

PART II
THE HISTORICAL ATMOSPHERE

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CHAPTER I

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WESTERN NATIONAL STATES AND THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

In the formation of all the great European powers, the rôle of some dynasty was predominant for its armed force was the power which swept out the system of feudal particularisms and, in the majority of cases in alliance with the cities, it made an economic and administrative unity out of the loose medley of petty local rules. What Ernest Renan said from the point of view of his own fatherland: "The king of France, if I dare say it, was the ideal type of a state crystalizer, the king of France who created the most complete national unity," is more or less true concerning all the other modern national states. Whereas in these great national states the centralizing royal power became more and more the chief executive of the national will or at least the representative of an overwhelming national majority, the Habsburg dynasty carried on this work almost as a private enterprise of the imperial family.

Why did Habsburg not succeed in a work which in the western states was completed, why was it unable to put the political unity on the basis of a compact linguistic, and national unity? Some readers will not see any problem in this question and they will simply allege that the western states were from the beginning national unities. But the situation is not so simple. The truth is that England and France in the earlier Middle Ages were also states of an extreme racial and national complication and there, too, an assimilating and unifying process of several hundred years was necessary in order to create a national solidarity. It would be one of the most attractive sociological tasks to compare the unifying function of the Habsburg dynasty with that of the English and French crown and to seek for the causes which made the Habsburg dynasty unsuccessful—in spite of the protection of the German empire and the economic and cultural supremacy of the Germans—in creating an efficacious national majority opinion. There is no place for the more detailed analysis of this problem; I can mention only as a kind of hypothesis the following points: (1) The ethnographical basis was in Austria far more mixed. (2) The geographical divisions and the cultural antagonisms among various races, nations, and religions were far deeper, especially the struggle of the Byzantine culture with the western established here an antithesis which the western states did not know. (3) The territory of the state became a closed structure far later. In consequence of the continuous occupations and expansions the work of unification always

confronted more new and difficult problems. The Italian territories, Galicia, Bukovina, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were such morsels which Habsburg was incapable of digesting. (4) The Turkish occupation of more than two hundred years kept an important part of the monarchy under the sway of a foreign racial and cultural structure which made not only the work of unification impossible on vast territories, but also became the source of constant political and diplomatic struggles. After the expulsion of the Turks, on the other hand, a gigantic reimmigration and colonization took place which produced a thoroughly new psychological atmosphere. (5) The causes above mentioned retarded the evolution of the monarchy about two hundred years. (6) Whereas the unifying function of the royal power in the west was carried on at a time when the racial, linguistic, and national consciousness of the great masses were yet rudimentary: in the Habsburg monarchy the process of political and administrative unification went on in a period in which nationalism became a conscious force. (7) The Habsburg dynasty could not give a home to all the peoples living in its territory in their integrity but one part of those peoples, often the greater part, remained outside the frontiers of the monarchy and constituted there the germs of a national state (Serbia, Rumania, Polish, and Ukraine territories).

Whatever may be the opinion of some people concerning this hypothesis, there can be little doubt that the essence of the Habsburg rule was without a national character and it was far more of a private nature than that of the other unifying dynasties. This truth is very succinctly and clearly stated by Arnold von Luschin, the eminent Austrian law historian, in these words:

Our empire did not grow on a homogeneous national ground but it is the result of a conscious activity of many hundred years of its dynasty which succeeded in combining its German territories with non-Germans at a time when these latter in their isolation were incapable of fulfilling their mission as a state. Therefore the history of Austria is not so much the history of a people or a country as a history of a state.¹

¹ *Grundriss der Österreichischen Reichsgeschichte* (Bamberg, 1914).

CHAPTER II

THE HABSBURG EMPIRE AS A FAMILY ESTATE (FIDEI COMMISSUM)

The Habsburg monarchy remained until its end a species of medieval entail held together by the same imperial will, and by the same insatiable desire for consolidation and expansion. Metternich, the mighty chancellor, said the following words to the ambassador of the German Bundestag after the death of Emperor Francis I (while Roman emperor, Francis II), in order to emphasize the continuity and unchangeableness of the Habsburg state:

Where the basis is not deranged, there is no serious danger; the old house stands solidly. The successors of the entail, of the *fidei commissum* is another but this other wishes nothing else than his predecessor has wished. In the same direction with the same force and endurance.

This sentence can be regarded as a most characteristic feature of the Habsburg rule, of the fundamental ideology which remained always the categorical imperative of *my house, my army*, a kind of a dynastic religion. The real founder of the dynasty, Rudolph Habsburg, who at the end of the thirteenth century had defeated the Czech King Ottokar and laid down the basis of the so-called Habsburg *Hausmacht*, the patrimonial nucleus of the later empire, was one of the most successful and daring state *accapareurs*. His family of *Alleman* blood already possessed in the eleventh century widely extended estates in Alsace and in Switzerland and had family connections with some of the most important dynasties of the age.

This desire for expansion, this trend of *l'art pour l'art* imperialism remained a chief motive force also in the successors of Rudolph in the interests of which the family practiced such a successful and extended activity in marriages and contracts for succession which was strange even in a period when there was a widely spread habit of gaining sovereignties by marriages, donations, and exchanges. On this field Maximilian I (1493–1519), called the “Last Knight,” was particularly skilful, and obtained by his marriage the Netherlands and Burgundy; by the marriage of his son Phillip, Spain and the Indies; while he gained by marriage contracts a right for his grandson Ferdinand both to the Hungarian and the Czech crowns. As a consequence of these feverish and fortunate marriage activities, with the purpose of uniting the most heterogeneous and remote countries under the scepter of his family, Charles V (1519–56) became really the proprietor of a world-empire so big that the “sun never sets on its

frontiers." This marriage expansion made such a great impression on the contemporaries that it gave rise to the often-quoted locution: *Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube!* ("Let others make wars, thou happy Austria, marry!")

This continuous imperialistic expansion of the Habsburg house found an almost symbolical expression in the title of the dynasty which until the end, not without a certain comic aspect, was the record of the innumerable marriages, hucksterings, and captures of the Habsburgs in many parts of the world and in various periods. I will fully quote this title because it seems to me that it will introduce the reader to the psychic structure of the monarchy more than many abstract considerations. This so-called *grand imperial title* was the following:

We, by God's grace, Emperor of Austria; King of Hungary, of Bohemia, of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodomeria, and Illyria; King of Jerusalem, etc.; Archduke of Austria; Grand Duke of Tuscany and Cracow; Duke of Lothringia, of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and Bukovina; Grand Duke of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia; Duke of Upper and Lower Silesia, of Modena, Parma, Piacenza and Guastella, of Ausschwitz and Sator, of Teschen, Friaul, Ragusa and Zara; Princely Count of Habsburg and Tyrol, of Kyburg, Görz and Gradiska; Duke of Trient and Brixen; Margrave of Upper and Lower Lausitz and in Istria; Count of Hohenembs, Feldkirch, Bregenz, Sonnenberg, etc.; Lord of Trieste, of Cattaro and above the Windisch Mark; Great Voyvod of the Voyvodina, Servia, etc., etc.

CHAPTER III

THE FATA MORGANA OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

This expansion over countries far and near, well known and exotic, of which some are at present only known by the specialists of historical investigation, this incoherent and chaotic imperialism had three consequences of very great importance from the point of view of our problem: the first is of a biological nature, the second of an international, and the third of an inner political.

Under biological I mean the marriage contracted by Philip the son of Maximilian I, with the heiress of the Spanish throne, Johanna the Crazy. By this marriage the Habsburg and Burgundian blood, "already showing symptoms of degeneration, received a positively pathological synthesis" which in some successors to the throne manifested itself now as a childish playfulness, now as a tyranny inclining to melancholy.

Not less dangerous was the international consequence of Habsburg imperialism concerning the future of the monarchy. The Austrian dominions of the *fidei commissum* gave sufficient strength to the Habsburgs so that they were capable of securing the German imperial crown for the dynasty since the first half of the fifteenth century. This *Holy Roman Empire of the German nation* like a *fata morgana* was always before the Habsburgs and threw them into a series of warlike and diplomatic complications which meant very often the sacrifice both of the Austrian and Hungarian interests which often impeded the inner consolidation of the monarchy. Mr. Henry Wickham Steed, the keen English observer of the Habsburg drama, says correctly:

For centuries the Habsburgs had sacrificed the strength of Austria to the Roman German imperial dream. From Ferdinand I to Charles VI their aim had been to exercise universal sway. Maria Theresa, Joseph II, and Leopold recognized the chimerical nature of the dream but still struggled for undisputed hegemony in Germany. Not until the defeat of Sadowa in 1866, nor in reality until the foundation of the new German Empire at Versailles in 1871 did the Habsburgs give up their German ambitions and turn their eyes resolutely to their own realms.¹

This situation through centuries gave to the Habsburg policy the character of an *activity without a center*. The great Western dynasties realized more keenly the proper force of their powers and the real forces of which they disposed. But the Habsburg dynasty always vacillated between its two centers: they tried to base their rule now on

¹ *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (London, 1913), p. 12.

the family possession on the Danube, now on their loose imperial connection. If the Emperor had concentrated himself on the Austro-Hungarian possessions and had avoided the awful complications of the Spanish War of Succession after the extinction of the Spanish branch, he could have attacked the Turks with quite another energy and could have assumed the work of unification in his restricted realm with a far greater efficaciousness. Especially after the Thirty Years War, which was a victory of German feudalism, the German imperial connection became more and more a source of political complications and intrigues for the Habsburgs. There were, even in the eighteenth century, some three hundred little sovereignties on the territory of this chaotic empire, which did not have even fixed frontiers. Many of the princes were ruling inside and outside of the Empire. This confusion was so great that the greatest political thinker of the epoch of Emperor Leopold I, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk, who in 1684, wrote a treatise which was considered for many years as an oracle under the title *Österreich über Alles, wann es nur will* (Austria above all, if only it wants to) was incapable of forming a clear idea of the relation of Austria to Germany.

"Nobody could exactly determine at this time," says the historian of the Austrian state idea, Professor Bidermann, "how far the German territory extended into the Austrian and what part of Austria belonged to the Roman-German Empire."²

It is clear that this German imperial phantom and the chaotic system of petty sovereignties of this anarchical *Kleinstaaterie* had very disastrous results from the point of view of Austrian unity, the more as the rival powers, in the first line of which stood France, utilized often and successfully this centerless state of the Habsburg dynasty. Ernest Lavisse writes ingenuously:

The French policy pays the great electors and sometimes boasts of having bought the German crown. It buys the Protestant princes, the enemies of Catholic Austria, it buys the Catholic princes who in their capacity as princes are enemies of the imperial power. In France the price of a prince of such and such rank was accurately known, as was the cost of a minister or a court mistress: Versailles was familiar with the price list of the German consciences.³

This international situation naturally had a further consequence; the third mentioned above which I called an inner political. The continuous hucksterings and conquests of the Habsburg foreign policy—as I have already mentioned in another connection—made the formation of a united public opinion impossible in countries so different in

² H. T. Bidermann: *Geschichte der Österreichischen Gesamt-Staats-Idee* (Innsbruck, 1867), Vol. I, p. 50.

³ *Vue générale de l'histoire politique de l'Europe* (Paris, 1904), p. 128.

economy, culture, and traditions. Especially the annexation of Belgium and Lombardy, as the result of the Spanish War of Succession and later the participation in the Polish booty, proved fatal to the monarchy which was incapable of giving an organic unity to all these territories so remote from its center and being more developed in culture and national consciousness. The eagle with the double head, the symbol of the Habsburg weapon, looked with its one head toward the Slavs, with the other toward the Germans, according to the changing sinuosities of the foreign policy which aimed now at a Western hegemony, now at an Eastern supremacy.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNIFYING FORCE OF GERMAN COLONIZATION

However great may have been the indistinctness of the structure of the Habsburg empire, and however preponderant may have been the rôle of dynastic absolutism in this conglomerate of countries, it would be an error to consider the whole, as many did, simply as an accidental formation held together only by armed force, by marriage intrigues, and by contracts obtained by violence. Though this empire as a whole did not have a unified national and geographical basis,¹ still important popular forces were at work to form a vague feeling of solidarity in the nucleus of the empire among Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, and Croatia. This situation was manifested by the fact that even before the definite integration of the monarchy, the work of unification was tried by several princes: now by an Austrian, now by a Czech, now by a Hungarian. But when Ferdinand I (1521–1564), elected on the basis of contracts of his grandfather, Maximilian I, succeeded in combining his Austrian possessions with Bohemia and with a part of Hungary, he already had in this effort a solid background in some important social forces. Among these forces the first in time and also the most important objectively, was the German colonization, the state-building character of which was duly and often emphasized. The Austrian state is indeed a result of this powerful migratory wave which pushed the peasant youth of Germany out of the old country already saturated by the narrow limits of the feudal structure and drove them toward the northeast and southeast. The Austrian state became a fruit of this southeast expansion, as the Prussian state, a result of the northeast. This colonization signified that the more developed German agriculture and superior town life introduced the germs of Western civilization into the backward and primitive social structure of Central and Eastern Europe. Everywhere indeed in Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Transylvania, in the southern Slav countries, renewed swarms of German colonizers flooded the farthest regions. Sometimes they accompanied the feudal conquerors, but very often too, they came as invited guests of the respective governments which pampered these foreigners with all kinds

¹ Already in the tempest of the World War a noted Austrian professor, Dr. R. Sieger, undertook the task of demonstrating the geographical unity of the Habsburg empire, in his book, *Die geographischen Grundlagen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie und ihrer Aussenpolitik* (Leipzig und Berlin, 1915). His argument is ingenious but seems to me not sufficiently solid. On the contrary, with the liberties he takes it would not be difficult to prove the geographical unity of France and Germany or of almost any two European countries.

of privileges in order to secure for their kingly powers the financial, cultural, and political protection of a higher type of civilization. The kingly powers in their continuous fight against the feudal lords and other local territorial resistances needed foreign warriors, priests, financiers, artisans, and agriculturists. This endeavor is expressed with striking lucidity and plasticity in the famous admonitions of the first Hungarian king, Saint Stephen (1001–38), which can be regarded not only as a Hungarian governmental doctrine in those times, but also as a general public opinion among the sovereigns of Central and Eastern Europe. The admonitions of the great king advised his successor as follows:

The utility of foreigners and guests is so great that they can be given a place of sixth importance among the royal ornaments. The Roman Empire, too, became powerful and its rulers glorious and august by the fact that from everywhere the wise and noble men were flocking into that country. For, as the guests come from various regions and provinces, they bring with them various languages and customs, various knowledges and arms. All these adorn the royal court, heighten its splendor, and terrify the haughtiness of foreign powers. For a country unified in language and in customs is fragile and weak. Therefore I order thee, my son, to receive them with good will and to nourish them honestly in order that they abide with thee more joyfully than elsewhere. [*Proptereo iubeo te, fili mi! ut bona voluntate illos nutrias et honeste teneas, ut tecum libentius degant quam alibi habitent.*]

This policy remained in later centuries, too, the spirit of the royal policy in all those countries where its work of centralization against the native feudalism had to be protected with foreign forces. The Saxons of Transylvania, for instance, were invited *ad retinendam Coronam* according to a document which gave them extended privileges in that country. It is only natural that the Habsburg dynasty found allies in these German colonists based not on a conscious national conception which in those times was scarcely dawning, but according to the necessities of the developing state power which consciously utilized the greater economic and financial force of the German civilization.

CHAPTER V

COHESION CREATED BY THE TURKISH PRESSURE

Another great force which protected the unifying work of the Habsburg rule was the need of the masses for protection against the Turkish danger. The real date of the formation of the Habsburg empire was the Battle of Mohács in 1526 when the Turks destroyed the completely demoralized and impotent Hungarian feudalism. The defeat at Mohács and the sudden death of the Hungarian king, Louis II, made the marriage contract of Maximilian valid and Ferdinand became king of the western parts of Hungary whereas the central parts, the most fertile third of the country, went under Turkish rule and Transylvania took the rank of a semi-independent principality under national rulers, but under Turkish suzerainty. From this time the nucleus of the Habsburg empire, the Austrian, the Czech, and the Hungarian center was from a military point of view united under Habsburg rule, which began a fight of two hundred years for the acquisition of the two other parts of Hungary by eliminating step by step the Turkish invasion.

The Hungarian dominions of Ferdinand formed for a long period a species of military bulwark of the West against the Turkish danger and the Austrian Archduke alone, in his quality as German emperor, disposed at this time of the financial means and military organizations on the basis of which the defense of the West became possible and the gradual expulsion of the Turks could be undertaken with the hope of success. And the more completely we understand the economic and social history of this epoch, the feudal disorganization and anarchy of the Hungarian and Czech state, the more we must acknowledge that the Habsburg dynasty was during those centuries the only sufficiently centralized and militarily organized power which could resist the growing trend of Turkish imperialism and begin later with its expulsion. The unrivaled heroism of some Hungarian and Croatian captains in their isolated fortifications (of a Zrinyi, a Dobó, a Losonczi) aroused the enthusiasm of the suffering nation but was utterly incapable of checking the terrible force of the highly efficient Turkish army.

We really witness that in the same measure as the danger of the Turk occupation grew more prominent since the fall of Constantinople, as the despair of the Christian people was augmented by the fall of Athens, of the Balkan states, of Belgrade, and of Buda, the more grew the conviction among the nations of the Danube basin that the old isolated state frames were no longer sufficient for the obstruction

of the formidable Asian danger. Already as early as the first half of the fifteenth century, King Sigmund of Hungary, of the Luxemburg dynasty, urged at his deathbed the unification of the Hungarian, Czech, and German crown in order to form a bulwark against Turkish aggression. The same need was felt even by the eternal antagonists of the dynastical power, by the upper classes and, from the beginning of the sixteenth century we often meet plans and aspirations which try to combine the nobility of various countries in order to support the Habsburgs in their struggle against the Turkish invasion.¹ This international co-operation of the noble classes, however, evoked the suspicion of the dynasty which in its continual fight against the feudal forces regarded this alliance of its natural opponents as a menace against its absolutistic system and impeded systematically these unifying tendencies from below, from which a kind of moral cohesion could have been evolved between the various countries of the monarchy. Therefore the struggle against the Turks became more and more a private enterprise of the Habsburgs for the consolidation and strengthening of their own power. That is the reason for this unheard-of indifference with which the liberation of Buda, of the heart of the country by the imperial troops in 1686 was accepted by Hungarian public opinion at a time when this exploit was greeted by the West with an outburst of enthusiasm. Those who know the deeper history of the epoch will, however, find this attitude not surprising, for there was no real feeling of national cohesion: the largest strata of the nobility hated the dynasty as the destroyer of the ancient privileges; the masses of bondsmen deprived of all rights regarded with a perfect indifference whether the imperial, the Turk, or the national armies would squeeze out of them the expenses and the blood-tribute of the war, whereas the lower middle classes, a very uninfluential factor, were exasperated by the religious persecutions of the dynasty to such an extent that Protestant priests began to consider the Turks as a bulwark against the intolerance of the Habsburgs. Whereas the fight of the French king for the unification of France against English foreign rule laid the cement for the first foundation of French patriotism, the struggle against the Turks was not accompanied in the consciousness of the contemporaries by any kind of international cohesion among those peoples the sons of which were the real instruments of this work of liberation. In spite of this, the great masses themselves felt more and more clearly the growing power of the dynasty in the face of which the chances of the feudal forces became weaker and weaker. Needless to say that in this growing military bureaucratic and financial force of the dynasty there were certain elements of a moral cohesion: in the leading German element a kind of a dynastical

¹ Bidermann, *op. cit.*, I, 6-7.

state consciousness began to evolve and in the imperial army, created by the genius of Eugene of Savoy, the prestige of victories evoked a feeling of military solidarity among the soldiers which gained the force of a popular movement. Those songs which glorified the hero, the great French *condottiere*, were, even during the World War, a powerful instrument for creating enthusiasm in the imperial army and remained real pillars of the military consciousness of the monarchy. In these songs which were taught in the Austrian schools until the collapse of the monarchy, we would seek in vain for the expression of a national or state solidarity: the great war lord had no real connection with any country or people. His genius served exclusively the interests and glory of the Habsburgs of whom he became the ardent supporter after the offenses which he suffered in the French court. How characteristic, for instance, are the following lines of one of the more representative songs:

Prinz Eugenius, der edle Ritter
Wollt dem Kaiser wieder kriegen
Stadt und Festung Belgerad.
(Prince Eugene, the noble knight,
Would try to capture for the Kaiser
The city and fortress of Belgrade.)

The song is exclusively militaristic and dynastic and has no bearing on fatherland and state.

CHAPTER VI

ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE DYNASTY AND THE OPPRESSED CLASSES OF THE PEOPLE

But in spite of this dynastical, patrimonial, and imperialistic nature of the Habsburg rule, we very early witness in it a character and tendency which became a further sustaining force in its work of centralization and unification. As the great Western national dynasties, the Habsburgs too, realized more or less clearly that, against the particularist forces of the feudal ages, against the petty kings, the robber knights, and the privileges of the estates, they needed the sympathy and protection of broader popular forces in order to get a more effective money and military support from the bondsmen and to strengthen the economic and financial power of the cities against the chronic rebellions of the feudal lords. There are many facts which demonstrate the growing tendency of the dynasty to protect the broader masses of population not only in the German provinces but also in other parts of the empire, even in rebellious Hungary. This character of the royal power was already clearly delineated under Ferdinand I. His constant fight against the misgivings of the feudal anarchy gained for him the sympathy even of a part of the lower nobility. Since 1545, he urged energetically the Hungarian Diet to abolish the *glebae adstrictus* ("tied to the soil") condition of the serfs and to give them back the right of the free migration because "their lamentations rise to the heavens continuously."

In a later period Basta, the cruel and bloody imperial general, of Italian origin (1550–1607), enjoyed the support of the Hungarian peasantry in Transylvania against the national nobility and he got a certain popularity among the poor masses. "Even a beggar could call on him," says one of the documents. The old policy of the former dynasties of the Árpáds and of the Anjous and of the great popular king Matthias Corvinus, the Just, defending the peoples against the extortions and robberies of the feudal classes became also a constant trait of the Habsburgs at least of their better type of representatives. Unfortunately this tendency could not have the same effects as in the West because the dynasty was foreign to most of its peoples and operated with a foreign army and bureaucracy. It awaked with its absolutistic despotic and bigoted Catholic tendencies the antipathy even of those masses which would have been its natural allies: of the German citizens of the cities. In spite of this the anti-oligarchical attitude of the Habsburgs was sometimes very prominent and found in the policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, as we soon shall see, a real sys-

tem of social policy of a very advanced kind. Even the rigidly absolutistic system of Bach, after the suppression of the Revolution of 1848 which we shall analyze more in detail, carried on a long series of almost revolutionary measures against the petrified rule of the feudal classes. Francis Joseph himself, though a typical absolutist in thought and feeling, pressed universal suffrage on the old régime in Austria and coquetted with it even in Hungary where he got into conflict with the Magyar feudal classes. This tendency was even more accentuated in the political conception of the two heirs apparent: Rudolph regarded feudalism as the chief enemy of his empire and Francis Ferdinand was determined to break the rule of Magyar nobility in order to obtain legal equality for the oppressed Slav and Rumanian nationalities. The last off-shoot of the family, Emperor Charles I (called King Charles IV in Hungary), made a final and almost desperate effort to save his throne by democratic reforms and tried to enforce universal suffrage on the recalcitrant upper classes of Hungary headed by Count Stephen Tisza.

Under the sway of this continuously renewed effort there undoubtedly arose in many parts of the monarchy a kind of moral cohesion among the Habsburgs and the oppressed classes, especially the peasantry of the nationalities which was very often protected by the Habsburgs against German and Magyar rule. Many years after the death of Crown Prince Rudolph, Daszynski, the Polish socialist leader, narrated in the Austrian Parliament that, according to the belief of large masses of the peasant population in Galacia, Rudolph was not dead but that he traveled in disguise over the countryside in order to make preparations for the liberation of the suffering people. The writer of these lines also observed very often during his trips in Transylvania that the idea of the Emperor (the Rumanian peasant always called him emperor and not king which was the official Hungarian denomination) enjoyed almost a kind of religious sacredness among the backward Rumanian peasants. The ardent loyalty of the Jugo-Slavs toward the emperor and against the Hungarian nobility in the period of the Revolution of 1848 constituted one of the most outstanding forces which saved the throne of the Habsburgs. But all these important tendencies on which a really constructive state policy could have been built were never consequently and systematically utilized by the Habsburgs and the ruling classes allied to them. Here, as on all other grounds, the characteristic of the Habsburg policy given by Grillparzer remained true: this policy was always a policy of "half-deeds and half-ways."

CHAPTER VII

THE FIGHT OF THE ABSOLUTISM AGAINST THE ESTATES

The unity created in the realm of Ferdinand I remained a very loose unity during all his long rule in the first half of the sixteenth century. His power was in conflict, in all his provinces, especially in the Hungarian and Czech kingdoms, with the ruling classes, the powerful nobility of those times. There were indeed in this epoch two powers in the empire: the power of the dynasty based on its own finances, army, and bureaucracy reinforced later by the prestige of the imperial title; and that of feudalism in the various countries and crownlands which continued its medieval life almost unaltered.¹ There was no real connection between the Emperor and the great masses of the peoples of his empire. The people, the millions of serfs devoid of any rights, stood under the exclusive rule of their landlords, the greatest of whom regarded the Emperor almost as a *primus inter pares*, as the most powerful and the richest landlord who had the largest estates, most money, and the biggest army. The barter economy in the distribution of wealth, the undeveloped system of communication, and the insecurity of daily life made it possible for the more powerful landlords to play the rôle almost of a state with the real rights of a sovereign. The alliance of these petty kings, capable sometimes of moving the impoverished nobility and the abused peasantry in complots against the Emperor and their eternal intrigues with foreign rulers, was a continuous danger for the dynastic power.

The Habsburgs understood this situation very well because, in their Spanish territories and in the other western states, they clearly saw that without the elimination of the feudal authorities there was no place for unification and a centralized type of administration in a country. Therefore, the state idea of the Habsburgs in those times could not be other than to overthrow the second state of the nobles and to put in its place their own administration, jurisdiction, and army. This process dominated the history of the Habsburgs during more than two centuries.

When Ferdinand I, who was born in Spain and had grown up at the imperial court, ascended the Austrian throne, he not only utilized his Spanish experiences but he constantly surrounded himself with those military leaders and diplomats who were, so to say, masters of the struggle against the feudal world. In this manner the Habsburg

¹ This dualistic character of the Habsburg state was vigorously demonstrated by Arnold Luschin, *op. cit.*, I, 196-228.

rule became a foreign rule not only in the eyes of the Hungarian and the Czech nobility but also in the view of the German estates. The young archduke came first of all in conflict with these latter elements. He had scarcely come into the country when his new system was opposed by the nobility of lower Austria whose resistance was strengthened by the cities. Ferdinand, accustomed to Spanish absolutism regarded this formal, rather than actual resistance as high treason and in the so-called Blood Tribunal of Wiener Neustadt in 1522 condemned to death and executed six prominent men of this movement, among them the mayor of Vienna. With this there began the bloody weeding out and breaking down of the feudal world which under the successors of Ferdinand not infrequently resulted in spreading fire and anarchy to many parts of the empire.

But later as emperor he found the noble classes allied with another power which impeded his work of unification. The feudal world was converted to Protestantism in order to sustain its local particularism by a freer and more rational religion against the papal and imperial universalism. Though Ferdinand did not yet dare to begin his struggle against this other front with full vigor, he keenly realized the danger which the alliance of the estates and Protestantism would mean for the royal power. In his testament he emphatically admonished his sons to abstain from Protestantism. "I would rather see you dead than to be affiliated with the new sects." Indeed already under his rule there began the process of counter reformation and of the expansion of the Jesuits.

At the same time Ferdinand undertook the work of unification with great energy and he is regarded not without reason as the founder of the German bureaucracy. He built up the organs of administrative unity, the privy council, the army council, and the court treasury. At the same time he endeavored to establish the organs of a local administration which would control the feudal bureaucracy. In this manner a new type of administration was created which in France under the name of the *aristocratie de robe* had such a prominent rôle in the foundation of royal unity, a staff of eminent lawyers and administrators which, amid the primitive feudal administration, introduced a higher conception of law and state and a more effective protection of city life and productive work in general.

After the death of Ferdinand this unifying policy was continued by Emperor Rudolph II (1576–1612), but his mental derangement threw the whole system into such a vacillating and reckless condition that it made it hateful to the whole empire. In Hungary, for instance, with the help of some wicked lords and under the most flimsy pretenses, a long series of high-treason processes was started against all those feudal persons who were regarded as opposed to the dynasty or whose estates were coveted by some of the Emperor's favorites. All

those accused were sentenced to death and their property confiscated by a corrupt judiciary.

The cruel war of Rudolph against the Protestants became the beginning of a policy which fatally influenced the later destinies of the monarchy. In the whole empire both in the Austrian provinces, in the proper sense, and in Moravia and Bohemia and in Hungary, there went on a ferocious extermination of Protestants who were mostly allied with the nobility and with large masses of the peasantry. This struggle was carried on by armed force and ideologically with the cooperation of the Jesuits. So-called "armed commissions of religion" were installed which captured the Protestant churches one after the other. This movement in the Czech countries, especially in Moravia, the country of the "iron barons," took on a strictly national character in the form of a specific Czech Puritanism. Especially the so-called "Bohemian-Moravian brothers," successors of the great Czech reformer, John Huss, who was an inspired disciple of Wycliff and who suffered a martyr's death in 1415, became the chief supporters of the anti-Habsburg movement. They combined their Protestant traditions with a strong national feeling against the Viennese Roman Catholic court and its German-speaking bureaucracy. A Czech nobleman for instance told his son, speaking German, "I would rather bark like a dog than speak the language of the foreigners."

The religious persecutions of the imperial policy led also in the German countries to a long series of popular outbursts in which religious feeling was sometimes mingled with social discontent against those feudal lords who oppressed the peasantry. In Hungary, too, a vehement national and racial antipathy arose against the Habsburg. In his fight against Protestantism the method of the Emperor consisted in playing the feudal elements against the citizens of the towns and vice versa. This was an imitation of the proceedings which were applied previously in Styria against the Protestant nobility. The work of counter-reformation was initiated in the royal cities as the court knew very well of the great hatred which existed among the cities which were mostly German and among the feudal classes. The Hungarian higher clergy always urged the king to combat the churches by armed forces in the cities. Only later the same process turned on the Protestant nobility.²

In such a manner the ill-famed Habsburg principle of the *divide et impera* (divide and rule) was introduced for the first time in its Machiavellian self-consciousness on religious grounds. It later became, in the national field, the chief factor in the creation of a political and moral atmosphere entirely unfit for the formation of an organic solidarity in the Habsburg empire. Under the sway of this

² Acsády, *History of the Hungarian Empire* (Budapest, 1903), II, 240-43. In Hungarian.

ferocious policy of religious persecution and in consequence of the fight of the imperial power against the liberties of the noble estates, there arose a kind of an alliance between the nobility, ousted from their landed properties by arbitrary processes, and the large strata of citizens and peasants molested in their religious life and overburdened with taxation and military service against the absolutism of the Habsburgs, against the German bureaucracy, and the Catholic high clergy allied with them.

This movement, partly social, partly religious, and partly national aroused a long series of semi-national rebellions against the Habsburgs which sometimes in the hands of a mighty and ambitious personality shook the very foundations of the Habsburg empire as the national and social discontent was strengthened and financed very often by the foreign enemies of the Habsburgs. The first national hero of this type was the remarkable personage, Stephen Bocskay, who as an almost legendary leader of the dispossessed smaller nobility and of the peasant masses persecuted in their religious faith and overstrained by a system of arbitrary taxation, organized such a widely spread rebellion against the Habsburg with the help of the Turks that their throne became endangered and Rudolph was compelled to guarantee the religious liberty of the Hungarian Protestants in the Peace of Vienna (1606). At the same time the semi-independent principality of Transylvania became more and more the center of the old feudal world which created a special type of Magyar nationalism directed against the Habsburgs and combined with the protection of the persecuted Protestantism. Transylvania became a bulwark of religious freedom against the clericalism of the Habsburgs and the Diet of Torda, by the codification of religious liberty, was an early protest against the methods of the counter reformation (1557).

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SPANISH TERROR

The cruel and unbalanced policy of Rudolph overstrained the chord. The feudal world became more and more conscious of the danger which menaced it by Habsburg absolutism. Under the milder régime of his successor, we witness a greater activity of the noble classes. We see the beginnings of a conscious foreign policy of the estates which the growing pressure of Turkish aggression made even more prominent. Already, under the rule of Rudolph, the Austrian feudal classes made a close alliance with the Czech, Moravian, and Silesian nobility as well as with the Hungarian, Transylvanian, and Croatian estates. We can even observe a conscious endeavor to establish a central council of the noble classes for the administration of all those affairs in the internal and foreign policy in which the nobility of the various countries were equally interested. This feudal coalition took a more and more menacing attitude against the centralizing policy of the Habsburgs. When Ferdinand II (1619–1637), an entirely bigoted, passionate personality of a purely Spanish type succeeded to the throne, the conflict between Protestant particularism and Habsburg Catholic universalism, a struggle of life and death, became inevitable which under the tempests of the Thirty Years War led to an atomization of Germany and to a consolidation of the Habsburg dynasty.

The personality of Ferdinand II was a real incarnation of the Jesuit ideal which did not know any moderation or regard. "A desert is better than a country with heretics," he used to say, and he remained loyal to this slogan. The extermination of Protestantism and by it the annihilation of the resistance of the nobility to the final establishment of the absolutistic rule upon the whole territory of his empire, that was his ideal of a state. The aristocratic Spanish priests who were always with him took care that the Emperor should not know hesitation and milder compromises. He heard every day two masses and he visited constantly the monasteries and often personally rang the bell in the hermitage of Neustadt for the vespers. He initiated the historical custom according to which the Kaiser at Vienna assisted publicly the procession on Corpus Christi Day and, beginning with 1622, the Emperor walked among the crowd with a candle. (This practice remained unaltered until the end of the monarchy.) Ferdinand regarded his political enemies simply as the enemies of God and he was devoured by a burning desire to annihilate the hated sect of Protestantism.

Such was the individual who, at an important turning-point of

history, found himself opposed by a big coalition of the feudal classes, especially by the proud and inflexible Czech and Transylvanian estates, which, under the leadership of Count Mathias of Thurn and of the powerful and clear-sighted Prince of Transylvania, Gabriel Bethlen, laid siege to Vienna and endangered his throne. Ferdinand made his first offensive against his Czech enemies and won a decisive victory over them in the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. This signified a new epoch in the history of Austria. Ferdinand, with the cruelty of the religious fanatic and of the despot of God's grace, now undertook systematically the work of the extermination of the reformation and of the Czech national nobility. Perhaps there is no second example in history of such a total annihilation and extirpation of a whole political system. More than a score of noblemen were executed in Prague with cruel brutality. Before the execution even the Emperor seemed to vacillate but the mighty Jesuit, Lamormain, put an end to his meditations by declaring that he would take the whole matter on his conscience. The Emperor yielded but previously he did something in the interests of his victims. He prayed when they were executed for the salvation of their souls. For this purpose he went to the famous madonna picture of Maria Zell in Styria, where he knelt before the picture and implored the Virgin that the Czechs should obtain at least in their last moments an illumination and that they should be conducted before their death within the pale of the church.

It became his dogma to make the people blessed by terror. He boasted of torturing and executing his subjects out of love in order to save their successors from the damnation of heresy. But beside his transcendental aims the Spanish humanitarian did not forget his worldly purposes. He made colossal confiscations in Bohemia and Moravia, the value of which is estimated at fifty million golden florins, in those times an immense fortune, which he applied as a fund *to create a loyal aristocracy for his throne*. From all parts of the world hungry adventurers eager for booty poured into the unfortunate country as the representatives of Catholicism and of the Habsburg state idea, as bureaucrats and war lords of the Emperor. The pressure of executions, imprisonments, and confiscations upon the nation was so formidable that, beginning with 1623, a long wave of emigration began from Bohemia and Moravia. In the year 1628 alone thirty-six thousand emigrants left the country, among them one hundred and eighty-five noble families.¹

With this reign of terror Ferdinand reached his aim: he extirpated almost entirely the recalcitrant Protestant nobility in the Czech countries which signified in those times the complete extermination of the whole national life, because the real supporters of it belonged then to the noble classes. The whole Czech people sank into a long

¹ For other interesting details see Dr. Eduard Vehse, *Geschichte des österreichischen Hofes und Adels und der öst. Diplomatie*, Dritter Teil (Hamburg, 1851).

torpor of peasant unconsciousness. The new nobility, the so-called *Brief- und Hofadel* (nobility of letter and court) which Ferdinand put in the place of the feudal one, became an obedient instrument of the imperial will. In this way the mechanical unity of the empire was secured in the countries of the Czech crown, and the monarch, had no ulterior purposes or aims. The old struggle between the dynasty and nobility ceased and the servile court nobility seemed to be a sufficient basis for the unification of the empire. No new kind of administration was introduced into the country purged from feudalism, but the old administration of feudal nobility continued under the direction of the new nobility.

Thus the system of Ferdinand became a prototype of absolutist and Catholic concentration which remained a salient trait of the Habsburg rule. The idea that the state can be held together by purely military forces with the help of a court nobility entirely dependent upon the throne and with the protection of the Roman Catholic church, this conception of a *Machtstaat*, became as we shall see later in detail the chief obstacle to real co-operation and psychic penetration between the various peoples and classes of the monarchy. And the system had also another quality which slowly but surely ground up the moral forces of the monarchy. To press anything and anybody into the bed of Procrustes of the dynastic and patrimonial ideal, to persecute all originality and independence which sought for new ways and means and for a freer kind of co-operation, to reward the servile routine, and a formal loyalty revelling in words: these elements of the Spanish system infiltrated deeply into the Habsburg *fidei commissum* and envenomed its blood circulation.

But what still more undermined the system was its entire political immorality. Ferdinand II and Leopold I (1657–1705) applied literally the principles of Machiavelli though they probably were not familiar with them. Let us illustrate this spirit by a document produced by the official historian of the Habsburgs, Hormayr, who became the most severe critic of the system after he abandoned the country of Metternich. This document is almost symbolical of the methods of the *divide et impera* of Austrian absolutism. The document in question is a protocol of the state council which under the chairmanship of Ferdinand II was held relative to the matter of the pacification of Hungary. The council was assisted by the Papal Nuncio, by the family ambassador of Madrid and Florence, the governor of Bohemia, Cardinal Franz Dietrichstein, and by the chief military leader Wallenstein and other outstanding personalities of the epoch. The Spanish ambassador made a proposal according to which his lord and king would be inclined to supply for forty years forty thousand soldiers to the Emperor, in order to crush rebellion in Hungary. "In this manner this whole nation, so disloyal to the imperial majesty, could be exterminated root and branch and the capital and its neighborhood could

be made safe from the aggressions of these monsters." And when some members of the council expressed doubts concerning this plan because of the well-known bravery of the Hungarians, the Spanish ambassador continued his argumentation as follows:

The best wisdom would be to buy the Turks at any price and separate them from the Hungarians. . . . The Hungarians should be constantly irritated, the Turks should be made distrustful towards them and if possible an eternal peace should be settled with the latter. . . . The best method would be that already experienced in Spain: foreign governors should be set over these Hungarian barbarians to give them new, entirely arbitrary, laws without the possibility of any legal redress. . . . If the Hungarians complain at Vienna, the answer ought to be: His Majesty does not know anything about these procedures which are very disagreeable to his most high person. In this manner these beasts who do not see beyond their noses could not make any accusations against the emperor and would turn all their hatred against the governors. . . . In this way the Hungarian nation unaccustomed to such a yoke would attempt a rebellion against its severe governors. This rebellion would give a desired opportunity to punish the traitors with inhuman penalties and tortures.

This awful and almost incredible declaration given here in practically the same words as Hormayr reports it, was undersigned by the whole state council and the Emperor. On the basis of this document Wallenstein and the other military chiefs were charged with the control of all popular movements in Hungary.²

² *Anemonen aus dem Tagebuche eines alten Pilgermannes* (Jena, 1845), I, 116-19.

I know that the authenticity of this document will be questioned by a certain group. Baron Joseph Hormayr (1781-1848), a historian of immense knowledge and brilliancy became in 1816 the official historiographer of the Habsburgs, but in 1828 he abandoned the country and accepted a position in Bavaria in order to avoid the vexations of the Metternich system. From this time the historiographer became an acute critic of the Habsburg system and I will not question that he was biased against it. Nevertheless, I believe in the authenticity of the document (although it was not found in certain parts of the Viennese Archives) for the following reasons: (1) Some of the best Hungarian historians believed firmly in the trustworthiness of Hormayr. (2) Also competent Austrians told me that though he sometimes colors his statements they regard him incapable of a conscious falsification. (3) The disappearance of documents disagreeable to the Habsburgs was not exceptional. (4) The later spirit of the Habsburg policy in Hungary corroborates the principles of the document. (5) Some passages of it were already quoted in a sensational book of the noted Viennese critic and publicist, Hermann Bahr, in 1907. The book was mutilated by the censors and later seized by the police. Professor Joseph Redlich and his friends brought the matter before Parliament where the authenticity of the document was not questioned as far as I know.

My guess is, therefore, that Hormayr told the truth though he colored and vivified certain expressions. And another point: why should we be surprised by the infamous cruelty of this document from the beginning of the seventeenth century, when we have another analogous from August 30, 1905, a letter in which William II, so much admired by certain American radical pacifists, tells Prince Bülow that an alliance should be made with the Sultan in order "to put the Mohammedan forces under Prussian leadership," but, "before all the Socialists must be shot down, beheaded, and made harmless, if necessary, by a blood-bath and the foreign war later!" (Published by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, October 14, 1928.)

If we even take into consideration all the mitigating causes, the brutal atmosphere of the period, the cruel methods and eternal intrigues of feudalism, its predatory spirit against the working-classes and the poor, its continuous plots and treasons in the pay of foreign interests, the document quoted still remains a horrible reminiscence of the governing spirit under Ferdinand which remained the real spirit of the imperial policy under his successor Leopold I. The influence of a small group of prelates, Jesuits, rapacious aristocrats, the so-called *Viennese camarilla*, became even more preponderant and the Emperor continued the policy of the counter-reformation and of an absolutistic centralization in the whole monarchy, especially in Hungary, with a renewed vigor. The terrible "Blood Tribunal" in the city of Eperjes under Count Caraffa, the war lord of Leopold, crushed all constitutional and religious resistance. "From March to September, 1687, the butchery lasted," says an independent Hungarian historian, "and already in October the Diet was opened which surrounded by foreign military forces, voted all which was expected from it."³ The re-Catholization of the whole aristocracy in Hungary formerly belonging almost entirely to Protestantism was accomplished. In 1655 there were only three Protestant families and the work was continued with the forceful conversions of the cities and of the counties. A systematic warfare was carried on against the Protestant churches and many hundred processes of high treason were inaugurated. The fate of the Protestant-Hungarian galley slaves was so pathetic in Buccari and Naples that their condition repeatedly moved European public opinion. The system of confiscating landed property of the disloyal nobility continued and the new aristocracy loyal to the throne was reinforced. Especially the complot of some feudal aristocrats under the leadership of Nádasdy (all Catholics!) in which the motives of national exasperation were curiously intermingled with the purely private business interests of the rebel magnates was an excellent instrument for the court absolutism to complete the final blow against the deeply wounded feudalism. The rebellion was cruelly revenged, its leading men were executed. In 1670 about two thousand men, nobles, and distinguished citizens were imprisoned. Immense treasures in land and jewelry were confiscated. A terrible despair took hold of the whole country and the hatred against the court and the absolute system and the procedures of counter-reformation developed in the naïve consciousness of the great masses into a form of hatred against the Germans, and in those times were born those popular slogans which remained veritable symbols in the soul of the Hungarian people: the hatred against the *German* Vienna which sucks out the Hungarian blood and treasure. "The faith of a German

³ Professor Aladár Ballagi in his commemoration of the 250th birthday of Francis Rákóczi, II.

is a faith of a dog he promises all when he is in anguish but later he grants nothing rather under any devil than under the German. . . .” Such and similar outbursts were deeply rooted in the subconscious strata of the popular public opinion and made it always an easy manoeuver for the feudal classes to direct and canalize against Vienna all social or political discontent which could become dangerous for them. After the suppression of the feudal rebellion many thousands of fugitives fled to Turkish or Transylvanian territory and became the nucleus of a series of insurrections called *kurucz insurrections*, the ideology of which was a curious mixture of the feudal interests with the social and religious unrest of the disinherited classes.

In connection with the counter-reformation there was another movement in favor of Habsburg Catholicism which was directed against the Graeco-Oriental church and embittered the life of vast masses of Rumanian Serfs. The effort of the Roman Catholic church to push back toward Rome the masses of people living in Graeco-Oriental communities was protected by the Habsburgs with armed force. The history of the Greek-Catholic union constitutes one of the most horrible pages of the work of conversion made in the Habsburg monarchy, and contributed much to the exasperation of the bondsmen population.⁴

Besides the counter-reformation and the extirpation of the disloyal feudal elements, a third great fact completed the final consolidation of the Habsburg rule in this epoch. That was the continuation and the victorious accomplishment of the war against the Turks under the brilliant leadership of Prince Eugene of Savoy. The Peace of Karlovicz, in 1699, put all of Hungary under Habsburg rule with the exception of the Banat of Temesvár. This event changed the whole situation of the monarchy. From this time on there was no further organized power against the Habsburgs. The resistance of the feudal classes was entirely broken before the prestige of the imperial dynasty and the new army organized by Prince Eugene on a modern Western pattern. This ascendancy of the Habsburgs was so elementary that immediately after the reconquest of Buda, the heart of the country, in 1687, the Diet accepted not only the legal succession of the male line of the Habsburgs but it extended this privilege also to the Spanish branch of the dynasty and renounced the old right of armed resistance against unlawful imperial acts. The same diet gave citizenship to 167 foreigners to the new aristocracy of the Habsburgs which became a reliable bodyguard of the now hereditary Habsburg monarchy.

But a more solid foundation than the constitutional guaranties

⁴ Benedek Jancsó, *History and Present State of the Rumanian National Aspirations* (Budapest, 1899), I, 733-97. In Hungarian.

above mentioned was bestowed upon the Habsburgs by a complete reorganization of the system of land ownership in the country. Following the advice of the Archbishop Kollonics, a leader of the counter-reformation and Germanization in Hungary, the Emperor constituted a special commission, the so-called *neoacquistica commissio* with the purpose of controlling the legal title of all those landed properties which were previously under Turkish rule. This whole territory was considered as conquered by the army of the Emperor and the committee claimed a heavy ransom from all those proprietors who now became imperial subjects. And as eight-tenths of the country was originally under Turkish domination the commission was able to extort large sums from the landed interests for decades and put above them the sword of Damocles of expropriation. All undesirable elements could easily be eliminated under the legal disguise. At the same time the Catholic and loyal elements were strengthened by opulent donations and the power of the high clergy with growing Germanizing tendencies became more and more preponderant. Many foreign ecclesiastic bodies and priests flooded the country with the purpose of paralyzing the native clergy of national tendency. Under such conditions the trend of the counter-reformation became almost irresistible. The Hungarian tradition attributes to Kollonics the ill-famed dictum, "I will make Hungary first a prisoner, then a beggar, and finally a Catholic." This maxim may be apocryphal but it expresses without doubt the state of mind, the hatred, and profound exasperation with which the great masses of the Hungarian population regarded the triumphant predominance of the Habsburgs.

CHAPTER IX

MERCANTILISM AND PRAGMATICA SANCTIO

The forces outlined above made the power of the Habsburg monarchy irresistible at the beginning of the eighteenth century in its whole empire. Against this daily growing power all resistances and rebellions of the feudal classes became futile. The last leader of all the dissatisfied elements of Hungary, a man of a remarkable and tragic personality, Francis Rákóczi II (1675–1735), of the famous stock of the Transylvanian princes, the hero of the last *Kurucz* insurrection against the hated world of the *Labancz* forces (the nickname of the Austrian crowd) tried in vain to oust the Habsburg rule. The whole movement was a curious mixture of narrow feudal local interests and of the aspirations for religious freedom and social emancipation. On the one hand stands Rákóczi the leader, a man with almost kingly powers who possessed in Hungary and Transylvania 445 villages on an area of 1,400,000 yokes.¹ On the other hand were all the impoverished masses of the country: noblemen whose estates were confiscated; poor priests; teachers driven by the counter-reformation from their offices; small peasants ruined by the eternal *kurucz-labancz* conflicts; soldiers dismissed from the imperial, Turkish, or national armies; and other uprooted parts of the population without bread and without any chance for the future. This fundamental contradiction, like a red thread running through the whole plot, of a feudal leader like Rákóczi with his immense landed estates and loyal Catholic feelings joining forces with the Protestant masses and with the disinherited peasantry, gave to the whole movement a kind of psychological danger and a lack of balance which the prince could scarcely appease by very vague and uncertain promises. In spite of this dilemma his standards *Pro Deo et libertate* and his famous proclamation issued in 1703, *Recrudescunt inclytæ gentis Hungaræ vulnera* (“the old wounds of the glorious Hungarian nation reappear”), and the kind, humanitarian spirit of the leader in sympathy with the sufferings of all the peoples oppressed by the Viennese absolutism evoked such a mass of popular enthusiasm that he succeeded for seven years in fomenting the spirit of rebellion against the Habsburgs whom he dethroned at the memorable Diet of Ónod in 1707. Large parts of the country were again covered with blood and the rebellion menaced not only the Austrian elements but at the same time the noble and wealthy circles of Hungary. Rebellions of famine and anarchical plunderings

¹ A Hungarian yoke (*hold*)=1.066 acre.

disturbed very often the campaign of Rákóczi who got into an entirely helpless position in face of the highly disciplined and efficient Austrian army and his destiny was sealed when his foreign allies and inspirers, especially the shrewd diplomacy of the French, abandoned him. Though noble and enthusiastic in his intentions the prince remained always a semi-conscious instrument in the hands of foreign diplomatic intrigues. The lack of any serious financial and administrative background made the whole insurrection die from hunger.²

Rákóczi was compelled to flee and in his exile he made a last unsuccessful attempt to reconcile himself with the Habsburgs. The Viennese court became completely triumphant. The sequestration of the Rákóczi estates and the unheard of servility of the nobles who dishonored in a special law the memory of their former chief made the Habsburg rule in the country firmer than in any previous time. The possibilities of personal feudal wars were over. The lords abandoned their eagle nests, and their fortifications were demolished. At the same time a colonizing activity on an immense scale had begun in order to repopulate colossal territories devastated by the Turks and the civil wars. Many hundred thousands of foreigners, especially Germans, Rumanians, Ruthenians, and Serbs, came into the liberated areas of Hungary. One of the best experts of this movement thinks that the gigantic proportions of this new immigration can be compared only to that directed toward the United States in the nineteenth century. Very often the aims of colonization were connected with those of Germanization. These new immigrants having had no moral connection with the old traditions of the country became as a matter of fact ardent supporters of the Habsburgs both from an economic and a political point of view. Especially on the *military confines*, bulwarks erected on the frontiers of the liberated territories which remained under a strict military administration, there arose a proverbial Habsburg patriotism perhaps the only real one which the Habsburgs were capable of fomenting in their realm. The name of *graničar*, the soldier and citizen of these military confines, became a mock name for politicians who showed an exaggerated loyalty toward the Habsburgs.³

The great international events of this epoch only accentuated the predominance of the monarchy. As a result of the Spanish War of

² The romantic uprising of Prince Charles-Edward in 1745 for the reconquest of the throne of Scotland presents startling analogies with the upheaval of Rákóczi demonstrating the common traits of feudalism under different racial and political conditions. (See for particulars: R. Pauli, "Entstehung des Einheitstaates in Grossbritannien," *Preussische Jahrbücher* [Berlin, 1872].)

³ An old song expressed this loyalty in the following way:

*"If the Glorious Emperor desires,
The graničar jumps into death."*

Succession, Charles VI acquired the Italian possessions of the Bourbons in the Peace of Utrecht (1713). On the other hand, in the continued war against the Turks, Prince Eugene conquered Belgrade and in the Peace of Passarowicz (1718) he restored the whole Banat of Temesvár to the empire and placed the Habsburg sovereign in control of Serb and Rumanian territories. The unifying work of Ferdinand I was finished and made an overwhelming impression on all the countries, especially on Hungary where the Emperor, as Hungarian king, came into the possession of a power which no other Hungarian king since Matthias Corvinus (1458–90) could rival.

Under these advantageous inner and outer conditions for the monarchy, we witness a more and more conscious effort in the imperial court and among the leading elements to replace the mechanic and military unity of the empire with one that is economic and political. During the reign of Charles VI, as Hungarian King Charles III (1711–40), there was beginning a conscious and consequent mercantilistic policy. Until then every kingdom, province, or crownland constituted an economic unity but now the so-called *transito* was introduced, that is, measures were taken to make it possible for goods introduced in any of the Habsburg countries to pass from one into the other without paying custom duties over again. This policy was energetically continued by later kings and in 1775 it was successful in uniting the Bohemian countries and the Alpine countries (with the exception of Tyrol) in a single custom union. By and by all the countries grew into a vast united market. The local merchants of the former periods who supplied only a closely limited area with their goods were replaced by big industrial and agricultural producers who possessed privileges for the whole economic territory. A kind of division of labor between the various provinces made its first appearance. Wool and glass were manufactured in Bohemia, clothes in Moravia, iron in Styria, and fancy goods in Vienna, for the whole economy of the empire. Only Hungary remained until the middle of the nineteenth century a strictly separated economic unit resisting the unified circulation of the monarchy. This situation was not a result of a Hungarian chauvinism (on the contrary, it was an old grievance of the Hungarian diets that the custom barrier between Hungary and Austria was very detrimental to Hungarian economic progress) but a consequence of the narrow-minded fiscal policy of the Hungarian nobility who refused on the basis of their ancient feudal privileges to pay taxes and, therefore, the only means of getting a financial contribution from them was the indirect way of custom duties on Hungarian corn and cattle.

This quickly growing military economic, and administrative unity of the monarchy aroused in the best minds of the empire the effort to unify and centralize the vast territory—following the examples of

Louis XIV and Peter the Great—in a homogeneous system of law and constitution. The book already quoted, of von Hörnigk, emphasized the fact that the countries of the Emperor formed a *natural body* and by the exchange of their raw materials they *constituted a small world* which could exist by itself. A similar thought was expressed by the great philosopher Leibniz who encouraged Emperor Leopold to become a second Justinian by elaborating a new system of civil law for the whole territory of his empire. The same effort was renewed and continued by the victorious military leader, Prince Eugene of Savoy in 1726 when he advised Emperor Charles VI: “It would be necessary to make as far as possible a *totum* from the extended and glorious monarchy of your majesty. . . .”

But perhaps nobody saw more clearly the position of the monarchy at the beginning of the eighteenth century than the ingenious secretary of the court treasury, Christian Julius von Schierendorff, who, under the influence of the union between England and Scotland completed at this time, expressed the opinion in a scholarly memoir that the empire would be seriously endangered (and here the author was surely influenced by the experiences of the Hungarian rebellions) if it did not succeed in combining its various parts into a common constitution and a common order of succession for the throne. But this plan could only be achieved if a real popular representation were bestowed upon the whole in which all the classes of the monarchy, even the lower, would participate. This thinker, so much advanced for his age, at the same time emphasized the fact that the unjust and wretched state of the peasant masses especially of the Hungarian and Czech serfs, was the chief impediment of the consolidation of the monarchy. Therefore, the bondsmen of the noble rebels should be liberated. The *arcanum dominationis* (the secret of domination) would be a just policy of taxation.⁴

But these revolutionary ideas of a liberal centralization did not have a wide echo. Both the Habsburg absolutism and the particularism of the estates abhorred equally these measures. But his ideas concerning the legal succession to the throne had probably an effect on the carrying on of the *Pragmatica Sanctio* by which Charles VI, deprived of a male successor, proclaimed the hereditary right of the female line in case the male line should die out. This fundamental decision which was in Austria a purely personal decree of the Emperor emanating from the old patrimonial principles for the maintaining of his *fidei commissum* gained on the Hungarian Diet such a constitutional form and motivation that it was rightly called the “first declaration of a unitary state idea” in the empire. The Hungarian law of 1722–23, indeed, proclaimed not only the hereditary right of the fe-

⁴ See for the particulars of Schierendorff's reform-plans, A. Fischel, *Studien zur österreichischen Rechtsgeschichte* (Wien, 1906), Abschnitt II.

male line in Hungary but at the same time declared that all the kingdoms and countries of the Emperor outside of Germany should come *indivisibiliter ac inseparabiliter* ("indivisible and inseparable") in contact with Hungary and its annexed countries and territories under the scepter of the Emperor entitled to the throne. This document, though it emphasizes solemnly the liberties and privileges of the Hungarian estates, nevertheless acknowledges the permanent connection of the countries of the Hungarian crown with the other countries of the dynasty and explains this connection as a defensive alliance established by the struggles against Islam. And though we know very well that the law was not a spontaneous act of the Hungarian upper classes but that it was the result of much previous softening, pressure and of a long series of grafts: still one cannot deny that the Habsburg empire which was a purely military dynastic and patrimonial unity until this moment, got in the *Pragmatica Sanctio* its first jural formulation and by it a certain moral cohesion.

CHAPTER X

THE SYSTEM OF DOUCE VIOLENCE

It was said that every Habsburg felt himself to be an instrument of Providence and interpreted this mission *à sa façon*. This statement is particularly true in the case of Maria Theresa (1740–80) who continued with new and personal means the realization of the traditional aims of the dynasty: the work of unification, Germanization, and Catholicization. She worked with an unbending energy for these ideals but she partly replaced the former methods of military violence by means of a feminine captivation, of patient compromises, of sugared violence, and even, if necessary, with the tears of the persecuted woman in all the cases in which she faced a more serious resistance. Indeed the only feudal opposition which remained dangerous for her in her empire, the opposition of the Hungarian nobility, she was able to disarm, at least transitorily, by these methods of feminine refinement; nay, she was successful in inducing Hungarian feudalism to make great efforts for the defense of her throne when it was threatened by a formidable coalition of her enemies. "The beautiful, brave young lady with the Hungarian face" as she was called in the circles of Hungarian nobility drew the estates into a veritable enthusiasm which among the luxuries of her Viennese court and in the refined social life of the baroque culture forgot more and more their former offenses and complaints.

The first lady of the empire lured the Hungarian aristocrats to Vienna and encouraged them for a permanent stay and for marriages with Austrian ladies. She adorned them with her decorations (even establishing a new Hungarian order for this purpose, the Order of St. Stephen) and founded for their sons a special institute and college, the so-called *Theresianum* where the noble Hungarian offsprings were educated together with the Austrians in the honor of the dynasty and in the cult of the empire. (More than a century ago in the same spirit another institution, the so-called *Pazmaneum*, was established by the brilliant leader of the Hungarian counter-reformation, Peter Pázmány, where the Hungarian theological pupils grew up in the spirit of the court and centralization.) Later she surrounded herself with the "Hungarian noble bodyguard," a corporation into which every county was entitled to send two youths. By this policy she laid a moral foundation for the Austrian court nobility. The successors of all those adventurers who poured into Vienna from all parts of the empire were melted for the first time into a conscious class regarding the

service to the throne as their real life profession. The supreme measure for all values became the imperial grace and the imperial will.

Though through her husband, Francis of Lorraine, Grand Duke of Tuscany, to whom she presented sixteen children, new blood and a more liberal spirit was introduced into the reigning house now called Habsburg-Lorraine, the Empress adhered stiffly to her Catholic and anti-Protestant religious traditions, perhaps not only from fanaticism but because she hated the reformed religion as the fomenter of the national resistance in Hungary and as the state religion of her rival, Frederick the Great, the Prussian king, to whom she was compelled to abandon her province Silesia. We may say that her religious policy was scarcely more humane than that of her predecessors. The Empress, on the other hand, regarded the business of conversions as one of her chief royal functions. When she sent one of her sons abroad to study the world she wrote the following severe instruction for him: "You must blindly follow your confessor in all that pertains to your conscience, religion and morality. Without his permission you must not read a single book, not even the smallest pamphlet." She enforced these rigid principles not only in her family life but also in the policy of the empire and, in the middle of the eighteenth century, a new cruel wave of persecution of the Protestants fell on Hungary.

However, the Empress not only continued the old absolute and clerical traditions of her dynasty but, at the same time, she introduced two new elements of the greatest importance into the Austrian state ideal. The one was her work by which she formed from the former loose conglomerate countries a more and more united and strongly centralized bureaucratic state. That great organizing task which was carried on in France by Louis XIII and Louis XIV and in Prussia by her powerful contemporary, Frederick the Great, was achieved by her genius in Austria. She swept out definitely the organs of feudal particularism and built up the whole vast machine of the modern state in all spheres of public administration, in the center, in the middle instances, and in the field of local affairs. Vienna was now able to carry out its will over the whole territory of the empire, even in the newly acquired Galicia and Bukovina (with the partial exception of Hungary where they still did not dare to apply in full rigor a complete centralization) by means of its own organs, and by its own bureaucracy in the spirit of a unified system of law and administration. The unification of Bohemia, for instance, with the other countries of the empire, was no longer a mechanical but an administrative and organic process. The old *Ständestaat*, the ancient feudal state, the state beyond the state, (with the exception of Hungary) was now completely annihilated. Therefore, not without reason is Maria Theresa regarded as the *founder of the unified Austrian state* which is no longer a sheer military and power-organization for the taming of the estates and the

continuation of a warlike imperialistic policy but a *Beamtenstaat*, a state of civil officials, which is intended first of all as an administrative system.¹

And with this great change a second and not less fundamental one comes into Austrian state life. Now for the first time the imperial power appears to be in a constant, direct, and vital contact with its real subjects, with those millions of bondsmen who, by the old feudal state, were hermetically separated from the throne. In consequence of imperial finance, administration, and justice, Maria Theresa made the great discovery of enlightened absolutism: an Austrian sovereign got a clear consciousness of the fact that the force of her army, the stability of her throne, depended in the first place on the economic and cultural conditions of the great masses of population. And a really grandiose state activity began in this direction. The government of Maria Theresa carried on in the territory of the whole empire, even in Hungary, a long series of fundamental social reforms which infused fresh blood in the torpid veins of the former feudal state. Useful agricultural arts were encouraged by means of public administration and education, by a rational regulation of forest exploitation, by the promotion of horse and sheep breeding, by the diffusion of potato culture, and by the betterment of communication. But the greatest achievement of the social policy of the Empress was the reconstruction of the relations of the bondsmen by the preparation of the so-called "urbarium," which by fixing a minimum acreage for the use of each serf and the maximum for their burdens, tried to make the situation of the poor peasants tolerable. In these efforts the Empress exercised great energy: "I must do justice both to the rich and the poor, I must satisfy my conscience and I won't lose my soul for the interest of some magnates and noble persons." In vain was she threatened by the Hungarian lords with the specter of serf rebellions. The Empress strenuously continued her work. She received the delegations of the peasantry personally and under her government and that of her wonderful son, the later Joseph II, was established that almost mystical authority of the imperial power before the oppressed peoples which could not be annihilated thoroughly even by impotent and reactionary successors to the throne.

In the field of popular education, too, from the elementary schools up to the universities, the work of rebuilding and reorganization continued, of course in a strongly Catholicizing and Germanizing spirit. But this Germanization was not directed against the mother-tongue of the people but it aimed rather to establish in the place of the dead Latin language which remained the language of the nobility, particu-

¹The meaning and significance of the whole system was masterly analyzed by Joseph Redlich: *Das österreichische Staats- und Rechtsproblem* (Leipzig, 1920), I, 25-37.

larly in Hungary, a modern language for the use of international communication and the state administration. Indeed, her famous decree, the *Ratio educationis*, delivered a deadly stroke in Hungary and in her annexed parts against the exclusive rule of the Latin language. Beside the Latin language she declared the German literature as the "only source of civilization" and she intended to make German in a short time the general language of the whole empire.

On the other hand the great and comprehensive cultural work of the Empress continued the same spirit of a rigid absolutism under the exclusive influence of the court and the Jesuits. She wished sincerely the welfare of the common people but entirely in the old Habsburg spirit and its narrow limits. She sought even to conserve the rule of the nobility in the social sphere. A progressing peasantry, *but under their old rulers*: this was her aim. "Those who are born in boots should not desire to wear shoes," she said on one occasion. Similarly in the realm of the spirit she abhorred modern notions. Her censors made a veritable war on condemned books. Pascal, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Locke, Milton, even the great historical work of Gibbon, and the *Werther* of Goethe were tabooed, according to notes of contemporaries. The bishop of Eger alone burned four thousand books. The list of prohibited books was officially printed by the government, but later this list too was forbidden that the public should not be informed about books of which they did not previously know.²

From the Austrian side it was often asserted that Maria Theresa had actually solved the very problem of the monarchy which she grasped not only from a jurial and military point of view but with a woman-like warmth and intuition (she was often called the *Landesmutter*, the mother of the country), and if her successors, especially her son, had not abandoned the *douce violence* system of the grand lady by which she softened step by step the Hungarian feudalism and incorporated it in an almost unconscious way into her unified realm, then many crises of subsequent periods could have been avoided and the *Gesamtstaat*, the unitary state, could have been achieved without revolutionary convulsions. This point of view seems to me very shortsighted because it tries to explain great historical changes exclusively from the point of view of a single ruling coterie. It will suffice to allude to the fact that even in Bohemia they did not succeed in the extirpation of national separatism in spite of the total elimination of the old patriotic feudalism and cessation of the old constitution. It is almost certain that the national idea would have arisen even with an entirely tamed nobility. We can go even farther and assert that the very methods of the Empress led inevitably toward the creation of the national feeling and idea by laying down the fundamentals for the material

² Acsády, *op. cit.*, II, 522-23.

and spiritual culture of the great masses. However Austrian, even Germanizing, the tendencies of the Empress may have been, her work must have become revolutionary from a national point of view, too, in the sense that by it the great masses of the peasantry were lifted up from their somnolent existence of many centuries and the first dawning of a civic consciousness was infiltrated in these skulls thickened by feudal absolutism. From here until the vague presentiment of national consciousness is only a step. Her work was also revolutionary concerning the better elements of the noble classes themselves. The German and French cultural influences, with which they came into daily contact in the splendid international court of the Empress, aroused in them *a contrario* the consciousness of their own vegetating and backward national language and literature. This process really occurred in the noble bodyguard of Maria Theresa where some enthusiastic young Magyars, critical or poetic souls, lifted the standard of the languishing Hungarian literature and elaborated a program for its reconstruction. "We became very cramped in things Magyar," they said, and began courageously to fish out "the precious gems" of their mother tongue "from the thick, dirty dust" of the feudal Latinity. The Germanizing Empress became against her will the regalanizer of the national consciousness and this propaganda *malgré elle* was continued in exactly the same unintentioned manner by her son, and successor to the throne, who began again new methods of dealing with the Habsburg state idea.

CHAPTER XI

THE SYSTEM OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ABSOLUTISM

Joseph II (1780–90), who had already functioned during a part of his mother's reign as a co-regent saw distinctly the shortcomings of this system, that it remained on the surface, that it was based too much on feudalism and clericalism, and that it was incapable of solving the greatest problem of the monarchy, the problem of the serfs. Traveling extensively in Europe, and sometimes entirely incognito in his own countries, and studying intimately the historical and philosophical literature of his epoch, (he admired Voltaire and once he called personally on Rousseau) this conviction of his matured into a real political passion the more because he was in heart and in mind a real child of the great rationalist century who had not the least doubt that a sovereign could transmit directly the abstract philosophical truths into life provided he possessed sufficient energy and consequence.

And indeed, history has seldom witnessed such an idealism, such a humanitarianism, and such a sense of duty on the throne as that by which this revolutionary despot was characterized. For Joseph II remained just as stiff a type of autocratic ruler as his predecessor. He hated the estates and in his times there was not a sufficiently developed bourgeois public opinion which could have participated in political power. And in the question of militarism his policy was very rigid. The slightest neglects of duty in the army were punished with the cudgel.¹ Especially the example of his famous rival, Frederick the Great, enforced on him this absolutist and militarist conception. In any case, the fact that after the loss of Silesia within the German empire a new German great power arose beside Austria, the more and more menacing Prussian state became a decisive motive in the hearts of the Habsburgs.

However, the new state ideal of Emperor Joseph differed radically from the conception of his mother. He no longer wanted to be a gorgeous sovereign with a prestige lent from the church and surrounded by the greedy luxury of the court nobility. In his nineteenth year he said:

The inner force, good laws, an honest judiciary, an orderly finance, an imposing military force, a progressing industry, a ruler held in esteem are more worthy of a great European court than festivals, parades, expen-

¹ Further interesting details will be found in Beidtel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung, 1740–1848*, I, 59–66.

sive clothes, diamonds, golden halls, precious vessels and brilliant sleighing parties. . . . I would never demand from my subjects any gorgeous display.

When he became sovereign he remained true to this early conception and he wished to be in the first place the first official and soldier of the country who with an admirable tenacity worked for the realization of his ideal, the essence of which remained the traditional Habsburg conception: unity, centralization, German state language, powerful imperial administration, and the elimination of feudal particularisms. But the state ideal of Joseph had two other very important aims. The one was that he regarded his state more and more as the state of the citizens and of the peasants. The second, that he tried to make the state independent of the church. "The state is not a monastery," he said, and he undertook with an iron energy the fight against the spirit of intolerance. A lay state which determines for itself the kind of religious life which it will employ and a governing activity according to the principles of his philosophy for the welfare of the great masses with the purpose that the Emperor should have the greatest weight and authority both inside and outside: that was the essence of his system called after his name *Josephinism*. And he displayed so much perseverance and so great an élan in the propagation of his principles, that though the greatest part of his positive achievements collapsed, his spirit did not die and remained almost to the end of the monarchy a real source of all liberal initiatives.

Joseph clearly perceived the revolutionary character of his state conception and he also knew that he could not realize it by the narcotizing half-measures of his mother. In particular he keenly visualized that he was compelled to fight a death struggle with Hungarian feudalism which made the realization of his great reforms impossible. "The Sarmatian spirit of the estates," this eternal rumination of dead paragraphs for the maintenance of their class rule, their never-ceasing policy of *gravamina*, their complaints for their offended privileges, their persistent sabotage against all measures tending to promote the interests of the peasant masses, their corrupt and impotent Latin administration, their endless judiciary procedures, the unchecked rule of the latifundist system, emaciating the popular energies, and constantly fomenting national dissensions and animosities, the eternal flickering of the fire of peasant revolts, "the servile and slavish humiliation of the working masses," which he witnessed in Transylvania with his own eyes, this whole backward feudal atmosphere exasperated so much the great humanitarian reformer, that he decided not to care for the void formulas of this antiquated constitution (he saw only its nature of class domination but he did not realize that it was at the same time a certain bulwark against the autocratic

Austrian militarism and counter-reformation), but to carry on his lofty plans with entire disregard for it. He refused to be crowned lest his constitutional oath should impede him in the destruction of that feudal constitution which he felt as the chief impediment to the consolidation of his empire. Therefore, as an uncrowned, as a "hatted king" as the popular language called him, he began the realization of his great work and the holy crown of St. Stephen imbued with a mysterious force, according to the Hungarian traditions, a symbol of national independence, he ordered transferred to the Viennese treasury as an anachronistic symbol. The Viennese treasury already contained many other useless symbols of a past glory, such as the crown of Wenceslaus and the ducal hat of Lower Austria. Now the proud symbol of Hungary was relegated to the same limbo.

Disregarding all national susceptibilities he began a long series of social reforms all serving his philosophical conception. With a single stroke he put an end to serfdom and introduced the duty of general taxation. He wished to wipe out forever the hated name of bondsman. He announced the unlimited right of free migration for the serfs. He permitted them to marry, to learn a profession, to go to school, and to enter a learned profession without the permission of the landlord. All these measures quite alarmed the Hungarian feudal society, the more so since serfdom without any culture misunderstood completely the plans of the humanitarian Emperor and in some places they went into open revolt, for instance in Transylvania, where the consequence was a terrible peasant revolt under the leadership of Hora and Kloska which led to the extermination of more than a hundred villages and 4,000 people. The exacerbation of the nobility was heightened by the order for general taxation. In vain the Emperor announced, to sooth the nobility, that in recompense for the new reform he would be inclined to comply with the old request of the country by eliminating the custom barriers between Hungary and Austria and by suppressing all intermediary duties. The feudal classes affirmed, however, that without the Diet, which the Emperor refused to convoke, they were incapable of expressing their wishes. On the other hand the Emperor wished to have nothing to do with the Diet because he held that the Diet of the nobility was a sheer anachronism, the country having 40,000 nobles and 5,000,000 peasants: the former were the legislators, the latter the slaves. It was quite unthinkable—this was the argument of the Emperor according to a contemporary—that the nobility would spontaneously abdicate its privileges and therefore permit the constitution to be remolded by a single man. The 40,000 noble families were represented by 500 on the Diet but from these 500 only the ten most influential had a real rôle in the legislation. Therefore the constitutional proceedings would have been senseless.²

² Acsády, *op. cit.*, II, 545-46.

In the field of local government with disregard for the old territorial divisions, he placed the state administration in the hands of imperial officials. He separated the judiciary from the administration and tried everywhere to eliminate the old feudal authorities. He tried to atomize and standardize the Old World. He saw in every historical structure only an anachronism and tried to overthrow every traditional institution instead of transforming it and filling it with a new spirit. Into the non-German parts of the empire, more and more foreign German-speaking officials were sent in order to promote the unification of the realm and to counterbalance the local influences. Besides, to keep the old nobility in check the Emperor endeavored to create a new small nobility by extended distribution of letters of nobility. "Innkeepers, retailers, tanners, printers, lackeys of the counts, court officials, Armenians, and other such despicable peoples arose to the rank of nobility in our country" complains a popular writer of the Magyar nobility. At the same time the Emperor had pleasure in the cultivation of a literature directed against the historical nobility which lashed with sharp irony the privileges, the customs of the nobles, and their cruelties against the peasants.

With the same energy and relentlessness he tried to reform the church which he considered merely as a part of the state administration. In his memorable edict of 1781 in the so-called *Patent for Tolerance* he wished to put an end to the terrible sufferings of the Protestants and though he did not abolish the privileged position of the Roman Catholic church, he extended religious freedom to the Protestants and the Greek Orientals. The Emperor was fully aware of the historical importance of his decree. "Nobody should suffer any more tribulations in consequence of his faith, nobody should be constrained any longer to accept the evangelism of the state if it is against his conviction," he wrote in one of his letters. A murmur of alleviation swept over the whole monarchy especially over Hungary where a large Protestant minority was living. The humanitarian spirit of the Emperor did not stop here, but he expanded the privileges of tolerance to a certain extent even to the Jews who until his epoch lived without any civil rights on the properties of the nobility and on the imperial estates.

At the same time he tried to curb the haughtiness of the Roman Catholic church. He put in force the *Ius placenti* according to which no papal bull could be made public without the previous consent of the monarch. Even his reformatory zeal and revolutionary rationalism developed into the grotesque when he regulated by imperial decrees ecclesiastical ceremonies, processions, Lent, burials, and even purely individual and family relations. His plans for religious reforms aroused such an excitement that Pope Pius VI hastened to Vienna in 1782 in order to check the Emperor in his dangerous career, admonishing him that his reforms might cause serious revolts in his Italian

provinces. But the Emperor went farther on his way and ordered the conscription of the incomes of the rich prelates in order to eliminate the terrible antagonism between their princely luxury and the misery of the lower clergy. He did away with 700 monasteries and nunneries with nearly 40,000 conventuals. The remaining ecclesiastical orders were put under severe supervision of the state. As a logical consequence of his policy, he took away the sacramental character of marriage and made it a simple civil contract.

These revolutionary decrees of the great rationalist naturally remained mostly on paper. Disregarding the really existing historical forces he came more and more into conflict with them and they proved to be mightier than the will of the enlightened autocrat. The feudal and clerical elements of the empire indulged in initiating an astute sabotage against his humanitarian proscriptions. He was therefore often constrained to take off the edges of his decrees and to soften them to the extent that the faith of the persecuted masses became doubtful of his intentions. In spite of these shortcomings the monarchy never was inspired with so much ardor for the public good from any of its regents as from this perhaps unconscious Benthamite.

The same work of centralization, unification, and modernization was continued by a vast codifying activity; both the civil code and the penal code were based on advanced principles and introduced in the whole empire. At the same time he undertook an almost feverish activity of colonization in order to introduce skilled artisans from every part of Europe. The peasant colonization of his predecessors was continued with an outspoken Germanizing tendency. The German language was introduced as the state language over the whole territory of the monarchy and at the same time the whole educational system was reorganized in order to give instruction in this tongue to the youth. This audacious but hasty policy which misunderstood completely the whole psychology of national evolution became the beginning of a new epoch not only in Hungary but also in Bohemia and in Croatia. Joseph II became, against his will, the real promoter of the national renaissance. Feudal public opinion, till then almost entirely indifferent to national matters, under the sway of the medieval Latinity, regarded the linguistic reforms of the Emperor as humiliating and as whip cuts under which their dreamy national consciousness began to prance. This resistance could not be reduced to genuine national motives; it was rather a growing fear of the nobles that their jobs in public administrations would be taken by the German imperial bureaucrats. Béla Grünwald, the best historian of this epoch says:

The vindication of the use of the Magyar language could not be a sincere one. The same counties which (arguing against the decree of the Emperor) emphasized the possibility of an administration in the Magyar tongue, declared it in 1811—that is, twenty-seven years later—an impossibility. . . .

And about two decades later in a very nationalistic county, famous for its *kurucz* traditions, it was said that "the introduction of the Magyar language would endanger our constitution and all our interests . . . and religion would be ruined if the Latin language would be eliminated."³

Regarding such and similar facts one must really doubt the sincerity of the resistance of the nobility against the reforms of the Emperor. The resistance, indeed, was not a serious one. In a few years German was introduced in all the Hungarian counties and the old Magyar bureaucracy remained in service complying with the new policy of Vienna. A similar opposition arose in Bohemia even among the already tamed aristocracy of this country. The Bohemian nobility suddenly remembered the time when their predecessors were masters of the country and they attributed their diminished might to the expansion of the German language. A historian of this period narrates that those opposed to the Emperor immediately discovered their own Czech mother-tongue which they formerly despised as the language of the peasants and servants. Nay, it became fashionable to promote and to foster the old forgotten language.⁴ A similar exasperation overwhelmed the Croatian nobility which made common cause with the Hungarian against the Germanizing despot though they were almost entirely Latinized and without any contact with the real popular movement.

In this world, without a genuine national feeling the Emperor himself was not led by any nationalistic tendency in a modern sense when he undertook his policy of Germanization. He did not fight for instance against the Magyar language but he fought against the Latin. Following the example of the great national states he thought that, on the basis of the medieval Latin administration of the nobility, no effective work in the interest of the masses could have been carried on. The necessity of a unifying language connecting all the parts of his empire seemed to him a peremptory claim. Under this necessity he could not choose any other language but German, the only one which had a vast culture and literature under its sway and which had a considerable minority in all his provinces. His so-called policy of Germanization was therefore not a result of the national feeling but rather of the entire misunderstanding of this force. He was not aware that the colossal economic and cultural activity which he inaugurated in the interest of the material and spiritual elevation of the great masses must inevitably have led toward a national renaissance of all

³ The whole political and social structure of feudal Hungary was brilliantly analyzed by Béla Grünwald in his wonderful study, *The Old Hungary* (Budapest, 1910). It is deplorable that the book was not translated into any foreign language.

⁴ Some other interesting details concerning the development of the Czech nationalism were collected by Alfred von Skene in his *Entstehen und Entwicklung der slavisch-nationalen Bewegung in Böhmen und Mähren im XIX Jahrhundert* (Wien, 1893).

the nations. It is an interesting fact which explains the whole process that the most nationally apathetic elements of the Hungarian society were the most ardent enemies of the Emperor and even the German-speaking population of Transylvania, the Saxons, were fiercely opposed to his policy which disregarded their ancient privileges. On the other hand the great promoters of the Hungarian renaissance, the champions of Magyar language and literature, had a vivid sympathy with the monarch. Why? Because these refined spirits who were longing for Western civilization had the same conception that the Emperor had: they saw in the German culture the best vehicle for linking the backward country with Western civilization. Francis Kazinczy, the noble leader of the Hungarian renaissance, later wrote:

It was superb to see in the pharmacy of Joseph, how the better souls of the society became interwoven in spite of their divergencies in color because they were united by the same love of the commonweal. Great and small, patriot and foreigner, official and private, civilian and soldier, were for solidarity if they found merit in each other.

But whatever may have been the real motives of the resistance of the nobility, there can be no doubt at all that the Germanizing policy of the Emperor aroused to a new life the paralyzed national consciousness in very large stratas of the population. And when the first news of the great French Revolution arrived, there came an outburst of the hatred of foreigners and of the antipathy against the German language. A patriotic contemporary observer wrote:

In many places the German hat was thrown away and they put the Hungarian fur cap and shako on their heads. The German dress found on a Hungarian was pulled off. . . . Nay, everybody spoke Magyar and those who did not know it learned the language, though some few months previous, especially in elegant society, you could not find anyone speaking this language.

And this anti-German tendency broke out with equal vehemence in other parts of the monarchy, too, when the Turkish war seemed to take an unfavorable turn. Belgium was in open revolt and the Hungarian feudals conspired with the Prussian king. Even the loyal German Tyrol, defending its ancient privileges, started rebellion. The resistance of the Emperor, gravely sick, collapsed. He decided to return to the way of the old constitution and withdraw all his decrees and patents with the exception of those relating to tolerance and the liberation of serfdom. To demonstrate the sincerity of his purpose and to indicate the change in the system he sent back the Holy Crown into Hungary. The Austrian historian, surely not biased against the dynasty, says:

A delirium of enthusiasm swept over Hungary when the crown of St. Stephen was transported to the country. Old and young danced on the

streets, even the lame, according to a report of a contemporary, jumped for joy and everybody clamored: "hurrah for Hungarian freedom!" And even the Viennese expressed a common joy with the Hungarians. When the Hungarian crown jewels were fetched from the treasury the people pressed together before the imperial castle and their joyous cheering penetrated into the room of the dying Emperor. . . .⁵

A symbolical fact: the unselfish work of a whole life in the interest of the commonweal, the disinterested struggle of a great man against the dark powers of the past, a long series of brilliant reforms for the people, all were suddenly forgotten but the returning of the mystical medieval symbol threw them into raptures of enthusiasm. The poor Emperor, indeed, could not have received a more illustrative object lesson from the historical method against purely rationalistic deductions.

⁵ Viktor Bibl, *Der Zerfall Österreichs* (Wien, 1922), I, 25.

CHAPTER XII

BULWARK AGAINST THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The convulsions of the French Revolution which had already shaken the foundations of the system of Emperor Joseph had even greater and more general consequences for the future of the entire Habsburg monarchy. For all those complex questions which made the fate of the Danube monarchy problematical, which opened a process of long disintegration driving the monarchy from crisis to crisis, were a direct consequence of the French Revolution. The resistance of the old feudal society was no longer a serious menace to the Habsburg rule which was growing more and more powerful. But, at the end of the eighteenth century, two new currents met and became the source of a pernicious synthesis for the Habsburgs. One of these currents was formed by the popular forces aroused by the social policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. The peasantry and the bourgeoisie ceased to be passive objects of the patrimonial state and they assumed a more and more critical attitude against it. At the same time the waves of the French Revolution stirred these masses, alarmed by new purposes and aspirations infiltrated from the West, and which were in strict contradiction to the old traditional absolutist and patrimonial order of the Habsburg state.

The Habsburgs and their leading statesmen themselves realized the seriousness of this situation. They understood that if these ideas of national and political democracy should get a hold on the Danube monarchy, the system of imperial absolutism which they identified with the monarchy itself could be maintained no longer. Fearing dangerous consequences, similar to those which resulted in the execution of one of the mightiest rulers of Europe and of his wife, the daughter of Maria Theresa, and which created a panicky atmosphere, the most influential political leaders perceived that the only possibility of salvation would be to check by police and military force the ideas codified by the great revolution and propagated by the imperialistic policy of Napoleon. Under the sway of this terrified attitude Emperor Francis II (1792–1835) took the lead in the coalition against Napoleon and drove his empire into a war which lasted twenty-three years, which in its early stages, caused the humiliation of the Habsburg dynasty but later its political hegemony in Europe. As the leading state of the Holy Alliance, it elaborated the most complete internal program of international reaction. This program in the hands of the almighty chancellor of the Emperor, who during thirty-eight years conducted the whole inner and outer policy of the realm, became

almost a state religion of the *ancien régime*. This system, called the "system of Metternich," which dominated Austria during the whole first half of the nineteenth century, represents one of the most consequent and audacious attempts in history to conserve an antiquated order. This system in conscious opposition to its predecessor, to the "Josephinist system," was also called, not without reason, by the name of the Emperor, the "Francisist" system, for recent historical investigations have demonstrated sufficiently that this system of *stability*—not without a certain grandeur—this system of *Ruhe und Ordnung* ("Calmness and Order"), of the absolutism *sans phrase*, of a modern despotism of God's grace was not an invention of Metternich (if we are entitled at all to reduce great historical currents to the name of a single man) but it emanated from the very personality of the Emperor, from "his conviction, heart, and conscience."

We must consider somewhat more closely this system of Metternich and Emperor Francis both in its theoretical foundations and in its practice, because it has become almost a *communis opinio* of recent historians that we must seek the deepest causes of the dissolution of the monarchy in the very dialectics of this system. It is highly characteristic of the psychic structure of the former empire that this correct historical conception was only accepted after the collapse of the monarchy and the dethronement of the Habsburgs. Today it is difficult to doubt the truth of the opinion, elaborated in the most trenchant manner by Joseph Redlich, that this system of Francis and Metternich made the whole structure of the monarchy so rigid during its rule of half a century, not counterbalanced by any other influence, that it developed, with such a terrible consequence, the militaristic *Machtstaat* centralizing and bureaucratizing to death all institutions; that it so totally suppressed every germ of a free thought and political criticism with the help of a devouring police and clerical mechanism that the empire became absolutely unfit to assimilate the real postulates of the epoch, to introduce those reforms without which no state could exist in the freer and more democratic atmosphere of Europe. It is impossible not to observe that the *facies hippocratica* of the dissolution of the monarchy can be clearly diagnosed in this period of so-called splendor of the empire when Metternich was the "coachman of Europe" and when as the leading power of the Holy Alliance it seemed to swim in the luxury of its world power.

Naturally it is impossible to give here in this sketchy outline a whole picture or even all the fundamental traits of this famous system. All that we can do is to continue the analysis of the previous chapters and try to give to the reader a moral insight into the mass psychology of the system. For this purpose we shall be obliged to separate things which in reality belonged together and had the character of a unitary governmental program.

As has already been emphasized the *real front of the system was directed against the great French Revolution*. In the ideas of the French Revolution Francis-Metternich saw only a *French fancy good* which could be stopped at the frontier by appropriate customhouse chicaneries. The best expert and defender of the system, Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, so reconstructs the opinion of Metternich and his collaborators:

The revolution, the greatest misfortune which can afflict a country and which according to its nature destroys all, has a Proteus nature. The remembrance of the greatest manifestation of this evil, still producing its after effects, justifies the name of Jacobinism. It appears now as religious and spiritual, then as political, again as mysticism, philanthropism, liberal fanaticism, or as Italian Carbonarism or the *Giovine Italia*.

The real supporter of these confused, wicked, and cracked ideologists is the newly established bourgeois middle class which the system considers as its chief enemy. Against this theory of professors (*Professorentheorie*) against this swindle of the universities (*Universitäts-schwindel*) is directed the whole hatred of the system. The middle class of the cities is the real source of the Jacobinism. This enlightened demagogy (*aufgeklärte Demagogie*) corrupts the whole life of the state and begins to envenom also the lower classes of society which remained safe from the moral cancer of presumption (*moralischer Krebs der Praesumption*). "People are like children and nervous women; they believe in ghosts and the injudicious attitude of the masses is characterized by Metternich with the words: the simpletons called the public."¹

Based on these axioms the problem for the system was sufficiently simple. These products of decomposition of crazy or wicked spirits must be kept isolated from the naïve and good soul of the people. It became necessary to introduce a sort of spiritual custom duties, more complete and ramified than perhaps the world had ever seen, the chief administrator of which became a police and spy organization. Metternich, one could say without exaggeration, created a *Spy International* and his paid agents and denouncers swarmed in all the capitals of Europe. But naturally the real center of gravity of the system was in the monarchy itself and its insidious, polypus arms entangled not only the suspected *litterati* and politicians but often even the leading elements of Viennese society. Step by step even the more prominent archdukes came under police control; and Metternich seized the correspondence of the Empress Maria Ludovica (the third wife of Francis) with her brother-in-law Archduke Joseph, the Hungarian Palatinus (governor), and presented it to the Emperor in order to arouse his matrimonial jealousy (wholly without foundation in this case), to put

¹ *Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch* (München, 1925), I, 381–86.

an end to a somewhat liberal political current which he felt disagreeable to him. One can imagine how this system could chicane the life of simple citizens; and there can be no doubt that the following description by Charles Sealsfield of the police system of his time can be accepted without qualification:

Since the year 1811 ten thousand *Naderer* or secret policemen are at work. They are recruited from the lower classes of the merchants, of domestic servants, of workers, nay even of prostitutes, and they form a coalition which traverses the entire Viennese society as the red silk thread runs through the rope of the English navy. You can scarcely pronounce a word at Vienna which would escape them. You have no defense against them and if you take with you your own servants, they become within fourteen days, even against their own will, your traitors. . . .

The persecutions of the so-called demagogues and Jacobins and other dangerous elements continued. Very often many men were sent up for execution and into prisons for harmless political discussions and for a mostly naïve and romantic play with the humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideas of the French Revolution. This cheap defense of the state served only to give a new field of activity to the growing crowd of police spies and helped to make the Viennese people amiable, careless enjoyers of life without backbone and without political judgment, to create that *Capua of the spirit* the marks of which remained deeply engraved in the mass psychology of the Viennese population. The descriptions of Mme de Staël of the Viennese society in its joyous hedonics without a semblance of serious discussion or an intelligent interest in the real problems of the epoch, its cult of mediocrities, and its distrust of all original talents prevailed until the end of the monarchy as an artificial flower of the system of Metternich.

This system menacing with the gallows and with imprisonment the serious patriots interested in the benefit of the country, and rewarding generously every spy and mixer in intrigues, was a diametrical antithesis of what could be called a reasonable civic education. Indeed, even the more thoughtful conservative contemporaries clearly understood the dangers of this situation relative to the corruption of civic consciousness and some ponderous voices arose against it. Thus, for instance, the far-sighted aristocrat already quoted, Baron Andrian, wrote the following embittered lines:

Men should be merry, should become drunk, should tell obscene jokes, or at best should establish a cotton factory, or read the theater paper of Adolf Bäuerle, but all interests concerning their community, their province, their state, the most important question of the epoch, however much they affect their purse and their whole existence, they should politely leave alone in order not to incommode the governing gentlemen.

This situation bore down the more heavily upon society because the police activity of the system was not only concerned with politics

in a proper sense, and with the investigation of imaginary plots, treasons, and so-called "ramifications" (secret political connections on a large scale) but it choked the whole scientific and literary life, too, by the control of its political and ecclesiastical spies. One of the victims of the system, Hormayr, the brilliant writer already mentioned, characterized in the following manner the hopeless attitude of the Austrian intellectuals of his day:

In all the higher branches of knowledge with the exception of the *sciences exactes* there is not a single praiseworthy literary achievement; journalism throughout the whole glorious empire is null, the clever heads discouraged, under suspicion, very often exposed to the most stubborn persecutions in consequence of slanderous denunciations. . . . Such writers as Gibbon, Robertson, Hume, were partly forbidden and all the geniuses of Germany (Goethe, Schiller, Johannes Müller, Herder, Lessing, Jean Paul) were totally or partly suppressed.

It became an axiom of the system that people *read themselves into criminals*. No wonder that they regarded censorship as the most important instrument against criminality. This atmosphere became the death of all true talent, and the passionate cry of Grillparzer, the greatest Austrian poet of this epoch: "despotism has destroyed my literary life," may be regarded as the cry of pain of the best of a whole generation.

A real drive was started against all those scientists who, as rare exceptions, represented a freer type of spiritual investigation. They were constantly persecuted, often ousted from their positions, as the famous Bolzano, professor of religious philosophy in the University of Prague. This educational system which put science into the service of the dynasty and of Catholicism naturally made all inquiries into political and social matters impossible. Sealsfield complained:

Free spiritual creation or investigation is completely unrealizable, nay, it is strictly forbidden to the professors. During his studies the student is severely watched over and his professors are official spies. The teacher of religion must hold a confession with the students six times a year. The inclinations, the good and bad qualities, every emotion of the young men, are observed and noted in catalogues from which a copy is sent to the Court Commission for Studies in Vienna, a second to the governor's office, and a third remains in the school archive. This sharp supervision is augmented in the upper years. . . .

After finishing their studies, those who are graduated, both jurist and theologian, are entirely in the hands of the government. Their past and moral curriculum are the measure of their career.

The German national student movements, the activities of the *Burschenschaften*, especially the excitement of the *Wartburgfest* (1817), an outburst of the patriotic feelings of the students and the killing of a Russian spy, a widely known playwright of the epoch,

Kotzebue by a German youth only strengthened the exacerbated struggle of the system against the ghost of revolution. The ill-famed decisions of Karlsbad put all the universities under police supervision and the censorship was intensified. But the system did not consider the police and the organization of the spies sufficient for the maintenance of its power. Its alliance with clericalism became more rigid and outspoken. They tried not only to check political ideas but also the so-called *Deist venom*, the spirit of a Kant, a Fichte, and a Schelling. Religion was considered as the most important part of secret police activity and the complot and hidden intrigues of bigoted archduchesses with the reactionary monastic organizations began to influence the whole machinery of the state. The Josephinist traditions, however, of the dignity of the state counterbalanced to some extent in the person of the Emperor and his chancellor these tendencies. But when the fourth wife of the Emperor, the Bavarian princess, Caroline Augusta, appeared in the political arena, the attack of clericalism became more vehement and successful. The new Empress brought from Munich her Jesuit confessor and at the court a well-organized coterie was created, called the "pious party," which was able to bend the Emperor to its will. The Order of the Liguorians obtained an asylum in Vienna to the great astonishment and fear of the more liberal, Josephinist circles, who saw in them precursors of the Jesuits. And indeed very soon the Jesuits themselves were officially readmitted into the country and the influence of Rome became manifest. In 1819 the imperial couple made a trip to Rome which signified the triumph of the ultramontane influences. Sickness and age made the Emperor more indulgent and the Empress herself supported energetically the fight of her husband against the "Aufklärung." She opposed even the work of the Kindergarten because she feared they would foster too much "enlightenment" among the lower classes. She used to say that she would prefer to be hanged rather than to contribute something to the unhappy trend of this unstable period. To this same circle belonged Archduchess Sophie, the Empress' sister who later became the leading motor force in bringing her son Francis Joseph to the throne!

The constant terror from the demon of revolution made the system entirely blind to the real needs of the masses. The grandiose beginnings of Maria Theresa and Joseph II were not only abandoned but a period of open reaction began. The dynasty made a defensive alliance with the most backward elements of the nobility. They no longer dared to touch the chief problem of the monarchy, the emancipation of the bondsmen, because they felt that both the social and the national consciousness of a people growing in wealth and culture would be irreconcilable with the leading thoughts and fundamental institutions of their system of stability. Quite symbolical is the an-

swer which one of the leading adherents of Metternich, Frederick Gentz, a brilliant publicist, gave to Robert Owen, the great English philanthropist who tried to convince the Austrian government of the necessity of certain reforms in the interest of the working people. This assistant of the great chancellor was quite outspoken on the subject: "We do not desire at all that the great masses shall become well off and independent. . . . How could we otherwise rule over them?"² A corollary axiom of the system was that "Mankind needs from time to time a radical bleeding or else its situation will become inflammatory and the liberal frenzy immediately bursts out." Such a state philosophy regarded every manifestation of the modern spirit as its enemy. When, on one occasion, the plan of a new railway was submitted to Emperor Francis he received it with the greatest distrust: "No, no, I will have nothing to do with it, lest the revolution might come into the country." And the Emperor was perfectly right from the point of view of his system: Any development of the techniques was irreconcilable with his policy which tried to maintain rigidly the absolutist patrimonial monarchy.

But that which exasperated the system most in the new world-order was, in the first place, the desire for a written constitution and—the logical corollary of this—the idea of national self-determination. And the destiny of a Tyrolese deputation which went to Vienna before the Emperor in order to make a humble petition for the restoration of the old constitution of the country tells us more about the real system of the Emperor than many volumes could. It must be noticed that the Tyrolese people were the most loyal and most faithful element of the monarchy which in the struggles against Napoleon under the enthusiastic and brave peasant leader, Andreas Hofer, stood heroically by the Habsburgs as a symbol of their ardent Catholic feelings and their vehement Tyrolese local patriotism. These very humble and very conservative people, when after the Bavarian occupation they were reattached to Austria, seem to have caught something from the pulsation of the Napoleonic period, for they appeared before the Emperor for the betterment of their constitutional position. Even the word constitution irritated the Emperor very much and he received his most loyal Tyroleans in bad humor and gave them the following lesson from civic education:

So, you want a constitution! . . . Now look, I don't care for it, I will give you a constitution but you must know that the soldiers obey me, and I will not ask you twice if I need money. . . . In any case I advise you to be careful what you are going to say.

To this imperial decision the good Tyrolese answered: "If thou (it was a privilege of the Tyrolese to address the Emperor in this form)

² Bibl, *op. cit.*, I, 157.

thinkest thus, it is better to have no constitution. . . .” To which the Emperor replied “That is also my opinion.”³ This attitude distrustful toward the people, but gladly accepting the alliance of his former enemies, the feudal estates (which now became harmless), found an almost classic expression in another utterance of the talkative Emperor when in 1820 he gave the following admonition to the Hungarian magnates at Pest: *Totus mundus stultizat et relictis antiquis suis legibus constitutiones imaginarias quaerit. Vos constitutionem a majoribus acceptam illaesam habetis; amatis illam et ego illam amo et conservabo et ad heredes transmittam* (“the whole world has gone crazy, and abandoning its good old laws, is searching for idealized constitutions. You have a constitution which you have received unimpaired from your ancestors. You love it and I love it. I shall cherish and defend it and hand it down to my descendants”). The harmony between autocracy and feudalism was, at least seemingly, complete.

Such a mode of thinking naturally could not understand (it could only hate and persecute) the most important revolutionary force of the period: the thought of national unification and self-determination. The conception of Metternich and of the whole system is very important at this point, because their policy was the issue upon which the old Austrian world came most severely and fatally into conflict with the spirit of the times, and from this time on it remained a problem of life and death until the final collapse of the monarchy. Many—not only foreign observers—often misunderstood completely the point of view of the *ancien régime* as regards this all important question; its attitude is often interpreted as if it were directed against all manifestations of the national idea in the spirit of an intolerant and ferocious Germanization. This opinion is completely erroneous. The truth is that the system hated German nationalism no less than the Hungarian or the Italian (which were at this period the most highly developed) but it had no objection whatever to permitting every people to speak, cultivate, even develop its own language in its local sphere. Those elements of the national idea which especially exasperated the system were the aspirations to overthrow the former status of the European state system and the attempt to rebuild the national territories on a unified basis. Or to put the thesis in the words of the most reliable interpreter of Metternich, the Austrian historian already quoted:

Regarding things more closely, the revolutions are directed both against the throne and the people which latter can have no advantage from the levelling which is the purpose of the middle classes. That is the reason why the masses remain indifferent to the national movement for unification: In Italy the productive element in city and country wishes to have nothing in common with the machinations of the nobility, of the at-

³ C. Sealsfield, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

torneys and physicians without occupation, of the half-cultured *litterati*. In Germany the real German people are indifferent toward what is called by the national chauvinists *der Deutsche Sinn* (the German spirit) and they are similarly apathetic towards the troubles which have their center in the cabinets incapable of governing and in the middle classes.

According to this point of view Italian unity is a pure phantasm: "Nationalism does not fit Italy, for Italy is a purely geographical idea" which has no foundation, neither in history nor in the soul of the people. The same was the opinion of Metternich concerning Germany. German particularism emanated from the very spirit of the people. It was a political axiom of Metternich that "No Bavarian will become an Austrian, no Austrian a Prussian, no Prussian a Bavarian, no Bavarian a Würtemberger and no one in any of the German countries will become a Prussian who was not one before."

Those who so completely failed to comprehend the fundamental nature of the national movements for unification were almost organically incapable of applying an adequate policy concerning these aspirations. Their unique political aim remained the same to the end: to withdraw the national demagogy in order to maintain the nationless vegetative unity of their empire in the same rigid unchangeability as the system of absolutism. And what the chancellor expressed in a pretentious style, based on a very extended reading, was propagated by Emperor Francis in his despotic crudeness and in his petty bourgeois gossip. I know, for instance, no more characteristic expression of his nationless attitude than when he explained his own policy to the French ambassador as follows:

My peoples are strange to each other and that is all right. They do not get the same sickness at the same time. In France if the fever comes you are caught by it at the same time. I send the Hungarians into Italy, the Italians into Hungary. Every people watches its neighbor. The one does not understand the other and one hates the other. . . . From their antipathy will be born order and from the mutual hatred, general peace. . . .

It will be instructive to compare with this naïve but sincere utterance the following from the French *Déclaration des Droits* of 1795:

All the peoples are independent and sovereign whatever may be the number of individuals constituting them and whatever may be the extent of the territory occupied by them. This sovereignty is inalienable, every nation has the right to organize and to change the forms of its government. No people has the right to interfere with the government of other people. An attempt against the liberty of any people is an attempt against all others. . . .

Two diametrically antagonistic conceptions of state solidarity speak to us from these declarations, and the struggle of these prin-

ciples determined indeed the history of the whole subsequent century and even an important part of the struggles in the present. In this struggle the Emperor and Metternich were not only "the Don Quixotes of legitimism" but also of medieval nationalism which emphasized national particularism to the detriment of a national unity. In this system the idea of a modern patriotism always remained unknown. When on one occasion someone was recommended to Emperor Francis with the explanation that he was a clever and ardent patriot, the sovereign replied distrustfully, "I hear he is a patriot for Austria. But the question is whether he is a *patriot for me*." This patrimonial conception of patriotism remained unchanged until the end of the monarchy and became, as we shall see in detail, the deepest cause of its dissolution. The same force which, in the great national states, was the real fundamental of state cohesion and which, directed by prudent sovereigns, proved to be an eternal source for the sacrifices of the people: the same force remained in the Habsburg monarchy not only unused but it was drawn back and even insulted.

The cruel persecutions against the German "Jacobins" have already been noted. At the same time in Hungary, too, under the protection and denunciation of the reactionary aristocrats, the cultural rather than political movement to propagate liberal ideas, led by the Abbot Ignatz Martinovics, one of the freest spirits of the epoch, was distorted into a dangerous complot, and with the help of a corrupt tribunal seven of the best men of Hungary were executed. At the same time many of the leading figures of the Hungarian literary renaissance suffered many years of imprisonment in the ill-famed jails of Spielberg, Kuffstein, and Munkács. But the brutality of the system culminated in Italy where Austrian troops were penetrating as far as Naples and Sicily in order to annihilate the new constitutions of the peoples. In the Austrian and Italian provinces a drive was made against all the Italian patriots and liberals. Among these Count Confalonieri and Silvio Pellico, the poet, were sentenced to death but by "imperial grace" the penalty was commuted to imprisonment. Their experiences in the fortress of Spielberg were of such a terrible nature that the later memoirs of the poet *Le mie prigioni* and the revelations of the count drew upon the Viennese government not only the indignation of contemporaries but even aroused the anti-Austrian feelings and politics of later generations. It is quite natural that under such a system and practice Machiavellian measures were often attributed to the government of Metternich, perhaps, in cases where it was not true. For instance, when in 1846 the Ruthenian peasants killed one hundred and forty-six Polish nobles and carried the corpses together with a large number of wounded in a long train of carriages into Tarnow before the edifice of the imperial district office, this terrible peasant upheaval aroused the general conviction in the society of the

Polish nobles that the whole rebellion was inspired by imperial agents in order to check the Polish nobility which at that time was imbued with revolutionary ideas.

This system would have been dangerous and impossible even if it could have been carried on with a Jacobin dogmatism and with a fanatical purity devoted exclusively to abstract ideas. But the system did not have such a moral foundation. Its leading men represented, in the first place, their own interests. Grillparzer wrote about Metternich:

If a chief permits his subordinates to accept presents, he is ordinarily not meticulous in his own dealings. And the colossal expenses of the prince who took over the legacy of his father in a bankrupt state, his buying of estates, points clearly to diplomatic *pour boire*. . . .

And when in consequence of the frenzied military, diplomatic, and police squanderings, a state bankruptcy was proclaimed in 1811, reducing the price of money to one-fifth, Viennese public opinion was convinced that the Emperor utilized this catastrophical financial crisis of his subjects to his own enrichment. This accusation was so persistent and general that the sovereign tried to appease exasperated public sentiment by a stammering and hypocritical declaration in the official paper. This spirit of hypocrisy permeated the whole system of Emperor Francis who with his artificially created public opinion endeavored to mask his bloody despotism in the colors of a jolly *bonhomie* and of a *petit bourgeois* joviality. He knew the dialect of the suburbs and loved crude jests. He often mixed with the people of Vienna and one of his wives was a frequent guest at the Viennese dance halls. He was always extremely busy with the enthusiasm of an accountant over the smallest affairs of his subjects to such an extent that his bureaucratic fervor made a real governmental function quite impossible. With the system of spies and jails he formed his society as efficiently as he did by assuming the pose of a *Landesvater* and a *Familienvater* (the official press applied to him the phrase "father of the country," ascribed to him paternal affection possessed by the head of a family). The spirit of his government penetrated public life and society to such an extent that the so-called *Biedermeier* style of his epoch is the very expression of the pulsation of a society which, turning aside from all great and general interests, exhausts itself in the voluptuous enjoyment of the petty pleasures of existence and which varnishes its greedy sensualism by a Philistine formalism. Not without reason, Francis was called the *Tiger im Schlafrock* ("the tiger in the night gown").

One could not survey better the whole intellectual and moral face of this system than in the picture which Grillparzer gave us with such an artistic intuition, in his diary:

The emperor has died. Whereas the papers spoke during his life of the almost idolatrous veneration of his subjects concerning the person of the fatherly monarch, of all this not a single trace was manifest after his death. All went to his burial with a serene face, as if they were going to a carnival dance. . . . The reason is that he was not at all adored and that the papers lied. . . . In ordinary times his nature was not bad, not stupid, not even feeble, not base, even vulgar would be too hard; it was common. There was no elevation, no kind of sublimity in him. He was just concerning material mine and thine; had he the slightest idea that there were also spiritual goods, perhaps his justice would have extended also to them; but his spirit was closed and barred. He esteemed arts and sciences only as far as they bring accountable and ponderable utility or as they furnish the spirit, not as they strengthen it. His religiosity was a custom. . . . If he himself would have become in a night a Turk under the pressure of the necessity of the state, the next morning he would have considered a rebel anyone who still believed in Jesus Christ. Those nearest to him indulged in the vilest debauches; he knew it and tolerated it for one secretly dissolute was more sympathetic to him than a morally elevated man. Of his promises he held those given as a private man scrupulously (as a nobleman holds his debts contracted in game); as sovereign, he had no hesitation in breaking the most formal ones. . . .⁴

After the death of Emperor Francis when Ferdinand I (as Hungarian king, Ferdinand V), an imbecile and epileptic, came to the throne (1835–48) all the reactionary and clerical tendencies of the system developed unchecked to full maturity. The system became almost its own caricature. The Josephinist traditions disappeared completely and Metternich becoming old was more and more subservient to Jesuit influences. This “absolutist monarchy without a monarch” was dominated by a clique which an acute observer of the period called a *theologisch-diplomatische Weiberzunft* (“a theological diplomatic female guild”). Clericalism and absolutism attained its climax in Austria. The Jesuits taught according to their own order of studies, the so-called *ratio studiorum* and their spirit infiltrated all the strata of social and cultural life. The Spanish spirit of the Counter Reformation reappeared. Some four hundred Protestants of Zillertal were driven out from their mountains in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century in order not to irritate their Catholic rulers.⁵ Austria lived medieval days in a time when the third French Revolution was rapidly approaching.

⁴ *Grillparzer's Werke*. Herausgegeben von Stephan Hock. II Teil, pp. 94–95.

⁵ Georg Loesche, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich* (Tübingen u. Leipzig, 1902), pp. 214–22.

CHAPTER XIII

REVOLUTION AND MILITARY ABSOLUTISM

The system of Emperor Francis developed by Metternich into its last consequences piled up an immense mass of discontent in the whole monarchy. This situation was the more dangerous as, since the beginning of the forties of the last century, the advance of mechanical industry in the manufacturing districts of the monarchy, especially in Bohemia, led to a serious crisis in economic life. A large part of the former handicraftmen could not suffer the competition of the big plants and they swelled the ranks of the proletariat. The seriousness of the social conditions was still more aggravated by the intensification of the difficulties of the bondsmen problem not yet solved. In many places the peasants refused to comply with feudal taxations and here and there serious upheavals arose which could be suppressed only by military force. The crisis in agriculture enhanced the danger of the industrial. The famine year of 1847 evened still more the tense social conditions. The rabble proletariat of Vienna attacked and plundered in several districts the baker-shops and the whole imperial city was full of alarming news. This misery was not restricted to the laboring-classes in a proper sense but choked the poor intelligentsia also. Especially the wretchedness of the university youths (particularly that of the Jewish students) created an intellectual strata full of revolutionary dissatisfaction. The exacerbation of the masses ran so high that some official reports of the epoch speak of the danger of communistic ideas. Against these revolutionary disaffections the police became impotent because their activity was so completely absorbed by the great policy, the "ramifications" and ferreting out of complots, which was at that time extended to the police control of the newly established Scientific Academy, that the system had not sufficient officials and soldiers to maintain internal order.

But Metternich would not make any concession even now in spite of the fact that the waves of the February Revolution of Paris aroused Austrian public opinion to the boiling-point. He contracted a loan of six million silver rubles from the Tsar for the renovation of his dilapidated "bulwarks" and announced in his official paper that Austria was sufficiently strong to defeat all revolutionary movements. But some days later bloody rebellions started at Vienna in the face of which the court did not dare to retain Metternich; and his system of forty years suddenly broke down accompanied by the jubilation of the people. Absolutism completely lost its head and accepted from one day to the next the entire independence of Hungary without hav-

ing a clear understanding of the significance of this new constitution, without making any serious effort to bring this new constitution into harmony with the other parts of the monarchy. Similarly it tried to appease the Czechs by the so-called Bohemian charter, by the far-reaching promises of an imperial decree which assured to the crown of Wenceslaus almost the same independence which it bestowed upon the crown of St. Stephen. Every act of the government showed the stamp of headlessness and insincerity: the catastrophical aggravation of the Italian problem and the fight for liberty carried on by King Charles Albert, shook the very foundations of the Old Austria and forced it to compromises with its own peoples. But instead of a serious effort to place the empire on a new democratic basis and to create a workable compromise among the evolutionary possibilities of its various nations and peoples living on such different cultural levels, from the first moment of the constitutional concessions the old absolutist militarism and police system lay in wait in order to annihilate the new liberties of the peoples and to restore the old autocracy.

The sins of the past continued to live not only in the fact that the petrified absolutism was entirely incapable of accommodating itself to the spirit of a constitutional life but also because another no less dangerous situation which consisted in the lack of organization and immaturity of the democratic public opinion. The absolutism of many centuries so completely choked all movements of the popular forces and eliminated so entirely all political criticism and civic education that those peasant, citizen, and intellectual elements which now appeared for the first time on the scene of public life were lacking in all political preparedness and in all systematic effort toward the realization of those great aims which they suddenly faced. They sought in confused, disordered, and purely sentimental ideological conceptions, not seldom in unrealizable dogmatic exaggerations, the way of solution instead of embracing the only possible task, to remold the old feudal absolutist state with the help of necessary compromises into a new form of constitution apt to guarantee the free development of all the nations of the monarchy. There was almost wholly wanting in the empire, except among the Germans, an educated and self-conscious bourgeois middle class which could have undertaken the work of reconstruction with hope. Nay, even this German middle class was almost blind toward this purpose for in its haughty German hegemonial consciousness it could not realize the Austrian problem, but it visualized only the unity of the German empire as it became manifest in the *Paulskirche* of Frankfurt among brilliant ideological declamations, but with little real political insight. At the other extreme there was the street, the pressure of the violent demagogic agitation, the politicians of the petty bourgeois coffee-houses and restaurants whom the system of Metternich had estranged from all reasonable political

thinking. As a sharp observer of the period said, "They feasted now in street demonstrations and hootings and howlings as they formerly revelled in roast chickens and the waltzes."

But there was also a third fatal heritage of the Metternich system which impeded, almost hopelessly, the efforts of the democratic public opinion of 1848 from establishing adequate reforms. This opinion was divided into as many parts as there were nations spread over the whole area of the empire, and none of the nations had the slightest idea of the aspirations of the other peoples living outside the narrow limits of its own territory. For instance when Count Stadion drew public attention for the first time to the deplorable state of the Ruthenians of Galicia in many political circles it was asserted that this people did not exist at all, and that they were purely the invention of the statesman to counterbalance Polish influence. In such an atmosphere, where the second greatest nation of Galicia was not even known, it might be expected that each people would regard the problem of the revolutionary upheaval from the narrow point of view of its local country. With the exception of some clear-sighted spirits, general public opinion did not realize that the monarchy was based on the co-operation of ten nations and many smaller nationalities but each nation was busy only with its own existence and problems. The ruling German nation was occupied chiefly with the problem of German unity and with plans to safeguard the German hegemony both in the Reich and in Austria against the growing pressure of the awakened Slav peoples. Though Emperor Francis, amid the storms of the Napoleonic Wars, took the title of an emperor of Austria in 1804 and, two years later under the pressure of the *Rheinbund*, he abdicated the German imperial sovereignty: the leading Germans of Austria remained still under the sway of the old unified conception and the central committee of the Viennese estates accepted, in April, 1848, a resolution in favor of the German character of Austria. Both the liberal nobility and the bourgeoisie cherished the plan to give to Lombardo-Venetia, to Hungary, and to Galicia an extended autonomy, retaining them only in a loose connection with the monarchy in order to maintain the German hegemony in Austria against the growing preponderance of the northern and southern Slavs. It is significant to observe that the Austrian Germans, from the first moment of their revolutionary awakening and relative liberty, felt their solidarity with their brothers in the German empire more clearly and intensely than their historical connection with the other peoples of the Habsburg monarchy. (Even then the idea of the *Anschluss* was far stronger than the idea of a confederation toward the east.)

The aspiration of the Magyars was even more manifest. The only idea by which they were dominated in the revolutionary period of 1848-49 was the idea of their total independence from Austria and

the effort to build up a unitary national state by the assimilation of all the nations living on Hungarian territory. It is similarly beyond doubt that the Italians felt nothing in common with the Habsburg empire and their chief desire was to get rid of the Habsburg yoke. The tendency of the Slav peoples of the monarchy was not so clear and precise. The great Slavic Congress in Prague (May, 1848) which was a reply to the German National Assembly in Frankfurt and which gathered almost all the Slav tribes of Europe, was so mixed in its composition, so heterogeneous in its political and social consciousness that there was no really unified conception or common point of view among them, the less so because the representatives of the various Slav nations had serious linguistic obstacles in the way of understanding each other, even if the anecdote may be untrue, often reported by German sources, that these Pan-Slavs, ardently remonstrating against German supremacy, were often constrained to use the German language as a vehicle of their deliberations. In spite of all these difficulties, in this memorable assembly which contained such diametrical antagonisms as the conservative Palacký, the great historian of the Czechs and Bakunin, the Russian revolutionary anarchist, two fundamental agreements grew out of the aspirations of the Slav peoples. The one was the dawning consciousness of the Slav solidarity, the feeling that the Slavs have a special historical mission in Europe; the other, that, in face of the growing military and cultural expansion of the Germans, the Slavs must defend the integrity of their national cultural evolution.

What interests us most in this connection is the fact that the existence of historical Austria was not a really important issue for the peoples of the monarchy in these overflowing days of their revolutionary nationalism, but that each of them regarded its own national problems. These centrifugal forces were even more enhanced by the renaissance of the *Ländergeist*, the spirit of the old local particularisms of the various crownlands and countries. The diets showed everywhere a perfect indifference toward the problems of the whole empire. The few Austrian patriots regarded almost with terror this audacious trend of national and local patriotisms against the state, and one of them exclaimed—and his exclamation became a slogan: *Ein Königreich für einen Österreicher!* (“A kingdom for an Austrian.”)¹ This feeling was so strong even in German liberal circles that when the first rumors came that Marshal Radetzky, the imperial army chief, won decisive victories over the Italian troops (which was a victory of Austrian absolutism not only over feeble Italian liberty but also over the fresh freedom of the peoples of the monarchy) Francis Grillparzer,

¹ Richard Charnatz, *Österreichs innere Geschichte von 1848 bis 1895* (Leipzig u. Berlin, 1918), I, 10.

the leading poet of the epoch, glorified him as the hero of the Austrian unity in the following often quoted verses :

Glück auf mein Feldherr, führe den Streich!
 Nicht bloss um des Ruhmes Schimmer,
 In Deinem Lager ist Österreich,
 Wir andern sind einzelne Trümmer.
 (Good speed, my general, strike the blow!
 Not only for the splendor of glory,
 In thy camp is Austria,
 We others are only isolated ruins.)

The men did not perceive that the enthusiastic ode of the poet was in reality not the trumpet of victory but rather the epitaph of the Austrian state because it emphasized with an almost symbolical force the fatal fact that the army of the monarchy and the peoples of the monarchy were fighting for different ideas and that the unity of the empire remained a militaristic unity opposed to the antagonistic aims of its peoples. In any case the specter of the dissolution of the monarchy pressed very hard on the contemporaries.

Curiously enough, if one penetrates more deeply into the national and social structure of Austria during these years, one cannot share this boundless pessimism. There were still great and powerful forces in operation which could have saved the monarchy. The might and prestige of the imperial house based on the army and the bureaucracy were at that time not seriously attacked. Even Louis Kossuth the leader of the radical Hungarian opposition expressed his loyal expectations concerning the person of the young king, Francis Joseph. He and his followers did not think of a real severance of Hungary from the other parts of the monarchy and the *Pragmatica Sanctio* was not attacked. Only a complete constitutional freedom was claimed for the country. The non-Magyar population of Hungary were distinctly in favor of the maintenance of the imperial unity because they saw in it their only safeguard against the more and more vehement and intolerant attacks of Magyar chauvinism. At the same time the most influential elements of the Germans in Austria (in spite of some pan-Germanistic sentimentalism) stood firmly for the maintenance of Austria. And what is still more important: the large Slav majority of the monarchy was emphatically loyal to the Habsburgs because, in spite of a vague Pan-Slavism, it clearly felt that it needed a state which would and could guarantee its national development against both the German and Russian pressure. Not only Croats and Serbs defended with their blood the cause of the dynasty but even the leading elements of the Czechs were of the opinion that they were deeply interested in the safeguarding of the monarchy. In that memorable letter in which Francis Palacký, the generally accepted leader of the new Czech nationalism, repudiated the invitation of the Parliament of

Frankfurt, as a protest against German unity, intended to absorb the Slav nations, he gave a real program of a new Austria fit for the aspirations of her Slav peoples. He emphasized very distinctly the historical necessity of Austria as a shield and shelter for the smaller nations of the Danube basin (Slavs, Rumanians, Hungarians) against the growing pressure of a despotic Russian empire. "If the Austrian empire had not existed during past centuries, it ought to have been created in the very interest of Europe and of humanity."² Not for the destruction of Austria but for the remolding of the empire was the struggle of the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs carried on almost until the outbreak of the World War. The conception of Palacký was corroborated by the Slav national convention at Prague with an imposing force in spite of the ideological chaos of this assembly. The Slav Congress elaborated a proclamation to the nations of Europe which delineated very strongly its standpoint concerning the Austrian problem. This manifesto emphasized the peaceful intention of all the Slavs and at the same time their right for self-determination and national independence. They were not hostile to the empire but they intended to remold the old monarchy into a confederation of nations equal in their rights, maintaining the necessary unity of the whole monarchy. They claimed especially the same constitutional position which the German and the Hungarian element possessed. The Congress made an appeal to the Hungarian government to do away with those revolting coercive measures which were directed against the Slavic tribes of Hungary, especially against the Serbs, Croats, and Slovaks.

Even more clear and significant for the moral atmosphere of the Slavs was a memorandum, drafted by the Congress, to the Emperor to inform him of the real aspirations and desires of the Slavs. The aim of this memorandum remained in many respects the foundation of the Slav policy also for the future. This document emphasized the fact that the system of centralization could only keep together the loose masses of the various nationalities of the monarchy by the means of absolutism, whereas the real future of Austria and its rôle as a great power depended on whether it could guarantee to the Slav nations of the monarchy, hitherto oppressed, a real autonomy for national development. The only constitution which could secure this aim would be one which remolded the centralized monarchy into a federative state.³

In this historical constellation Francis Joseph, 18 years old, occupied the throne (1848–1916) in consequence of a court complot which eliminated the feeble-minded Ferdinand. The young Emperor himself attached to his name Francis the name of his great popular

² Dr. Alfred Fischel, *Der Panslavismus bis zum Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart u. Berlin, 1919), p. 254.

³ Alfred Fischel, *op. cit.*, pp. 284 ff.

predecessor Joseph, and there were people who saw in this fact an almost symbolical action because according to their judgment the long reign of Francis Joseph was a curious mixture of the reactionary principles of Emperor Francis and of the revolutionary methods of Emperor Joseph. This point of view is not without a certain truth but it seems to me that what was really Francisist in his system was spontaneous, emanating from the very character of the sovereign, whereas its Josephinian elements were rather superficial, artificial compromises forced on the Emperor by the necessities of a given situation. But however unstable and changing his method of government may have been, there remained always constant and unaltered in his profound distrust of his peoples, of the constitution, of democracy, and his conviction that the only real foundation of his rule must be his army and his attachment to the feudal aristocracy.

It was a real misfortune for the whole monarchy that the young Emperor with his eager energy for work, his vivid sense of administrative duty (he might be called without exaggeration the first *Hofrat* of his monarchy, so fervent for bureaucratic work, so amazing in his *Kabinettsfleiss*, and so lacking in any real broad conceptions), occupied his throne under the terrifying experiences of a world-revolution when he saw his power vacillating amid the menacing clamor of the street, when twice he witnessed the flight of the imperial court from Vienna, and always stood under the sway of his rigid generals, Windischgrätz, Jelačić, and Radetzky, who were rooted deeply in the ideas of the old autocracy. It is no wonder under such conditions that the youthful emperor did not realize the one fatal problem of the monarchy which consisted in giving free opportunities for the development of so many fragmentary peoples between the two millstones of German and Russian imperialism. He visualized only the old problem of the Habsburg *Hausmacht*, how to augment its international splendor, how to overcome its Prussian rival, and enhance its influence in the Balkans against the Russian protector of the Slav nations.

The great fatal problem of the monarchy, the problem of nationality, appeared to him still in the old narrow-minded conception of Metternich in the spirit of the *divide et impera*. In spite of all his real and seeming concessions which he made to the necessities of the changing historical situation, he remained rigidly attached to a system of centralization until the end, disregarding the fundamental national claims.⁴ This attitude was not motivated by any national bias, he did

⁴ The Emperor never took the idea of a national compromise between the Czechs and the Germans seriously. In his new important work (*Kaiser Franz Joseph von Österreich*, Berlin, 1928), Joseph Redlich narrates that it was a widely accepted public opinion among the Austrian parliamentarians that the Emperor did not favor such a compromise because, according to a statement of his daughter, Archduchess Marie Valerie, "if Germans and Czechs should make a compromise, the situation would become the same as in Hungary—the Emperor would lose his power there too."

not hate the various non-German nations of his monarchy, nor did he particularly love the Germans whose language was the vehicle of his army and bureaucracy. On the contrary every conscious manifestation of German nationalism disgusted and alarmed him because he feared a gravitation toward his later ally and, subconsciously always, his hated rival, the Hohenzollern. But he remained unaltered, a rigid autocrat in all the questions pertaining to the interests of his imperial will. In his state ministers he always saw a kind of court lackeys and he said repeatedly to Conrad von Hötzendorf when he was the Chief of the General Staff: "Believe me, the Monarchy cannot be ruled in a constitutional manner." And he was perfectly right in this because, with those two systems with which he experimented during his long reign, with the system of the rigid centralization, and later with the dualist system based on the German-Magyar hegemony, an honest constitutional government was really out of the question.

This attitude was the more fatal for in spite of the first chaotic movements in the early days of the revolution of 1848, the more careful observers could distinctly see that this vast popular movement was not only directed toward the destruction of the old régime but that it also contained powerful constructive forces. So even Hungary, the country of rigid feudalism, also, under the leadership of a very able and enthusiastic group of her revolutionized nobility, undertook the first decisive steps toward the elimination of the feudal privileges and the rebuilding of the country on a democratic platform. It is true that in the most important question, in the problem of nationality this new liberal public opinion completely misunderstood the real spirit of the epoch, but by a prudent, humane, and loyal policy, the Habsburgs could doubtless have been successful in adjusting Hungarian democracy amid the newly liberated co-operation of the other nations. For the very leaders of the Hungarian movement for independence in September, 1848, knocked at the door of the Austrian popular assembly inviting it to undertake the rôle of mediator in the fatal controversy between the Emperor and the Hungarian nation. But far more than this happened. The parliament of the Austrian people, which the military reactionary rulers after the second Viennese rebellion had interned at Kremsier, a little remote Moravian town, recovering from the feverish revolutionary dreams, undertook the task with remarkable energy and sagacity of giving a new constitution to the peoples of Austria. After the absolute rule of many centuries the nations of the Austrian half of the monarchy met for the first time in order to discuss face to face their mutual national and cultural problems and to find a solution for all. The antagonisms were very great and, at the beginning, the spirit of the old distrust dominated. The rigid centralism of the Germans and the radical federalism of the Czechs clashed vehemently. The plan of the Czech lead-

er, Palacký, was to rebuild the monarchy entirely on the basis of the principle of nationality and to divide the whole monarchy into a German-Austria, a Czech-Austria, a Polish-Austria, an Illyrian-Austria, an Italian-Austria, and a Jugo-Slav-Austria, and also to form separate territories for the Magyars and the Rumanians. (It is worth while to notice at this juncture that this platform of the Czechs was later radically changed when they accepted the old feudal basis of the historical right, claiming the integrity of the whole territory of the former crown of Wenceslaus without taking into account the diversity of the nationalities living in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.) This plan hurt not only the German centralist consciousness but the very developed traditional feeling for independence of the single countries. The Tyroleans, for instance, had already previously emphasized that they must have a proper government and would have nothing to do with the Viennese ministry.⁵ Similarly the Poles refused vehemently the idea of dividing Galicia into a Polish and a Ruthenian territory. The Istrian and the Dalmatian particularism clashed and the antagonism was very great between Carinthia and Carniola, while the historical individuality of Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and Görz revolted energetically against all plans of territorial dismemberment.

Under such auspices the chances for a compromise looked very unfavorable. But the natural wisdom of the various peoples soon became victorious. The parliamentary reporter of the constitutional committee understood the dangers of the situation very sharply and he admonished the representative in a powerful speech that in the present controversy, only those dragon teeth are shooting up which Metternich had sown during his long régime. Now the liberated nations must get rid of this spirit and, as the great principle of national equality appeared in world-history, it should not be transformed into the emancipation of the Slavs. If it is true that the German was previously the master and the Slav the servant, this proposition can only be accepted with the qualification that the former government was German and enslaved both nations. Those who transmit the hatred of the Slavs against government and bureaucracy to the German people continue in the old policy of *divide et impera* of Metternich. The constitutional committee also emphasized the dangers which a radical annihilation of the old constitutional frames would have caused (as Palacký proposed it) and offered a solution which would avoid centralization, the death of the single provinces, but at the same time a loose federation which would make all central government impossible.

Indeed, the compromise delineated in this manner was successful and the Parliament of Kremsier adopted a solution along the middle line reconciling the centralist and the federalist ideals. It main-

⁵ Viktor Bibl, *op. cit.*, II, 179-80.

tained the historical kingdoms and countries but it divided the larger territories into *Kreise* (districts) the establishment of which was arranged according to the ethnographical settlements of the peoples. In the administration of the individual countries local governors were planned responsible to the particular representative bodies in order to secure a true self-government against the possible abuses of the central power. The principle of national equality was pronounced as the basic institution of the new constitution and provisions were made that, in territories where mixed nationalities lived, tribunals should be erected on the footing of equality for the settlement of all disputes concerning national issues.

Unfortunately the limits of the present work make it impossible to outline in detail this remarkable draft of a constitution though its significance from the point of view of the history of ideas is considerable and at the same time a powerful argument for the force and fertility of the democratic principle. Behold! after three hundred years of absolutism and militaristic centralization, in spite of the envenomed past, it sufficed to bring these peoples together and to secure for them the right of free discussion and a new spirit and a new will was triumphant over the old spirit infested by feudalism and absolutism. *Here for the first time a consequent and logically consistent attempt was made to rebuild a large empire on the basis of a supra-national unity and to codify the great principle of national equality in all the walks of public life.* In this manner the first freely elected representative body of Austria solved or at least brought nearer to solution a problem which the periods of absolutism did not even distinguish. Particularly imposing is the clear-sightedness with which the makers of the constitution realized the basic importance of the principle of self-government for the solution of the national problem. The speakers of the national assembly emphasized continuously that France, in spite of her repeated revolutions, could not be regarded as a free country because she had no municipal liberties. *Free local government is the basis of the free state!* At the same time the work of Kremsier remains a memorable document of that high spirit of humanism which animated the generation of 1848, both the Germans and the Slavs. And it is no exaggeration when Joseph Redlich, the keenest analyst of this constitutional draft, asserts that "*measured both by moral and intellectual standards this document is the only great political monument of the common will for the State which in imperial Austria the peoples have created through their own representatives. . . .*"

But Francis Joseph and his councilors did not care for the work of Kremsier, they did not care for those mighty popular energies which were manifested by it. The cynical words of Prince Windischgrätz which he uttered according to tradition when he heard that the

popular representation refused to give to his Emperor the old title "by God's grace": "If they will not hear from God's grace then they must hear from cannons' grace" may be true or later invented, they express at all events the spirit and practice of the military counter-revolution. That was the reason why the constitutional assembly of Kremsier was dissolved by armed force when absolutism became sufficiently reinforced by the conquest of Vienna, by the Italian victories of Radetzky and by the armed occupation of the Hungarian capital. And, though after Kremsier they made a new experiment with an arbitrary sham constitution which restored the full power of the centralistic system, they simultaneously continued with great energy their campaign for the military subjugation of the rebellious peoples and the supreme aim was quite manifest: the complete restoration of the old régime. Already under the feeble-minded Ferdinand, there began the work of the "pacification" of Hungary, the armed struggle against a constitution to which the Emperor himself gave sanction and the perfidious game with the Jugo-Slavs exasperated by the Magyarizing policy of the Hungarian government. Jel-lačić, the Croat Ban, became the obedient instrument of the Viennese camarilla for the destruction of the Hungarian constitution and the world witnessed a very stupendous political drama of which it was said by a contemporary: "The King of Croatia declared war on the King of Hungary and the Emperor of Austria remained neutral and these three monarchs were one and the same person." This treacherous game, which, after the victory of Radetzky at Custoza threw away its mask definitely, drove the Hungarians into despair and, when the new arbitrary constitution abolished quite openly the independence of the country, the national assembly accepted the proposition of Louis Kossuth and dethroned the Habsburg dynasty at Debreczen (April 11, 1849) exactly in the same manner as more than a century before, the Diet of Rákóczi had done. The declaration of independence adopted by the national assembly is a long enumeration of the historical crimes of the Habsburgs committed against the constitutional and personal liberties of the Hungarian people. They are accused of plotting

with the enemies of the country, with robbers and rebels for the suppression of the Hungarian nation; of attacking the legally sanctioned constitution by armed force; of dismembering the territorial integrity of the country which they had sworn to maintain; of employing foreign military power for the murdering of their own subjects, and for the annihilation of their legal freedom.

The constitutional accent of the rebellion of Rákóczi and the revolution of Kossuth was the same, but whereas the former did not surpass the limits of feudal rebellion the latter was no longer the private affair of some malcontent feudal lords and of a wretched serfdom attached to them, but a distinctly national and democratic movement in

which not only the liberal wing of the nobility but also the new middle classes and the whole peasantry, liberated from the yoke of feudalism, took up arms for the defense of their young freedom. That is the reason why Vienna was incapable of suppressing it as it formerly suppressed the rebellions of the feudal exiles and the *kurucz* forces. The Habsburg power, victorious over revolutionary Vienna and Prague, was incapable of conquering the Hungarian revolution in defense of the Constitution of 1848. The later dualistic structure of the monarchy was an expression of this historical fact. But in 1848 the dynasty was not inclined to any just compromise though before the dethronement of the Habsburgs very influential Hungarian circles were in favor of an honest peace but Prince Windischgrätz haughtily refused the representatives of the Hungarian national assembly with the words which became fatal: *Mit Rebellen unterhandle ich nicht!* ("I will not negotiate with rebels!") Therefore later when the Hungarian armies became victorious the dynasty had no other choice than the unheard of humiliation of asking for the assistance of the Russian Tsar who sent a mighty army for the pacification of Hungary. General Görgey, the great Hungarian war-leader, acknowledging the futility of the struggle and in order to save the last remaining force of the unhappy country, surrendered not into the hands of the Austrians, but into those of the Russian general Paskiewicz, who, as the Hungarian tradition tells, announced proudly to the Tsar: "Hungary lies at the feet of your Majesty."

But Habsburg proved to be not only a ferocious enemy; it was a cruel conqueror thirsty for revenge at the same time. The same terrible method which the victorious Austrian army applied in Lombardia and Venetia when the Habsburg foreign rule was again restored by terror tribunals, by war taxes, by the imprisonment of thousands of suspicious men, and by the most carefully selected brutalities (General Haynau, called the "Hyena of Brescia," whipped the women in the open streets): the same method was introduced, as so often in the past, into unhappy Hungary unconquered by the Austrians. The bloody hangman of the Italian people, General Haynau was sent to Hungary to create order there. Indeed, the "punishments" inflicted by the conquerors were so without parallel that the Russian Tsar and his chief of staff felt themselves impelled to ask in Vienna for the mitigation of their measures. And this system was not the accident of some officers breaking away from discipline but the deliberate policy of Prince Schwarzenberg, the Austrian premier who when he was advised to follow a policy of grace and conciliation toward Hungary, repudiated the offer with the following remarks: "That sounds all right but before all we wish to hang a few." No, the Viennese camarilla wanted to establish a terrifying example, and on the anniversary of the same day that the Viennese populace killed the war minister, Latour, thirteen Hungarian generals were executed in Arad (nine of

them on the gallows). Their only crime was that they defended the constitution to which they had sworn in the name of the King. A great number of other officers were given heavy penalties in jail. According to Hungarian tradition, which was held three generations, the various terror tribunals handed down 114 death sentences and imprisonment was resorted to in 1,765 cases. The later official historians have tried to mitigate the poignant memory of these horrors by affirming that the young emperor had no knowledge of these judicial murders but later investigations demonstrated that Francis Joseph had previous information of the execution of the Hungarian generals.

But the revenging arm of Haynau and his men struck not only the rebels of the army but all those who were in contact with political life in that stormy period. Bishops and ministers encountered harsh imprisonment and several leaders of the Hungarian revolution were hung in effigy. And on the same day when the martyrs of Arad ended their lives, there was executed in Pest one of the most excellent and most moderate Hungarian statesmen, the premier of the first Hungarian constitutional government, Count Louis Batthyány. Thus the whole monarchy was pacified by the old Spanish methods of blood and iron. The jovial people of Vienna, the successors of the Hussites in Prague, the Italian patriots, and the Magyar "rebels," all succumbed to the bloody arms of the Habsburgs. No wonder that these events profoundly impressed the public opinion of all those peoples who suffered by these terrible methods. That is the reason why I try the patience of the reader with an enumeration of all these details. *For these facts are not only facts of the past in the Habsburg drama but they were direct causes of the process of dissolution.* These bloody facts created such a psychological state among the masses, for instance, in Hungary, that it influenced most powerfully the whole political life of the country. The slogan of the *accursed Austria-Vienna* remained always a kindling symbol in the imagination of the masses. "Vienna" remained always equivalent to the wailings of the Protestant galley slaves, to the insurrections choked in blood, and above all to the constitution stolen by the help of the Russian bayonets. In the face of this emotional complex all rational argumentation broke down. Habsburg remained hated and abhorred even when he tried to give rights and liberties to the people. *Timeo Danaos . . .* "We accept nothing from the *Viennese camarilla*, not even the good." That feeling was so intense that ten years after the catastrophe when Count Stephen Széchenyi, the great conservative statesman, was placed with broken spirit in a Viennese asylum shortly before his tragic suicide, he gave in his diary to Francis Joseph the epithet of "the apostolic usurper" and he called the gallows the "pillars of Francis Joseph."⁶ And even

⁶ *The Literary Legacy of Döbling of Count Stephan Széchenyi*. Edited by Dr. Árpád Károlyi (Budapest, 1921), II, 40, 84, 86. In Hungarian.

in the last decade of the monarchy when attending public meetings, I often observed that the memory of "the thirteen of Arad" swayed the masses as the wind does the standing grain. That is what many Austrian and Hungarian statesmen never realized. They did not understand how insignificant demagogues could excite the feeling of the masses into paroxysms against institutions which, as the free-trade policy or the Austro-Hungarian bank, could serve the very interests of the Hungarian majority too. They did not understand because they always used rationalistic methods and they did not know that the masses are led more by old memories and semiconscious ancestral sentiments than by the rational calculations of economic motives. All political dissatisfaction and all social discontent could be easily directed against Vienna in such manner. And I think I am quite safe in believing that the same mental processes were going on in the soul of the Czech, of the Polish, and of the Italian masses. What Arad was to the Hungarian, the scaffold of Prague was to the Czech, the jail of Spielberg was to the Italian, and the bloody parade of Tarnow was to the Pole.

CHAPTER XIV

THE STABILIZATION OF ABSOLUTISM: THE SYSTEM BACH

After the "settlement" of the Italian and the Hungarian difficulties the system sat more and more haughtily in the saddle of absolutism; it could do so with a reassuring complacency since in the face of its reinforced military power, its Prussian rival got himself into a position of humiliation. The struggle of Premier Prince Schwarzenberg for German hegemony was temporarily successful: the old loose *Bundestag* was re-established. Though without the title of a German emperor, Habsburg became again at least seemingly the leading power of Germany. There was no further obstacle to a new reign of the old absolutism. The second enlarged edition of the Metternich system began which culminated in the so-called "system Bach," named after the Minister of Interior, Alexander Bach, who from a champion of the March revolution transformed himself into the incarnation of the new reactionary system. The Bach system agreed with the system of Metternich on three substantial points. One was the Germanizing centralization which now was extended without any check to Hungary. Bach shrewdly constructed his ill-famed *Verwirkungstheorie* according to which Hungary has forfeited her former constitutional liberty in consequence of the Revolution. The country with complete disregard for its historical evolution and for its local municipal life was divided into quite mechanical administrative districts which got all their directions from the imperial government. At the same time a veritable army of German and Germanized Czech officials flooded the country, called in the popular language the "Bach hussars," and received by the public opinion of the country with distrust and hatred. "A swarm of locusts covers the country to eat it up," said the contemporaries. And though the system was equally served by many hundreds, nay, thousands of the nobility trembling for their jobs, it remained until the end a strange and hostile power in the country.

The second point in which the old absolutism continued was the extension of the former police and spy system over the whole country and was pushed so far that the very chief of the system, Alexander Bach, came under police control. The extent of the police system may be sufficiently characterized by the following episode, narrated by Heinrich Friedjung, the historian of the epoch: Once the archbishop of Vienna made a reproachful remark to the head of the police, concerning the moral conduct of the officers of the gendarmes, of whom many lived in concubinage; to which the chief of police replied that

the archbishop would do better if he would control the relation of his clergymen to their cooks. Several days later the police handed over to the cardinal a long list containing many canons and other clergymen with a precise statement of their mistresses. This same police minister established a curious type of herbarium in which every man somewhat known in the political field was classified according to genus and species. In this herbarium Bach himself did not enjoy a very white sheet.¹ But the enormous police force was not sufficient, not even the ordinary troops put on a war footing, but the organization of the *gendarmery*, a kind of military police, was created whose colossal proportions amazed even an expert of the Tsar.

The third point in which the system of Bach continued and surpassed the system of Metternich was the total surrender of the empire to Catholicism and especially to the Jesuits. The Concordate of 1855, this "*printed Canossa*" appeared before the liberal and Josephinian intelligence as a vassal treaty with Rome which stifled the spirit of the youth delivering the whole educational system, the whole spiritual production, and the whole matrimonial jurisdiction to the representatives of Rome.

These were the most outstanding features of the system of Bach which pressed heavily not only on the "rebellious" Magyars but also on the other nations of the monarchy, even on the Croats and those Hungarian nationalities which were the chief pillars of the Habsburgs in their fight against Hungary. The same system of centralization, Germanization, and spy control tortured the loyal nations exactly in the same manner as the Magyar revolutionaries. The leaders of the Slovak movement, Stúr and Hurban, and the Rumanian hero, Jancu—though in the revolutionary period they were obedient instruments in the hands of the Viennese court—could now enjoy the famous "gratitude of the Habsburgs" because they were captured and interned in the same way as many leaders of the Hungarian renaissance, among them the greatest poetical genius of the period, Michael Vörösmarty. Under such circumstances with a well-motivated irony a Magyar nobleman could say to his Croat colleague, "What we received as punishment you got as recompense."²

This system was an absurdity not only from the moral point of view but also from the national. In a period when national consciousness was already developed, after the transitory realization of the Hungarian independence and after the popular parliament of Krem-

¹ Heinrich Friedjung, *Österreich von 1848 bis 1860*, II Band, I Abt. (Stuttgart u. Berlin, 1912), pp. 193-94.

² Many interesting details concerning the dissatisfaction of the non-Magyar nationalities under the Bach system can be found in Albert Berzeviczy's book, *The Period of Absolutism in Hungary, 1849-65* (Budapest, 1922), I, 144-63. In Hungarian.

sier, it made a desperate effort to maintain the absolutist state, disregarding the national principles, with the help of ecclesiastical and police auxiliary troops. The Bach system was truly characterized by a former comrade of his in the revolution, the deepest political thinker of the period, the noble and clear-sighted Adolph Fischhof: "A standing army of soldiers, a sitting army of officials, a kneeling army of priests and a creeping army of denunciators."

The Bach system, however, was not at all a simple copy of the traditions of Metternich, because it also contained important Josephinian elements. One might even say without exaggeration that this absolutism realized such revolutionary reforms in that period still dominated by feudal influences which a constitutional government could scarcely have accomplished. Alexander Bach, the renegade, remained indeed on one point a revolutionary: he took the liberation of the serfs very seriously and carried on the great reform against all resistance and laid the foundation of the modern state in administration and in economics. For, however incomplete, dull, slow, and servile the bureaucracy created by him may have been, it was undoubtedly a great advance compared with the former inefficient administration of the nobility. New railroads and new highways were built in all the countries of the monarchy. A unitary custom barrier guaranteed free trade between Hungary and the other parts of the empire. The legal system and the judiciary became modernized and unified.

But this very cultural and economic renewal made the system more and more oppressive and hated. The growing spiritual and material energies of the nations were increasingly opposed to foreign domination. Besides uncontrolled absolutism was almost limitless in squandering the money of the treasury of the country. Immense sums were spent for useless military fortifications in Lombardy and Venetia and the provisional occupation of the Danubian principalities cost two million florins and the lives of forty thousand men. This adventure was not only futile but of very disastrous consequence. The leading Russian circles were exasperated by the perfidy of their former ally during the vicissitudes of the Crimean War and the door was open for the Pan-Slav propaganda. *Der Weg nach Konstantinopel führt über Wien* ("The road to Constantinople leads through Vienna!")

CHAPTER XV

EXPERIMENTATION IN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE "DIPLOMA" AND THE "PATENT"

The more one digs into the history of the monarchy the more clearly does one realize the long series of faults, errors, and crimes which drove it into dissolution. Opposed to this point of view, the leading German and Magyar circles always try to show that this process was a fatal one and nobody could foretell the consequences of various measures into which the monarchy was pressed under the weight of external conditions. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized, however, that in no important issue of the monarchy were there wanting men who predicted with an amazing insight the consequences of a policy motivated by a criminal light-mindedness. That was the case in face of the absolutism of Metternich. The same was now true in regard to the neo-absolutism of Francis Joseph. I could quote, if space would allow me, a long series of eminent men who understood that this centralization, based on the imperial bayonets, must lead to collapse and only a system of a well-balanced federalism which would satisfy the national aspirations of the various peoples of the monarchy could maintain the state. But federalism without local government is an empty word. It is perfectly clear that the system of absolutism was entirely incapable of solving the problem of the monarchy. It was even unfit half a century before in the hands of such a genius as Joseph II, who at least knew what he wished to accomplish and who tried to remold the empire on the basis of a vast and logical (though an essentially erroneous) scheme. But how much more was the system of Francis Joseph, which tried to apply the old methods of his ancestor without any true conception, without any ethical ardor, sentenced to a fiasco in a period when even the most modest popular fragment of his monarchy reached the totality of national consciousness.

If we look over the seven-decade reign of Francis Joseph, we are unable to find in his governmental system—in spite of his proverbial energy and feeling of duty—anything which could be called a standpoint based upon principle, a systematic endeavor, or even a modest program looking to the future. The only real motives of his system were military power and diplomatic prestige. What later Premier Taaffe called, with open cynicism and with an untranslatable word, *Fortwursteln* ("blundering along the old rut," perhaps), meaning the petty compromises from day to day, the concessions without principle, the sacrifice of all true political conceptions for the momentous exigencies of opportunism—this policy was not an invention of the

Kaiserminister but the old historical tradition of the empire. There was no spontaneous initiative in this system. The great changes were not the results of statesmanlike aims but only adaptations of a purely mechanical nature under the pressure of the events of the outer policy. However manifest the unfeasibility and the demoralizing effect of the Bach system became, it would have been continued without doubt, if on the battlefields of Magenta and Solferino (1859), the Habsburg absolutism had not received a mortal blow, being constrained to surrender Lombardy, through Emperor Napoleon, to the King of Sardinia in order to save at least his endangered German hegemony.

The entire lack of a clear political conception was also demonstrated after Solferino, when haphazard experiments were made in replacing absolutism by a form of moderate constitutionalism. In October, 1860, the Emperor issued the so-called "October Diploma" which he qualified as a "permanent and irrevocable fundamental law." This new constitution signified a rupture with the Germanizing centralism and an essay to gain the more active co-operation of the feudal nobility of the various countries. The special purpose was the reconciliation of the Hungarian conservatives for whom the feudal constitution before 1848 was re-established. But this half-measure could not gain the more liberal public opinion in Hungary. In this manner the Diploma satisfied only the feudal elements of the Slavs to whom it gave the possibility of reorganizing their forces on the basis of a larger local autonomy.

As the general dissatisfaction was growing the Emperor dismissed the author of the Diploma, the Polish Count Goluchowski, as early as December of the same year and two months later casting aside the "permanent and irrevocable" October Diploma (though under the pretext that it would only be reinterpreted and supplemented), gave to the monarchy the so-called "February Patent" (1861) which, in the hand of Anton Schmerling, the former president of the Parliament of Frankfurt, became an instrument to carry on a conception diametrically opposed to the Diploma. If the Diploma—as it was rightly characterized—may be regarded as a *coup d'état* of the aristocracy against the reigning German bureaucracy of Vienna, the Patent signified the continuation of the German bureaucratic centralization. The only difference was that the absolutism got a fig leaf by the so-called "Curia System" which played a preponderant rôle in Austrian political life before the introduction of universal suffrage. Under this system public life was represented by four groups of interests. The big landed estate, the chambers of commerce, the towns, and the villages sent their deputies into the *Landtags* or the diets of the single countries; and the diets sent their representatives into the *Reichsrat*, the central parliament. (Only later, in 1873, was the *Reichsrat* directly elected by the electorate on the basis of the same Curia system.) This

very artificial procedure was established to secure the rule of the wealthy and highly cultured German minority above the Slav majority.¹ It is clear that this constitution was only a continuation of the old feudal diets, and a leading publicist of the period wittily called the new system "provincial diets strengthened by a few attorneys and manufacturers." The moral weakness of this pseudo-parliamentarianism after the experiment of Kremsier soon became manifest and the "theater of Schmerling" was boycotted not only by the Magyars, but also by the Czechs, and the Poles soon abandoned it, exasperated after the short Slav intermezzo of the Diploma by the new régime which again continued the German centralization of the Bach system with a small parliamentarian show window. The best criticism of the system was given by Count Julius Andrassy, the later Hungarian premier and foreign minister of the monarchy, who declared:

Messrs. Bach and Schmerling committed not only a political but also an arithmetical fault. They put the monarchy on a basis on which there were six millions against thirty millions: they put the pyramid on its head.²

Golden words indeed, but a few years later the same arithmetical fault was committed by Andrassy himself who, with the help of Francis Deák won the Emperor for the compromise of 1867, creating the dualist system which maintained the pyramid further on its head with the small correction that they heightened the basis from six to twelve million by the addition of five million Magyars and a million Hungarian-Germans. This new basis was manifestly very unstable against the will of eighteen million people, the more so as the Germans and the masses of the Magyar people (as we shall see later in detail) felt the new connection rather as a burden.

¹ An acute analysis of the Curia-System is given by R. Charmatz in his able book, *Österreichs innere Geschichte von 1848 bis 1895*, *op. cit.*, I, 50-52.

² Quoted by Victor Bibl, *op. cit.*, II, 274.

CHAPTER XVI

THE PERIOD OF SHAM-CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE DUALIST SYSTEM

As all great constitutional changes in Austria, the system of Dualism, too, was the result of a historical catastrophe. The dualistic system was born on the battlefield of Königgrätz, July 3, 1866, when Austrian absolutism definitely collapsed under the stroke of its more national and more liberal Prussian rival. The crisis of the Habsburg empire was so deep that it was compelled, in the Peace Treaty of Prague, to abdicate not only its claims toward the German empire but also, in spite of its successes on the Italian battlefields, to surrender Venetia to Italy. That was perhaps the greatest crisis and the most fatal turning point of the monarchy. Now locked out from the German imperial connection and having lost its Italian properties, the traditional *fata morgana* of the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved and the road was open to the historical mission of Austria which would have consisted in giving a home, shelter, and defense, the possibilities of a national development for all those smaller nations which lived in central Europe either in a complete isolation or divided from their co-nationals.

Unfortunately the political atmosphere was not propitious for a really creative policy. The masses became apathetic and cynical by the long absolutism. It makes almost a ghastly impression when we read that the very day when the news of the disaster at Königgrätz arrived at the imperial city, many thousands of Viennese were united in a dance in fancy costumes and they sang and drank merrily in the gardens of their jovial inns. Even the leading German bourgeoisie stood hesitatingly, and in frozen despair, at this fatal crisis. This attitude was symbolically characterized by Grillparzer in the pathetic question: "I am born as a German, am I still one?" and he shouted to the victorious Prussians: "You believe you have given birth to an empire, but you have only destroyed a people!"

The Magyars, too, saw only the problem of their own national state and they did not grasp seriously the consequences of the new situation and did not ask what would happen with the many countries and nations of the monarchy with which they were connected by the ties of the *Pragmatica Sanctio*. According to a tradition, when Francis Deák, the great liberal Hungarian leader, heard the first news of the Austrian defeat, he exclaimed, "We lost the war! . . . we are now victorious." Similarly in the Czechs flamed up again the con-

sciousness of the independence of their holy crown. The recent war events accentuated very much the patriotic feelings in both countries. The Hungarian Legion of General Klapka, supported by Bismarck, had made a common cause with the Prussian armies against the hated Austria and the Prussian proclamation to the peoples of "the glorious Czech Kingdom" poured new oil on the fire of Czech nationalism.

This situation was further endangered by the fact that the dynasty and the ruling circles still considered nothing else but the old problem of the Habsburg patrimonial power and their chief endeavor was not to establish a new and better balanced order in Austria but rather to prepare a war of revenge against the victorious Prussian rivals. That was the reason why after the defeat of Königgrätz Baron von Beust, the former Saxon antagonist of Bismarck, was nominated foreign minister of the monarchy. He abandoned the federalistic tendencies of Count Belcredi (for, after Schmerling, there was again a Slavophile political experiment) and opened the way for the dualistic compromise. To make a policy of revenge possible a compromise with the Magyars seemed inevitable.

The burning desire for revenge against Prussia, the uncertainty of the international situation, the untenableness of the Hungarian conditions, and the effective intervention of Empress Elizabeth (called the "beautiful Providence" by the Magyars), in favor of the Magyar standpoint were victorious over the resistance of the Emperor who at last accepted the restitution of the Constitution of 1848, the platform of Hungarian independence, the division of the empire into two countries, in a word, that whole program against which he carried on a bloody war and pressed during two decades the nations of the monarchy into the Procrustes-bed of the unifying and Germanizing absolutism. In opposition to this policy the dualistic constitution was a definite attempt to secure the leadership of the Germans in Austria and of the Magyars in Hungary. At the moment of its birth this new equilibrium was, at least temporarily, possible, for the German economic and cultural hegemony was still preponderant in Austria, whereas the Hungarian nobility was an almost absolute master of the political and municipal life. In spite of this fact in a true constitutional way the dualistic platform would never have gained a majority either in Austria or in Hungary. Only on the basis of a parliament emanating from the artificial machinations of the Curia-system, did the new constitution become a law in Austria. But even that pseudo-majority did not have an opportunity for fair discussion because it was put before a *fait accompli*. The whole dualistic compromise had already been practically settled by the Emperor—the Hungarian king—and the Magyar upper classes. The Austrian parliament was under the strict necessity of accepting the will of the Emperor. It is true that it was the loyal conception of Francis Deák that Hungary

could only accept a connection with a constitutional Austria, and really the German liberals received as a kind of a political present the December Constitution of 1867 which introduced a series of legal guaranties. But in reality no true constitutional life was possible on the basis of the purely artificial German majority, the less as paragraph 14 of the new constitution established the right of the Emperor to issue, in cases of emergency, decrees which were under the competence of the parliamentary representation. (This right was exercised between 1897 and 1904 in seventy-six cases.) Also in Hungary the situation was that of a pseudo-constitutional device because the masses of the nationalities and of the laboring-classes had never (as we shall see later in detail) an adequate share in political and municipal rights. Therefore, the compromise of 1867 and the dualistic system based on it, appeared before public opinion as the compromise of the Austrian Emperor with the Hungarian feudal classes which the liberal German high bourgeoisie accepted, though not without serious hesitations, in order to secure its own hegemony against the will of the Slav majority.

The Slavs of the monarchy knew very well from the beginning what dualism meant for them and though the new constitution was prepared in a rather hidden way, the Slavs expressed repeatedly their exasperation against the dualistic plans. Francis Palacký, the same Palacký who announced the Habsburg monarchy in 1848 as a historical necessity for the Slav peoples, on the first rumor of the dualistic *pourparlers* which had already begun before Königgrätz, declared in 1865 that "the day of the proclamation of the dualism will become with an unavoidable necessity at the same time the birthday of Pan-Slavism in its least desirable form." And he added, "We Slavs will face it with an honest suffering but without fear. We have existed before Austria, and we shall exist after it." The Slavs knew very clearly what they wished. Immediately after Königgrätz the so-called second Slav congress at Vienna made a decision in favor of a pentarchical constitution for the monarchy which set against the Hungarian conception of dualism a plan of federation among the five big national groups of the monarchy. And in the same month, when the draft of the dualist compromise was put before the Austrian parliament, a considerable number of Czech, Croat, Ruthenian, and Slovenian politicians under the leadership of Palacký and Rieger, the Czech leaders, made a pilgrimage to Moscow to express their belief before the public opinion of the world that after the triumph of dualism the Slavs had their only hope in Russia. The German Liberal "majority" of the Parliament soon remained alone, all the other nations deserted the assembly which they regarded as incompatible with their national liberties. Only later they came back when the "permanency" of the Dualistic system became manifest.

So the emigration of the Slav souls from the monarchy began early and the conviction grew that their fate could be alleviated only by an international complication. These feelings were strengthened not only by the romantic Pan-Slavism of the epoch, but the Czechs, exasperated by the dualistic system, soon found an effective protector in French public opinion. A series of enthusiastic and brilliant French writers became patrons of the Czech cause and their sympathy was not only due to the successors of the Hussites but it was also in accord with the French *Realpolitik* which knew very well that the German-Hungarian dualism against the Slavs must inevitably lead to a bulwark of a Pan-Germanist imperialism whereas a federalized monarchy would be incapable of carrying on any kind of an aggressive German policy.

Not only was the hatred of the Czechs aroused under the injustices of the dualist constitution against Austria but even in the ranks of the hyper-loyal southern Slavs a growing distrust became manifest in consequence of the fact that simultaneously with the Austro-Hungarian compromise, a new Hungarian-Croat compromise was forced on the Croatian nation which, according to southern Slav public opinion, made a constitutional development of the Croats and Serbs impossible. Thus the Austrian and the Hungarian pseudo-constitution was completed with a Croatian pseudo-constitution which got an artificial majority only with the help of a packed diet in Zagreb. From this time Croatian public life was always in an open or hidden state of absolutism which under the twenty years régime (1882–1903) of Count Khuen Héderváry applied the worst methods of the Habsburg *divide et impera* system, fomenting national hatred among the nearly related Croats and Serbs.

Among the Slavs of the monarchy only the Poles became real beneficiaries of the dualistic system because the Austrian government urgently needed their help to get a workable majority in the Austrian parliament in order to renew the economic and military compromise with Hungary every ten years. In order to secure their assistance Galicia gained, if not a jural, at least a *de facto* state independence: the Polish *Szlachta* (the noble class) got an almost unlimited opportunity for the development of Polish cultural life and for the economic and political exploitation of the Ruthenian half of the country. In this manner the dualistic constitution—according to the plastic expression of Professor Schücking—created two *privileged* nations (the German and the Magyar) two *mediatized* nations¹ (the Polish and the Croatian, which in spite of its pseudo-constitution, still had a sufficiently extended local autonomy). In face of these aristocratic nations

¹ Mediatized is the term applied in the old German public law to those territories which stood not directly under the control of the empire but only indirectly through the intermediary of their feudal lords.

the other nations of the monarchy played only the rôle of third-class peoples which did not even have a proper name in the constitutional frame but figured as a somewhat confused conglomeration under the anonymous title *die im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder* (kingdoms and countries represented in the parliament).

But not only the Slavs felt as a heavy burden the pressure of the dualistic system; the nations of first rank themselves entered with very mixed feelings into this marriage of political interest. The liberal Germans, the most cultured element of the monarchy in those times, distrusted from the beginning the dualistic system. The more thoughtful elements of the Austrian-Germanhood understood very well indeed, that they won only a pyrrhic victory in the dualistic compromise. Ignatz Plener, one of the outstanding leaders of the German liberals, called the new constitution a monarchy on short notice (*Monarchie auf Kündigung*) and another liberal talked of the *Königgrätz of the parliamentary system* thinking of the anti-democratic institution of the so-called Delegations. And the compromise was not yet settled when in an anonymous and sensational booklet a "German-Austrian" predicted the dissolution of Austria as a consequence of the dualist constitution. For the very moment in which all the other nations would be surrendered to the Magyars in the eastern half of the monarchy, the bloody events of the Revolution of 1848 would repeat themselves: against the unjust supremacy of the Magyars not only the nations of Hungary would rebel but also the Czechs, the Poles, and the southern Slavs, who would demand the same constitutional independence as the Magyar upper classes possess. Under such conditions the historical necessity of Austria would become a senseless slogan. On the contrary the life and peace of the nations and states of Europe would depend on the dissolution of Austria.

And two years after the toiling through of the dualistic system Adolf Fischhof, the great independent political thinker previously quoted, called by his contemporaries the sage of Emmersdorf, with the whole force of his political wisdom, admonished the leading circles of the dangers of the dualistic policy. He wrote:

None of the great nationalities of Austria could secure in itself the existence of the monarchy but each of them can endanger the Empire by its resistance. Every one can act destructively but *to proceed constructively can be done only with all united*. . . .

The existence of Austria could only be based on the principle of justice.

It is therefore a vital interest for a state of nationalities to spare the feelings of its peoples, and to keep away from them everything which would give the impression of a domination of strangers, and it would be advisable to comply with their desires as far as its own safety permits. The state therefore must give them the guarantee that one nation will not

be subordinated to the other but each will be coordinated in order that they should not march as parties against one another but as allies side by side in a common cause, for national unity in a Nation State is the harmony among nations in a Nationality State.

Such a supra-national state would also be in the well-comprehended interest of the Germans. And the great prophet admonished his contemporaries to regard the example of Switzerland. He recalled the truth, already announced by some German liberals several decades previously, that Switzerland is a republican Austria in miniature whereas Austria is a monarchistic Switzerland enlarged. But what a difference in the inner social and cultural life of the two countries!

However, in addition to considerations of the inner policy, international points of view demanded also the up-to-date remolding of the Monarchy not in the spirit of force and constraint of the Dualistic system, but according to the principles of a popular federalism which alone could achieve peace among the nations. The real mission of the monarchy would be toward the East. This mission could not be accomplished by a centralized Austria. Every growth in power of such a monarchy at the lower Danube or toward the southern Slavs could only paralyze the more advanced nations living in it, without giving an advantage to the uncultured peoples with which it would come in contact. The situation would be quite different when the monarchy would become federalized and would thus give the opportunity to the peoples outside the monarchy to join their kindred nations already living within its boundaries. Never was the Austrian problem presented with such lucidity to public opinion, and the axiomatic proposition of Fischhof, “. . . . *centralization only makes the nations centrifugal; let us decentralize and they will become centripetal*,” may be regarded as the veritable key to the Habsburg problem. The neglect of these principles, in the last analysis, ruined the monarchy.²

Not only in the ruling German nation were mighty currents opposed to dualism, but also in Hungarian public opinion (though the leading classes of Hungary enjoyed most of the advantages of the new system) there was a growing party which abhorred from the beginning the dualistic constitution as unfit for the complete independence of the Hungarian state. However, not only national chauvinism fostered this conviction but there were far-sighted men who feared the artificial nature of the dualistic system. The great leader of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, Louis Kossuth himself, made an ardent protest from the solitude of his exiled life against the new constitution which would inevitably arouse the wrath and hatred of the Slavs against the two privileged nations. At the same time he repeatedly

² This prophetic book, *Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes* (Wien, 1869), should be read by all the students of the Habsburg problem.

admonished Hungarian public opinion that Hungary's independence from Austria would remain a dead letter as long as the Hungarians would not guarantee equal freedom to all the other nations living with them. This chief dilemma of the Hungarian national policy will be treated elsewhere. I would only emphasize at this juncture that from year to year it became more difficult to maintain this constitution and every critical observer could clearly see that it could be maintained only by a corrupt and restricted electoral system, by open ballot, and by terroristic procedures in the administrative and military machine. Nay, at the beginning of our century this anachronistic sham parliamentary system itself proved to be incapable of safeguarding the dualistic order. When a majority came into the Hungarian parliament with a program to give a more ample sphere to the Hungarian national army the sovereign, called by the servile press of the country the "most constitutional Emperor of Europe," did not hesitate to dissolve the legislature by armed force (February, 1906). It became manifest that the dualistic system could be maintained only by open absolutism against the overwhelming majority of the people of the monarchy. The pyramid on its head became more and more unstable and not only the base but the apex as well began to revolt against the system. The ruling Magyars attacked it even more vehemently than the Slavs outside the constitution.

The psychology of this strange phenomenon (which became one of the deepest causes of the dissolution of the monarchy) will be analyzed later. Here I wish only to observe that there were from the beginning keen observers in the surroundings of the Emperor who foresaw the catastrophe which the dualist constitution would bring into the monarchy and who made a desperate effort to put the decaying pyramid on a new basis. This endeavor was further corroborated by the conviction that the German unity in the Reich could influence in a dangerous manner the German people of Austria. Victor Bibl writes:

It became a conviction of most members of the dynasty that it was to the very interest of the existence of the monarchy to divide the Germans in two halves and to commit their tribe in the Sudets [mountains between Prussia and Bohemia] to the reliable custody of a Bohemian-Czech state. In this manner the possession of the Bohemian countries should appear by their Slavization less desirable to the Hohenzollern state.

But as always under the rule of Francis Joseph, a new emergency in the external policy was needed to enforce a new turn to the internal policy. In February, 1871, fourteen days after the proclamation of the German empire, Francis Joseph appointed Count Hohenwart as his premier, who, with the co-operation of Albert Schäffle, the brilliant German economist and sociologist, tried to take a definite step toward the federalization of the monarchy. Since the German hegemony was

definitely lost for Austria after the final triumph of Prussia, Habsburg renewed his Slav sympathies. To prepare for this achievement, the electoral law was extended. The government lowered the property qualification for the franchise and, with the help of the so-called *Zehnguldenmänner* (the ten-florin men), the way was open toward political assertion to new masses of citizens, with the clear understanding that the enlargement of the franchise was equivalent to the destruction of the German hegemony. For the beginning the chief endeavor was the reconciliation of the Czechs, and indeed Schäffle was successful in making a compromise in his famous *Fundamentalartikel* with the Czech leaders as a result of which the Emperor, in his solemn decree, promised to the Bohemian Diet to lay down the coronation oath as a symbol of the acknowledgment of the rights of the Czech crown. And the ninth point of the articles delineated these rights in the following manner:

All the affairs pertaining to the Kingdom of Bohemia which will not be declared as common among all the kingdoms and countries of the empire belong in principle to the legislation of the Bohemian Diet and will be administered by the Bohemian authorities.

At the same time a draft of a nationality law was presented to the diet guaranteeing the full equality of the German and Czech people in the kingdom. It was announced as a cardinal proposition that in the future only such officials and judges as speak and write both languages will be appointed. And lest the national equality should not remain a dead letter, provision was made that the diet should be divided into national sections.

These fundamental thoughts carried out in detail and combined with an appropriate revision of the dualistic compromise would have signified without any doubt a new period in the history of the monarchy. By them the door would have been opened toward the federalization of the empire under the maintenance of the community of those affairs which touched the common interests of all the nations. But the Germans were so much imbued with the thought of their hegemony and they felt the planned bilinguist administration to be such a burden that they considered the reform plans of the government an attack on themselves; the Fundamental Articles were called "Destructive Articles" and Vienna was stirred to an almost revolutionary mood. This current alone would not have been sufficiently powerful to oust Hohenwart but at the same time the Hungarian leaders, trembling for the Dualistic System and allied to Beust, made such a vehement resistance against the new constitutional scheme that the Emperor lost heart and abandoned the whole plan of reconciliation by dismissing the Hohenwart cabinet. In vain Schäffle demonstrated in the conference, presided over by the Emperor, how modest and cautious his issues were,

and how remote they were from the Swiss or American plan of confederation. Even a faint approach toward a mild scheme of federalization aroused the nervous indignation of the privileged nations.³ So, ultimately, the Prussian victory over the French gave a final stabilization to the Dualistic Constitution and Count Michael Károlyi is right in his assertion that the System of Dualism was the consequence of two battles: *Königgrätz* laid the foundation for it; *Sedan* consolidated it.⁴

This short-lived Hohenwart-Schäffle intermezzo was the only serious and broad-minded attempt, since Kremsier until the dissolution of the monarchy, which, in the petty atmosphere of the Habsburg policy, without principles and without moral scruples, showed a real path toward the solution of the national problem. Its failure was a fatal misfortune for the monarchy not only because it did not attain its purpose but because the Emperor with his light-minded promises drove the Czechs to exasperation and strengthened their anti-dynastic feelings. From this moment until the last hour of the monarchy the sheer struggle of interests among the various nations made a real constitutional life impossible because every nation felt it more important to gain for itself the so-called "national advantages" (the establishment of new schools and universities or the acquisition of administrative jobs) than to defend the common constitution. On the contrary, the nations were not unwilling that the Emperor should apply paragraph 14, his right for emergency decrees, by neglecting parliament, supposing that they would get for their indulgence certain national recompensations. As a matter of fact the general tendency of evolution could not have been other than to strengthen the power of the Slav majority to the detriment of the former German hegemony. The economic development of the various nations, their cultural expansion, and every extension of the franchise necessarily broke a stone each time from the citadel of the German hegemony. This inevitable process led toward Pan-Germanistic and anti-Semitic mass currents, the more so as the German liberal party during its long government sacrificed entirely the social interests of the big masses to the leading financial groups, mostly Jewish, a tendency which resulted in the formation of a Christian socialist anti-Semitic party under the energetic leadership of Karl Lueger, the later mayor of Vienna (1897–1910).

The lack of any constructive aim in the national policy found a cynical expression in a saying of Count Taaffe who, during fifteen years, was the leading exponent of a policy of slow Slavization that

³ The details of this significant episode were stated with great moral sincerity by A. E. F. Schäffle himself, *Aus Meinem Leben* (Berlin, 1904), two volumes.

⁴ *Fighting the World* (New York, 1925).

“all the nationalities should be maintained in the same well-tempered dissatisfaction.” This was the new addition to the old policy of the *divide et impera* in the era of sham constitutionalism. But the most dangerous consequences of this sham constitutionalism became manifest in the direction of the foreign policy, which, closed from all popular opinion and true parliamentary control, put the nations of the monarchy before a *fait accompli* in the most important issues. Among these diplomatic chess moves nothing was more fatal than the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1878) and its final annexation (1908) which made the dual monarchy the most hated enemy in the opinion of the southern Slav peoples. By this policy the Habsburg monarchy became *an openly anti-Slav power* and this change found immediately its diplomatic expression in the defensive alliance concluded between Austria-Hungary and Germany (1879) which in four years was extended to the Triple Alliance. This policy which later the Serb custom war, initiated by the big landed interests of the monarchy, and the artificial establishment of the impotent Albanian buffer state, envenomed still further, made the Habsburg monarchy the chief obstacle of the Jugo-Slav efforts for unification. The haughty and imprudent words of Count Andrassy after the Congress of Berlin: “The doors of the Orient are now opened for your Majesty,” clanged in the ears of the Jugo-Slavs like an insult and aroused the jealousy of Russian absolutism. Immediately after this “diplomatic triumph” of the Hungarian statesman, the acute eyes of Adolph Fischhof detected the real significance of this event which he compared with the catastrophe of Königgrätz. He wrote:

Andrassy is our political Benedek [the general who lost the battle against the Prussians]. Covered by the fog of his preoccupation, as his unfortunate compatriot by the fog of Chlum, he was enveloped and attacked by the enemy in the rear, without even divining it. And this diplomatic defeat is far more menacing than the former military disaster; for this diminished only our power, but the latter endangers our existence.⁵

And to the extent that the dissatisfaction of the Slav peoples of the monarchy and of the Hungarian nationalities grew, it was further nourished in the same measure by this general excitement which the anti-Slav foreign policy of the monarchy aroused. I shall devote a separate chapter to a more detailed analysis of this connection because this fatal convergence of the outer and inner policy in the southern Slav question which foreshadowed its terrible dangers during the last three decades of the monarchy led with inevitable logic to the catastrophe of Sarajevo and to the World War. Francis Joseph

⁵ Quoted by Joseph Redlich in *Kaiser Franz Joseph*, p. 351.

was undoubtedly not entirely unconscious of these dangers, for the war party of the monarchy under the energetic leadership of Conrad von Hötzendorf often alarmed him with the desperate accentuation of the necessity of a preventive war with Serbia and Italy. These same circles admonished the Emperor that the military coercion of the enemies of the monarchy alone would not suffice if, at the same time, the monarchy would not receive a new constitution in the spirit of federalization. But the Emperor was incapable of deciding himself either for war or for any important constitutional issue though he considered a future conflict inevitable. He could not realize the extreme gravity of the southern Slav question for Austria and the growing dissatisfaction of all the nations with the dualistic constitution. The crowned bureaucrat and enthusiastic officer became too old to comprehend the real vital issues of his peoples. In this manner *Schönbrunn*, the residence of the senile Emperor and his court, came in a more and more vehement conflict with *Belvedere*, the residence of the heir apparent, Francis Ferdinand.

The long reign of the Emperor, covering the lifetime of three generations, became a veritable fate of the monarchy. In the last decade of his life he was transformed into a rigid dualistic state-machine incapable of understanding or even of hearing any new or opposite political conception. The word of Trialism (a tendency to remold the dualistic monarchy into a trialistic structure by building up a Jugo-Slav state) was not even allowed to be mentioned in his presence. Similarly the dissatisfaction of the Hungarian nationalities were entirely disregarded among his intimates and it was assumed that they were perfectly happy. Generally speaking all disagreeable news were consistently held back from him. He never had an intimate conversation aside from the highest members of the aristocracy and of the military staff. He regarded his ministers as lackeys of a higher rank with whom he had intercourse only under the strictest formalities. His hostility and contempt for the press, which he regarded as a dirty business, was proverbial. In the last years of his life his entourage held him so strictly under its sway that sometimes (as I know from a reliable source) extra copies of the newspapers he read were printed lest the true news should excite his majestic nerves. And the older he became the more the hereditary qualities of absolutism became manifest as against the superficially acquired qualities of constitutionalism. General Baron von Margutti, who worked in his cabinet, noted many intimate traits of that rigid Spanish atmosphere which surrounded the Emperor.⁶ When he was compelled to abandon the Lombardy, even in those hours of the catastrophe he did not forget to secure the

⁶ *Kaiser Franz Joseph. Persönliche Erinnerungen.* (Wien, Leipzig, 1924).

right to appoint during his lifetime the cavaliers of the Iron Crown, the symbol of the lost province. If he wore the uniforms of his foreign regiments, he applied meticulous care that they should correspond to the latest prescriptions. This scrupulousness sometimes approached the comic. For instance, when his daughter Gisela, the Bavarian princess, appeared at the imperial table, the Emperor wore the star of the Bavarian order of Saint Hubertus and he expected his staff to wear their Bavarian distinctions. This mentality was manifestly very remote from reality and the deep necessities of modern life. His one-sidedness was further augmented by his greatly developed susceptibility against the disagreeable reminiscences of the past and by his almost inhuman rigidity toward the sufferings of common beings. A short story narrated by the private secretary of Francis Ferdinand in his memoirs throws a gleam of light on the whole psychology of the Emperor. A colonel who lost his leg at Königgrätz came before him for an audience asking for an official appointment, being incapable of providing for his large family with his modest pension. The Emperor received him gracefully and asked him where he lost his leg. The colonel answered, "In the battle of Königgrätz," to which the Emperor rudely remarked, "Well! sir. We lost that campaign and you will be remunerated for it!" A man of such a moral atmosphere, how could he understand and rightly measure the sentiments and aspirations of the subjugated national minorities?

But the quality which made his individuality entirely unfit to understand and appreciate the real character of all mass problems was his rigidly anti-democratic personality. The people and the middle classes were entirely alien to him as men of a minor rank and only of incidental importance. The following episode, reported by the same author, speaks more than volumes about the true atmosphere of his period and about his so-called correctly constitutional attitude so much vaunted during his life by the leading articles of the newspapers of his realm. According to the court etiquette Doctor Kerzl, his physician in ordinary during many decades was required to wear a frock coat on every occasion in which he met his imperial patient. One night the Emperor had a serious catarrh and suffered under great respiration troubles. His old lackey ran very anxiously for Dr. Kerzl. The doctor in his excitement took only his lounging coat and ran to the Emperor. But the patient as soon as he observed his doctor, though scarcely capable of taking his breath and with a face almost blue from the coughing-fit, with a final effort made a rejecting gesture toward his physician and shouted the single word, "*Frack!*" (frock coat).⁷ In

⁷ Paul Nikitsch-Boules, *Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen an Erzherzog Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand* (Berlin, 1925), pp. 47-48.

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this single word we realize the pulsation of the whole atmosphere of absolutism and at the same time the feeling, not without grandeur, of that grace-of-God origin which defies death rather than transgress the rule of Spanish etiquette.⁸

⁸ Since the completion of my manuscript three monographs were published on Francis Joseph by Eugene S. Bagger (New York, 1927), by Joseph Redlich (already quoted) and by Karl Tschuppik (Hellerau, 1929). These important and very different contributions, both in conception and personal attitude, did not alter my understanding and evaluation of the rule of Francis Joseph in the main things. The trait which mostly strikes the reader in the biographies of Redlich and Tschuppik is the fact that the Kaiser became so much a governmental institution and organ that his personality almost disappears. In spite of the monumental and comprehensive quality of Redlich's work and in spite of the journalistic acuteness of Tschuppik, one scarcely feels a human being behind his "state-life"—without conceptions, without principles, entirely devoted to the traditional dynastic interests. And this presentation is not the fault of the authors, but it rather clearly expresses the pathological rigidity which the "Habsburg structure" has assumed in its last true representative. And when Bagger tried to humanize this figure with the help of more intimate anecdotes and reminiscences, one has the feeling that in spite of the method of the psychology of Adler which he sometimes brilliantly applies (see the relation of the Kaiser to his tragic brother Maximilian) the picture of his intimate character does not become clearer, but sometimes assumes an almost grotesque, inhuman, and sinister quality which he scarcely possessed.

CHAPTER XVII

DAMNOSA HEREDITAS

Perhaps on some pages of the previous analyses the reader may have the feeling that, in the reconstruction of the historical atmosphere, I was too much impressed by my personal experiences during the catastrophe of the monarchy and projected them in an undue manner upon the remoter past. In proving my point of view I shall now adduce two crown witnesses in a true sense: the two heirs apparent of the monarchy, Rudolph and Francis Ferdinand, both tragic heroes of those historical forces which were developed from the products of the envenomed methods of the Habsburg polity.

The details and true causes of the love-tragedy of Mayerling (which put an end to the young life of Crown Prince Rudolph) are still not sufficiently elucidated and are contradictory. This fact itself is highly symptomatic. The spirit of the secret police was so strong in the monarchy, the publicity of the press so weak, and the prestige and the will of the court so feared that an event of such enormous consequences which shook public opinion in the monarchy and all around the world could be veiled until the end and held back from a historical criticism. But the fact that such a keen spirit and well-intentioned will as the late royal son had, perished amid the joys of a crude revelry or after it, or in a common suicide with his mistress, or by a foreign hand: this fact alone shows very clearly how a personality of a greater caliber was without a sphere of activity and without creative hope in the vast realm of the Habsburgs, and how he was abandoned to his disorderly passions.

Crown Prince Rudolph, the intimate friend of liberal publicists, scholars, and politicians, was a typical *libre penseur* of the last decades of the nineteenth century who considered a wealthy bourgeois class as the real foundation of the state, who sympathized with the Jews, and who had a certain aversion against the Slavs as supporters, in those times, of a clerical policy. He was an ardent enemy of feudal aristocracy because he realized that this class was becoming more and more a parasite caste, performing no serious work in the interest of the state. As every Habsburg, he laid the utmost stress on his army and was a passionate antagonist of the Hungarian aspirations for independence, though he liked the Magyars and he felt comfortable in the society of Magyar aristocracy. In the time of the vehement manifestations in consequence of the Hentzi affair (when Magyar nationalistic feeling was very tumultuous) in 1886, he advised a military demonstration against Hungary. The Hungarian problem as a social

problem too occupied his attention very much, and in connection with some anti-Semitic outbursts in the eighties of the last century, he wrote the following clear-sighted lines:

Poor Hungary. We stand before an epochal crisis. Things cannot go on in this manner. The so-called Jewish persecution and the Croatian complications demonstrate that the Slav problem becomes more and more pressing. Hungary is badly administered. It has no good bureaucracy, it has no solid basis. This is a country like Russia or Turkey. Like those countries, it also lacks a rich and cultured middle class. It has only a wretched official class, it has many Israelites and poor people, impoverished peasants, and a big populace. The real basis of a modern state, an extended bourgeois class, is absent. Opposed by Croatia, such a country will not be capable of undertaking the struggle with success, and to solve the inner situation there is wanting the necessary state power. Hungary faces a complete state decay, and the time will come when we shall be compelled to interfere from Vienna.¹

Aside from the uncertainty of the inner situation, the Crown Prince felt equally certain that the monarchy would come into unavoidable conflict with Russia. Oscar von Mitis, the able biographer of Rudolph, writes:

A deep anguish took possession of him at the thought of the approaching great war and he always complained—here he was again entirely militarily motivated—when an occasion was omitted to strike the future enemies separately.

Though he disliked the Prussians and though his entire sympathy was for French culture, his fundamental political thought remained still that the monarchy could not be maintained without the protection of Prussian bayonets. For there must come a final reckoning with Russia in order to open the way toward Saloniki, the expansion toward the Balkans being the special mission of the monarchy. And in this connection the Crown Prince favored more an economic and a cultural than a political expansion. That such a tendency would be unreconcilable with the old constitution and structure of the monarchy seems to have been sufficiently realized by Rudolph. The mission of Austria should be to carry on the culture of the West toward the East, German culture, but not German force. On the contrary Austria should protect in their national aspirations the southern Slavs as peoples who came last into the sphere of Western culture and to whom belonged the future.²

¹Other acute observations will be found among his letters published under the title, Kronprinz Rudolf: *Briefe an einen Freund, 1882–1889* (Wien, 1922).

²Mitis, *Kronprinz Rudolph*, Neue Österreichische Biographie (Wien, 1925), Vol. II. Since I wrote this sketch of the figure of the Crown Prince a more complete biography has been published by the same author (*Das Leben des Kronprinzen Rudolph*, Leipzig, 1928). His more extended researches only corroborate the main lines of his provisional biography. It is now very probable that his death with his mistress

Almost a generation later the same problems were faced by the other heir-apparent, Francis Ferdinand (the nephew of the Emperor), however, no longer from a liberal but what later was called in the monarchy a Christian-Socialist point of view. He was a deep-dyed absolutist, almost on the verge of atavism. He inherited the distrustful melancholy of Emperor Rudolph II, and the signs of a mental disorder were soon manifest. He despised liberalism and progressive intellectualism; his only confidence was in his army, in his church, and in the loyal part of feudalism, but at the same time he keenly understood that his throne could not be maintained without satisfying the social and particularly the national aspirations of the broad masses of population. He hated the old governmental and military system of Francis Joseph because he saw that the dualistic constitution swelled up from day to day the centrifugal forces of the monarchy and forced it into a struggle of life and death with the Slav peoples who were coming more and more under a Russian protectorate. Also, from strictly personal points of view, he pitilessly despised the court of his uncle which exposed him and hismorganatic wife, Countess Sophie Chotek, the later Duchess of Hohenberg, to a long series of humiliations and which forced on him a renunciation under oath of all the rights of his children to the throne. It was a widely known fact that often very vehement conflicts arose between him and the old Emperor. Not seldom he burst forth that he had "no more value than the last lackey in Schönbrunn" and he said among other sinister presentiments that "sometime I will atone for the faults of the governmental system."

But his more ardent hatred was directed against Hungary, because in the Hungarian problem he perceived little else than the Magyar chauvinistic policy which suppressed the non-Magyar nationalities and which, denouncing every endeavor for federalization as high treason against the fatherland, barred the way toward the solution of the southern Slav question. That this Magyar megalomaniac policy was only a result of deeper social causes, especially that it was a consequence of that feudal and clerical system of the monarchy with which Francis Ferdinand was in complete sympathy, this connection did not stand clearly before the protector of oppressed nationalities. But he saw one point with an almost terrifying lucidity,

was a double suicide similar to one which he contemplated in 1888 with another woman. An though a hereditary burden in his nervous and moral character is evident, the new analyses of von Mitis make the political factors in his tragedy even more manifest. The spectre of the approaching Russian war, of the necessity of a preventive war with Italy, of the dissolution of the monarchy, of the irreconcilable antagonism between the two parts of the empire (which implicated him, as it seems, in a secret plot with the Magyar feudalism), his growing exasperation against the petrified policy of his father . . . all these dangers of the empire undermined his frail nervous system and pushed the liberal atheist into a kind of sensuous nihilism.

namely, that if he should not be successful in solving the Jugo-Slav problem of the monarchy, giving full guaranty of national development for the southern Slavs, then this problem would destroy his whole empire. At the same time he perceived very distinctly that the chief obstacle to any reasonable solution was the dualist constitution which gave to the Magyar ruling class great privileges detrimental to other peoples. Under the sway of this conviction he threw more and more passionately and demonstratively into relief his point of view as protector of the Slavs and of the other oppressed nationalities and in every single cause he accentuated this attitude. For instance before the delegation of a small nationality of the monarchy, he expressed his surprise that there was any trace of loyalty left toward the throne when the government was tolerating the unjust procedures toward this people.³ When the Cuvaj absolutistic régime threw Croatia and the whole Jugo-Slav world into despair and exacerbation, he used vehement utterances against the system. He denounced repeatedly Magyar supremacy and declared that Hungary was maintained in quite medieval conditions by a small oligarchy and that the Magyar nobility was working continuously against Austria and the monarchy as a whole. This attitude of his was so sincere that it proved to be more powerful than his greatest passion, his strictly Catholic conviction. When, in 1913, the Greek Catholic bishopric of Hajdudorog was established by the Roman Curia in accordance with the intention of the Hungarian government, and against the Rumanian desires, as a religious instrument for a policy of Magyar assimilation, Francis Ferdinand wrote a sharp letter to the papal nuncio in Vienna in which he uttered, among others the following statement:

I am surely a good son of the Roman church but when the issue concerns the most elementary rights of the peoples, whose destiny I shall lead some day with God's help, I pay no heed to anyone and I do not abstain from severing my connections with the Holy Father, if he should exercise his powers in a direction which would run contrary to my intentions, devoted to the welfare of my future *Landeskinder*.⁴

Francis Ferdinand was indeed a tragic personality. If his character in his narrow fanaticism, in his sometimes petty and greedy business transactions, in his rigid haughtiness (all his kindlier feelings were exhausted in his marital and family relations), in his almost pathological hunting passion, near to bestiality, cannot arouse our sympathy, still, any observer striving for justice will acknowledge that he became a martyr of a world problem, the importance and fatal conse-

³ Other characteristic details concerning the motives of the Archduke will be found in R. W. Seton-Watson's book, *Sarajevo: A Study in the Origins of the Great War* (London, 1925).

⁴ Albert Freiherr von Margutti, *Vom alten Kaiser*, pp. 123-24.

quences of which he grasped more clearly than any of his predecessors and to the solution of which he wished to sacrifice his whole life and energy. In the interest of this supreme aim he was even inclined to experiment with universal suffrage and democratic reforms, in order to overthrow Magyar feudalism which he hated not so much for its anti-social as for its nationalistic and particularistic character. As a matter of fact the moral and political structure of this revolutionary protector of the nationalities cannot be portrayed in too reactionary a light. The director of the war archive of Vienna, Colonel Glaise-Horstenau, gave us a vivid and impartial picture of his atavistic and unbalanced personality. He considered universal suffrage a sheer absurdity. He regarded the ministers as private employees of the sovereign who could be dismissed when he liked. He had a distrust for strong and independent personalities. He persecuted corruption but he had no scruples against building roads for the benefit of his private property with state money. He threw over the railway schedules according to his mood and closed important highways to the public in order to satisfy his hunting passion. He hated the Jews, the liberals, the Free Masons, and the Socialists. He used the words "to make order," "to put down," "to shoot," and other similar menaces as extensively as William II did.

In this moral and political atmosphere he did not hide his intention to overthrow the dualistic system and the Magyar hegemony as soon as he came to the throne, and to be willing to apply force should it be necessary. Colonel Brosch, one of his intimates, the director of his military bureau, had elaborated the minutest details of a plan to establish order by armed force in the monarchy, especially in Hungary, should his anti-constitutional measures arouse a revolutionary excitement. He was determined not to take the Hungarian coronation oath as long as he would not be capable of putting the constitution in harmony with his conviction. All these details were widely known during his life. But what public opinion, even well-informed opinion, became acquainted with only after his death and which makes his fate almost symbolically tragic is the fact that a few months before the catastrophe of Sarajevo he had in the drawer of his writing-table a fixed plan of a manifesto which he intended to publish the very moment when he should occupy the throne of Francis Joseph. In this manifesto, obviously influenced by the constitution of the United States, he gave a solemn declaration of faith in favor of the principle of national equality in the monarchy.

This promise was an open and decided determination against Dualism and the details of this plan were recently published by an intimate of the dead prince. Francis Ferdinand contemplated a federation of the nations of which members of equal right should be the

Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Croats, Slovenians, and Italians. Where the linguistic frontiers were doubtful, there a plebiscite based on a very simple and just criterion should decide to which state group the various popular elements should belong. "The economic freedom of the individual, the political freedom of the nations, or mutual dependence in the economic sphere . . . independence in the political sphere . . ." these would have been the leading ideas on which the United States of Great Austria would be based.⁵

And if one may legitimately doubt whether such a dismemberment of the monarchy on a strict linguistic line was a workable plan and whether the strictly feudal and militarist environment of the archduke would have been capable of the realization of such an immense conception, nobody can deny the truly Napoleonic measure of this construction (and really Francis Ferdinand had an enthusiastic veneration for the Corsican dictator, whereas he regarded Metternich as the bad spirit of the monarchy). But, what makes him a true tragic hero, is the lethal irony of destiny that he was killed by the same southern Slav world the emancipation of which was his chief endeavor. At the same time the attempt at Sarajevo is symbolical from another point of view. It was the old Emperor, the representative of the rigid antiquated structure of the monarchy, who sent to death—though unintentionally—the representative of the new spirit, the hated presumptive heir of his throne whom he did not understand at all. According to the careful analysis of Victor Bibl, an impartial authority on this subject, the heir-apparent had been admonished from different sides that because of the intensity of the Jugo-Slav revolutionary movements, he would risk his life if he should attend the maneuvers in Bosnia. Not only the traditional hatred against Austria was at the boiling-point but the visit of the Archduke at Sarajevo which was previously made public and which coincided with the national holiday festival of the Serbs, the Vidov-Dan (St. Vitus's Day) had the effect of a provocation to Jugo-Slav public opinion. Indeed, the heir-apparent did not remain untouched by these admonitions. He even expressed his scruples before the throne itself but there an appeal was made to his sense of duty and the performance of the task was resolutely demanded. Mr. J. N. Jovanovič himself, the Serbian minister at Vienna, informed Ritter von Bilinski, the joint finance minister, of the perils of the contemplated military enterprise. The maneuvers in Bosnia were regarded by the Jugo-Slav public opinion as simply the rehearsal for an attack against Serbia as the mortal enemy of the monarchy. And what makes the Viennese plan even more strange and startling is the

⁵ Johann Andreas Freiherr v. Eichhoff: *Die geplante Gründung der "Vereinigten Staaten von Grossösterreich"* (Reichspost, March 28, 1927).

fact that the military authorities of Bosnia and the secret-police organization made such insufficient preparations for the protection of the Archduke and his wife that seven would-be murderers were counted at the criminal investigation after the catastrophe, and Archbishop Stadler of Sarajevo was really justified in saying that the Archduke was sent into a regular avenue of assassins. General Margutti, the intimate of Francis Joseph, said that the inadequacy of the precautions in Sarajevo "baffled every description." And one of the Archduke's Hungarian adherents, Joseph Kristóffy, a former minister of interior, wrote that when the Emperor had come to Sarajevo there was a detective behind every tree and when the Archduke came, there was an assassin behind every tree.

The events after the murder were also very strange and disconcerting. One of the first declarations of the Emperor after hearing of the catastrophe were the stupendous words: "In this manner a superior power has restored that order which I unfortunately was unable to maintain,"⁶ (that was surely an allusion to the morganatic marriage of the prince and to the dangers that the order of legal succession could have been altered by his will in the future). At the same time his chamberlain, Prince Montenuovo, took such measures concerning the burial, as came near to an insult to his memory and his dead wife, the courageous comrade in his deadly adventure. The circle of the Archduke was so exasperated by this and similar rude procedures that General Auffenberg called them "a fanatical attempt to eliminate the dead Archduke as speedily as possible from the sphere of his former activity and, if this could be attained, from the memory of his contemporaries." On the other side the enemies of the dead prince both in Vienna and in Budapest laid not the least restraint on their joyful feelings over the event, which seemed to liberate themselves from many political cares.

Under the sway of these and many other similar facts some observers both in Vienna and in Budapest held the opinion that an influential court camarilla which hated the Archduke sent him intentionally to death. As far as I can estimate the situation, this hypothesis is as erroneous as the other which regards the Sarajevo plot as the criminal work of the Belgrade government. The truth is that on both sides the person of the Archduke was equally hated (the old Austrian dualistic gang hated in him the daring reformer; the Serb nationalistic revolutionary organizations, the man who was determined to solve the Jugo-Slav problem not on a Great-Serb but on a Great-Croat basis, not outside but inside of Austria) and perhaps this latent subconscious attitude corroborated the traditional *Schlamperei*,

⁶ *Vom alten Kaiser*, pp. 147-48.

this Balkan slovenliness which was not only confined to the Balkans but began at Vienna.⁷

All these facts, however, have only a symptomatic interest for us as the outburst of the old struggle between Schönbrunn and Belvedere, between Dualism and Federalism. For we should not overemphasize the importance of Sarajevo as the immediate cause of the World War. Every competent observer of the situation will agree, I think, on the point that if the catastrophe of Sarajevo had been avoided June 28, 1914, it is more than probable that the unsolved problems of the various irredentas would have led earlier or later to other outbursts and the world-conflict would have arisen from another incident. One can affirm without exaggeration that Francis Ferdinand was a man sen-

⁷ The admirable work of Professor Fay on the *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1928) did not change my opinion concerning the responsibility of the leading Viennese circles in the catastrophe. He dismisses, it seems to me, too easily the charge of criminal negligence, raised against the Sarajevo authorities. Not only the intimate circle of the Archduke was shocked by their behavior, but also such men, whose objectivity cannot be doubted, as the German Ambassador von Tschirschky, General Margutti, General Auffenberg, Colonel Glaise-Horstenau, Victor Bibl, and others expressed similar opinions. Many newspapermen who ran to Sarajevo immediately after the murder were quite emphatic on this point. One of them, the brilliant Hungarian correspondent to *Az Est* gathered a long list of facts for the demonstration of the *mala fides* of certain governmental organs and intended to write a whole book on his experiences, but the World War, the Revolution, and his internment in Russia impeded the finishing of the work. But the chief witness in this matter was Francis Ferdinand himself who, after the first attempt against his life, accused passionately the mayor of Sarajevo. I feel that Professor Fay wrote an almost exclusively diplomatic history, whereas the social and moral atmosphere of the period is somewhat neglected.

At the same time he overstates the responsibility of Serbia though there can be no doubt that some officials and officers of the Serb government were involved in the plot. However, he overemphasizes the artificial character of the assassination and does not take sufficiently into account the overheated revolutionary atmosphere and the wild southern Slav temperament for which life does not count very much. (See the murder of King Alexander and his wife and the recent tragic case of Mr. Radić and his followers!) He accepts willingly the demonstrations of loyalty to the Archduke, knowing not how such manifestations were arranged. He accepts, somewhat too credulously, the Protocol of the military tribunal of Sarajevo as an entirely authentic document. After the scandalous experiences of the Friedjung, and Zagreb trials in time of peace, it is scarcely critical to suppose that during the excitements of the war and when the Austrian militarists were seeking for the justification of their war, a fair trial could be expected. Finally, he underestimates the admonition given by Ambassador Jovanović to the Austrian minister of Finance, Mr. Bilinski, because he spoke only of the possibility of an outburst of disloyalty in the army and did not mention the danger of private assassins. Professor Fay forgets that such an announcement on the part of the Belgrade government would have aroused such indignation among the super-excited nationalists of Serbia and especially in the menacing organization of the *Black Hand* that the position of the Pasić government would have immediately become untenable, perhaps even the lives of the ministers endangered. Besides the declaration of the Serb minister at Vienna was not a hiding, but an overstating of the dangers. For in a country where the loyalty of the imperial army becomes doubtful, it is manifest also that the danger of anarchistic elements must be guarded against. One should not forget that the revolutionary outbursts against oppressive Austria became so vehement that the German Kaiser did not dare to attend the funeral of his murdered friends at Vienna due to the warnings of Count Berchtold.

tenced to death by volcanic social forces, and the ghost of plots and attempts persecuted him and his environment almost constantly. That this opinion is not a gratuitous a posteriori assumption but is founded on facts will be evident from an episode which demonstrates that only by a hair did he escape death in 1906, in a plot prepared by another irredenta. In the issue of July 25, 1926, of the *Neue Freie Presse* an eyewitness narrates the following incident: When the last part of the *Wocheinerbahn*, the second railway communication between Vienna and Trieste, was opened to the public, the Archduke was charged with the representation of the Emperor at the festival, because, considering the vehement Slovenian and Italian irredentist agitations in these parts of the country, the council of ministers vetoed the original plan according to which the Emperor personally was to assist in the solemn opening. The correspondent writes:

During the trip Francis Ferdinand was in a state of great excitement. He was continuously nervous and sought to master his uneasiness by a forced cheerfulness and by harmless stories, as if he had forebodings of his end. He lived in a constant fear of attempts, which was further heightened by the plot against the life of the grand duke of Russia committed several days before. With a definite forethought, in the dailies and in the several localities where the train was stopping the precise hour of the arrival and departure of the train was announced. Exactly on time a special court train went through the stations . . . but it was occupied only by some police organs. The train on which Archduke Ferdinand and his suite traveled followed many hours later, and this precaution was well motivated indeed. Though the track was rigorously guarded, a bomb exploded in a great tunnel which the empty special train passed through and killed four gendarmes. This is a fact, which in those times was strictly concealed and which remained unknown to the public until now. . . .

But the catastrophe could have reached him not only here but during the later festivals at Trieste. The same correspondent narrates that there, too, they did not dare to arrive on time, but only several hours late, when darkness had begun to fall.

The police of Trieste took almost Tsaristic measures of precaution. From the railway station along the embankment to the palace of the governor where the archduke took lodging, every house was crowded with policemen who were ordered to keep all the windows closed from the early morning through the whole day, and to hold every person at home behind closed doors after two o'clock in the afternoon. There was a constant fear that from one of the windows a bomb could be thrown. The governmental edifice was full of secret police. The widely opened windows of the state apartment looked down on the piazza. Suddenly a crowd of a hundred people marched there and began to sing irredentistic songs and to shout: "Abasso Austria, Abasso Habsburg, Abasso il Principe!" ("Down with the Prince.")⁸

⁸ Ludwig Klinenberger, *Die Eröffnung der neuen Alpenbahn nach Triest*.

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The situation remained unchanged or got even worse during later times. In almost every part of the Jugo-Slav provinces, especially among the university youths, were some exalted personalities who were in favor of terroristic acts to attain Jugo-Slav unity.

On the basis of such widespread facts everybody who knows the exuberance of the Italian and southern Slav temperament and those traditional feelings which the Habsburg rule piled up in the consciousness of these peoples, will realize that Sarajevo was not an accident but only a link in a long catastrophical chain of mass-psychological excitements. It was rightly said with a pun not quite adequately translatable that the real cause of the World War was not the young unbalanced Princip, the murderer, but the traditional principle of the monarchy which put under yoke the national aspirations and possibilities for development of the various peoples of the country.

CHAPTER XVIII

A HISTORY OF CONFLICTING SENTIMENTS

One who looks over again dispassionately and without bias all those mass-psychological problems, the hopelessly incomplete picture of which I have tried to present on the preceding pages, will clearly understand that this special something which characterizes most of the history of the monarchy compared with the history of other states is the fact that we do not find a single common ideal or sentiment which could have united the peoples and nations of the monarchy in any political solidarity whatsoever. This history was not a common undertaking of the nations but mostly the struggle of the Habsburgs against the particular national consciousnesses and the struggle of these national consciousnesses among each other.

Regarding the problem of the existence of the monarchy from a mass-psychological point of view, its solution would have meant the establishment of a psychic synthesis which would have been capable of reconciling the special experiences and personal events of the various nations into a superior common unity, of building up a historical Pantheon in which the heroes of all the nations could have shaken hands with each other in the light of some new common ideals which could have reduced to a common denominator the antagonistic experiences and struggles of the various peoples of the monarchy. Such an ideal, however, was totally absent from the history of the Habsburgs and lived only in the consciousness of some few isolated, outstanding spirits who realized it almost personally in their own souls with a distinct sentimental and intellectual accent. Something was felt of this ideal by Joseph II and his enthusiastic collaborators, the Austrian and Hungarian lovers of the *Aufklärung*, and the same ideal in a clearer and more differentiated form later stood before the eyes of such heterogeneous but in this respect equally motivated personalities as for instance Dr. Fischhof, the German revolutionary; Baron Eötvös, the Hungarian state philosopher; Palacký, the Czech historian; Ludovit Gaj, the Illyrian apostle; Jancu, the Rumanian fighter for independence; or in a later generation, Hermann Bahr, the critic; Joseph Redlich, the historian; Karl Renner, the socialist; Baron Szilassy, the diplomat; Conrad von Hötzendorf, the warlord; and Masaryk, the "realist," to mention only some outstanding representatives of this type. All these men felt something of the international solidarity of the peoples of the monarchy and visualized very positively that out of these various energies something greater and

more brilliant, more many sided and humane, could have been formed than the exclusive ideal of the nation states.

Regarding from this point of view the process of dissolution of the former monarchy, it could be expressed in the following few words: *The Empire collapsed because the historic tradition of each nation stood in a hostile and hateful way against the historical experiences of the other nations.* The monarchy collapsed on the psychic fact that it could not solve the problem declared insoluble by a Hungarian statesman: it could not establish a reciprocity among the different experiences, sentiments, and ideals of the various nations. Nobody saw more clearly this delicate connection than Hermann Bahr who with the intuition of his visionary imagination wrote the following impressive words:

. . . . Elsewhere the descendent has an easy task in entering the heritage of the fathers because it contains a single will and a uniform sense. In us, however, shout a hundred voices of the past, the struggle of the fathers is not settled, each must decide it anew, each must choose among his fathers, each must for himself pass through the entire past again. For the past of our men has this in particular, that none of them was ever closed, nothing was fought out, the father recedes before his son, but in the grandson he goes ahead again, nobody is or feels secure, each feels himself divided, our men have too much inborn. Elsewhere one can confidently follow his fathers, we cannot do this because our fathers, disunited among themselves, make an appeal to our judgment. *Je ne puis vivre que selon mes morts*, ("I can only live according to my dead ones."), Barrès said. But we cannot live according to our dead ones because we would be torn apart since each of our dead ones tears in an opposite direction.¹

Indeed this was the problem, but not a single serious step was undertaken to solve it, because it became perfectly insolvable as we shall see. Under such circumstances only a purely mechanical solidarity, a kind of "vegetative symbiosis," could have been established among the various nations of the monarchy and every true sentimental, organic connection was lacking. If Renan is right in his famous definition which he gave concerning the concept of a nation—and he is right without doubt—: *Or l'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup des choses en commun et aussi que tous aient oublié bien des choses*, then it is manifest that the history of the monarchy is the most opposite imaginable pole of such an evolution: *here the peoples did not do anything in common and they did not forget anything.*

¹ *Dalmatinische Reise* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 95–96.

PART III
THE CENTRIPETAL FORCES: THE EIGHT PILLARS
OF INTERNATIONALISM