

PART VII
CONSCIOUS EFFORTS IN CIVIC EDUCATION

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CHAPTER I

OBSTACLES TO CIVIC EDUCATION

It is manifest that in the framework of those historical forces, constitutional life and public mentality which we have become acquainted with in this volume, there was no real opportunity for a conscious effort in civic education. The whole monarchy has never been considered as a problem of the people who constituted it but only as a problem of the dynasty and of the ruling classes. The real outstanding and fundamental question of the monarchy, how to satisfy the different national and cultural claims of the various nationalities in such a way as to give them ample possibilities to develop their historical individuality and consciousness but at the same time to build up a super-national consciousness of a state solidarity among them, this question, as we have seen, with very few exceptions, was not even perceived or formulated. Really the whole moral and constitutional atmosphere of the monarchy made such a conscious effort in civic education impossible. To solve this problem would have meant, in the ultimate resort, the federalization of the monarchy. The problem could have been solved only "between equals," or at least potential equals. But the whole system of the monarchy was the formal denial of such an equality. The German-Magyar hegemony was the real bulwark of the Constitution, the unshakeable rock upon which the whole system was built. And inside of this framework a *divide et impera* policy in Austria, and the strict repudiation of any idea of national equality or super-national federalization in Hungary. And though a relatively great progress was achieved in Austria toward the cultural self-expression of the various nations as a result of continuous struggles and compromises, the problem as a whole, in a systematic, conscious, constructive manner was never touched. Mr. Strakosch-Grassmann in his valuable book on the history of the Austrian public instruction has acutely shown that a bettering of the general conditions in the recent decades was a direct result of the growing decentralization in popular education and of the growing elimination of the paralyzing influences of the centralized administration, but this manifest progress could not bear the desired fruit because the process was checked by the antiquated framework of the Dualistic Constitution.

The lack of a solid will, which has characterized the Austrian state administration since 1879 in an ever increasing measure, was also manifest in the field of public education. . . . The want of any political plan and the absence of any ethical consideration are characteristic of the whole state administration.

And his final conclusion was that the "national organization of public instruction in Austria would presuppose the organization of all the nations into political and administrative units." Each nation should have the incontestable right to establish its own schools at its own expense. The educational items should disappear from the budget of the state and should belong exclusively to the competence of the single nations.

The federal state, following the example of the United States, of Switzerland, and of the German empire, is the only solution of the problem as to how the Austrian state can continue. But the antiquated crownlands should be replaced by the political organizations of the Nations. . . . The old Austria, in which officials of the central Viennese administration have governed the whole empire, no longer survives. . . . The individual nations of a state composed of so many heterogeneous peoples exist not to be kneaded into a unitary state, but the state should be transformed in such a way that each individual nation could have the greatest possible amount of self-determination. . . .¹

As a matter of fact the internal evolution of Austria, as has been demonstrated, was dominated though in an unconscious and chaotic way by this principle. An organic solution, however, of the whole problem was impossible on the basis of the Dualistic Constitution. The growing floods of national energy could not find a sufficient natural outlet. This situation was further aggravated by the fact that civic education in Austria and in Hungary followed not only different, but totally antagonistic principles.

¹ *Geschichte des Österreichischen Unterrichtswesens* (Wien, 1905), pp. 349-53.

CHAPTER II

THE AUSTRIAN SYSTEM OF CIVIC EDUCATION

Generally speaking, the whole public instruction in Austria was permeated by the old dynastic and patrimonial conception of the state. Austrian history was described, almost exclusively in all the textbooks as a history of the dynasty and its war lords. After the perusal of the accepted textbooks in civics and history, one has the impression that all the events were personal acts of the Emperors. The whole history as it was taught was a glorification of the dynastic force, a kind of a vast *dynastic epopoeia*. All the chapters of the widely spread texts, all their pictures emphasized and extolled the same point of view. One has the feeling that the peoples were only mute personages in the anational drama of the Habsburgs, purposeless instruments in the hands of the Emperors, their war lords, and ministers. The school festivals were celebrations of the birthday of the Emperor and of other important family events. All patriotic songs were the glorification of the Sovereign or of the exploits of his successful generals. It is quite characteristic that the only Austrian song which could be called patriotic in a popular sense, the song glorifying the memory of Andreas Hofer, is not an expression of an Austrian solidarity but of the loyalty toward "the good Emperor Francis" and of the love "of the holy country, Tyrol."

This tendency to describe Austrian history as the personal work of the Habsburgs; to extol all their military exploits, even the smallest; to eliminate as far as possible the memory of their defeats, errors, or faults; to qualify all movements opposed to the Imperial Majesty as pure crimes or rebellions was a constant feature of all the popular textbooks. They are permeated with the spirit of a nauseating Byzantinism. Some few examples will elucidate the extreme morbidity of the whole atmosphere. For instance, Dr. Emanuel Hannak, former director of the Teacher's Seminar in Vienna gave the following instruction to his pupils under the heading "Formation of Character and Will":

The rapturous feeling of love and esteem clings primarily to the leader of the state, whose picture is already known to the child from his earliest infancy by the money in circulation and by its presence in a dignified place both in the home and the school. He learns to venerate him as the father of the fatherland and extends this reverence to all the members of his majestic family. . . .¹

¹ *Methodik des Unterrichtes in der Geschichte* (2d ed., Wien, 1907), pp. 14-15.

When the minds of the children were filled with a great amount of useless details and servile adulations, the most important economic, cultural, and national connections of Austrian history were entirely neglected. For instance, concerning the Viennese revolution of 1848 an extensively used textbook narrates that "for such troubles the too benign Emperor felt himself not a match, he left Vienna and went to Olmütz, to his residence. . . ." On the other hand all the results and achievements of a period are exclusively portrayed as the personal work of the sovereign. A popular little textbook, for example, though containing only seventy-nine small pages, enumerates under the title "What Emperor Francis Joseph Did for His Peoples" in a long series of items all the creations of this great emperor, beginning with the granting of a constitution and finishing with the water-supply of the capital.² Naturally all the new universities or hospitals were a personal present of the magnanimous sovereign to his beloved nations.

But in spite of the exuberance of this dynastic patriotism, the real results of the system were very small. Especially in the non-German regions the dynastic enthusiasm spread by the schools was only "a cold lip-service of the teachers," whereas in an unofficial manner they extolled and cherished the national aspirations of their respective peoples. This growing chasm between dynastic and national patriotism could not be bridged by the anxious efforts of the official administration. So for instance it became a system, especially in the non-German regions, to have the students write so-called "Patriotic Tests," an endeavor to bring into harmony the regional patriotism with the Habsburg patriotism. The better teachers, however, felt always the futility of such an attempt. What could the poor school do against the impetuous flood of national dissatisfaction, against the acrimonious criticism of the popular leading articles of the daily press and against the continuous national scandals in the Diets and in Parliament? The more serious teacher, therefore, avoided as far as possible these patriotic experiments because they were perfectly aware of the fact that such and similar artificial worship of the dynastic state was useless and could only debase the moral character of the pupils. At this juncture I remember a characteristic episode. A new governor of Dalmatia, dissatisfied with the growing Slav spirit of a high school, asked somewhat bitterly the director of this institution why its moral atmosphere could not be as good and patriotic as that of a *Kadettenschule* (colleges for the education of future officers). To which this acquaintance of mine replied: "Sir, if you were capable of putting all

² Al. Swetina, *Das Wichtigste aus der Österreichischen Geschichte* (5th ed., Sternberg, 1908), pp. 56-57.

the children of this province under the same conditions as your cadets, separated from their family, in the dynastical hothouse of a secluded college, we could obtain exactly the same results. . . .”

This courageous answer gives really the true key to the problem of civic education in Austria. The only institution of the monarchy, as has been already emphasized in another connection, which was really successful in creating for a long period a type of man in whom the idea of a dynastic patriotism and of the interests of the super-state was stronger than the national aspirations of his race, was the imperial army. Why? Because it constituted a real state within the state, a dynastic island in the sea of the growing national and social struggles. Upon this island there was quite an artificial cultural vegetation. And the chief textbook of the *K. K. Armee* (Imperial-Royal Army), the famous *Dienstreglement* (Rule of Service), was a real Bible of Habsburg patriotism. It is highly characteristic that the traditional oath taken by the soldier was purely and simply an oath of vassalage toward the Emperor and his official officer staff, without a single word of any duty of the soldier toward his fatherland, people, or constitution. On the other hand, a very scrupulous and tactful care was maintained that the members of the imperial army should feel themselves as equals not disturbed by national rivalries or chauvinistic particularisms. Thus, for instance, paragraph 5 of the *Dienstreglement* emphasized in a solemn and resolute manner that

the destiny of the army, uniting many thousands in a lofty purpose, demands a common spirit and unity both in the singular organized bodies and in the totality of the armed force. This common spirit is rooted in the feeling of solidarity and in the realization of the necessity of subordinating private interest to the well-being of the whole. It creates the professional feeling (*Standesbewusstsein*), fosters a severe self-denying accomplishment of duty, and develops the highest military virtues. . . .

But this very definition of the dynastic patriotism shows its fragility for the modern times. It created not a state consciousness but a professional consciousness for the imperial service. Therefore, any progress in national and cultural development of the various peoples lessened this professional solidarity and strengthened the national, strictly opposed to the imperialistic super-state. The leading circles were perfectly aware of this situation and it became a kind of governmental maxim to keep the “loyal army” as far as possible aloof from the general population infected with the bacilli of a more liberal and national public opinion.

In this dilemma only a new type of civic education could have found a way out: a civic education convincing the various peoples of the monarchy of the necessity and advantages of a mutual, economic and cultural co-operation under the patronage of a free federal state.

But nothing was done in this direction. The ten nations of the monarchy and its various nationalities were total strangers to each other, and the whole system of public education was entirely incapable of closing this gap. Discussing this problem retrospectively with some outstanding educators of former Austria, their opinions converged on the point that the whole system of public education never faced this problem in its real importance and seriousness.

The chief interest of Austrian history—so a former educational leader wrote—was not concentrated upon Austria as a state of various nations but it was always directed upon the Habsburg state under the hypothesis of the political and cultural preponderance of the Germans. . . . Though this spirit was far less chauvinistic than that of the Western nation states, it was also devoid of any genuine enthusiasm, and the idea of a general reconciliation of the nations was never considered. . . . There was scarcely the opportunity and still less the desire to learn the languages of the non-German peoples and a mutual intellectual penetration, therefore, was out of the question. Especially the distance between Austria and Hungary became more and more unbridgeable; the general Austrian student left school with the impression that beyond the Leitha an entirely foreign country began. . . . Though a certain amount of political geography concerning the various nations was taught, this teaching was entirely a dead letter, giving no impetus toward a better mutual understanding and co-operation. The strangeness of the people to each other was the cause of the downfall of the old Austria and our school system did nothing to prevent it.

Another eminent expert emphasized to me that the purely dynastic accent of Austrian history was detrimental to a state idea and even in the nationally mixed territories the German students rarely learned the non-German languages. Besides, the most important chapters of modern Austro-Hungarian history were treated in a very summary way, giving to the students very slight opportunity to understand the essence of those changes which led to the dualistic remolding of the constitution. All the actions and movements against the Habsburg dynasty were naturally portrayed as riotous upheavals without any real justification.

Speaking generally, however, one might say that public education in Austria committed sins of omission rather than commission. In the cool dynastic and bureaucratic atmosphere of this system everything was omitted which could have led to mutual hatred among the students and to the artificial fostering of national and racial antipathy. Unfortunately the other great factors in civic education, political life, and local administration, the daily press and the social organizations of the citizens worked in quite another direction. In all these fields of public life the spirit of an intolerant nationalism grew stronger and stronger. In so far as national consciousness permeated more and more all the various ethnical elements of the monarchy, the emphasis and fostering, the lip-service and adulation of this feeling

became a springboard for all business politicians and demagogues. National feeling in its vagueness, elasticity, and traditional sentimentalism gave an excellent opportunity for building up a united national front against the "common enemy," for canalizing all economic and social dissatisfaction of the masses, and for hiding class antagonism and cultural differences for the benefit of a loud, confused national demagogy. The dynamics of this process have already been described elsewhere.³ At this juncture I would like only to emphasize that neither the state nor society tried to counterbalance, on the basis of a constructive policy, these dissolving tendencies. The immense majority of the Austrian newspapers, especially the most powerful German capitalistic press, found it excellent business to promote the wave of national paroxysm. The same was done by the so-called national and cultural associations, an extended network of which covered all the countries of the monarchy. Each nation had its own national-cultural associations motivated by the necessity of safeguarding its national rights against the aggressive tendency of another nationality by fostering national consciousness; by organizing the still apathetic strata; by founding schools, choirs, libraries, and other cultural organizations in order to strengthen the nation as a whole. No one can deny that these associations were an important factor in the development of national consciousness, especially among the more backward nations of the empire. But from the point of view of a state-solidarity their effect was strictly detrimental because they soon were transformed from an instrument of self-defense and consolidation into a demagogic apparatus, a chauvinistic machine for the benefit of the political bosses and of sinecure officials, shouting the most envenomed slogans of national hatred. The political parties and the local administration, and later, as we have seen, the state administration itself, came more and more under the sway of the hypertrophy of the nationalistic feeling created by these pseudo-cultural associations.

³ Compare pp. 284–87 of this book.

CHAPTER III

THE HUNGARIAN SYSTEM OF CIVIC EDUCATION

Just the opposite was the situation in Hungary where, after the Compromise of 1867, all Habsburg administration was completely eliminated and the time-honored Hungarian state reassumed its complete internal sovereignty. The ruling Magyar classes, triumphant against the centralizing Viennese administration, regarded as their only historical mission the building up of a unitary Magyar state. The acknowledgment of the other nations as not only agglomerations of individuals but as distinct political units of the country was repudiated as an offense against the very idea of the Hungarian nation. Though a cold lip-service was paid to the dynasty by the official circles, by the high clergy and aristocracy, as long as the sovereign did not interfere with the claims and interests of the ruling class, this dynastic loyalty did not permeate the vast strata of the population of the Magyars who combatted through centuries Habsburg absolutism and Germanization. Therefore, this dynastic religion which determined to a large extent civic education in Austria was almost entirely lacking in the Magyar nation and animated only certain circles of the nationalities which, owing to the traditions of the past, continued to regard the Habsburgs as a kind of potential bulwark against the growing tide of Magyar nationalism.

The main features of this nationalism, its tendencies toward an artificial, if necessary, even forcible Magyarization of the non-Magyar nationalities, were described elsewhere.¹ In this connection I would like only to emphasize that in opposition to Austria the Hungarian state had a very systematic, even highly dogmatic conception of a civic education devoted exclusively to the conception of a Magyar national state. The leading circles of Hungary regarded the Hungarian state, in spite of the small Magyar majority of the country, as a united national state, entitled to this dignity by the same historical reasons by which the English, the French, the German, and the Italian nations have a right to build up a completely homogeneous national state, disregarding any other ethnic elements as constituting parts of state sovereignty. All the moral and spiritual energies of the state were devoted to this unique aim of national assimilation, centralization, and consolidation. The entire educational system of the state served, almost with a religious fervor, this supreme dogma of national unity. In the absence of a bourgeois class in a Western sense and in the absence of an organized peasantry and an efficient labor movement, this

¹ Compare pp. 327 ff. of this book.

ideology of national unity and solidarity was carried on almost exclusively according to the traditions and social values of the feudal classes. If I called the public training in history in Austria a dynastic epopoeia, I must characterize the Hungarian system of civic training as a *feudal epopoeia*. The whole public education, press, and cultural activity of social associations described and portrayed the history of the Magyar state as a unique effort for national independence and solidarity under the exclusive leadership of the Magyar nobility. All the uprisings and rebellions of the feudal classes against the Habsburgs were glorified as national struggles for emancipation in a modern national sense. All the selfish opposition of the feudal classes against the reforms of the enlightened absolutism was explained exclusively by high national motives. The whole history of the country was set forth as a classless history of national enthusiasm against the devilish plans of Habsburg centralization and the even more devilish plots of the Rumanians and the Slavs, who in spite of the unheard of magnanimity of the Magyars, made common cause with the Austrian aggressors. The imperialistic episodes of Hungarian history, the Greater Hungary of a Louis the Great and King Matthias were enthusiastically commented upon not only as things of past glory but also as future possibilities provided the nation should reconquer its ancient unity and warlike virtues.

I had the opportunity of getting some interesting replies on a questionnaire which I sent to some educational authorities of the former Hungary inquiring about her pre-war experiences in this field. One of them, the former head of a very important instructional district, characterizes the knowledge of the Magyar students concerning the culture and aspirations of the non-Magyars as follows:

The non-Magyar peoples of the country were only mentioned in the political geography and in a very cursory manner. The only thing which the students knew about them was in what parts of the country they lived and what was their numerical strength. Their achievements in history were narrated as perfectly hostile actions against the Hungarian nation under the devilish excitation of the Habsburgs. (For instance, the riot of Hora-Kloska, the upheavals of the nationalities in 1848-49.) Never a word was said concerning their ethnic particularities, culture, literature, or popular art. Generally speaking, when occasionally the non-Magyar peoples were mentioned they were always portrayed as of an inferior culture and as enemies of the Magyars who made common cause with the Habsburgs from sheer malevolence, envy, and hatred of the Magyars. The psychological cause of this attitude was never explained to the students, at best the fact was alluded to that, as they were formerly conquered by the Magyars when the state was created, later they tried to avenge themselves against their rightful masters. That pre-eminently economic and social causes contributed to this antagonism, especially the pressure of the latifundist system, the repulsion against the feudal administration, and the defense

of their national language was concealed by silence by all our books and teachers. The Compromise of 1867 was glorified as the work of the "sage of the nation" and described as giving total independence to the country and guaranteeing the supremacy of the Magyars over the nationalities. But never was reasonably elucidated what was the part of the Magyars in the Constitution, what were their duties and obligations toward the other nations of the monarchy. On the contrary the illusion was fostered that Hungary was an entirely independent, free, and self-sufficient country which could do what it liked. The other nations of the monarchy, the Germans themselves, were disregarded as mute and insignificant partners in the Magyar epic. A kind of romantic symbolism permeated all instruction. The Magyar nation became the innocent poor fellow of the popular tales who was attacked on every side by malignant enemies, but he, by his incredible courage, was always victorious over the treacherous assailants. Similarly, until the Compromise the Habsburgs were described as monsters who attacked the loyal Magyar nation without any serious motive, exclusively led by hatred and antipathy. That this struggle was largely due to the economic and social privileges of the feudal classes, which checked all efforts of the King in building up a modern state, was never mentioned or analyzed.

In this atmosphere the Magyar student never learned the languages of the other nations, even in nationally mixed territories where there was a possibility for doing so. It was the very intention of the administration that in the high schools and similar institutions the non-Magyar languages should play a minor rôle. Therefore, there was no intellectual or cultural co-operation between the Magyars and non-Magyars. Generally speaking, the whole elementary and secondary education was characterized by the fact that the child's face was turned backward, he could look only upon the past. He could never see himself in his relation to the present. And this past was an artificially constructed picture in the center of which stood the heroic Magyar nation, surrounded by few friends and many enemies. No wonder, therefore, that the student, graduated from high school, did not know anything concerning the real cultural and economic forces of his country and the opposite historical traditions of the various other nations.

All the other experts whom I questioned narrated very similar experiences. The non-Magyar nations were regarded as peoples without history, having no special mission, the Magyarization of which could be the only possible issue in the long run. All the festivals, literary and social associations fostered the same spirit. The chivalrous Magyar nation was terribly abused by its pernicious enemies, both by the dynasty and the nationalities, but the time is near when it will reconquer its former glory, its entire independence and unity. All the moral and financial forces of civic education were concentrated toward this ideal, which represented the most sincere and serious conviction of the Magyar society and of the leading educational staff. For three generations Magyar public opinion, almost without any

counterbalance, regarded the history of the country and of the whole world through this distorted perspective.

Following the relative consolidation and material prosperity of the period after the Compromise, the spirit of this exclusive nationalism became more and more intolerant. Even the catastrophe of 1849, when the Russian intervention made the struggle against Austria impossible and when the heroic leader of the Magyar forces was obliged to lay down his arms, even this tragic episode became as oil on the fire of national conceit because public opinion embraced the legend eagerly that General Görgey, the Hungarian generalissimo, was a traitor and without this devilish personality the Magyar would have been triumphant over both the Austrians and the Russians.

In spite of the inherent fallacies of this system of civic education, it seemed for a long period to be efficient and victorious, especially in the big cities and in all those circles where Magyar economic, cultural, and political life was sufficiently intensive. Magyar public opinion was under the mirage of this optical illusion, disregarding the fact that in the rural districts and in the small towns many millions of non-Magyar nationalities were untouched by this trend of exuberant patriotism. It was dazzled by the results of the brilliant Hungarian capital and certain other important commercial centers where the German and the Jewish middle class and even many members of the other nationalities became ardent supporters of the Magyar state idea. The meaning and significance of this process has been previously analyzed. In this connection I would like to emphasize again that it was to a large extent a spontaneous assimilation due to the ardor and passionate driving-force of this civic education. In a recent historical novel Louis Hatvany reconstructed with ability the psychology of this process. He narrates how the teacher Mihályi (formerly a Slovak with the family name of Mihalek) shouted to the boys of his class "like a student reciting his lesson that on the Eastern rampart of Europe the handful of Magyars defended European civilization against the Turks and fought its solitary fight, poor abandoned race, for the liberty of the world." Also the enthusiasm of the Jewish assimilated elements is excellently portrayed by the same author. An old Jew ridicules the ardent Magyar feeling of his son:

"Who speaks Magyar? Nobody understands the Magyar tongue beyond Pressburg." Now the voice of the son was choked. But only for a moment, then he replied courageously: "And if we, like our King Matthias, will reconquer Vienna, then even there everybody will speak Magyar."²

The feeling out of which such and similar attitudes arose was in most cases perfectly genuine, nourished by national festivals through

² *Lords and Men* (Budapest, 1926), I, 263. In Hungarian.

which patriotism, especially the memory of March 15, 1848, the beginning of the Hungarian revolution (interpreted almost exclusively as a national upheaval against Austria and not as a proclamation of human rights, which it was at the same time) and the tragic remembrance of the thirteen Hungarian generals murdered at Arad by the imperial justice in 1849 was extolled with an ardent enthusiasm. The growing fervor of these memorial days alarmed certain circles and a loyal premier, Baron Desider Bánffy, tried to counterbalance them by establishing a new national holiday tending to bring into harmony the Magyar feeling with loyalty toward the King. Therefore, a law was passed in 1898 which declared April 11, as the national holiday, as the fiftieth anniversary of the day when, in 1848, the laws of independence proposed by the Hungarian parliament were sanctioned by the Monarch. As a matter of fact the new national holiday received only a very cool lip-service because public opinion did not forget that the same laws were ignominiously violated by the Habsburgs within a few months. The only result of this shrewd loyalty was, therefore, to re-enforce the enthusiasm of the real national festivals.

Another successful instrument in the promotion of Magyar solidarity was the Magyarization of the family names. The origin of this fashion may be found in the imperial administration when Joseph II ordered that the Jews should adopt German family names. Especially the liberal enthusiasm of 1848 and 1867 induced many people to accept Magyar names as a symbol of their loyalty to the victorious nation which was willing to share its privileges with the other nationalities. Later the tax on applications for the new names was reduced to a nominal sum which made this patriotic custom quite usual and widely spread. By it a great number of sincere Magyar patriots were created but at the same time it opened the door for adventurers who tried to find admittance into feudal society by their new names. The government greatly favored these measures in the state offices, it even applied certain compulsory procedures. As the participation of the Jews and Germans was disproportionately high in the Hungarian economic and intellectual life, the Magyarization of names was an excellent instrument for showing to foreigners the non-existent racial unity of the country. The true motive of the leading circles was unmasked after the war when Hungary was dismembered and the non-Magyar territories detached. The ruling element did not need any longer the assistance of the Jews in its fight against the nationalities and consequently its public opinion changed radically. The Magyarization of names is no longer favored. On the contrary the state makes grave hindrances against the Jewish applications.

As in Austria, in Hungary too, the press and the so-called cultural associations played a great part in the creation of national consciousness and solidarity. There was, however, a great difference be-

tween the two systems in the fact that whereas the Austrian state kept itself farther and farther from the national struggles and avoided intentionally the impression of a German state, in Hungary both press and the system of cultural associations served as a powerful means in the hands of the state authorities against the nationalities and for the propagation of national unity. An extended network of Magyar cultural associations was artificially fostered and those of the Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Serbs demolished. Only the Rumanians and the Germans had sufficient strength to maintain to some extent their cultural associations. But the slightest cultural movement of the nationalities was severely controlled and its "irredentistic" aims vehemently denounced, even in many cases where they were really purely cultural, whereas the similar Magyar associations enjoyed not only complete freedom but were allowed to employ a licentious language. In a study relative to the activity of these associations, a Hungarian observer made the statement that they had the tendency to become instruments of the political machine and jingo organizations against the nationalities:

They confide to the government that the Slovaks will establish a reading-room and, therefore, the country is in danger; that the state inspectors are not sufficiently severe with the Slovak teachers; that the Rumanian teachers intend to hold a meeting for the bettering of their financial status; that the Hungarian Vend pupils frequent the schools of the Austrian Slovenians and that the authorities give too much freedom to the movements of the nationalities. The cultural associations squandered great energies and their leaders are unable to understand that their activity is not only futile but positively detrimental. . . .³

Still more dangerous, from the point of view of a true state solidarity, was the activity of the Magyar press. While the press of the nationalities was often molested and persecuted, accused of anti-state tendencies, the language of the most influential Magyar organs became more and more vehement and offensive against all political and cultural movements of the nationalities. Only a few Magyar statesmen and publicists realized the extreme danger of this attitude by which the very sources of state consciousness were envenomed. Louis Mocsáry denounced repeatedly this system by which the nationalities were constantly irritated and Magyar public opinion misled. The utterances of the nationality press were very often not only misquoted but intentionally falsified and, as the Magyar circles were unable to read the press of the non-Magyars, the fear complex of the nationality danger grew parallel with the national consciousness of the various peoples. The non-Magyar nations were not only accused of disloyalty but were often insulted by the vituperation of their most

³ Victor Aradi, "The Cultural Work of Our Cultural Associations," *Huszadik Század*, January, 1914.

cherished national traditions. Let me quote only a single example. In 1901 when Svetozar Miletić, the once popular leader of the Hungarian Serbs, who was imprisoned because of his attitude at the time of the Serbian war against the Turks when he offered to raise a corps of Serb volunteers in the cause of Christian Slavdom, died, a Magyar daily, which claimed to be the organ of the radical Magyar intellectuals, wrote the following obituary:

A traitor died, the country which he betrayed was the Hungarian fatherland, this endeared fatherland. . . . Against this glorious fatherland was he a traitor, this base man, whose corpse now lies in state. . . . There was nothing in his heart but an inextinguishable hatred against the land where his cradle rocked and which he knew would receive his putrefying cadaver. . . . The venomous spider gave out his death gasp in his own web. . . . The pen in our hand shudders from contempt when we put on paper the name of Svetozar Miletić. . . . We would like to restrain it but we cannot check our feelings, not even before the bier. . . . As long as it was warm, this exposed body, excited, propagated, and organized riot; as long as this death-pale lip could speak, it taught hatred against the fatherland. . . .

To this terrible outburst of a base demagogy, Louis Mocsáry wrote the following remark:

Is it permitted to write in such manner? Must we copy the habits of the hyenas, digging out the dead for the presentation of Magyar feeling and patriotism? It may be a case of hyperpatriotism but this habit is not a Magyar one. One thing is certain, that by such utterances one can infiltrate inextinguishable hatred into exasperated breasts which at a given occasion will burst out in atrocities. . . .⁴

It is manifest that the behavior of the Serb leader was not patriotic from a Hungarian point of view and would have aroused anger in any other country too. On the other hand this episode demonstrated with many other symptoms that in a country where the hero of a national minority could be attacked in such a way without any interference on the part of the state against the perpetrator, when at the same time all the manifestations of the nationality press were continually persecuted, there was no idea of a true system of civic education trying to coalesce the various national traditions into a state consciousness. What really happened was a licentious exaggeration of Magyar feeling and a hidden exuberance of the nationality consciousness among the intellectuals of the non-Magyar peoples.

⁴ *The Balance Sheet of the Dualistic System*, p. 238.

CHAPTER IV
DYNASTIC PATRIOTISM VERSUS
NATIONAL PATRIOTISM

Looking over the general tendencies of the two systems, we must say that the Austrian system was entirely incapable of establishing any kind of a popular state consciousness, whereas the Hungarian civic education was overdoing Magyar national consciousness to the detriment of a spontaneous state consciousness of the non-Magyar nationalities. And the danger of the situation was even greater: the Magyar state consciousness in its robust exclusiveness denied not only the existence of the non-Magyar nationalities as corporate entities of the state, but at the same time denied more and more the very existence of a super-state regulating the joint affairs of Austria and Hungary. Under such conditions the loyalty toward the common sovereign, the dynastic patriotism of the patrimonial state became the only uniting tie between the two countries and the various nations. But this feeling became, as a matter of fact, weaker and weaker, an artificial flower in a time when the idea of the self-determination of the nations was growing. The artificial escutcheon of the dualistic state, on which a small dynastic weapon held together the larger weapons of the "anonymous Austria" and of the seemingly united Magyar national state, is almost a symbolical expression of the extreme weakness of the whole structure. The middle weapon, the dynastical patriotism of the Habsburgs, became more and more pale, losing its real driving-force. But not only this curious escutcheon, monument of a desperate statesmanship, the various national hymns too, this real emanation of the popular souls symbolized even more strikingly that Habsburg patriotism was incapable of checking the national patriotism. Let us compare some characteristic utterances of the imperial hymn with those of the national songs of the peoples. The famous Austrian Popular Hymn almost gives the impression of an occasional poem of a high-school teacher by its banal and rigid loyalty in spite of the wonderful music of Haydn

God save, God guard
Our Emperor, our country!
Powerful with the Faith's protection
Shall he lead us with wise hand!
The Crown of his Fathers
Shall defend us from all enemies:
Closely with the Throne of Habsburgs
Austria's fate remains united.

448 DISSOLUTION OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

How differently ring the national songs of the various nations!
For instance the beginning of the Magyar anthem was this:

Unshaken to thy Fatherland
Be loyal, O Magyar!
It is thy cradle, it is thy grave
Which nourishes thee and covers.

Or of the Rumanians:

Awaken, Rumanian, from thy deadly sleep
Into which thou wert forced by barbarous tyrants!
Now or never: create another fate for thyself
To which even thy cruel enemies should bow!

Or of the Slovaks:

Up, ye Slovaks, still is living our true Slovak language,
While our loyal hearts are beating truly for our nation.
Living, living, yea and deathless is the Slovak spirit:
Hell and lightning, Hell and lightning rage in vain against us.

Or of the Czechs:

Where is my Fatherland?
The waters rumble in the fields
The pinewoods roar on the rocks
In the gardens bloom spring flowers
'Tis a Paradise on earth
And this is the beautiful country,
The country of the Czechs, my Fatherland.

And of the Croats:

Flow Sava, flow Drava,
Neither thou Danube lose thy strength!
Whenever thou roarest, tell to the World
That the Croat loves his nation
Until his soil is not lit up by the sun,
Until his oak forests are struck by the lightning,
Until his body is covered by the grave,
Until his heart no longer beats.

It is highly characteristic that the only nation of the monarchy which did not produce a national hymn in the proper sense was the first leading nation of the monarchy, the German. Why? Because the center of gravity of the German national consciousness, even for the Germans of the monarchy, was not the national Austria but the German empire as a nation state. At the same time the German leading nation in Austria was so intimately connected with the Habsburg dynasty that the glory of the monarchy as a whole held back the expressions of a special German patriotism within the empire.

No wonder that the intensity of all these national feelings was stronger than the artificial suggestions of a receding dynastic pa-

triotism. And this growing trend of national feeling and consciousness was neither checked nor co-ordinated by any other moral synthesis. The Habsburg empire became more and more a conglomerate of various nationalistic feelings among peoples which did not know each other but which hated each other bitterly. The dynastic patriotism, the faith of some ten thousand officers, aristocrats, priests, bureaucrats, and industrial magnates was powerless against the popular enthusiasm of the exuberant national individualities. The state of the Habsburgs collapsed, in the final analysis, because it was unable to offer a real solidarity to its various nations by the help of a system of serious civic education. The more enlightened Habsburgs knew very well the fatal importance of this problem but they could not solve it. The means which were employed were far too mechanical and incoherent. Outside the army we have not a single example of a real type of civic education. Only Crown Prince Rudolf made an attempt in this direction by editing under his patronage a monumental work of many volumes under the title: "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Writing and Pictures." But this enterprise had a very small influence in an atmosphere already envenomed by constitutional and national struggles.

Perhaps no one understood more keenly the situation of the monarchy from the point of view of public education than Karl Möring, a great soldier, military engineer, statesman, and a careful student of the United States. In his famous anonymous book *Sibyllinische Bücher aus Österreich*, dedicated to Archduchess Sofia, mother of Emperor Francis Joseph, he wrote in 1848 the following prophetic lines:

Must oligarchy and bureaucracy push the monarchy from year to year nearer to the abyss until, standing on the verge and shaken by the slightest thrust, it loses its equilibrium and tumbles down? Such a curse would be terrible and would exclude any hope or possibility of reform. There exists one means still, but only one. It must be applied because it is a matter of life and death. And this only means is public opinion, this appeasing, equalizing, and harmonizing intermediary between people and Throne which translates freely the adversities of the state into the language of the truth and not into the jargon of the bureaucracy. It puts clear spectacles before the eyes of the Monarch and not those colored by the oligarchy or ground according to its needs. . . . Yea, public opinion, this tested Palladium of England, this trumpet of the wholesome voice of the people, it alone can be the Savior of Austria. . . .¹

The diagnosis of Karl Möring remained true until the collapse. There never was in the monarchy a public opinion in the Western sense, only an agglomeration of group opinions, led by oligarchical interests.

¹ Hamburg, 1848, I, 153-54.

That the crucial problem of the existence of the monarchy was that of civic education was finally realized by the last Emperor himself when, in the desperate hours of the beginning dissolution, he made among others the following statement to the great pacifist and humanitarian, Professor F. W. Foerster, who, almost as a political physician, was called in July, 1917, to the deathbed of the agonizing empire:

My proclamation of amnesty has aroused much uneasiness and contradiction in some circles. . . . But it was my firm conviction for a long time that the hopelessly entangled situation of the Austrian people cried for a radical change, the tradition of narrow-mindedness and short-sightedness is so deeply rooted that we can be saved only by an entirely new disposition of mind. . . . I know that many thousands among my people have long been anxious for such a new beginning, but abroad they do not understand this, nay they do not surmise for what purpose we were united by Providence in this South-eastern corner of Europe: Austria is, as a matter of fact, neither a German nor a Slav state. Though the Germans were the founders of the Danube Monarchy, they are at the present time a minority surrounded and interspersed with many ascending peoples. . . . Under such circumstances they can remain the leaders of the younger cultures only if they are able to give the example of the highest culture . . . and to meet the newly evolving nations with love, esteem, and generosity. . . . Sins were committed on all sides; all the faults must now be corrected . . . therefore we must turn over a new leaf! . . . The unity of the state cannot be imposed by force—less than anywhere else—upon the nations of Austria . . . it must arise from the moral union of these peoples. . . . Already the youth should be influenced by this spirit: instead of the text-books on both sides which incite to racial hatred, rather such books should be created in which the great qualities and virtues of the Slavic race should be brought home to the German youth . . . and in the same way it should be honestly told to the Slavic youth what Germandom has contributed to the general culture and particularly to the young nations of the Slavic South-eastern world. . . .²

According to Foerster, the monarch spoke these words in great emotion and with strong emphasis. But this imperial lecture on civic education came too late—not to mention that there was no recipe for the Hungarian problem, the cornerstone of the whole system, in the program of the last Habsburg. He did not even dare to mention this other side of the situation. . . . The reasons for it are obvious.

² Quoted by Polzer-Hoditz, *op. cit.*, pp. 462-63.

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Some general remarks may be added to the chief conclusions of this work concerning both the past and the future.

As to the historical meaning of the process of dissolution, the reader will perhaps share the impression which I experienced the more my investigations proceeded, namely, that the collapse of the Habsburg empire was not anything surprising but rather the long continuance of this amalgamation of peoples without a common state idea, based on the mutual hatred and distrust of the various nations. Manifestly their inner revolutionary forces were not sufficient, in time of peace, to get rid of the Habsburg yoke. Regarding the process as a whole, the most outstanding groups of causes which undermined the cohesion of the old patrimonial state were threefold:

1. The growing national consciousness of the various nations which could not find place for a true consolidation and adequate self-expression in the rigidity of the absolutistic structure, later not changed but only modified by the semi-absolutism of the Dualistic System under which neither a confederated constitution nor even a sound local national autonomy could be achieved.

2. The economic and social pressure of the feudal class rule, allied with a usurious kind of capitalism, which did not allow the productive forces of the various nations to be developed. Vienna was not only a natural economic leader but at the same time an economic exploiter of the weaker nations through her financial and administrative monopolies. The national exasperation of the peoples was strengthened by the feeling of being a kind of a colony for German capitalism. At the same time the hunger-belt of the latifundist system paralyzed to a large extent the beneficent influences of a united customs territory. A true division of labor among the various territories remained rudimentary whereas a new national middle class arose everywhere which felt its economic interests incompatible with the supremacy of big Viennese finance.

3. The lack of any serious kind of civic education. All the nations lived as moral and intellectual strangers to one another. Both the dynastic epic in Austria and the feudal in Hungary were incapable of creating a sufficiently strong and cohesive state idea. Finally these two fallacies pushed the two hegemonic nations into a fatal conflict, even more pernicious than that in which they were engaged with their lesser nationalities.

This growing dissolution and final collapse of the Habsburg empire was mainly the work of three factors: