

CHAPTER I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN-MAGYAR HEGEMONY

As we have repeatedly emphasized, the political struggles of the last half-century of the Habsburg monarchy were chiefly determined by the so-called Compromise (*Ausgleich*) which the Dualistic Constitution settled in 1867, the essence of which was the political domination of the Germans in Austria, and that of the Magyars in Hungary. On the one side the "kingdoms and countries represented in the Austrian parliament, *Reichsrat*," the seventeen so-called crownlands (*Kronland*), under German supremacy, on the other side "the countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown," which phrase included, besides Hungary proper, Croatia and Slavonia as annexed countries and the city and district of Fiume as a "separate body" (*Separatum Corpus*) of the Crown of St. Stephen. We shall discuss later this strange political structure and its grave political consequences.

This is the more important because that process of the national awakening which I outlined in the last chapter of Part VII, did not signify in itself a centrifugal tendency but only the endeavor of each nation to develop its own national existence and culture. This endeavor became centrifugal only by the fact that the other non-German and non-Magyar nations of the monarchy felt the German-Magyar hegemony as a burden and there was a growing conviction among them that under this hegemony they were incapable of developing those economic, intellectual, and moral values which they considered as their national right. This struggle against the German-Magyar hegemony—as we shall see in detail—was complicated by other national struggles also among the so-called "oppressed nations" and what was still more dangerous was the fact that the two leading nations themselves fought each other more and more bitterly.

Another important fact realized by all objective observers was that these national struggles, growing in passionate intensity, showed directly opposite tendencies in Austria and in Hungary: in the former, political evolution went on manifestly in the direction of national equalization and federalization, whereas in the latter—at least seemingly—toward a unitary, unilingual, Magyar national state in which only one political nation was acknowledged as the force maintaining and directing the state. In the following treatment, therefore, we must separate completely the analysis of national struggles in Austria and in Hungary. But, before entering upon the investigation of these two different processes, I would like to point out some important facts

which will elucidate the very nature of the German-Magyar hegemony.

Above all there can be no doubt that the Dualistic Constitution was not created out of nothing by the Compromise of 1867, that it was not a sheer excogitation of Beust and Deák for the oppression of the other peoples, but it was only a jural fixation of a historical situation of several centuries. It was a jural recognition of the facts that the Austrian half of the monarchy consisted of a rather mechanical agglomerate of countries and provinces completely conquered and unified by the Habsburgs, deprived of their former constitutional independence; whereas, on the other hand, the Hungarian half constituted a country more or less independent for a thousand years, controlled by a feudal constitution which was successful until the end in retaining, partly by passive resistance and partly by armed insurrection, the unifying and Germanizing attack of the Habsburgs. This meant at the same time that the Habsburgs were incapable of incorporating Hungary into the uniform system of their other countries and territories and of reducing it to the rôle of a simple *Kronland*. This situation found for the last time an almost symbolical expression in the War of 1848–49 between Hungary and the Habsburgs when the latter could only suppress the Hungarian “rebellion” with the help of the Russian Tsar. This issue demonstrated clearly that there was a certain parity of forces between Austria and Hungary, or better, between Habsburg and Hungary. In 1867 the Emperor acknowledged simply this fact in a new jural form. Unifying absolutism capitulated before Hungarian “constitution and independence.”

It is not less clear on the other hand that this Dualistic Constitution was not based upon the ethnographical distribution and the numerical forces of the peoples and nations of the monarchy. In order to get an adequate idea of the ethnic forces of the monarchy, we must regard separately its constitutional units. Austria proper, Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia, and the last conquest of the Habsburgs, Bosnia, and Herzegovina (a kind of a constitutional mystery which did not belong, strictly speaking, either to Austria or to Hungary) constituted both from a historical and an administrative point of view distinct divisions inside of which the dynamics of national forces manifested themselves under different forms.

The distributions of the nations of Austria is shown in Table IV. Round numbers only are used for the sake of simplicity.

Table IV clearly shows that in the Austrian part of the monarchy the ratio of the leading German element was only 35.58 per cent and it was confronted by a great Slav majority of 60.65 per cent. Speaking in round numbers we may say that of the total population of Austria less than ten million Germans lived with a majority of eighteen million non-Germans.

The hegemonous rôle of the Germans was further endangered by

the fact that as a colonizing element it was present everywhere in the monarchy but it lacked a solid ethnographical central point from which its economic and cultural forces could have radiated throughout the whole territory. Different nations constituted an absolute majority in various provinces: (1) Germans in Salzburg, 99.73 per cent; in Upper Austria, 99.70 per cent; in Lower Austria, 95.91 per cent; in Vorarlberg, 95.36 per cent; in Carinthia, 78.61 per cent; in Styria, 70.50 per cent; in Tyrol, 57.31 per cent. (2) Czech-Moravian-Slovak in Moravia, 71.75 per cent; in Bohemia, 63.19 per cent. (3) Poles in Galicia, 58.55 per cent. (4) Slovenians in Carniola, 94.36 per cent; in Görz and Gradiska, 61.85 per cent. (5) Serbo-Croats in Dalmatia, 96.19 per cent. (6) Italian-Ladins in Trieste, 96.19 per cent.

National particularism was further accentuated by the existence of three provinces where the leading nation constituted only a relative majority. These provinces and their leading nations were: (1)

TABLE IV

Nations	Total Number	Percentage of Total Population
1. Germans.....	9,950,000	35.58
2. Czechs-Moravians Slovaks....	6,436,000	23.02
3. Poles.....	4,968,000	17.77
4. Ruthenians.....	3,519,000	12.58
5. Slovenians.....	1,253,000	4.48
6. Serb-Croats.....	788,000	2.80
7. Italian-Latins.....	768,000	2.75
8. Rumanians.....	275,000	0.98
9. Magyars.....	11,000	0.04

Germans in Silesia, 43.90 per cent; (2) Ruthenians in Bukowina, 38.90 per cent, and (3) Serbo-Croats in Istria, 43.52 per cent.

Generally speaking, Austria had only six provinces which could be regarded as nationally homogeneous: the German Lower and Upper Austria, Salzburg, Vorarlberg, the Slovenian Carniola, and the Serbo-Croat Dalmatia. German hegemony was further hampered by the fact that national minorities lived often not in close settlements but were found in a very mixed population in the various districts, cities, and communities which was a serious obstacle to the formation of homogeneous administrative divisions. For instance, in Carinthia, the settlements of the Slovenians permeated deeply the German regions. Bukowina was a kind of an ethnographical museum where, beside the two chief nations, there lived Germans, Jews, Poles, Magyars, Slovaks, and Lippovans, not only dispersed in the towns, but sometimes in close settlements. Purely German villages were adjacent to purely Magyar ones.

Also two other factors made German hegemony fragile. The one

was of a historical nature: the Germans were confronted by peoples of a very developed national consciousness who like the Czechs, the Italians, and the Poles were animated by a more positive state conception than the Austrian-Germans who with their Janus-faced policy could not choose between the Greater German and the Austrian-German state conception.

The other factor was the awkward geographical formation of Austria. Our economic survey has sufficiently proved how ill-founded the theory was (advocated especially during the World War from Austrian-German side) concerning the geographical unity of the monarchy. The truth was that the monarchy contained various mountain and river systems with no organic connection with Vienna. For instance Galicia and Bukowina had no real contact with the other parts of the monarchy, Tyrol projected like a wedge into the Swiss mountains and Upper Austria might have belonged with equal right to Ba-

TABLE V

Nations	Total Number	Percentage of Total Population
Magyars.....	9,945,000	54.5
Rumanians.....	2,948,000	16.1
Slovaks.....	1,946,000	10.7
Germans.....	1,903,000	10.4
Serbs.....	462,000	2.5
Ruthenians.....	464,000	2.5
Croats.....	195,000	1.1
Others.....	401,000	2.2

varia. If Hungary would have been a real and organic part of the empire, there could have arisen some kind of unity. But Hungary itself was a closed geographical unity admired by Elisée Reclus and other experts in geography, the historical consciousness and constitutional scheme of which was rigidly opposed to an Austrian state unity. With such a centrifugal Hungary in its background, Austria was like a fan which had only a periphery without a central part.

From many points of view the ethnographic and geographic basis of Magyar hegemony in the Hungarian countries was of a different nature. In studying these conditions we must separate Hungary proper from Croatia-Slavonia which had a distinct territorial autonomy. According to the census of 1910, Hungary in the restricted sense had an ethnographical distribution such as is shown in Table V.

These results of the official Hungarian statistics were often attacked by the advocates of the national minorities of Hungary by asserting that this numerical supremacy of the Magyars existed only on paper, and was due partly to the pressure and retouching of the ad-

ministrative organs and partly to the superficial assimilation of the Jews¹ and the renegades of the other nationalities who joined the Magyars *en masse* in order to share the advantages of their domination. This criticism was not entirely baseless but a detailed analysis of the whole process of assimilation in Hungary led me to the conclusion, in my book already quoted, that the results of Table V may be accepted as a roughly adequate description of the situation. Even applying the utmost caution we may accept it as a fact that the Magyars constituted in pre-war Hungary (Croatia-Slavonia not included) though a small, nevertheless an absolute majority. This conclusion is the more important because at the settlement of the *Ausgleich* (Compromise of 1867) the Magyar element constituted only 44.4 per cent of the whole population of the country. The Magyarization of the country made an important step forward. No honest observer will deny that in this process the artificial political assimilation, of which we shall speak later, was not a negligible factor. Nevertheless more important and more natural causes were operative in the growth of Magyar hegemony. I am compelled to enumerate these causes very briefly:

1. The powerful natural unity of the Carpathian basin held together by two large rivers furnishing a natural division of labor between the mountainous peripheries and the Hungarian plain.

2. The Magyar nation occupied the richer plains of the country and, in its central position, it exercised a great attraction on the nationalities of the peripheries. At the same time, the growing capitalism of the country accentuated this process as the leading elements of capitalism were intimately connected with the Hungarian government. These and other factors concurred with the result that the Hungarian towns with a Magyar majority became six times greater in population than they were at the end of the eighteenth century, whereas the towns with a non-Magyar majority could only double their population in the same period.

3. The cultural and intellectual distance between the Magyars and the other nations of the country was far greater than between the Austrian-Germans and their more developed neighbor nations, for instance, the Czechs, the Italians, and the Poles. The greatest part of the Hungarian nationalities, as the Rumanians, Ruthenians, and the Eastern Slovaks were scarcely awakened from their bondsmen stupor, whereas the more developed German minorities (in the first place the Saxons of Transylvania) had a tendency to unite with the Magyars for certain cultural or political privileges against the other nations.

4. While in Austria the capitalistic evolution created a strong

¹ According to the same census there lived in Hungary 911,000 Jews or 5 per cent of the population. Therefore, if the Jews had been treated as a separate nationality, the Magyar majority would have disappeared.

class differentiation in the ruling German nation, and at the same time caused the formation of an important middle class among the non-German nations, in Hungary this process was only at the beginning; the country remained in its bulk agrarian, and the industrial development of the country, even at the time of the collapse of the monarchy, was scarcely more striking than that of Austria in the eighties of the last century. Therefore, the political unity of the historical society remained far more compact and the leading rôle of the feudal classes, animated by the ideology of Magyarization and national unification, far less contested.

5. But all these factors were surpassed in significance by the following: in Hungary there were no crownlands which could foster the particularist consciousness of the various nations. The particularism of the county organization, already mentioned, was not national but only administrative. This organization stood entirely under the sway of the local wealthy nobility, almost exclusively Magyar or assimilated by the Magyars. These feudal elements opposed vehemently all attempts at national organization of the non-Magyar peasantry because they understood very well that the national emancipation of these masses would have meant also their social and political liberation. A natural result of this situation was that, almost until the hour of dissolution, there was in Hungary proper no national minority which aspired to an independent state as was the case of the Czechs, Poles, or Italians in Austria.

This transitory supremacy of the Magyars, however, was weakened by the fact that in three important regions of the country the non-Magyar nations constituted the majority. In the so-called Left River district of the Danube, the Slovaks constituted 58.8 per cent of the population; in Transylvania the Rumanians, 55 per cent, and in the region called the Tisza-Maros angle again the Rumanians had a relative majority constituting 39.5 per cent of the population. A further fateful trait of Hungarian hegemony was that the pressure of the *latifundia* weighed more heavily upon the Magyar small peasantry than upon the non-Magyar.

Even more uncertain will appear the numerical basis of Magyar hegemony when we consider the fact that the settlements of the various nations varied as mosaically as in Austria. It often occurred that Magyar, German, Rumanian, and Serb villages adjoined each other. In such cases generally the chief law of assimilation went on as the process of the sea which determines in the long run the ethnic composition of the islands. In the midst of the large compact popular settlements, the smaller enclaves were swept away by the waves of this sea. The Magyars, as the most intellectual and proletarianized element of the country, moved toward the greater urban agglomerations

and Magyarized them. On the other hand in the smaller villages, included within non-Magyar majorities, the opposite tendency was prevalent.

The numerical hegemony of the Magyars appears even more endangered when we consider the entire territory of the Hungarian crown comprising the ethnic conditions of Croatia-Slavonia. Here in opposition to the kaleidoscopic ethnic relations of Austria and Hungary an almost complete homogeneity prevailed. Of the 2,622,000 inhabitants of this country, 2,283,000 were Serbo-Croats, that is, 87.1 per cent of the population. Confronted with this large majority the rôle of the Germans with 5.1 per cent and the Hungarians with 4.1 per cent was quite insignificant the more so as the Germans were mostly town-dwellers, whereas, among the Magyars, the officials or workers sent from Budapest constituted an important contingent. If,

TABLE VI

Nation	Total Number	Percentage of Total Population
Germans	12,011,000	23.38
Magyars	10,120,000	19.71
Rumanians	3,222,000	6.27
Slavs	23,416,000	45.59
Others	2,585,000	5.05

therefore, we take the whole Hungarian crown into consideration, that is, Hungary proper *and* Croatia-Slavonia, the reader will clearly realize that the hegemonic Magyar element was on this territory a minority similar in position to the Germans in Austria. The ten million Magyars constituted only 48.1 per cent of the whole population, and beside them there were 10,800,000 non-Magyars.

If we remember finally that of the 1,932,000 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina there were 1,823,000 Serbo-Croats, that is, 96 per cent of the whole population, we see that the two hegemonic nations, the Germans and the Magyars, were in a distinct minority compared with the other nations. If we group the chief ethnic elements of the whole Austro-Hungarian empire, we are faced with the figures shown in Table VI which gives the percentages of the total population of 51,355,000.

Table VI demonstrates that the two hegemonic nations, the Germans and the Magyars together, with 22,131,000 constituted only 43.09 per cent of the whole population whereas the other nations of the monarchy formed a majority of 29,223,000 which is 56.91 per cent of the whole.

Under these conditions the Dual Constitution based on the German-Magyar hegemony was doomed to come into conflict sooner or later with the will of a considerable majority of the nations. In spite of this the constitution was capable of maintaining itself for half a century, and under its rule a conspicuous material and cultural development of the monarchy cannot be denied. It is, therefore, evident to anyone who is not a naïve admirer of the theory of violence that the German-Magyar political hegemony, not based upon the numerical preponderance of the two nations, must have been rooted in other important facts. I have already several times alluded to these facts in the course of this book. The Austrian half of the empire was a result of the German colonization, and the culture which united its economy, administration, and the army was in the main German culture. Similarly in the capitalistic era the new bourgeois class, which exercised

TABLE VII

Nationalities	Population	Number of Universities	Number of High Schools
Germans.....	9,000,000	5	180
Czechs.....	6,000,000	1	83
Poles.....	4,200,000	2	35
Ruthenians.....	3,400,000	0	3
Slovenians.....	1,200,000	0	0
Serbo-Croats.....	700,000	0	6
Italians.....	700,000	0	8
Rumanians.....	230,000	0	0

the economic leadership, was in its large majority of a German-Jewish character. In the Hungarian half of the monarchy we encounter an analogous situation. The feudal structure of the big landed interests which determined the course of the political and social life was the Magyar nobility and those elements of the middle classes and of the non-Magyar nobility which became entirely assimilated in tradition and ideology with the Magyar upper classes.²

It is easy to demonstrate, by means of outstanding facts of economic and cultural life, that this historical German and Magyar hegemony was very preponderant until the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. I shall quote only some facts, almost at random, in order to give a more concrete idea to the reader of the nature of this hegemony. Let us begin with Austria. The Germans constituting only 35.58 per cent of the population paid 63 per cent of the direct taxes in the first decade of the present century. A German paid on an av-

² Before the constitutional era there were about 550,000 nobles in Hungary. Among these 466,000 Magyars, 58,000 Germans, and 21,000 Rumanians. The "national" mission of the nobility was recently reassured by Julius Szeckfü, *Three Generations* (Budapest, 1922). In Hungarian.

erage twice as much in taxes as a Czech or an Italian, four and a half times more than a Pole, and seven times more than a southern Slav.³

The same preponderance of the Germans is shown in Table VII by the figures of higher education at the end of the nineteenth century.

The national distribution of officials and officers make the picture drawn by the figures in Table VIII even more impressive.

No detailed statistics were published concerning the nationality distribution of the officers in the army, but there can be no doubt that even in 1910 at least 85 per cent of the officers were Germans. This

TABLE VIII

Nationalities	Distribution among 1,000 Austrians	Nationalities	Distribution among 1,000 Officials
German.....	357	German.....	479 (+122)
Czech.....	232	Czech.....	232
Pole.....	165	Pole.....	125 (-40)
Ruthenian.....	132	Ruthenian.....	29 (-103)
Slovenian.....	46	Slovenian.....	32 (-14)
Serbo-Croat.....	27	Serbo-Croat.....	12 (-15)
Italian.....	28	Italian.....	35 (+7)
Rumanian.....	9	Rumanian.....	4 (-5)

TABLE IX

NATIONALITIES AMONG 1,000	OCCUPATIONS			
	Agriculture and Forestry	Industry	Commerce and Transportation	Intellectual
Germans.....	335	383	134	148
Czechs.....	431	365	93	111
Poles.....	656	148	112	84
Ruthenians.....	933	25	17	25
Serbo-Croats.....	869	46	38	47
Slovenians.....	754	134	35	77
Italians.....	501	234	127	138
Rumanians.....	903	27	25	45

fact is the more significant because according to an official record of 1900 there were in the joint army 400,000 Slav, 227,000 German, 220,000 Magyar, 48,000 Rumanian, and 14,000 Italian soldiers.

No less enlightening are the results of the statistical compilations, shown in Table IX, concerning the professional classes⁴ and the manner in which they were employed.

Table IX demonstrates that the Germans were far more active in industry and commerce than the other nations of the monarchy which

³ Heinrich Rauchberg, *Die Bedeutung der Deutschen in Österreich* (Dresden, 1908), p. 18.

⁴ O. Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage*, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

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explains their economic leadership. At the same time these figures verify the conclusion that national consciousness grows usually in direct proportion to the industrialization and commercialization of the various nations.

It would be an easy task to demonstrate the great economic and cultural predominance of the Germans also in other fields. But the foregoing examples give a sufficiently clear idea of how preponderantly the former Austria of the absolutistic period was a German state, when after the passionate struggles of more than a century, it retained still its German character.

Even still more striking was the economic and cultural hegemony of the Magyars in Hungary proper. I must restrict myself here to a few examples. Among the towns and bigger villages above 10,000 there were 80 with a Magyar, 9 with a German, 8 with a Slovak, 6 with a Serb, and 2 with a Rumanian majority. This signifies that 76.09 per cent of all the urban agglomerations was Magyar. We reach the same conclusion if we regard the ethnic composition of the towns. Table X, according to the census of 1910, gives the percentages of the various nationalities among the total urban population.

TABLE X

Nationalities	Per Cent
Magyars	76.6
Germans	9.7
Slovaks	4.3
Rumanians	3.6
Ruthenians	0.1
Croatians	0.5
Serbs	2.3
Others	2.9

Knowing the intimate connection between the urban agglomerations and the spirit of culture and democracy, we are entitled to draw the conclusion that the distribution of the spiritual and economic forces of former Hungary coincided approximately with the foregoing figures. Other facts will corroborate this hypothesis.

Among the intellectual professions the Magyars, whose percentage of the total population was only 54.5 per cent, show the figures in 1914 as given in Table XI.

TABLE XI

Professions	Per Cent
State Officials	95.6
County Officials	92.9
Judges and Prosecutors	96.8
Lawyers	89.1
Clergy	63.7
Teachers in Elementary Schools	81.9
Teachers in High Schools	91.5
Teachers in Universities and Colleges	93.4
Physicians	89.1

We find approximately the same ratio among the students of the middle and higher education.

Table XII shows the percentages of the various nationalities among the students graduated from high schools or similar institutions in 1913.

TABLE XII

Nationalities	Per Cent
Magyars	82.0
German	7.8
Slovaks	2.1
Rumanians	5.7
Ruthenians	0.1
Croats	0.2
Serbs	1.6
Others	0.5

Similarly among the students in the universities and colleges 89.2 per cent were Magyars in the first semester of the year 1913-14.

Not less conspicuous was the hegemony of the Magyars in the walks of economic life. Whereas, among the independent artisans working without apprentices, the percentage of the Magyars corresponded roughly to their percentage in the general population, among the more prosperous artisans employing apprentices the percentage of the Magyars amounted to 71 per cent. Generally speaking the larger an industrial plant was, the more its Magyar character became prominent.

Among the 2,884 proprietors of plants employing more than 20 apprentices, 2,228 were of Magyar tongue according to the census of 1910. Among 1,657 proprietors of estates containing above 1,420 acres, there were 1,515 Magyars. Of the intellectual leading staff of the larger industrial plants the Magyars held a percentage of 83 and of the qualified workers, 63.

If we compare the taxes paid by predominantly Magyar regions of the country with those paid by the predominantly non-Magyar districts, we find that the taxes of the Magyar counties amounted in 1907 to 101,000,000 crowns whereas the non-Magyar counties contributed only 81 millions. Budapest alone paid in direct state taxes a sum which equalled the financial contribution of the whole of Transylvania and of the Left River district of the Danube, which was the biggest part of the non-Magyar territory.

In order not to burden the reader with other facts, I beg only to emphasize one more outstanding feature of the situation. Table XIII will show the newspapers and periodicals published in 1909 in the various languages of the country.

In connection with these figures it will perhaps be interesting to note that among the ninety-four libraries of the former Hungary

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which possessed more than 10,000 volumes, there were eighty-five Magyar, six German, two Serb, and one Rumanian.

In these and similar facts we find the real basis of the Magyar and German hegemony. No honest observer of the situation would pretend that all these facts were only a result of the natural development of the social forces. There can be no doubt that the political system and the state administration influenced them to a certain extent. But it is

TABLE XIII

TYPES OF NEWSPAPERS	LANGUAGES IN WHICH PUBLISHED				
	Magyar	German	Slovak	Rumanian	Ruthenian
Political	248	50	5	17	0
Local	287	38	1	4	0
Literary	50	4	2	5	0
Technical	771	55	3	18	1
Others	21	3	0	0	0
Total	1377	150	11	44	1
Percentage	80.67	8.79	0.64	2.58	0.06

no less manifest that this hegemony was not an artificial one and was not based on sheer force but was a result of a long historical evolution of effects determined by the German dynasty, bureaucracy, militarism, and capitalism on the one hand, and by Magyar feudalism and finance on the other.

The struggle of the other nations was directed against the economic and cultural monopolies of the two hegemonic nations. This could only be accomplished by the transformation of the whole former political structure.

CHAPTER II

THE CHIEF TENDENCY OF THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL STRUGGLES: THE MOVE TOWARD NATIONAL EQUALITY

The struggle, which went on in Austria for more than half a century with growing ardor and bitterness and which led very often to the obstruction of the Parliament and many of the Diets, accompanied by political persecutions, street riots, military sieges, and imprisonments, assumed sometimes the forms of a chronic civil war. For instance, in 1895 the government of Count Badeni made an end to an absolutistic régime in Bohemia which lasted more than two years. During this time 7 journals were stopped, 17 associations dissolved, and 24 papers were put under daily censorship. One hundred and seventy-nine accused were put before exceptional tribunals and punishments of imprisonment were sentenced which totaled 278 years.¹

This struggle was in its deepest root the fight between two antagonistic principles and world views. The one was the point of view of the *beati possidentes* (those in power), tending to maintain the historical character of the state, the centralized bureaucratic empire under German hegemony. The other was the point of view of those outside the controlling power, of the oppressed or at least second-rank nations tending to remold the old Austria into a decentralized state of nationalities or of equal nations more or less on a confederative basis. Centralization under German hegemony or federalism, conscious of the fact that Austria possessed a Slav majority and therefore, willing to open a way to this majority will—these were the two antagonistic conceptions lying at the bottom of the kaleidoscopic national struggles of Austria.

Naturally this statement is far too abstract and schematic. The struggling masses and even their leaders very often had not a clear comprehension as to the nature and tendency of their fight because, in politics, the contending parties are led less by principles than by the conflicts of daily interests. It is quite clear that the Germans, full of the traditional conception of a German world-empire; or the Czechs, cherishing the brilliant memories of Hussitism and emphasizing more and more clearly the unity of the Crown of Wenceslaus; or the Polish nobility, regarding their nation as “the Christ of the Nations” and continuing the dream of the empire of Jagello from coast to coast; or the Italians, looking always wistfully toward the end of

¹ Richard Charmatz, *Österreichs äussere und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914* (Leipzig u. Berlin, 1918), pp. 20–21.