Austrian and the Hungarian points of view diverged even more radically because important differences arose in the text of the Austrian and the Magyar law regulating the Compromise. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Austrian interpretation of the law saw the establishment of a common state power in the Compromise whereas the Magyar emphasized the absolute distinctness of the Hungarian state and the entirely transitory character of the joint affairs for the period in which the Pragmatic Sanction was in force. This uncertainty was still more aggravated by the traditional spirit of the Magyar ruling classes which, continuing the feudal spirit of the politics of *gravamina* and disregarding the economic, social, and international conditions of the Compromise, studied always with the ardor of an attorney the loose and contradictory expressions of the legal text from which they could extract and demonstrate all the theses which were in favor with their momentary standpoint. And whereas the founders of the Compromise,

Francis Deák and Count Julius Andrássy, remained loyal to the spirit of the Compromise and repudiated the idea of a purely "personal union" between the two countries and emphasized the necessity of a military and economic co-operation with the nations of Austria beyond the community of the person of the Monarch, the legal interpretation of the next generation made the discovery that the Compromise acknowledged the possibility of an independent Magyar army and that the Compromise was exclusively an act of the Hungarian nation and of the Crown and, therefore, could be changed in disregard of the will of the nations of Austria which should not be considered as contracting parties in the Dualistic Constitution.

The confusion of the situation was still more accentuated by the institution of the Delegations, already mentioned. It is quite evident that for the control and direction of the military and foreign policy of a great empire the necessity arose that all the nations could have discussed among themselves the most important problems of their political co-operation. But for this some kind of a central parliament would have been essential. As a matter of fact the Austrians at the beginning contemplated the institution of the Delegation from this point of view. This conception, however, broke down in consequence of the constitutional intransigence of the Magyars who would not even hear of a common state organ because they maintained the fiction that there was no common empire or super-state in the monarchy. To what hair-splitting argument this point of view was leading is almost comically shown by the following announcement of Count Goluchowski, a foreign minister of the monarchy, manifestly made under Magyar pressure in 1907:

I don't know a common state because such a common state does not exist. . . . But what I know is the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which on the basis of the Pragmatic Sanction, stands as an organic whole in relation to foreign countries, quite apart from the institutions which regulate the co-operation of the two states of the monarchy.

That this non-existing common state could exact at any moment millions of the treasure of their nations and could drive hundreds of thousands to the slaughtering bench in case of war, such considerations did not interest the high priests of this constitutional dogmatism. For them it was a matter of no importance that the military and foreign policy of the country should be directed by the real interests of all the nations concerned; but it was a very grave problem that the fiction of the absolute independence of the Hungarian state should be maintained. That was the reason why the two Delegations of the two parliaments were not allowed to discuss their common problems in a joint meeting, but were compelled to exchange only written messages; and if they could not agree, they met only for a common vote under the obligation of abstaining from any debate. It, there-

fore, entirely justified the ironical criticism pronounced by a German liberal deputy during the discussion of the Compromise bill in the Austrian parliament, when he said:

. . . . I cannot imagine a stranger spectacle from a parliamentary point of view than that which these Delegations offer. This project is capable of only one further improvement, namely, to propose an amendment that the Assembly should meet in the dark and then everything would go on easily and smoothly. . . . For an Assembly which meets in silence and votes in silence is nothing more than a voting machine. . . . As a matter of fact, this new political construction reminds me of a child's game, familiar to our youth, in which one makes his presence known by a low piping. . . .

Indeed, in this Assembly there could not be a serious control of the common affairs of the monarchy. Convoked only occasionally, the 60-60 delegates of the two parliaments constituted an artificial, aristocratic atmosphere easily controlled by the governments and the court. In the great majority of cases the Delegations constituted only a parliamentary show-window beyond which the will of the Crown and of his confidant, the foreign minister (who was at the same time the minister of the Imperial House) had practically no check at all. As a matter of fact public opinion was generally entirely apathetic concerning the debates on international relations, the same public opinion which was seized by a fit of paroxysm at news of an electoral scandal or the report of a scuffle in a university hall between students of various nationalities. There was scarcely a man besides the foreign minister and some of his intimate counselors who would have been interested in international relations. Nay, the politicians regarded these problems with a kind of holy terror because it was well known that the Emperor took these matters very seriously and anyone would lose his chances of becoming a state minister if he should dare to intrude into the private reservation of the Crown. On the other hand neither did the press have a serious foreign service but its reporters only trimmed up the official communications and information received from the *Ballhausplatz* (Foreign Office). A distinguished Austrian writer on foreign policy (one of those white ravens who studied seriously international relations) narrated to me that he was always the target of irony and was regarded as an incorrigible snob because he dared to have independent opinions on foreign problems. . . . Besides, the nations were so absorbed by the nationality struggles and the Socialists by the affairs of their own class that the political parties lived under a false perspective: they overestimated the significance of the domestic policy and underestimated in a quite disproportionate way that of the foreign policy. At the same time the attention of the Hungarian public opinion was entirely absorbed by the fight for the Magyar army and state bank.

Only in such a political atmosphere could it have happened that the World War was determined by the decision of five gentlemen without the least participation of the nations of the monarchy; that the very organ of foreign policy was convoked only in the fourth year of the war and, therefore, the war was conducted without any efficacious parliamentary control; that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was perhaps the only warring power in which even the most outstanding state ministers had no idea concerning the most important facts of the foreign policy. What kind of a constitutional control could have existed in a monarchy in which members of the cabinet themselves did not even surmise that Count Czernin announced as early as 1917 the position of the Central Powers as a hopeless one in a report addressed to the Emperor? The minister of finance of Austria during the war, Dr. Spitzmüller, wrote concerning it the following confession:

What should one say to the fact that we, state ministers of important departments, did not have the least idea of such a report? I learn only now in December, 1918, that in April, 1917, one of the Central Powers explained to another that things could not go on any longer and that an end must be made. This was not communicated at all to the minister of finance, to the minister of public alimentation, to the minister of commerce, to the minister of agriculture. . . . That is horrifying.<sup>1</sup>

The conception that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy did not form any real unity and, therefore, could not have any real common organs led sometimes to absurd conclusions. For instance the officials of the joint ministries were joint officials of the two countries but they could not be regarded either as officials of Austria or officials of Hungary nor those of Austria-Hungary because the Magyar doctrine repudiated even the allusion to a super-state. This doctrine was the source of practical complications too. When Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed, this unhappy province hung in the air from a constitutional point of view because it did not belong in reality either to Austria or to Hungary, but was only administered as by a legal fiction through the joint state department of finance. The historical right of the Hungarian Holy Crown to this province was theoretically acknowledged but it was regarded, as that of Dalmatia, as actually dormant. This constitutional subtlety, in the eyes of the Magyar nationalists a case of tremendous importance, was the more remarkable, almost mysterious, as the Magyar ruling classes did only lip-service to it because the very idea of a unification of these provinces with Croatia-Slavonia seemed to them an extreme danger, menacing by a Jugo-Slav integration the very foundations of the Dualistic Constitution.

Similar susceptibilities made the solution of the problem of the escutcheon of the monarchy impossible almost to the end of the Com-

<sup>1</sup> A destructive criticism of the situation may be found in Dr. Spitzmüller's, *Der Politische Zusammenbruch und die Anschlussfrage* (Wien, 1919).

promise. In the joint army the old Austrian eagle was applied but that emblem shocked the historical sensitiveness of the Magyars and led repeatedly to scandals and conflicts. On the other hand a new escutcheon could not be found because the Magyar point of view repudiated all state community. Only during the convulsions of the World War was a shrewd statesmanship able to settle the intricacies of the problem, and its solution is almost a symbolical expression of the fragile relations of the two countries.<sup>2</sup>

But what undermined and discredited the Dualistic Constitution finally was not so much the ambiguity of its jural construction as its economic arrangements, according to which the participation in the expenses of the joint budget (the percentage of the mutual contribution for the maintenance of the army and of the foreign administration), the so-called *Quota*, was discussed and determined periodically every ten years by the Delegations. Similarly the most important economic affairs which were regarded as matters of common interest to both states (custom regulation, international commercial treaties, and the Austro-Hungarian bank) were submitted to periodical regulations by the parliaments of the two states. If in the question of the *Quota* the Delegations could not agree, the controversy was decided by the Emperor-King.

This constitutional mechanism led to absurd results from the point of view of the monarchy. It was always uncertain how long Hungary would be inclined to maintain the common economic relations which were not acknowledged as obligations following from the Pragmatic Sanction but as purely matters of a provisional contract. There could be no doubt that from year to year Magyar public opinion was less disposed to continue these economic connections. In this manner every ten years the economic foundation of the monarchy was called into question, and with this the very existence of the empire. For in case of the dissolution of the customs union, the commercial policy, and the currency, the community of the army and of the diplomatic relations themselves would have lost their sense and possibility in consequence of the growing antagonism of economic interests. But not only the feeling of nervous incertitude aggravated the political atmosphere but whenever the *Quota* or other economic negotiations were

<sup>2</sup>The new escutcheon was a triple one. The Austrian and the Hungarian escutcheons stood beside each other but separate. Between these two, connecting their peripheries, stood a small escutcheon, that of the Imperial House. Under the escutcheons winds a ribbon on which the motto, borrowed from the Pragmatic Sanction: *Indivisibiliter ac inseperabiliter*. This ingenious construction tries to demonstrate that the two states were somehow connected but there was still no common state because the Crown on the Imperial escutcheon (in consequence of its smallness) was situated lower than the Crowns on the escutcheons of the respective states. In this manner the able author of this constitutional mystery saved the community of the Monarchy, the inviolability of the hereditary right of the Monarch, and the complete independence of Hungary.

renewed between the two countries, the two contracting parties stood always as unscrupulous brokers, each against the other. Both, in order to acquire more advantages in those economic controversies, agitated its whole press and all their economic organizations with a view to portraying its economic situation in the most gloomy and sinister colors imaginable and to make the other partner appear as a cruel Shylock. Instead of determining the ratio of the mutual contributions on the basis of constant objective criteria (for example the population, the results of taxation, and of the savings accounts, etc.) with the help of a pre-established measure, all such transactions were carried on by both partners in the spirit of a demagogic propaganda and left behind them a great amount of bitterness and distrust. Indeed this system of a *Monarchie auf Kündigung* (a "monarchy at short notice") as it was ironically called was perhaps more detrimental to the Dualistic Constitution than all its other weaknesses. The Austrian governments under the difficulties of the Compromise negotiations tried, by concessions given to the various nations, to save the stranded ship of the dualistic system whereas the Magyar Parliament in the feeling of its national unity could generally secure more advantages in the dualistic bargains. The Emperor, who had an instinctive horror of democracy and did not dare to shake the foundation of the system, tried to satisfy as far as possible the will of Budapest against Vienna, enfeebled by nationalistic struggles. Of course, from a Magyar point of view, his concessions were never adequate while from the Austrian point of view they were exaggerated and, therefore, his prestige and popularity was damaged from both sides. And when he decided the controversies concerning the Quota (according to the Compromise it was his duty to determine the Quota when the Delegations failed to agree) he appeared partial to one of the parties. It became a fashion in Austria talk of "the absolutism of the Magyar king against the Emperor of Austria."

Under such circumstances the schism between the two countries became deeper and deeper. Karl Renner, one of the keenest observers of the situation, announced the bankruptcy of the Compromise because it became a constitutional absurdity, being an *Organgemeinschaft ohne Willensgemeinschaft* ("a community of organs without a community of will"). Not only the Slavs hated the dualistic system but also the leaders of the German liberalism regarded it with growing distrust. Ten years after the conclusion of the Compromise, Heinrich Friedjung, the influential Austrian historian, wrote the following statement:

In all public localities and in every social circle the decay of the state is openly discussed and provinces are divided among the neighboring states. . . . This evil is due to the fact that we simply do not know to which



state we belong and to what principles we owe loyalty. . . . Are we at all Austrian citizens? The official terminology knows an Austria-Hungary but no Austria. . . .

On the other hand some Christian Socialists also began to attack bitterly the Compromise and denounced it in their popular demagogy as an alliance of Magyar feudalism with Jewish capitalism. And if the Germans, the chief usufructuaries of the dualistic system besides the Magyars, became so inimical to it, it is easy to imagine what the feelings of the Slavs were toward it, those Slavs who regarded the Compromise from the beginning as an attempt against their constitutional liberties and who remained the ardent followers of Palacký, who coined the very phrase "Dualism means Pan-Slavism."

Not only the Germans and the Slavs, but the Magyars too, who were regarded as the first beneficiaries of the Compromise, turned more and more from the achievements of Deák and Andrassy, nay they became the most accentuated of the centrifugal forces of the monarchy. The truth is that the Compromise never had a majority in Hungary. That the nationalities had no use for it, is quite evident as the dualistic system meant an exclusive Magyar domination in the country. But the Magyar masses too, the small peasantry and the bulk of the artisans combined with a large strata of the intelligentsia, opposed the new system from the beginning, largely on a historical and sentimental basis because they expected nothing good from Habsburg militarism and absolutism even though it now assumed a semi-constitutional form. Only the more wealthy elements of society, the big landed proprietors, the rich capitalists, the higher bureaucracy, and the leading staff of the intelligentsia acknowledged the Compromise as a historical necessity for the country. Professor Szekfü himself, the historian of the present Hungarian counter-revolution, a supporter of the Habsburgs, a naïve admirer of the German-Magyar supremacy and of the Compromise has demonstrated that the dualistic system was from the first moment of its foundation bitterly opposed by the masses and it could be maintained only by a systematic corruption of public life and with the help of a restricted and brutally controlled electorate.<sup>3</sup>

From the beginning of the eighties of the last century, there became more and more manifest those forces which tended to loosen and finally to burst asunder the connection between Austria and Hungary. These endeavors started as a matter of fact from the camp of the traditional ideology of independence represented by men who regarded themselves as followers of the policy of Louis Kossuth. But this party, in consequence of the restricted suffrage and the corrupted electoral machine, was such a small minority in the political arena

<sup>3</sup> *Three Generations*, pp. 327-39.

that it did not signify a real danger to the Dualistic Constitution, protected by the big landed and financial interests. The real danger from the point of view of the Compromise arose only at that time when the ideology of independence and the hatred of Austria began to permeate even those parties and circles which stood on the basis of the Compromise as very influential elements in the higher nobility, bureaucracy, and local administration. Of course these exponents of the new ideology of independence (represented especially by Count Albert Apponyi and his followers) did not take this idea very seriously and they never dreamed of a separation from Austria or from the Habsburgs (for the big landed interests in Hungary were entirely solidary with the Habsburgs because the ruling class clearly understood that a real struggle for independence would have meant such a tension of democratic forces as would have inevitably led to a distribution of the landed estates and a local self-government for the nationalities), but they flirted more and more with the idea of the "expansion and development of the Compromise" in order to secure new privileges in the army and in the diplomatic representation of the state.

In this manner many factors contributed to the reviving of the idea of independence and of the traditional *Kurucz* feeling of the country. A demagogic propaganda was carried on which denounced the joint army and the common institutions of the monarchy as an emanation of the bad spirit of "cursed Vienna." Certain social and economic changes forced public opinion in the same direction: the proletarianization of large strata of small artisans who succumbed because of the competition of Austrian capitalism; the dominant position of the big Austrian finance in Hungary which retained a great part of the Hungarian industry as their vassals; the development of a large intellectual middle class in Hungary which could not find employment in the public offices, and the weakened position of one part of the Hungarian nobility which collapsed under the system of economic liberalism and was extremely desirous of getting new administrative, diplomatic, and military sinecures by the restriction of the joint institutions and by the development of the Magyar state ideal.

This tendency toward independence was further strengthened by the general current of civic education in Hungary under the sway of which two generations grew up which regarded the whole co-operation among the various nations of the monarchy with a kind of megalomania: they underestimated the rôle of Austria and especially that of the Slavs, whereas they overestimated the importance of the Magyars and disregarded entirely the Hungarian nationalities as a negligible quantity.

But there was also another factor which perhaps more than those already mentioned made the movement for independence more acute.

That was the antiquated electoral system of Hungary which was becoming less and less representative of the real interests of the country. Properly speaking, only those classes and strata were represented in parliament who stood for the Compromise or who opposed it bitterly on a historical and sentimental basis. On the other hand those classes and masses, the fundamental interests of which were not concentrated around the Dualistic Constitution but for which the agrarian policy or the social policy or the nationality policy had a paramount importance, the Magyar "dwarfish" peasantry, the agrarian proletariat, the industrial working-class, and the nationality masses were hermetically excluded from the Hungarian Parliament either by law or by the corrupt electoral practices.

This situation had a further danger from the point of view of the wholesome development of the monarchy. The ideology of independence became—more or less consciously—a kind of a *Verdrängungsideo- logie* ("an ideology of repression") against all efforts which endangered the interests of the ruling classes. Every historical society exercises a half-conscious, half-unconscious selection concerning those problems the discussion of which it considers advantageous or agreeable from the point of view of the dominant interests. This almost sociological law resulted in Hungary in the disproportionate predominance of the so-called "national problems" and of the *fine fleur* of these problems, of the constitutional and army problems to the detriment of the more serious economic and social considerations. Anyone who was anxious for a career or desirous of laurels turned toward those more dignified problems. On the contrary the agrarian problem, the *morbis latifundii*, the social problems of the working-classes, a new point of view in the nationality problem aroused the distrust and antipathy of the most respectable citizens. Under such circumstances it is only natural that as the demands of the agricultural laborers became louder, as the big landowners were molested by agricultural strikes, as the urban proletariat became a misunderstood and terrifying factor in Hungarian society (Socialism was treated for decades as exclusively a matter of police administration), and as the underground rumor of the nationalities became more audible, the "national problems" proved to be an excellent instrument for canalizing the economic and social unrest of the masses against Austria and for presenting the bill of the lower classes to Vienna and to the Habsburgs instead of to the feudal nobility. That was one of the reasons why important elements in the aristocracy embraced more and more the program of independence, and even the government of His Majesty accepted doctrines which stood in flagrant opposition to the fundamental ideas of the Dualistic Constitution.

The new nationalistic current began with an exuberance of the

old constitutional slogans and with a demagogic propaganda against the "cursed common institutions" which they portrayed as treason against the independence of the country. It was for decades the chief occupation of the leading politicians to explore the remotest corners of the Compromise in order to demonstrate that the old independence of the nation was surrendered or that important national privileges were forgotten or disregarded. As a consequence of this attitude there were endless and exasperating debates in parliament concerning the colors of the *porte-épée* and of the flags, the displaying of the emblems and escutcheons, the use of the army language, the singing of the imperial hymn, and the tactless behavior of some of the army leaders. Hypnotized by these and similar attacks, Magyar public opinion demanded more and more passionately the introduction of the Magyar language into the Hungarian regiments and later the establishment of an independent Hungarian army. At the same time the movement for independence was carried on also in the economic field and the Party of Independence spread continuous propaganda in favor of the economic separation of the country from Austria by the erection of customs barriers and by the establishment of an independent national bank. Every new draft of a bill concerning the necessary development of the joint army became a source of vehement scandals in parliament, lasting sometimes for several years. It became customary for the opposition to demand so-called "national attainments," from the government as a kind of compensation for the passing of the army budget and the granting of the new contingent of the recruits. But these so-called national attainments concerning the independence of the country and the Magyarization of the army were confronted by the prerogatives of the Crown, jealously safeguarded by the Emperor in all matters regarding the internal organization and direction of the army and, therefore, the relation became more and more envenomed between the King and the Hungarian parliament. Even the modest concessions made by the King to the chauvinistic opposition could not relieve the situation. On the contrary they were only as oil on the burning flame of national enthusiasm. For instance a long and embittered fight was carried on to change the title of the joint army from Imperial-Royal Army to Imperial *and* Royal Army. When finally in 1889 this magic word for the placation of the national feeling was granted, it proved to be inefficient. In the absence of any other economic, cultural, or social-political food, public opinion threw itself with a more and more rabid exasperation into the national and constitutional problems and exciting scandals arose between the Habsburg army, the Austrian *soldatesca* and the *Kurucz* gentry, the small bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Such and similar affairs always connected with the imperial hymn, the *Gott erhalte*, or the Austrian flag

abounded and envenomed the whole moral and political atmosphere of the country. (Affairs Janszky, Nessi, Ugron, etc.)

Under the pressure of this public opinion the opposition began a more and more turbulent fight against the government, and a series of obstructions were launched in parliament whenever new army bills were introduced. As a result of these obstructions the parliament, this famous united, efficient Hungarian parliament, was paralyzed and the country was plunged into a state of so-called *Ex Lex*: the government had no legal authority for exacting taxes and for enrolling recruits. This situation became, in 1904, so acute that the then Premier, Count Stephen Tisza, by a sudden coup openly violated the rules of parliament in order to secure the acceptance of the army bill. But the forceful measure of the Premier did not help. The opposition, both the Party of Independence and those on the basis of the Compromise, demolished all the furniture on the floor of the House and attacked with the broken pieces the Parliamentarian Guard established by Tisza. The Premier, in order to restore normal conditions, appealed to the "nation" because he was convinced that the usual electoral machine would function without difficulty. But the nationalistic public opinion of the country was so exasperated that the calculations of Tisza failed. The elections in 1905 led to the fall of his party and the so-called "national coalition" of the opposition gained a majority, and inside of this majority the Party of Independence, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth's son, Francis, became the most powerful party of the new parliament. Thereafter the antagonism between the Crown and the constitutional opposition became even more embittered. In this critical situation the "most constitutional Monarch" made an extra-parliamentarian experiment and the Minister of Interior of this "illegal" Cabinet, Joseph Kristóffy, menaced the rebellious ruling classes with the promise, made to a deputation of the Social-Democratic Party, of a universal, secret ballot. Kristóffy maintained that the real cause of the conflict between the King and the nation should be sought in the fact that the parliament did not represent the real will of the country because its laboring elements were excluded from the Constitution. There was only antagonism between the Crown and the privileged classes whereas the working-people of the country and the King would understand each other without difficulty.<sup>4</sup>

This new doctrine, the renewal of the spirit of Josephinism, shook the very foundations of Hungarian public life. The national coalition, the county administration, and the whole oligarchical structure of the country announced a struggle of life and death against the illegal government and those who participated in its administration.

<sup>4</sup> Compare pp. 111-12, 182-83.

The situation became almost revolutionary and "the most constitutional King" appointed a plenipotentiary royal commissary and dissolved parliament by armed force (February, 1906). And now the country witnessed a spectacle which astonished European public opinion. The people of the entire country saw and suffered without protest the destruction of their time-honored Constitution. It became manifest that behind this Hungarian parliament, glorified as strong, united, and strictly national as compared with the despised Austrian, there were practically no public forces. Not even a single mass-meeting, a single placard, or a single popular proclamation protested against the new era of the "Viennese absolutism." On the contrary the working-masses and nationalities regarded with malicious joy the impotent struggle of the national oligarchy.

There are many, both in Austria and in Hungary, who regard this date of 1906 as of decisive importance in the whole history of the monarchy and are of the opinion that, if the Emperor had then introduced universal suffrage by a royal decree and had opened the door (as he did later in Austria) for the free political expression of the working-classes and the nationalities of Hungary, the monarchy could have evolved along the line of Federalism, which would have substantially mitigated the international tension and would have even checked the outbreak of the World War. Those however who take into consideration that the irridentist propoganda against the monarchy was at this time already very advanced and who realize that the masses, excluded from the Constitution for centuries and lacking even the most elementary civic education, could not be made in a few years self-conscious factors in a complicated and gigantic political transformation (as this of the remolding of the Dualistic Constitution into a Federalistic one), those will be entitled to doubt whether the last decade would have been a sufficient period for the salvation of the monarchy. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the Monarch committed grave faults in the handling of this most critical situation. It became manifest that he utilized the promise of universal suffrage as a sheer bugbear against the Magyar upper classes and as soon as the Magyar coalition abandoned its claims against his army prerogatives, he called it into the government and accepted the falsification of universal suffrage (giving his previous sanction<sup>5</sup> to the electoral bill of Count Julius Andrassy, based on the principle of an oligarchical plurality and of open voting) in order to obtain, as a kind of compensation for his royal favor, the assistance of the Magyar ruling classes in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908). This behavior of the Crown contributed very much to the final moral

<sup>5</sup> This "previous sanction" was a Hungarian curiosity according to which no bill could be introduced by the cabinet before the legislature without the "previous sanction" of the king. This institution functioned like an "absolutistic check" because no premier would have dared a conflict with the monarch.

disintegration of the monarchy because it exacerbated not only the working-classes but also it showed clearly to the nationalities that they could not hope for any improvement of their situation from internal reforms.

As a matter of fact this cynical pact of the ruling classes and the Crown did not lead to a real consolidation and the struggle for "national concessions" in the army became recrudescant. The opposition again tried to restrict the royal prerogatives, the government again made some concessions (the so-called "Resolution Crisis" in 1912) but the Emperor repudiated brutally the new "rebellion" and the end of the powerless struggle of the opposition was once more that Vienna needed "the strong hand" of Count Tisza who, as in 1904, and now in 1912, rushed through the army bill by the violation of the rules of parliament, casting out by armed force the renitent deputies.

These tumultuous incidents (one of the deputies shot at Count Tisza with his revolver in parliament) made it obvious to all clear-headed observers that Hungarian parliamentarism had become merely an instrument of Habsburg absolutism because the principle of majority, in the name of which Count Tisza broke down with armed force the obstruction of the opposition, was manifestly only a pretext under a constitution which excluded the overwhelming majority of the nation from the suffrage and which terrorized the minority possessing the suffrage by the system of open ballot, corruption, and the mobilization of the army. Perceiving the danger of this situation, about fifty Hungarian publicists and politicians addressed a memorandum to foreign public opinion drawing the attention of European progressive thought to the international peril of the renewed absolutism.<sup>6</sup> At the same time the more far-sighted elements of Vienna emphasized repeatedly the entire bankruptcy of the Magyar parliamentary system. But the Crown and the official circles regarded things apathetically since Tisza secured for them with his "strong hand" 300,000 more recruits and 400 million Crowns more for military expenses. Though new promises were made for parliamentary reform, it was continually frustrated by the ruling class and in May, 1912, Count Tisza choked in blood the manifestation of the working-class at Budapest. Even during the tempest of the World War and in spite of the unheard of sacrifices of the Hungarian peasantry and working-classes, the cause of electoral reform could not make any real progress. Count Tisza, in the blindness of his class standpoint, made the following declaration before the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*:

Not the people demands, with us, the suffrage but the politicians. The Hungarian soldier in the trenches does not care about the suffrage; he is only longing for a leave of two weeks in order to till his lot; he doesn't think of the suffrage but only of his folks and the Fatherland. . . . We have become unworthy of these brave soldiers. . . .

<sup>6</sup> *Die Krise der Ungarischen Verfassung* (Budapest, 1912).

How this mightiest statesman of the monarchy, under the sway of his traditional point of view, was incapable of understanding the general world-situation was characteristically demonstrated by a declaration of his made to the editor of his official German paper (*Pester Lloyd*), who admonished him of the extreme importance of the electoral problem. Count Tisza emphasized the fact that such a problem did not exist in Hungary and that he himself, who knew thoroughly the moral attitude of the period, "dared to prophesy" that after the war a new *Biedermeier* epoch (so the extremely peaceful, narrow-minded, philistine attitude was called before the Revolution of 1848) would be born all around the world and the soldiers would be happy if, after their terrible sufferings, they could return to their work and their families.

Not only in the field of the constitutional and military problems did Magyar nationalism grow more and more acute, but also in the economic sphere. Louder and louder became its claims for a customs union independent of Austria, for a national bank, and for a Magyar foreign economic representation. From year to year it became more difficult to maintain the former economic unity. In 1902 the Sugar Convention at Brussels was already separately signed by Austria and Hungary as by distinct parties. The economic Compromise of 1907 faced such difficulties that well-informed public opinion both in Austria and in Hungary regarded this Compromise as the last one between the two countries and was convinced that Hungary would soon assume complete economic independence. The causes and psychology of this growing tendency for economic independence, we have already analyzed in another connection. At this juncture I wish only to allude to the fact that the ideology of independence was also considerably strengthened by certain foreign events, such as, for instance, the separation of Norway from Sweden, which had a great repercussion upon Magyar nationalism, while the erection of a Washington Memorial in Budapest by the American Magyars was enthusiastically appreciated as a symbol of independence.

The facts which demonstrated the growing force of the separatistic movements in all fields of social and political life gradually became more numerous. In 1900 at the occasion of themorganatic marriage of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Hungarian parliament made a declaration according to which "the Pragmatic Sanction did not establish a common order of heredity to the throne with Austria"; in 1903 Count Tisza called the Austrian premier in the Hungarian parliament a "distinguished foreigner," whose dilettante declarations had no political significance; in 1909 Count Albert Apponyi, then minister of public education, issued a decree which in all textbooks, maps, and globes supplanted the expression of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by that of "Hungary and Austria"; somewhat later under



the auspices of the same minister a historical textbook was written in which the Habsburg dynasty was portrayed as a foreign conqueror, a Germanizing power sucking the fat of the country. . . .

This antagonism grew during the war into a real frenzy. Magyar public opinion accused Austria of utilizing the Magyar soldiers as cannon fodder instead of its own treacherous nationalities. Austria on the other hand accused Hungary of promoting famine in the monarchy by its selfish policy of alimentation. As a matter of fact the Hungarian government introduced so many limitations of circulation inside the customs union during the war that the economic unity of the two countries became *de facto* illusionary. This, however, did not impede the Austrians from smuggling out of Hungary in torpedo boats great quantities of corn which led to parliamentary scandals. And the more desperate the war situation became the more grew the hatred and animosity between the two countries. It was a usual topic in the Austrian newspapers that the dualistic system had become for them a nuisance, the maintenance of which would not be worth while after the war. On the other hand the Magyar newspapers kindled by an extreme demagogy the flame of the traditional hatred of Vienna. For instance, *Az Est*, the most widely circulating and influential Magyar daily wrote in August, 1918, in such terms: "We do not care in the least how Austria helps herself nor with what wire she fastens her body. . . ." Or, on another occasion: "For the present moment it is entirely irrelevant for us what advice the preservation instinct dictates to this country in order to lengthen its life. . . . And if Austria is compelled to undergo an operation, it is entirely her own affair. . . ." It is characteristic that this newspaper wrote no less than twelve leaders in such a tenor during this month, which is the more significant because it always followed servilely the fluctuations of public opinion.

From all these it becomes patent that the whole edifice of the Compromise, both in its spirit and its practice, began to crack and crash and that the antagonism between the two hegemonic nations, nay between the Hungarian King and the Austrian Emperor, was even greater than the conflict between the hegemonic nations and the second rank nations. The centrifugal forces broke out more and more ruthlessly in the whole field. And to make the dissolution even more chaotic, to the constitutional conflict between Austria and Hungary was added a second one which, by the foreign complications aroused by it, gave later the final death-thrust to the old monarchy, paralyzed by the hydra of internal struggles. This conflict was the Hungarian-Croatian conflict.

## CHAPTER VI

### CROATIA VERSUS HUNGARY

It has often been said, and with full justification, that the relation of Croatia-Slavonia to Hungary showed in its essence, though in smaller proportions, still with even greater consequences, the same dangers and difficulties as the relation between the two leading states of the Monarchy. The Hungarian-Croatian relation, however, in contrast to the Austro-Hungarian, was for centuries quiet and undisturbed. Since the beginning of the twelfth century and since the death of the last independent Croatian King, Croatia entered into a union with the Crown of St. Stephen, the jural nature of which is not very well known to us. It is probable that it was one of those loose feudal connections which the nobilities of two countries established for the more efficient defense of their mutual interests. Geographical proximity, the fear of the smaller state of international complications, the identity of the economic and social structure, and expanding commercial relations made this connection advantageous from the point of view of both parties. Generally speaking, it was maintained without serious difficulties, according to our historical reminiscences, until the first decades of the nineteenth century. The Croatian nobility became simply a part of the Hungarian *una eademque nobilitas* and the exclusive use of the Latin language between them eliminated all national antagonism. State activities in the proper sense were, before the arrival of the modern period, very restricted whereas the local administration of the counties gave the nobility of the respective regions almost the independence possessed by a small state. Both nobilities kept their bondsmen aloof from all rights and the fear of riots became as much of a factor in political cohesion between them as did later the growing threat of the Turks and the fight against them. The Turkish advance changed the Croatian settlements substantially, pushing them back toward the north, securing a hegemonic position to the Hungarian state and to its administrative organization throughout the whole kingdom. In the period of the enlightened absolutism the unifying policy of the Habsburgs brought the Croat nobility more and more into a union with the Magyars, and with them they made common cause against the reforms of Joseph II and later against the ideas of the French Revolution which terrified and exasperated the Croatian estates not less than those of the Magyars. It became a fashion that the Croat nobles, in order to demonstrate their solidarity with the Magyars, wore Magyar apparel and also in other respects the relation between the two noble classes seemed to be very cordial.

In spite of this we should not think of a common modern state idea in this connection. If their interests were at stake, the Croat nobility would adopt an almost independent state policy. Thus, for instance, after the collapse at Mohács the Croatian estates elected Ferdinand as their king in 1527, quite independently of the Magyars, and acknowledged at the same time the hereditary succession of the Habsburgs, that is, 160 years earlier than the Magyars. They also hastened to accept the Pragmatic Sanction (manifestly in order to attain special royal favors) ten years earlier than the Magyars (1712). From these facts, however, one should not conclude that the Croat state was entirely independent but only that the special state consciousness of the Croatian nobility remained unaltered and that they expressed it now and then, when their interests demanded it, in isolated political acts without disturbing the practical union and co-operation with the Hungarian Kingdom. It seems also a well-established fact that apart from the Hungarian central parliament the Croatian *Sabor* (the local parliament at Zagreb) had a broad autonomy and that the laws passed by the Magyar parliament were ratified in some cases by the Sabor.

This loose feudal state and its method of political co-operation resulted in nothing serious except when the Magyar nobility was aroused to national consciousness, and when after the thirties of the last century, they tried to introduce the Magyar state language into Croat territories. After that the Magyar state idea came into a more and more violent conflict with the Croat state idea.<sup>1</sup> The memories of the common historical past and the often loose and contradictory stipulations of the Hungarian and the Croat laws were utilized by both parties for the strengthening of their antagonistic standpoints by the semblance of historical right. The Croats tried to demonstrate that they had never as a state lost their independence, that Croatia-Slavonia had always been regarded as a *regnum socium*, that their parliament had always been entitled to pass independent laws. In opposition to this thesis, the Hungarians maintained that, since the union there had never been an independent Croatian state, their local parliament had only the significance of a provincial assembly and it was therefore subordinated in all important issues to the Hungarian parliament and consequently Croatia and the territories belonging to it were only *partes annexae* of the Hungarian kingdom.

This growing constitutional and sentimental antagonism broke out in full force at the Diet of 1843–44 when the Magyars passed a law providing that the Magyar state language should be employed—as mentioned before—throughout the whole territory of Croatia as the common state language of the two countries. This measure exasperated Croatian society because the Croat national idea based on the

<sup>1</sup> Compare p. 305 of the present book.

historical conception of Illyrism had already permeated the masses of the Croatian people and the mighty personality of Ljudevit Gaj succeeded in arousing the distinct historical consciousness of the country. Public opinion advocated now not only the political independence of Croatia-Slavonia, but at the same time the re-establishment of the old Croatian Kingdom on the basis of the re-annexation of certain territories (which had belonged, in earlier times, to the Croatian state,) of Dalmatia, of the important harbor, Fiume, and the Croatian military confine.<sup>2</sup> The Croatian Sabor had in 1848 already echoed these ideas and declared the Croatian language a state language in the whole territory of Croatia. At the same time it issued a manifesto to all the Slav tribes living in the Habsburg monarchy which formulated with striking lucidity the ideology which became later the Austro-Jugo-Slav program:

The time of the nationalities has come, the nations will group according to their language and protect each other against foreign aggression. . . . Following out this principle we accepted the fraternal alliance of the re-awakened Serb Voivodina [the Serb territory of Hungary] with our triune Kingdom and expect the accession of all the Jugo-Slav-Austrian brothers in order to maintain the Austrian Empire on the basis of a confederation in which our nationally homogeneous organism will peacefully cooperate with the other peoples of Austria organized on the same principle. . . .

When, therefore, the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 did not acknowledge these claims but, on the contrary, tried to establish the authority of the Hungarian state and the use of the Magyar language throughout the whole Kingdom, including Croatia, public opinion in the Serbo-Croat territories became so exasperated that the Viennese Court had no difficulty in utilizing and mobilizing it against the Magyar revolutionary nobility and peasantry. As a matter of fact, as it has already been described, the Croatian *banus* (the governor of the country), Jelačić, and the Jugo-Slav military forces organized by him played an important rôle in defeating the Magyar struggle for independence.

After the collapse of the Hungarian revolution, Croatia became an independent crownland but the Croats were very dissatisfied with their new conditions and complained about the ingratitude of Vienna because the unification of Dalmatia with Croatia was refused and the pressure of centralizing absolutism was not lighter on the loyal Croats than on the rebellious Magyars. The later constitutional experiments even increased the exasperation of the Croats because the "October

<sup>2</sup>The Croatian Military Confinement, a part of the greater Military Confinement, was a large territory at the southern frontier of Croatia and Hungary militarily organized as a defensive bulwark against the Turks throughout two centuries. One of the advantages which the Compromise gave to Hungary was the reincorporation of this territory into the country and the reintroduction of the state administration instead of the military rule.

Diploma" of 1860, in order to appease the Magyars, reunited Fiume and the so-called Mur-territory with Hungary. The Compromise of 1867 and the subsequent Magyar policy envenomed the situation even more. Though no objective observer will deny that in the so-called Hungarian-Croatian Compromise which followed the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (the Law of 1868, XXX) Deák and the other leading Magyar statesmen were animated by a spirit of benevolence and equity, the second-rank rôle which this Compromise offered to the Croats in the Habsburg monarchy seemed to them unacceptable after the events of the revolution and the memories of absolutism. As a matter of fact the Compromise, following the traditional Hungarian point of view, did not acknowledge Croatia-Slavonia as an independent state but gave to it only a provincial autonomy inside the Hungarian state. In their internal administration, in the judiciary, and in the educational department the Croats obtained a perfectly free hand, but in all the other walks of public life they belonged to the competency of the Hungarian parliament to which the Croat Sabor sent a delegation. The Croats felt this self-government only as a shadow of self-government the more as the *banus*, the head of the Croatian government, was nominated by the King, not on the proposal of the Sabor but on that of the Hungarian government, that is to say, his position was not a parliamentary one toward his own country but it had the character of a Hungarian royal commissary. There can be no doubt that the great majority of the Croatian people were from the beginning inimical to the Compromise which was only accepted by a packed Sabor created by an agent of the Hungarian government, Levin Rauch, with the help of some nobles and bureaucrats, loyal to the Magyars and called ironically by public opinion the "Magyarons." But not even this obedient Sabor could be induced to accept paragraph 66 of the Compromise which declared the town, harbor, and district of Fiume to be a special body connected with the Hungarian crown. Originally the Croat text was at variance with the Hungarian, stating that concerning this question no agreement could be reached. And nothing could be more characteristic of the spirit of the time than the fact that the harmony between the two antagonistic versions was reached by a purely mechanical procedure, namely, that a thin strip of paper containing the translation of the Magyar text was pasted over the respective portion of the Croat text when the two versions were submitted for the King's signature. That means that the Compromise was based not only on electoral and administrative corruption, but also on the falsification of an important state document!

In spite of this it is conceivable that Croat public opinion might have become accustomed to the large local autonomy offered to it and might have acknowledged, in the long run, its several real advantages if it had been managed by the central government with complaisance

and justice, and particularly if the promise of the Compromise concerning the uniting of Dalmatia with Croatia on the basis of the historical right of the Hungarian crown had been fulfilled. But just the opposite happened. The unification did not take place and Croat public opinion was continually irritated by Magyar inscriptions, Magyar emblems, and Magyar officials not knowing the language of the people. At the same time in the majority of cases men were put at the head of Croatian administration in the office of the banus who had no root in Croatian national life and who appeared before it as obedient instruments of the Budapest administration. As a matter of fact one can say that Croatia from the beginning of the Compromise until the collapse, with the exception of short intervals, was governed in an absolutistic way, which absolutism was more open and brutal than that on which the dualistic system was based, because, in such a unilingual and unracial country as Croatia, this policy could only be based on the small and continually diminishing group of the "Magyarons."

Under such conditions the new system could only be maintained by a corrupt electoral and administrative practice which reached its culmination in the era of Count Khuen Héderváry, who governed the country for twenty years (1883–1903) with the help of his ill-famed method of the "horsewhip and oats." This crudely Machiavellian system may be regarded as the second spoiled and Balkanized edition of the system of Metternich. For, while the system of Metternich was mitigated by the extraordinary and highly cultured personality of the chancellor, the policy of Count Khuen introduced the most shrewd and ruthless methods of the Balkan politicians. Men of independent and honest conviction were persecuted, ousted from their offices and imprisoned, and were replaced by unscrupulous instruments of the absolutistic régime.<sup>3</sup> Thus the country was demoralized for generations. This policy was not only violent and corrupt, but even flagrant infringements of law were often applied. But the most fatal feature of this system of a Magyar *pashalic*<sup>4</sup> (as Otto Bauer characterized it) created by Khuen was the new *divide et impera* by which he played off the Serb minority against the renitent Croat majority, utilizing the religious and cultural difference between the two closely related tribes. The blind politician of violence did not perceive that this policy encouraged, properly speaking, the Serb irredenta directed against the monarchy. The Serbs were allowed to use their tricolors, the flag of

<sup>3</sup> The memoirs of Stephan Radić published by Charles H. Beard in *Current History* (October, 1928) casts a flood of light on these conditions. They demonstrate that even so malleable a personality as Radić, always inclined to compromise (he was capable of defending the imperialistic annexation policy of Aehrenthal in Russia!), migrated, so to say, from prison to prison under what he called the "slavery to Hungary and Austria."

<sup>4</sup> Turkish province where the Christian population was ruthlessly exploited by the ruling Turkish authority.

the Serbian kingdom, their schools were disproportionately favored, the Serbs newspaper subventioned from Belgrade remained undisturbed, whereas the Croatian papers were confiscated from day to day. In this manner the relative importance of the Serbs was artificially augmented to the detriment of the Croats in order to foment dissension and hatred between the two groups. This policy systematically undermined the foundations of the Magyar state. But Count Khuen saw only the petty struggles and tricks of his daily politics. His so-called Magyar patriotism was exhausted in carrying out all the measures ordered by Budapest, though he was not a Magyar chauvinist at all but rather an agent of the imperial policy of Vienna. The Magyar opposition called him a "Graničar," alluding to the blind loyalty to Vienna of the soldiers of the former military confines.

This system of absolutism, corruption, and artificial fostering of national struggles exasperated more and more Croatian public opinion. At the same time the separation of Croatia from Dalmatia and the other Jugo-Slav territories was increasingly felt as a burden in so far as national consciousness and the unity of the Jugo-Slav race was more clearly realized. The general dissatisfaction was further accentuated by the total apathy of Vienna concerning the complaints of the Croats. The people of Jelačić considered it a galling ingratitude that the Emperor, for whom they fought so strenuously in the drama of '48, now surrendered them completely to the absolutism of Khuen, to the rule of a man whose honor was publicly attacked without his obtaining satisfaction from the tribunal. The exasperation of the Croats spread throughout the territory of the Jugo-Slav monarchy. In 1903 the deputies of Dalmatia and Istria, members of the Austrian parliament, asked an audience of the Emperor in order to draw his attention to the sufferings of their co-nationals in Croatia. But the influence of the Hungarian government was sufficiently strong to obstruct the reception of the delegation. Habsburg repudiated ostentatiously his former allies who saved his throne. This affront had far-reaching consequences. The Croats, the most loyal nation of the monarchy, definitely lost confidence in the curing of their grievances with the help of the dualistic system. At the beginning of the twentieth century a new generation became active which had studied in foreign universities and which—enlightened especially by the teachings of Professor Masaryk—had acquired a clear conception of the solidarity of the whole Jugo-Slav race. The struggle of the Serbian kingdom for liberty and independence aroused the enthusiasm of many of the Croatian people. There was a growing conviction that the interests of the Serbs and Croats were common and that the *divide et impera* policy of Count Khuen meant only the oppression of both nations. The difference in religion and in the written language (the Croats use the Latin, the Serbs the Cyrillic alphabet) was of less

and less significance in the face of the growing consciousness of the community of their national interests. Since 1903 the symptoms of a revolutionary movement became manifest in the entire Jugo-Slav world. The Macedonian uprising, the collapse of the Obrenović dynasty in Serbia, and the defeat of the Khuen system in Croatia were signs of the same changing spirit. The Hungarian constitutional crisis, the struggle of the Magyar national opposition against the crown contributed very much to the establishment of the Serbo-Croat unity. The politicians of Croatia and Dalmatia gave credit to the assertions of the Magyar coalition that they were fighting for a true democracy, not only for the rights of Hungary but also for the constitutional liberties of Croatia and that they were willing to fight for the union of Dalmatia with Croatia on the basis of the right of the Crown of St. Stephen. In this spirit the so-called "Resolution of Fiume" in 1905 made a declaration according to which "Croats and Serbs are the same nation, both by blood and language," and that they have the right "to decide freely and independently concerning their existence and future." Animated by this feeling the Croats and Serbs offered their alliance to the Magyar parties fighting for the independence of Hungary against the "Viennese camarilla." This turn caused great alarm in Vienna because it meant no less than that the successors of Jelačić, the sons of the "black-yellow<sup>5</sup> bodyguard of the Emperor" (as the Jugo-Slav officers were often called), would make an alliance with the son of Louis Kossuth, then leader of the Magyar coalition. Consequences of the greatest importance could have arisen from this new situation if the Magyar opposition, which soon came into power, had respected these principles and aided the Jugo-Slavs in the attainment of their unity and liberty inside the Hungarian crown. The greatest obstacle to a reasonable federalization of the monarchy would have been eliminated. But just the opposite happened. The Magyar opposition, in which naturally the great landed interests dominated, after having gained power betrayed not only universal suffrage promised to their own people, but also the principles embodied in the Resolution of Fiume. This episode, however, was advantageous to the Croats, since the elections in 1906 were relatively free and there was assembled a Sabor which expressed the real will of the country. The old methods of a half-hidden absolutism could not be continued. And when, a year later, the former leader of the Magyar coalition, then minister of commerce, Francis Kossuth, the unworthy son of the great exile, reassumed the policy of Magyarization on the Croatian lines of the state railways, the Sabor resisted energetically and the whole Croat-Serb public opinion attacked the government so violently that the banus, Baron Paul Rauch, the son of that Levin Rauch who forty years earlier carried through the Compromise by

<sup>5</sup> Black-yellow were the Imperial colors.



illegal means, was compelled to employ open absolutism. He tried also to continue the *divide et impera* politics of Khuen but in another direction, playing the Croats against the Serbs. But this reprise in Machiavellian politics was unsuccessful this time: the Croat-Serb unity proved to be unshakeable. Unfortunately, Hungarian public opinion did not understand at all, not even now, the extreme gravity of the situation. The chauvinistic press made a wild race and one of the most popular and influential organs wrote thus in March, 1908:

If we cannot convince the Croats, we must subdue them. We must prophesy that Hungary will still have bloody conflicts with the Croats and Hungary will be obliged to reconquer Croatia. It is not absolutely necessary that there should be a Diet in Zagreb. Laws must only be kept in the face of a nation which respects them. If Croatia cannot be governed in a constitutional way, it will simply be governed in an unconstitutional way. The positive work of Magyarization must finally begin in Croatia. . . . If the Croats do not understand that they do not form an independent state beside Hungary, they must be convinced by arms.

And the most sorrowful aspect of the situation was that these and similar utterances were not only the shoutings of a jingo journalism but the emanations of a generally accepted doctrine according to which Croatia had no right to an independent constitutional life.

And the more the inner conflict became acute, the greater the Balkan chaos grew on the frontiers of the monarchy, the more the exasperation of the Christian Balkan peoples reached the boiling-point against Turkish rule: the more the dualistic *status quo* became difficult to maintain, the rulers were compelled to employ desperate methods. In order to discredit the Croat national movement and at the same time to justify, before international opinion, the action of foreign minister Aehrenthal, in the final annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the summer of 1908, a *razzia* was made against the Croat-Serb coalition, fifty-three members of which were arrested under the pretext that they had treacherous connections with Serbia. The monster process which was launched against them in March, 1909, made it manifest to any impartial observer that the documents of accusation were forgeries of police agents, and the moral depravity of the chief witness was proved without any doubt. In spite of this a packed tribunal, which refused the hearing of the witnesses of the defense, condemned most of the accused.

No wonder that such political machinations directed by the banus himself had a terrible effect on Jugo-Slav public opinion throughout the monarchy. This effect was even strengthened when Dr. Friedjung, the noted Austro-German historian, in connection with the scandals in Zagreb, produced documents against several Jugo-Slav politicians in order to demonstrate their conspiracies with Serbia. The men whose honor was attacked and life imperiled brought suit for defama-

tion against the historian which was carried on before a Viennese tribunal, not under Balkan forms as the Zagreb process, but by distinguished judges and lawyers. Besides, domestic and foreign public opinion was greatly aroused as it was widely known that Dr. Friedjung was a kind of an attorney of the foreign minister and his documents were given to him by the state department. The proceedings entirely cleared the situation. The attacked politicians were able to prove that Friedjung's documents were forgeries made with the special intention of compromising the Croat-Serb coalition and of justifying the policy of annexation of the monarchy. But even more than this became public. In a session of the Austrian Delegation (February, 1910), Professor Masaryk, the present president of the Czechoslovak republic, demonstrated that those documents upon which the whole high treason comedy was based, had been forged in Belgrade in the Austro-Hungarian embassy with the assistance of Count Forgách, the Austro-Hungarian minister. Masaryk called Forgách a second Azev (that was the name of an ill-famed Russian *agent provocateur*) and the foreign minister was unable to defend the Serbian representative of the monarchy. In spite of this, Count Forgách remained in foreign service, nay, he was rewarded by promotion.

These two processes undermined the entire moral prestige of the monarchy not only in Croatia but in the whole Jugo-Slav world. After the years of absolutism and oppressive politics no one could believe that a state in which such things could occur, would be capable of a just solution of the complicated problem of the Jugo-Slav state aspirations. All clear-sighted men of the monarchy realized the extreme gravity of the situation. Archduke Francis Ferdinand himself saw with despair the growing dissatisfaction of the Croats, and on one occasion he sent the following message to the Croat people by one of his Croat friends: "Please tell your Croats that they may once more safeguard their traditional loyalty. As soon as I succeed to the throne, I shall correct all the injustices which have been done to them."

But the situation became more and more desolate. The events both of the internal and external policy were alienating the hearts of the Jugo-Slavs of the monarchy. Even the last formalities of constitutionalism ceased to exist in Croatia under the royal commissariat of Cuvaj. At the same time Count Tisza again subdued the Hungarian parliament by force and suppressed in blood the demonstrations of the proletariat of Budapest for universal suffrage. There was not the slightest beam for the future in the whole monarchy. On the other hand, the peasant democracy of the Serb kingdom advanced more year by year in the building up of their nation state after a brutal military revolution had shaken off the hated yoke of Obrenović. The whole Jugo-Slav world of the monarchy began to regard Belgrade as a central point of the unity of their race. And when Ser-

bia in alliance with the Bulgarians and the Greeks began, in 1912, its victorious campaign against the Turks for the liberation of Old Serbia and Macedonia, almost all the Jugo-Slav population of the monarchy trembled with the solidarity of national consciousness. Even the Slovenians who both geographically and in their historical evolution stood the farthest from the community of the Jugo-Slav world, greeted with enthusiasm the liberators of their kindred folk: "There at Tshataldsha," said a Slovenian Catholic priest, Janez Krek, the great reformer and social politician of his people, in the Austrian parliament, "they fight for the last Slovenian peasant of the threatened Carinthian village. . . ." The Jugo-Slav policy outside the frontiers of the monarchy began to interest the masses more deeply than that inside. Because inside of the frontiers only the system of absolutism continued, spiced with renewed attempts against the person of the hated banus.

The ghost of the irredenta gradually strangled the monarchy and the dynasty which was incapable of maintaining the final loyalty not only of the "rebellious" Magyars but also of the Croats who, three generations earlier, saved the throne of the Habsburgs.

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**PART VI**  
**THE DANGER OF IRREDENTA**