ing the car lots at Northgate and the nondescript character of those at Shoppers' World, counterparts here were much the same as those facing the mall, so that the complex seemed accessible and inviting from its approach paths (figure 244).

242
Lakewood Center, detail of Bond Clothes storefront at opening, 1952. (Hearst Collection, Department of Special Collections, University of Southern California.)

243
Lakewood Center, general view showing May Company store and adjacent buildings. Photo author, 1986.

SEQUELS

Lakewood Center established a significant precedent in southern California for the construction of large, fully integrated retail complexes, each oriented to a pedestrian mall and conveying little semblance of a conventional urban retail district. Within the Los Angeles metropolitan area, thirteen other regional malls were open or nearing completion of their first phase by 1960.[53] Several more were community-sized centers anchored by a junior department store.[54] Indeed, after Valley Plaza, no regional center was built in the area without a mall as its spine.[55] None of the new complexes was as large as Lakewood; nevertheless, the average size was impressive. Three had between 400,000 and 450,000 square feet of retail space; three between 500,000 and 600,000; five between 675,000 and 800,000. Among the biggest, eight occupied between fifty and eighty-five acres; eight were planned for fifty or more store units; and the same number had parking lots accommodating between 5,000 and 7,000 automobiles. Three had department stores of roughly the same size as the May Company at Lakewood; at least four others had a department store of over 200,000 square feet. Nationwide, only New York rivaled Los Angeles in the number of large new shopping centers within the metropolitan area.[56]

The development of regional malls in Los Angeles occurred at a more or less even pace between the end of the Korean War and the close of the decade. Plans for at least three such complexes were announced in 1953, although construction began on only one of them. Two more were started in 1954 and in 1955; three each in 1956 and 1957, and one each in 1958 and 1959.[57] Two complexes had at least a major component of their master plan opened in 1955. They were joined by one more the following year, four each in 1957 and 1958, and two in 1960. Throughout the period, there was an overriding consistency in layout, tenant structure, and physical character. Among the shopping malls designed before the Korean War, Northgate and its immediate progeny, including Stonestown and Lakewood, were the most obvious precedents for this work. Continuity was fostered in part because two of the earliest sequels (Anaheim Plaza and Los Altos Shopping Center) were designed by Stonestown's architect, Welton Becket, and a third (Eastland) was undertaken by the same team (Eichenbaum, May, and Martin) responsible for Lakewood. Yet by the mid-1950s, the characteristics of these shopping centers reflected tendencies that were national more than particular to southern California or even the west coast.

As at Northgate and Lakewood, the tenancy of Los Angeles malls for the most part included a major department store branch as the retail anchor, balanced by an array of sizable chain outlets and smaller specialty shops. Nonretail functions tended to be limited to closely related support facilities, including restaurants, banks, a few recreational enterprises such as movie theaters and bowling alleys, and an equally modest number of offices, usually for medical and other services people were likely to combine with shopping trips. The broader planning reform agenda of creating a retail complex that also functioned as a civic and/or cultural center secured no more than token acknowledgment. The pedestrian mall in these



facilities tended to be a long and relatively narrow space where paved surfaces rather than landscaping predominated and where store windows were the primary objects of attention. Much as at Northgate, the buildings generally were treated as a neutral backdrop, without the cultivated variety of storefronts proposed in Gruen's projects and realized at Lakewood. But the most pronounced departure from Lakewood and Northgate was in the positioning of the major stores.

The layout of Lakewood was successful owing to its enormous size. All parts of the complex were considered more or less equally desirable because, in addition to the centrally placed department store, there were one or more secondary anchors—a junior department store, variety store, and supermarket—at each end. Less ambitious regional malls could not follow this tripartite arrangement with the same success since they had fewer large units. As a result, the favored layout in southern California and many other parts of the country soon became the "dumbbell" plan in which the major stores were placed at or near the ends. This configuration was planned, but not implemented, as early as 1949 at Shoppers' World. The concept gained additional publicity with an unrealized 1951 scheme undertaken by Marshall Field & Company for 1,500,000-square-foot center at Skokie, Illinois.[58] Probably the first executed dumbbell design plan was Stonestown, which opened in July 1952, not long before the planning got under way for the post–Korean War generation of shopping centers. Stonestown also provided a model in terms of the types of anchor units: a junior department store and huge supermarket, together balancing the major department store at the other end. Preliminary plans for several southern California successors called for a centrally placed department store, but almost all the executed designs utilized the dumbbell configuration.[59]

244
Lakewood Center, general view of store block. Photo author, 1986.

245
Anaheim Plaza, Santa Ana Freeway, Crescent Drive, Euclid and Loara streets, Anaheim, 1954–1957, Welton Becket & Associates, architects; later additions, demolished 1993. Aerial perspective, 1954. (Hearst Collection Department of Special Collections, University of Southern California.)

There was even greater impetus to situate the retail anchors at either end when both units were large branches of major downtown department stores and hence of equivalent stature. The idea of having dual anchors was another unfulfilled innovation of Shoppers' World, where a branch of Filene's was to have complemented that of Jordan Marsh. Most department store executives remained skeptical of such an arrangement, believing that competition should come from specialty stores instead. The closest thing to parity these companies were willing to accept was having a junior department store, as at Northgate, which would remain subordinate to the major store in the shopping center's hierarchy. Some change in thinking began to emerge during the mid-1950s, so that having dual anchors became a distinct trend, if not as yet a prevalent one, by the start of the next decade.

Among the early projects of this type to see realization was Anaheim Plaza (1954–1957), which was developed by the Broadway (figure 245). The leadership of what was by then Broadway-Hale Stores was in a good position to realize the benefits of having dual anchors from firsthand experience at the Crenshaw Center. Again working in collaboration with Coldwell Banker, Broadway executives planned to institutionalize what had occurred unexpectedly at the earlier project. There was little question as to how such an arrangement should be resolved when the entire complex was planned. The Crenshaw Center demonstrated the weaknesses of having the two major stores next to one another; the dumbbell plan was the logical alternative that could work to maximum advantage to all parties.[60] However, persistent apprehension about this concept, coupled with fears that the development of regional centers might soon oversaturate the market, prevented the Broadway's plan from being fully implemented until the 1960s.[61] Anaheim Plaza was also the first regional center in the metropolitan area after Valley Plaza to have its siting predicated on the freeway system, a factor that subsequently became key for almost every retail development of this scale.

Another important innovation in regional center design launched during the 1950s, which appears to have originated in the Los Angeles area, was the so-called "fashion square," comprised of a major department store and branch specialty stores dealing primarily in stylish clothing, accessories, and furniture. A few groupings of this kind were created during the 1940s, among the best known of which were the Miracle Mile at Manhasset, Long Island, and what later became known as the Chestnut Hill Shopping Plaza at Newton, Massachusetts.[62] However, probably the first such undertaking in the country where the complex was fully integrated and employed a pedestrian mall as a unifying feature was Fashion Square (1957–1958), a thirty-two-unit complex undertaken by Bullock's at Santa Ana, the largest community in Orange County (figure 246). More than its prototypes, the new Orange County center carried almost nothing in the way of everyday goods and services. Bullock's officials maintained that the majority of their customers made routine purchases and bought "fashion goods" on different occasions.[63] Thus, alongside the 330,000-square-foot



246

Fashion Square, N. Main Street and Roe Drive, Santa Ana, 1957–1958, Pereira & Luckman and others, architects; altered, some parts demolished. Aerial view, 1958. (Hearst Collection, Department of Special Collections, University of Southern California.)

department store were large outlets of I. Magnin, Desmond's, Haggerty's, and numerous smaller stores. Unlike at many shopping centers, the hierarchy was less one of corporate stature than of size. The layout was more informal than at most contemporary malls, with a large, irregular court, formed by Bullock's on one side, small shops on the other, and the three medium-sized stores at the ends (figure 247).

Like the Broadway, Bullock's devised the scheme based on the success of a previous, unplanned venture. When the company's Pasadena store opened in 1947 it was wholly isolated from retail activity, yet within a few years the fronting street had become the spine of a thriving new district of prestigious shops. During the next decade, over thirty stores were built there, and while it was not an integrated development, South Lake Center, as it became known, was widely recognized as a premier retail precinct. For Bullock's the impact of this growth, all of it orchestrated by Coldwell Banker, was so positive that company executives embarked on planning a complex along somewhat similar lines, without the constraints of, or the congestion from, a bisecting street.[64] The organization that had been so instrumental in creating the lone-wolf department store now joined its competitors in pursuing the potential advantages of a fully planned business center.

The proliferation of regional malls in southern California during the 1950s underscored the pivotal place of Lakewood Center in establishing new standards of scale and planning. A decade after Lakewood was be-

247
Fashion Square, mall. Photo "Dick" Whittington, ca. 1958. (Whittington Collection, Department of Special Collections, University of Southern California.)

gun, the commercial landscape of the Los Angeles metropolitan area had changed dramatically with fourteen such complexes in operation and proposals for many more under way. Collectively this work not only addressed the demands of an ever-expanding population but posed a serious challenge to the importance of older retail districts—those cast in a traditional mold such as downtown Los Angeles, Hollywood, and Long Beach, and even somewhat newer developments such as the Miracle Mile. As a whole, the complexion was now much less hierarchical, with many places serving as primary retail destination points rather than a single, dominant core with several important but subsidiary nodes around it. Downtown's status as the principal center for retailing had completely dissipated. That district was just another among many—physically larger than any one other place, but eclipsed in sales volume and in prestige by the now greater collective galaxy of regional centers. Downtown was considered of little consequence by a great portion of area residents. Outlying developments, whose promoters had once hoped for hegemony at least in a sizable part of the metropolitan area, likewise had diminished roles. Just as Hollywood never became the preeminent retail center for the region, and no one part of the Wilshire corridor secured dominance over the others, so neither Valley Plaza nor Panorama City attained the position of "downtown" for all the San Fernando Valley. Pioneering examples of each type reaped the rewards of novelty, drawing consumers from far afield at an early stage, but then competitors began to open, and within a decade the territory was more or less saturated.

The regional malls demonstrated that while the new commercial landscape was quite different in appearance from previous endeavors, many of its underlying aspects drew from work begun in the 1920s. Bullock's credited its Pasadena store with inspiring Fashion Square, but much the same type of district had been created along Wilshire boulevard in large part due to the unprecedented siting of its store there. If the Crenshaw Center provided the obvious antecedent for Anaheim Plaza, A. W. Ross had come close to achieving an equivalent along the Miracle Mile by securing both the new flagship store of the May Company and Coulter's sizable emporium lured from downtown. Indeed, it could be argued that the Miracle Mile also represented the dumbbell plan in embryo, with the May store at one end and a cluster of heavily used chain outlets offering a complementary balance at the other. The Farmers Market, Crossroads of the World, and earlier shopping courts revealed how a space oriented to pedestrians could serve as a significant asset in the retail field. The large chain store, which provided an essential component of the regional mall, and the anchors of less comprehensive centers were profoundly influenced by the focus on volume sales and self-service pioneered by the supermarket. Finally, there was the concept of one-stop shopping at a place where businesses operated in concert and to which one could drive, thence, park and reach the stores conveniently—an experience that regional malls and dozens of smaller shopping centers allowed Angelenos to take for granted by 1960, but which seemed very novel when it was introduced to the previous generation in the guaranteed neighborhood.

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AFTERWORD

The transformation from central shopping district to regional shopping mall occurred piecemeal as a result of numerous factors that no one party could predict and over which no one party exercised control. Major department store companies emerged as the pivotal players in the development of the regional mall just as they had been in the rise of the core retail center. In Los Angeles, these firms became crucial in the decentralization process scarcely a decade after finalizing the matrix for downtown development, and they never relinquished their formative influence on patterns of commercial growth during the years that followed. Yet the big stores found that expansion into outlying areas carried the continual risk of undermining their enormous investment in the city center. Department store executives were nervous about such a fate from the earliest stages of branch development. Los Angeles companies were less cautious than most, perhaps because the diffuse nature of residential development seemed to offer no viable alternative. These companies strove to achieve a balance: to maintain big emporia both in and beyond the urban core. But the equilibrium was short-lived. At midcentury, Los Angeles led the nation in the number of large department store branches, while the city also ranked among the least active in updating its premier downtown establishments.

Department store companies expanded outside the city center in part out of fear that chain store firms would seriously undercut their hard-won share of the market if the status quo was maintained. Sears, Roebuck helped create this new, intensely competitive situation by rejecting the